


16

Part II

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru



Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

16 Part II



"So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote . . . the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being."

Indira Gandhi

**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



AT THE A.I.C.C. SESSION IN DELHI, OCTOBER 1951

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Sixteen

Part II

(1 July 1951-31 October 1951)

**A Project of the
Jawaharlal Nehru
Memorial Fund**

© 1994

All rights reserved

Enquiries regarding copyright
to be addressed to the publishers

PUBLISHED BY

Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund
Teen Murti House, New Delhi 110 011

ISBN 0 19 563681 3

DISTRIBUTED BY

Oxford University Press
YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110 001
Bombay Calcutta Madras
Oxford New York Toronto
Melbourne Tokyo Hong Kong

PHOTOTYPESET AND PRINTED BY

Rekha Printers Private Limited
A-102/1, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase II
New Delhi 110 020

General Editor

S. Gopal

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interest in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the

'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit, that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read 'Indira Gandhi'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping line extending from the bottom of the 'G'.

New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

During the four months from July to October 1951 covered in this volume, Jawaharlal Nehru strove for the maintenance of peace with Pakistan and had detailed discussions with the U.N. mediator, Frank Graham, on the Kashmir issue. On Graham's draft proposals, Nehru's view was that until Pakistan's reactions were known to such basic questions as the disbanding of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces and the stationing of forces on their side of the ceasefire line, the Government of India could not make any commitment regarding their own position. It was also made clear to Graham that the legal validity of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not open to question. It followed from this that, while talking with the United Nations about withdrawal of forces, Pakistan had nothing to do with any Indian action on this matter. This was solely a matter for the United Nations.

The approach of the first general elections had galvanized the communal parties into intense activity; and Nehru regarded this as threatening the unity, progress and stability of the country. He also sought to check the growth of reactionary trends in the Congress and, finding it difficult to work with the Congress President, Purushottamdas Tandon, resigned from the Congress Working Committee and the Congress Election Board. This resulting in Tandon resigning his own office, Nehru took over the presidentship of the Congress, drafted the election manifesto and secured its adoption by the A.I.C.C., laid down the criteria for the selection of candidates, and campaigned throughout the country. Other major issues were the near-famine conditions in parts of the country, labour unrest, the preliminary report of the first Five-Year Plan and the Hindu Code Bill.

In foreign affairs, India did not participate in the San Francisco conference for signing a peace treaty with Japan but decided to conclude a bilateral treaty with Japan and establish normal relations with that country. The constitutional crisis in Nepal also engaged much of Nehru's attention.

The Nehru Memorial Library has been good enough to grant access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and other relevant collections. Shrimati Indira Gandhi made available to us documents in her possession and these papers are referred to as the J.N. Collection. The Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Home Affairs, External Affairs and Irrigation and Water Resources, the National Archives of India and the Press Information Bureau have allowed us to use the material in their possession. Some classified material has necessarily been deleted.

The biographical footnotes in the earlier volumes of the *Selected Works* have been indicated in the index with the volume number.

CONTENTS

1. General Elections

I. The Manifesto

1	The Congress Election Manifesto	13 July	1951	3
2	A Planned Approach to Problems	14 July	1951	13
3	The Goal of a Cooperative Commonwealth	14 July	1951	20

1. General Elections

II. Selection of Candidates

1	The Right Kind of Candidates	10 July	1951	33
2	To Chairmen, Pradesh Election Committees	19 September	1951	33
3	To Presidents, Pradesh Congress Committees	19 September	1951	37
4	To Chairmen, Pradesh Election Committees	21 September	1951	39
5	To C.D. Deshmukh	9 October	1951	40
6	To C.D. Deshmukh	10 October	1951	41
7	To C. Rajagopalachari	10 October	1951	42
8	To Bisnuram Medhi	11 October	1951	43
9	To Sri Prakasa	11 October	1951	43
10	To R.K. Patil	11 October	1951	44
11	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	13 October	1951	45
12	To C.D. Deshmukh	14 October	1951	46
13	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	15 October	1951	46
14	To Morarji Desai	22 October	1951	47
15	To B.C. Roy	22 October	1951	49
16	To Sri Prakasa	22 October	1951	50
17	Elections in Hyderabad	23 October	1951	52
18	To Govind Ballabh Pant	25 October	1951	53
19	Telegram to Bisnuram Medhi	27 October	1951	54
20	To Morarji Desai	27 October	1951	55

1. General Elections

III. The Campaign

1	Quiet Strength and Avoidance of a War Mentality	29 July	1951	61
2	The War Scare Created by Astrologers	6 September	1951	69
3	Combat Communal Reaction	16 September	1951	78
4	An All-Out War on Communalism	30 September	1951	90
5	The Relevance of Mahatma Gandhi	2 October	1951	102

1. General Elections

IV. Miscellaneous Matters

1	To R.R. Diwakar	4 August	1951	123
2	To C. Rajagopalachari	4 August	1951	123
3	Collection of Funds from Industrialists	14 August	1951	124
4	Distinction Between Official and Election Work	29 August	1951	125
5	Appeal for Subscriptions	27 September	1951	126
6	To Govind Ballabh Pant	29 September	1951	127

2. Congress Presidentship

1	Disapproval of Groupism in the Congress	10 July	1951	131
2	To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	19 July	1951	131
3	To Ajit Prasad Jain	19 July	1951	133
4	To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	20 July	1951	133
5	The Cause Greater than Personal Feelings	20 July	1951	134
6	Withdrawal of Resignations	20 July	1951	135
7	To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	21 July	1951	136
8	To Ajit Prasad Jain	22 July	1951	138
9	To Ajit Prasad Jain	22 July	1951	138
10	To Purushottamdas Tandon	22 July	1951	139
11	To K.M. Munshi	22 July	1951	139
12	To Purushottamdas Tandon	22 July	1951	140
13	To Purushottamdas Tandon	23 July	1951	140
14	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	24 July	1951	143
15	To A.C. Guha	25 July	1951	144
16	To Purushottamdas Tandon	25 July	1951	145

17	To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	26 July	1951	145
18	To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	26 July	1951	146
19	To Ajit Prasad Jain	26 July	1951	149
20	To N.V. Gadgil	27 July	1951	150
21	To Ajit Prasad Jain	31 July	1951	151
22	To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	31 July	1951	152
23	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	3/4 August	1951	153
24	To Keshav Deva Malaviya	4 August	1951	154
25	To Purushottamdas Tandon	6 August	1951	155
26	To C. Rajagopalachari	6 August	1951	156
27	To Abul Kalam Azad	6 August	1951	156
28	To Purushottamdas Tandon	9 August	1951	157
29	Resignation to Strengthen the Congress	13 August	1951	159
30	To B.C. Roy	17 August	1951	160
31	The Isolation of the Congress	21 August	1951	161
32	To K.G. Mashruwala	3 September	1951	171
33	On the Change of Leadership	8 September	1951	172
34	To G.G. Jog	8 September	1951	174
35	Faith in the Cause	9 September	1951	174
36	To Pratap Singh Kairon	13 September	1951	178
37	To B.S. Hirey	13 September	1951	179
38	To Pratap Singh Kairon	13 September	1951	179
39	Cooperation in the Common Task	14 September	1951	180
40	Nehru will Implement Nehru's Programme	16 September	1951	182
41	Elections a Side Issue	16 September	1951	185
42	To Shankar Lal	20 September	1951	189
43	To P.C. Ghosh	22 September	1951	190
44	To J.B. Kripalani	23 September	1951	190
45	To Master Tara Singh	23 September	1951	192
46	To Presidents of Pradesh Congress Committees	24 September	1951	192
47	To Ajit Prasad Jain	25 September	1951	194
48	To Sri Krishna Sinha	26 September	1951	195
49	To J.B. Kripalani	26 September	1951	196
50	To Sri Krishna Sinha	27 September	1951	197
51	To Raghukul Tilak	29 September	1951	198
52	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	4 October	1951	198
53	To Anugrah Narayan Sinha	7 October	1951	199
54	To Ramanand Tirtha	8 October	1951	201
55	To Presidents of Pradesh Congress Committees	8 October	1951	202
56	To U.A. Asrani	10 October	1951	205
57	To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai	13 October	1951	206
58	The Message of the Congress	15 October	1951	207
59	Breaking down the Communal Barriers	16 October	1951	207

60	Need for a Clear Vision	17 October	1951	208
61	The Presidential Address	18 October	1951	210
62	Muslims and the Congress	28 October	1951	222
63	To Pratap Singh Kairon	29 October	1951	223
64	To Lal Chand	30 October	1951	224
65	To Yudhvir Singh	30 October	1951	225
66	To I.D. Jalan	31 October	1951	226

3. U.N. and Kashmir

1	To S.M. Abdullah	6 July	1951	229
2	To V.K. Krishna Menon	7 July	1951	232
3	To V.K. Krishna Menon	22 July	1951	233
4	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	24 July	1951	236
5	To S.M. Abdullah	24 July	1951	239
6	The Jammu Praja Parishad Party	24 July	1951	240
7	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	1 August	1951	240
8	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	3 August	1951	241
9	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	8 August	1951	242
10	To S.M. Abdullah	13 August	1951	243
11	To S.M. Abdullah	18 August	1951	244
12	Plebiscite Details	21 August	1951	245
13	Graham's Draft Proposals	24 August	1951	248
14	Discussions on Graham's Proposals	26 August	1951	249
15	On Informal Talks with Graham	28 August	1951	253
16	To V.K. Krishna Menon	31 August	1951	278
17	To Lord Mountbatten	31 August	1951	279
18	Graham's Revised Proposals	31 August	1951	280
19	Demilitarization	4 September	1951	283
20	Reaction of Kashmir Leaders to Graham's Proposals	9 September	1951	287
21	To Frank P. Graham	11 September	1951	289
22	To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad	12 September	1951	292
23	To V.K. Krishna Menon	12 September	1951	293
24	To K.M. Munshi	18 September	1951	295
25	Status of Kashmir Constituent Assembly	18 September	1951	296
26	To Ghanshyam Das Birla	19 September	1951	297
27	To S.M. Abdullah	26 September	1951	298
28	Cable to B.N. Rau	28 September	1951	299
29	Agitation by Jammu Praja Parishad	2 October	1951	301
30	United Nations Observers	3 October	1951	302
31	To K.M. Cariappa	5 October	1951	302
32	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	12 October	1951	303

33	Cable to B.N. Rau	18 October	1951	304
34	Cable to B.N. Rau	24 October	1951	305
35	Cable to B.N. Rau	25 October	1951	306
36	Cable to B.N. Rau	30 October	1951	307

4. Indo-Pakistan Relations

I. The Danger of War

1	Pakistan's Military Confrontation with India	16 July	1951	311
2	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	17 July	1951	317
3	Cable to R.G. Menzies	19 July	1951	319
4	To Jairamdas Doulatram	19 July	1951	319
5	To Lord Mountbatten	19 July	1951	320
6	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	20 July	1951	321
7	To V.K. Krishna Menon	22 July	1951	322
8	To H.S. Malik	23 July	1951	328
9	To Jairamdas Doulatram	23 July	1951	328
10	Cable to Sayyid Abol Qasem Kashani	27 July	1951	329
11	Cable to M.A. Rauf	28 July	1951	330
12	To F.R. Roy Bucher	29 July	1951	330
13	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	29 July	1951	331
14	To Lord Mountbatten	30 July	1951	336
15	To C.R. Attlee	3 August	1951	341
16	To Udham Singh Nagoke	3 August	1951	345
17	To Bisnuram Medhi	4 August	1951	345
18	To S.M. Abdullah	4 August	1951	347
19	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	4 August	1951	349
20	To V.K. Krishna Menon	5 August	1951	351
21	Cable to Sayyid Abol Qasem Kashani	7 August	1951	354
22	Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan	10 August	1951	355
23	Cable to B.K. Kapur	11 August	1951	357
24	On S.P. Mookerjee's Speeches	31 August	1951	358
25	To Bisnuram Medhi	3 September	1951	359
26	Predictions of War	5 September	1951	359
27	To B.C. Roy	15 September	1951	360
28	To C.C. Biswas	6 October	1951	361
29	To Govind Ballabh Pant	8 October	1951	362
30	Liaquat Ali Khan's Assassination	16 October	1951	363

4. Indo-Pakistan Relations

II. Canal Waters Issue

1 To B.K. Nehru	22 September	1951	367
2 To Eugene R. Black	23 September	1951	369
3 Cable to B.K. Nehru	28 September	1951	373

5. The Hindu Code Bill

1 To Rajendra Prasad	2 August	1951	377
2 To B.R. Ambedkar	9 August	1951	378
3 To B.R. Ambedkar	10 August	1951	378
4 To Sri Prakasa	10 August	1951	379
5 To B.R. Ambedkar	15 August	1951	381
6 To B.R. Ambedkar	30 August	1951	381
7 Current Legislation in Parliament	30 August	1951	382
8 The Progress of the Hindu Code Bill	14 September	1951	383
9 To Rajendra Prasad	15 September	1951	384
10 To Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar	17 September	1951	386
11 To B.R. Ambedkar	17 September	1951	387
12 To M.C. Setalvad	20 September	1951	388
13 To Rajendra Prasad	21 September	1951	389
14 To Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar	21 September	1951	390
15 To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	22 September	1951	390
16 On the Powers of the President	25 September	1951	391
17 To B.R. Ambedkar	27 September	1951	392
18 On B.R. Ambedkar's Resignation	11 October	1951	394
19 To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja	25 October	1951	395

6. National Reconstruction

I. General

1 Report on the Union	6 July	1951	399
2 Faith in a Secular State	13 July	1951	419
3 For a Concerted Effort to End Poverty	15 August	1951	420
4 The Programme of Planned Economy	16 October	1951	422

6. National Reconstruction

II. The Naga Problem

1 To Bisnuram Medhi	13 July	1951	429
2 To Jairamdas Doulatram	28 July	1951	430
3 To Rajendra Prasad	30 July	1951	431
4 To Jairamdas Doulatram	6 August	1951	433
5 To A.Z. Phizo	7 September	1951	434

6. National Reconstruction

III. The Andhra Province

1 To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja	15 August	1951	437
2 Formation of an Andhra Province	22 August	1951	439
3 Telegram to Andhra Leaders	6 September	1951	440
4 Fast for Formation of a Separate Andhra State	14 September	1951	441
5 Telegram to A. Kameswara Rao	18 September	1951	443
6 Telegram to Vinoba Bhave	19 September	1951	443
7 To Swami Sitaram	29 September	1951	444
8 To Swami Sitaram	4 October	1951	446
9 To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja	5 October	1951	446
10 To Vinoba Bhave	7 October	1951	447

6. National Reconstruction

IV. The Railwaymen's Strike

1 Appeal to Railwaymen	5 July	1951	451
2 To G.V. Raghavan	7 July	1951	453
3 To Jayaprakash Narayan	18 July	1951	454
4 To Jayaprakash Narayan	28 July	1951	457
5 To Jayaprakash Narayan	8 August	1951	459
6 To Jayaprakash Narayan	30 August	1951	460

6. National Reconstruction

V. Attitude to Communists

1 To C. Rajagopalachari	25 July	1951	465
2 To C. Rajagopalachari	25 July	1951	466

3	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	5 August	1951	467
4	To P.A. Wadia	10 August	1951	468
5	To C. Rajagopalachari	11 September	1951	469
6	On Release of Communist Detenus	23 September	1951	470

6. National Reconstruction

VI. Rehabilitation

1	To Ajit Prasad Jain	22 September	1951	475
2	To Ajit Prasad Jain	22 September	1951	478
3	To Sri Prakasa	29 September	1951	479
4	Note on Rehabilitation in Assam	29 September	1951	480
5	To C.M. Trivedi	30 September	1951	483

6. National Reconstruction

VII. The Food Problem

1	To Bisnuram Medhi	4 August	1951	489
2	To Thakur Das Bhargava	5 September	1951	490
3	To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja	29 October	1951	490

6. National Reconstruction

VIII. The Kosi Project

1	The Kosi Project	4 July	1951	495
2	To Sri Krishna Sinha	5 July	1951	498
3	To Gulzari Lal Nanda	21 July	1951	499

6. National Reconstruction

IX. Miscellaneous

1	Faith in Democracy	13 July	1951	505
2	Rectification of the Assam-Bhutan Boundary	7 August	1951	508

3	To C. Rajagopalachari	10 August	1951	511
4	To C. Rajagopalachari	10 August	1951	512
5	To C.D. Deshmukh	17 August	1951	513
6	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	22 August	1951	513
7	To C. Rajagopalachari	31 August	1951	514
8	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	23 September	1951	514
9	The Study of the Classics	26 September	1951	515
10	To Govind Ballabh Pant	28 September	1951	517
11	Responsibilities of Labour	3 October	1951	518
12	An Unnecessary Controversy	19 October	1951	519
13	Problems of Adult Literacy	27 October	1951	520

7. Administration

1	To C. Rajagopalachari	7 July	1951	525
2	To C. Rajagopalachari	26 July	1951	525
3	To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja	26 July	1951	526
4	To B.K. Deb Barman	5 August	1951	526
5	Enquiries about Indian Students in London	15 August	1951	527
6	To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar	25 August	1951	528
7	Role of Heads of State	29 August	1951	529
8	To Govind Das	5 September	1951	530
9	To C.D. Deshmukh	22 September	1951	531
10	To Hukam Singh	23 September	1951	531
11	To B.C. Roy	6 October	1951	532
12	To Hukam Singh	8 October	1951	533
13	To Kartar Singh	14 October	1951	534
14	To C. Rajagopalachari	20 October	1951	537
15	To Hukam Singh	26 October	1951	537
16	To K.C. Reddy	30 October	1951	539
17	To Sampurnanand	31 October	1951	541

8. Nepal

1	To C.P.N. Singh	21 July	1951	545
2	To C.P.N. Singh	27 July	1951	546
3	Loan of Indian Officials	20 August	1951	549
4	Telegram to C.P.N. Singh	26 September	1951	555
5	Telegram to C.P.N. Singh	27 September	1951	556
6	To King Tribhuvan	3 October	1951	556
7	The Threat from Tibet	5 October	1951	560
8	Telegram to C.P.N. Singh	8 October	1951	561

9	The Crisis in the Coalition Cabinet	28 October	1951	562
10	Resolving the Crisis in Nepal	28 October	1951	566
11	To King Tribhuvan	30 October	1951	568

9. External Affairs

I. Foreign Policy

1	Consensus on Foreign Policy	11 August	1951	577
2	Graham's Proposal for World Disarmament	15 August	1951	595
3	Avoidance of War and Preservation of Peace	16 October	1951	597
4	To James Loeb Jr.	25 October	1951	599

9. External Affairs

II. The Japanese Peace Treaty

1	To M.A. Rauf	23 July	1951	603
2	To Thakin Nu	24 July	1951	604
3	To Thakin Nu	27 July	1951	606
4	On the Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan	28 July	1951	608
5	To S. Radhakrishnan	1 August	1951	610
6	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	6 August	1951	611
7	To M.A. Rauf	13 August	1951	614
8	On San Francisco Conference	15 August	1951	615
9	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	16 August	1951	615
10	Cable to A. Soekarno	18 August	1951	616
11	Cable to S. Radhakrishnan	20 August	1951	617
12	India and the Japanese Peace Treaty	27 August	1951	617
13	India's Reply to the U.S.	27 August	1951	620
14	Cable to B.N. Rau	9 September	1951	623

9. External Affairs

III. The United States

1	Closer Indo-U.S. Relations	15 September	1951	627
2	U.S.-Czech Relations	20 September	1951	630

3	The U.S.I.S. in India	4 October	1951	631
4	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	5 October	1951	632

9. External Affairs

IV. Burma

1	To Thakin Nu	12 September	1951	637
2	To M.A. Rauf	2 October	1951	638

9. External Affairs

V. China

1	Cable to K.M. Panikkar	2 October	1951	643
---	------------------------	-----------	------	-----

9. External Affairs

VI. Tibet

1	The Tibetan Delagation in India	21 July	1951	647
---	---------------------------------	---------	------	-----

9. External Affairs

VII. Vietnam

1	Recognition of the Bao Dai Government	24 October	1951	651
---	---------------------------------------	------------	------	-----

9. External Affairs

VIII. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1	The Change in Soviet Attitude	18 July	1951	655
2	A Visa to the <i>Pravda</i> Correspondent	19 July	1951	656

9. External Affairs

IX. Iran

1 Cable to B.N. Rau	14 October	1951	659
2 Iran's Request for India's Help	15 October	1951	659

9. External Affairs

X. Foreign Settlements in India

1 French and Portuguese Settlements	1 October	1951	663
-------------------------------------	-----------	------	-----

9. External Affairs

XI. Miscellaneous

1 Expenditure of Heads of Missions Abroad	7 July	1951	667
2 To S. Radhakrishnan	31 August	1951	669

10. Letters to Chief Ministers

I	7 July	1951	673
II	22 July	1951	679
III	1 August	1951	688
IV	9 August	1951	697
V	19 August	1951	700
VI	31 August	1951	709
VII	17 September	1951	713
VIII	19 September	1951	717
IX	22 September	1951	717
X	4 October	1951	718
XI	21 October	1951	728
XII	31 October	1951	731

11. Miscellaneous

I. Cases of Corruption

1	The Mudgal Case	24 September	1951	735
2	Corruption in the Punjab	4 October	1951	741

11. Miscellaneous

II. Concerning V.K. Krishna Menon

1	To C.D. Deshmukh	19 July	1951	745
2	To V.K. Krishna Menon	25 July	1951	746
3	To V.K. Krishna Menon	25 August	1951	748
4	To M.O. Mathai	29 September	1951	751
5	To V.K. Krishna Menon	14 October	1951	752
6	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	26 October	1951	756

11. Miscellaneous

III. General

1	The Ideal of Secular Democracy	2 August	1951	759
2	To Satyaranjan Baksi	10 August	1951	759
3	Observance of Festivals	4 September	1951	760
4	To the Committee on a Declaration of Freedom	20 September	1951	760
5	To Julian Huxley	22 September	1951	761
6	To C. Rajagopalachari	26 September	1951	762

ILLUSTRATIONS

At the A.I.C.C. Session in Delhi, October 1951		<i>frontispiece</i>
Signing the First Five-Year Plan, New Delhi, 7 July 1951	<i>between</i>	<i>pp. 164-165</i>
Addressing the A.I.C.C. Session in Bangalore, 14 July 1951		
Facsimile of a Message of the Congress, published in <i>Congress Sandesh</i> , 15 October 1951		196-197
With Frank Graham, New Delhi, 4 July 1951		
At a public meeting to condole the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, New Delhi, 17 October 1951		292-293
Facsimile of a note to the Home Secretary, 5 September 1951		
Celebrating Dussehra, New Delhi, 10 October 1951		324-325
On United Nations Day, New Delhi, 24 October 1951		
With Bijaya Shamsher, Ambassador of Nepal in India, King Tribhuvan of Nepal and B.P. Koirala of the Nepali Congress, New Delhi, 13 August 1951		548-549
With Thakin Nu, Prime Minister of Burma, New Delhi, 21 October 1951		
With Chester Bowles, U.S. Ambassador, New Delhi		580-581
Facsimile of a letter to C. Rajagopalachari, 26 September 1951		

ABBREVIATIONS

A.D.C.	Aide-de-Camp
A.I.C.C.	All India Congress Committee
A.I.N.E.C.	All India Newspaper Editors' Conference
A.I.O.C.	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
A.I.R.	All India Radio
A.I.R.F.	All India Railwaymen's Federation
A.O.C.	Assam Oil Company
A.P.C.C.	Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee
A.R.P.	Air Raids Precautions
B.O.C.	Burma Oil Company
B.P.C.C.	Bombay Provincial Congress Committee
C.E.C.	Central Election Committee
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
F.E.C.	Far Eastern Commission
G.A.T.T.	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G.I.P.R.	Great Indian Peninsular Railway
G.O.	Government Order
G.O.C.-in-C	General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
I.A.F.	Indian Air Force
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service
I.N.A.	Indian National Airways/Indian National Army
I.N.T.U.C.	Indian National Trade Union Congress
J.V.P.	Committee with Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya as members for the formation of linguistic provinces
K.M.P.P.	Krishak/Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
M.E.A.	Ministry of External Affairs
M.H.A.	Ministry of Home Affairs
M.L.A.	Member of Legislative Assembly
M.P.	Member of Parliament
N.A.I.	National Archives of India
N.A.T.O.	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
N.N.C.	Naga National Council
N.W.F.P.	North West Frontier Province
N.M.M.L.	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
P.E.P.S.U.	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
P.C.C.	Provincial/Pradesh Congress Committee
P.I.B.	Press Information Bureau
P.M.S.	Prime Minister's Secretariat
R.S.S.	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
S.G.P.C.	Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee
U.K.	United Kingdom

U.N.O.	United Nations Organisation
U.N.C.I.P.	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
U.N.E.S.C.O.	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
U.P.	United Provinces/Uttar Pradesh
U.P.P.C.C.	United Provinces/Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee
U.S.A.	United States of America
U.S.I.S.	United States Information Service
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GENERAL ELECTIONS

I. The Manifesto

1. The Congress Election Manifesto¹

The achievement of independence and the establishment of the Indian Republic concluded one phase of the Indian people's struggle for emancipation. The success of this phase of our struggle for freedom was unique in many respects. Under the leadership of Gandhiji the National Congress carried on this struggle and endeavoured to follow, to the best of its ability, the policy and methods which Gandhiji had laid down. In cooperation with vast number of the men and women of our country, it was the high privilege of the Congress to serve the cause of the country and of the masses of our people and lead them to success. The Father of the Nation told us to value the moral and ethical basis of national life and made this the condition of political action. He emphasised that means were as important as ends and the means we adopt ultimately shape the ends which follow. In accordance with India's immemorial teaching and heritage, the performance of duty was given first place, and rights and privileges naturally flowed from them. The Congress and the people could only imperfectly follow this teaching, but the inspiration they drew from it, benefited them and led them towards their goal. It is necessary for all of us to keep this in mind when conflict darkens the world, and dissensions and a lowering of standards threaten our public life. It is only by adhering to these first principles that real success can be achieved, and India can prosper and rise to her destined heights.

2. Even during our struggle for independence, its content was not merely political freedom, but also the freedom of the masses from exploitation and want. The provision of basic material needs of food, clothing and shelter was the first essential, to be followed by the provision for cultural growth. On the attainment of independence, exceedingly difficult problems confronted the nation and even threatened the newly-won freedom. During the last four years, these great problems of ensuring the freedom and the integrity of the country, of integrating the various parts into the Union of India, of attempting to rehabilitate millions of displaced persons, and of laying the foundations for future growth have absorbed the mind and energy of the country. The last Great War put an end in many ways to the old world that we knew and posed entirely new problems; the partition of India left a bitter legacy behind. Our civil and military services had to be organised afresh and the very large foreign

1. Election manifesto, prepared by Nehru and presented at the session of the A.I.C.C., Bangalore, 13 July 1951 and adopted on 14 July. The manifesto was again moved and adopted at the A.I.C.C. meeting at New Delhi on 16 October 1951. File No. G-63 B/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L. It was later published in newspapers.

element in them replaced by Indians. India's relations with her neighbour country, Pakistan, have, in spite of our best efforts, continued to be abnormal and have raised, and are still raising, difficult problems.

3. Because of the multitude and complexity of the problems that the country has had to face since the achievement of independence, our economic progress has not been satisfactory. Millions in the country still lack sufficiency of food, clothing and shelter. The objectives of the Congress, which have been embodied in the Constitution of India, still remain, in a large measure, unrealised. The time has come for our struggle for emancipation to enter into its second phase of realising those objectives, without which political freedom can have little meaning for most of us. Economic progress must therefore be given first priority, subject only to the maintenance of the freedom and integrity of the country.

4. The key to the character of the future economic and social organisation of the country and its motive power is provided in the Congress constitution, which has as its objective the establishment in India, by peaceful and legitimate means, of a cooperative commonwealth based on equality of opportunity and of political, economic and social rights, and aiming at world peace and fellowship. Thus the objective as well as the method is one of cooperation and the avoidance, as far as possible, of competition and conflict. This conception of social organisation inevitably leads to the secular State in which every individual has equal rights and opportunities, and the removal of barriers which may divide the people into opposing groups on the basis of religion, caste, class or region. The application of this principle in the national sphere would lead to social progress and peace and would strengthen the nation. Its extension to the international sphere leads to an independent foreign policy basing itself on the promotion of world peace.

5. The progress of a country with limited resources, such as India is at present, depends on the most effective utilisation of such resources for the public good. This involves a planned approach to the various aspects of national life and activity. The Congress welcomes therefore the functioning of the Planning Commission and considers that the method of planned development is essential for progress and must be continued. But such planning, in order to be effective, must have full support and cooperation from the public. Planning must include all aspects of our national life so that progress may be uniform and might not be held up by some backward sector. In India today, stress must inevitably be laid on the progress of the rural areas and the people who live there. Not only do they contain the vast majority of our population² and are the basis of our economy, but they have suffered neglect in the past and this must be made good so that they might have full opportunities for economic

2. Eighty five per cent out of the total population of 356 million was rural.

and cultural advance and to live the good life which is our aim. The first and vital step has been or is being taken to free the land from the burden of old and out-of-date agrarian systems of tenure. The abolition of zamindari, jagirdari and the like must be rapidly completed.

6. Increased agricultural production is absolutely essential for putting our national economy on a firm basis.³ Small and uneconomic holdings stand in the way of rapid advance in agricultural production. The line of advance should therefore be cooperative farming with the objective of making the whole or a substantial part of a village, a unit of cooperative management.

7. The conditions of agricultural labour⁴ should be improved, especially, in the lower wage pockets. Opportunities for work and employment in small scale and cottage industries should be afforded to them. They should be given preference in allotment of land in newly reclaimed areas, which should be worked on cooperative lines. Facilities should be given to them in regard to housing sites.

8. The preservation of milch and draught cattle and upgrading of cattle breeds are important for increasing the supply of milk and improvement of agriculture. Increasing attention will have to be paid to this.

9. The burden on the land of too many people subsisting on it has to be reduced by the diversion of part of this population to other vocations. Some of these can be absorbed in large industries but, in the main, scope for absorption will come through small-scale and cottage industries. These cottage industries are particularly important in India and must be developed and protected with the aid of the State and coordinated with other forms of industry. But it must always be borne in mind that the best techniques should be employed for small-scale and cottage industries in order to make them effective and economic. For this purpose the State should encourage research. Cottage industries should be organised in industrial cooperatives, wherever possible. The handloom industry is our major cottage industry and deserves every help from Government. It has suffered from lack of yarn and because of this, many handloom weavers have been unemployed or only partly employed. Government should make special arrangements for the supply of adequate quantities of yarn to them.

10. It is not possible to pursue a policy of *laissez faire* in industry. This has been rejected in most countries and is peculiarly unsuited to present-day conditions in India. It is incompatible with any planning. It has long been the Congress policy that basic industries should be owned or controlled by the

3. This sentence was added later on the basis of an amendment by B.S. Bhatt.

4. The number of landless labour was about 49 millions in 1951.

State. This policy holds and must be progressively given effect to.⁵ A State trading should be undertaken wherever the balance of advantage lies in favour of such a course. A large field for private enterprise is, however, left over. In this field the aim should be to develop cooperative enterprise on increasing scale. Thus, our economy will have a public sector as well as a private sector. But the private sector must accept the objectives of the national plan and fit into it. The progressive extension of the public sector in the field of what is now the private sector must depend on various factors, including the results achieved, the resources available and the capacity of the country at the moment. The test should always be what serves the social ends in view. No vested interest or inherited privilege should be allowed to come in the way of the country's economic progress, nor should we allow ourselves to be distracted by slogans and doctrines which sound attractive, but which might lead to a worsening of the condition of our people.

11. The general objective of economic progress has to be translated into concrete programmes in close relation to the needs of the people and the available means and resources. The first consideration must always be to avoid a breakdown on any point in respect of whatever is essential for the life of the community. This necessitates a system of controlled distribution in regard to commodities which are in short supply. It is also of the highest importance to keep prices from rising and to endeavour to reduce them. Many of our difficulties today are due to a high and rising price level, and the economic development has been seriously hampered because of this. If prices rise, this will not only come in the way of all progress, but will even prove detrimental to the real interests of those very sections of our people, for whose supposed benefit an increase in prices is sometimes advocated. Therefore, it is of essential importance to follow firmly a price policy aiming at first, a prevention of a further rise and secondly, to reduce present prices. Steps must be taken to maintain a fair and proper structure of relative prices as between agricultural commodities *inter se*, and between them and manufactured articles.⁶

5. The basic document of the Government's industrial policy was the statement of 8 April 1948 which contemplated a mixed economy. While private enterprise was allowed, the Government undertook the responsibility for the development of those industries in which the stakes of the nation were too high to be left in private hands. This policy had now been approved by the Planning Commission.
6. When essential commodities were in short supply, prices rose. This led to controls and inflation. In spite of controls, however, essential commodities continued to go into the black market, producing greater scarcity and a still further rise in prices. It was argued that the controls, alleged to be the cause of so much corruption, should be lifted. But when the controls were actually lifted towards the end of 1947 the Government was faced with the problem of soaring prices and had to reimpose the controls in September 1948. An enforcement department was set up under the Ministry of Industry and Supply for the strict enforcement of controls on certain commodities.

12. If prices have to be held and reduced, some measure of controlled distribution becomes essential. In the matter of food, the fate of millions of people is bound up with the presence of a nation-wide system of controls. But for these controls, the threat of famine⁷ might have materialised in different parts of the country. We must endeavour to create conditions of relative abundance of articles which are necessary for the masses. As this happens, these controls can be progressively dispensed with. But till we have an adequate supply, we must cooperate to make the controls function more effectively. Hesitancy and opposition to controls themselves produce weakness in their working. It is true that controls have led to corruption. The way to deal with this is to make the controls effective and to improve their administration.

13. Considerable progress has been made in the development of scientific research and the application of science to industry. This must be continued and adequate provision made for technical education. Top priority has been given, and must continue to be given, to river valley schemes which are basic for the development of agriculture and power supply. In regard to heavy industry, priority should be given to those industries which are considered of basic importance, such as steel, heavy chemicals, fertilisers and machine tools.

14. Any all-round development of the country on a significant scale must strain its resources to the utmost, necessitating the need for much larger savings on the part of the community. In order to build a better future we must be prepared to suffer hardships in the present. The necessary sacrifice in consumption has to be spread as widely as possible, but those with higher incomes have special obligations to fulfil in this respect. Corporate savings should play an increasing role in capital formation. Steps have already been taken in several States to utilise the voluntary effort of the people for constructive purposes and these have met with considerable success.⁸ A planned effort should be made to canalise, in an organised way, the unused time, skill and other resources of the people on a voluntary basis for the economic and social betterment of the community.

15. The achievement of economic equality and social justice must proceed side by side with economic progress. Thus alone can social peace and democracy be preserved. The post-war shift in relative prices has, to some extent, rectified the disparity between the rural and the urban sectors. The measures for economic development being undertaken by the State, particularly, the large irrigation and power projects and the programmes for agricultural

7. Famine conditions prevailed in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Saurashtra, Kutch and Madhya Bharat following failure of rains. It was estimated that to avoid widespread famine the country would need two million tons of foodgrains immediately.
8. For example, self-help projects in Assam for construction of roads and bridges, cooperative societies of cane growers in Bihar and boards for construction of houses for industrial workers in Bombay had been undertaken.

improvement, will lead to a further levelling up of the standard of living of the masses, especially in the rural areas. Between the upper and the lower ranges to fixed incomes, the gap has been narrowed in terms of the standard of living. Much more remains to be done. Redirection of public expenditure in the interests of social welfare and the imposition of estate duties on succession should be fully availed of as a means for the removal of inequalities. The tax structure should be examined and other methods explored for bringing about a reasonable relationship between the minimum and the maximum incomes, both in the private and the public sector, in keeping with the economic conditions of the country. Inequalities have been accentuated during recent years largely in consequence of illegitimate gains from black marketing, tax evasion, certain forms of speculation and other anti-social activities. To give immediate relief to the people and to promote social justice, these evils should be curbed with a strong hand. There has been uneven economic development in various regions in the country. In our further programmes for development of irrigation, power, agriculture and industry, the claims of these regions should be given special consideration.

16. The concern of the State for safeguarding the rights and interests of labour has expressed itself in several advanced measures of legislation.⁹ There is, however, much room for improving the implementation of these laws. Housing for workers is of great importance and should be encouraged by the State to the best of its ability and resources, in cooperation with the employers and the workers. A rise in the standard of living of the workers is not only desirable in itself, but leads to greater productivity. The per capita productivity in India, when compared to some other countries, is low. This may be due to a variety of causes which must be investigated. It must be borne in mind, however, that without higher productivity the interests of the nation as well as of the workers must suffer. The machinery and procedure relating to arbitration and adjudication of disputes should be so improved as to secure fair settlements, based on the principle of social justice and with the least expenditure of time and money. Legal technicalities, formalities and appeals should be reduced to the minimum.

17. Considerable improvement has been made in our railway services. The Chittaranjan Locomotives Works have been established as a State enterprise for the production of locomotives; the Hindustan Aircraft Ltd., are also producing railway wagons. The objective is to move towards self-sufficiency; progress is being made in this direction, though it will necessarily take time. A continuous attempt has to be made to bring about further improvements in

9. From 1947 to 1952 a number of labour laws were passed, e.g., provision of compulsory recognition of unions, conferring bargaining rights on unions, compulsory government adjudication of disputes, reduction of weekly working hours from 54 to 48, and introduction of compulsory welfare provisions for workers in large factories.

administration and for the convenience of passengers, more especially those travelling in the lower classes.

18. In some States, transport services have been nationalised resulting in greater efficiency and convenience to the public. This policy should be continued.

19. The public services and methods of recruitment have to be conditioned and adapted for the purposes of the national plan. Special training should be given, where necessary, for the purpose of the nationalised or public sector of our economy. It is essential that high moral standards should be maintained in our public work, and while good work should receive commendation, bad work should be condemned. An effective machinery for this should be devised.

20. There has been frequent reference to corruption, and there is little doubt that various forms of corruption exist as social evils today. Every effort must be made to put an end to this evil and some form of summary method must be devised to deal with such cases. At present the real difficulty in dealing with these matters is due to the dilatoriness of procedure in departmental inquiries and judicial proceedings in the law courts, and the standard of proof required, which often leads to the guilty escaping punishment.

21. The importance of education and public health is well recognised and yet no marked advance can be made in them so long as our resources are limited. At the same time, it is necessary to direct education in the right channels and remove many of the evils from which it suffers today. Education should be looked upon as something which trains the intellect and builds the character of the student, and not merely as a means for employment. What the next generation will be depends upon the education given now and the importance of this cannot, therefore, be exaggerated. Our system of education should not be divorced from the productive and other needs of the community, but should be related to them and be conducive to their fulfilment. The principles of basic education, i.e., learning through a craft, should be utilised to the largest possible extent. Even in higher education, some form of manual work should form an essential part of the curriculum, without which degrees or diplomas should not be given. An essential part of education should be an appreciation of and devotion to truth and beauty in their various forms. Art and literature, music and drama, singing and dancing should be encouraged.

22. In regard to public health, considerable progress has been made in the control of epidemic diseases and provision of improved water supply and general sanitation. The control of malaria has been effective in certain areas and had resulted in freeing these areas for intensive cultivation. Both from the point of view of public health and of production, malaria control is important and should be encouraged. A significant indication of the improvement in public health is the considerable fall in the death rate and a higher expectation of life.

23. The Constitution has laid a special duty on Government to bring about the economic and cultural advancement of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and other backward classes. Both the Central and State Governments have given particular attention to this important matter. The Congress, under Gandhiji's lead, has always made this social uplift of these backward classes as one of its principal planks and has laboured to this end with considerable success. This work must continue until these classes enjoy the same economic and educational opportunities and advantages as others. In particular, the tribal people have to be helped to develop according to their own genius.

24. Owing to certain historical and administrative necessities of the moment, certain States in India were classified as Part B and Part C States. This classification was transitional and cannot be considered to be permanent. It has to be remembered that certain parts of India have developed differently during past years. Certain border areas, as well as certain areas inhabited by tribal people, require special treatment. The general policy in regard to Parts B and C States should be to speed up the removal of differential treatment as rapidly as possible. The chief difficulty in regard to these States has been the lack of a legislature in most of them. As soon as properly constituted legislatures come into existence, the differences between them and Part A States will largely disappear.¹⁰ Where such legislatures and Ministries exist, there is no longer any reason for any differentiation to continue, except to the extent that there are certain covenants which have to be honoured. In regard to some of the small Part C States, the question of merger into a large unit should be considered.

25. One of the major problems before us during the last four years, which has demanded and must continue to demand priority and full attention, is that of the rehabilitation of the displaced persons from Pakistan. According to the figures of the last census, 49 lakhs came from West Pakistan and about 26 lakhs from East Pakistan. Of those coming from West Pakistan, about 30 lakhs came from rural areas. Rural displaced persons connected with West Punjab, who owned land or had been carrying on cultivation there, have been settled on land, except those who preferred urban occupations. These latter number about five lakhs. Of the urban people from West Pakistan, it is estimated that 13,17,000 have been rehabilitated in some way or other by finding gainful employment in Government or other services or by being given special training in production at various training centres. Of the remaining, about two lakhs of urban dispossessed persons did not require or ask for Government assistance. This left a balance of nine lakhs of persons requiring assistance in gainful employment in urban areas. The problem of displaced

10. It was envisaged that after the elections simultaneously with Part A and Part B States, the States of Himachal Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh, Coorg, Ajmer, Delhi and Bhopal should have legislative assemblies with ministries responsible to them.

persons from East Pakistan became serious early in 1950 and rehabilitation schemes were drawn up. The position was rather fluid as large numbers of migrants returned to their homes. Of the 26 lakhs that remained, a little over half, i.e., 13.50 lakhs have been rehabilitated. During the last few weeks, a new problem has arisen in West Bengal where a continuous stream of migrants from East Pakistan is flowing in. Every effort is being made to deal with this abnormal and disturbing situation.

By the end of the current financial year, the Central Government will have spent about Rs. 140 crores on relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons from western and eastern Pakistan. In addition, about 56 lakhs of acres of evacuee and other land have been given to them and about 3,56,000 urban houses, shops and industrial premises have been provided. Of these, 86,000 were new houses constructed by Government. The question of properties left by displaced persons in Pakistan has remained unsettled,¹¹ in spite of repeated efforts of Government. This is a vital matter affecting millions of people, which should be settled as early as possible.

In East Punjab, Delhi, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bombay and in some other parts of the country, many new townships and colonies for displaced persons have been built up.¹² Some of these are models of their kind and are conducted on cooperative lines, and are engaged in productive activities which are very satisfactory. It may be said that the results obtained in our rehabilitation work for displaced persons are remarkable. During the last 20 years or so, the problems of displaced persons had been faced in various parts of Europe and Asia. The results, we have obtained in our work, compare very favourably with the results elsewhere. The fact remains, however, that a large number of displaced persons have to be provided for and more especially in West Bengal, the problem at present is a growing one. High priority must necessarily continue to be given to this rehabilitation work for displaced persons both from western Pakistan and eastern Pakistan.

26. As India is a secular State, every citizen has the same duties, rights, privileges and obligations as any other. He has full freedom to profess and practise his religion. It is the particular duty of the State to protect these rights of all minority communities in the country and to give them full opportunities for development, so that they might play their part in the economy and public life of the country. The Congress will make every effort to¹³ ensure proper representation for them in the legislatures and other public bodies.

11. The Hindus and Sikhs who migrated from West Pakistan left behind 4,800,000 acres of agricultural land and houses worth Rs. 5,000 crores.
12. New townships were built at Faridabad, Gandhidham, Rajpura, Nilokheri, Tripuri, Kubernagar, Bairagarh, Ulhasnagar, Pratapnagar, Govindpuri and Chandigarh.
13. "Every effort should be made" was amended to "The Congress will make every effort to."

27. The women of India in the past, and especially in the struggle for the country's freedom, have played a notable part and distinguished themselves in many ways. They suffer, however, from a number of social and other disabilities. It is important that these disabilities should be removed so that they may take their full part in the economic and social progress of the country and make their special contribution to the life of the family and the community. In particular, they have to be intimately connected with all activities of social welfare and social education. Women are more responsible even than men for the next generation, and unless they are enabled to participate fully in all national activities, the progress of the nation suffers. The Congress is therefore of opinion that every effort should be made to open out opportunities of service for them in the legislatures and in social activities.

28. A demand for a redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis has been persistently made in the south and west of India.¹⁴ The Congress expressed itself in favour of linguistic provinces many years ago. A decision on this question ultimately depends upon the wishes of the people concerned. While linguistic reasons have undoubtedly a certain cultural and other importance, there are other factors also such as economic, administrative and financial, which have to be taken into consideration. Where such a demand represents the agreed views of the people concerned, the necessary steps prescribed by the Constitution, including the appointment of a boundary commission, should be taken.

29. In regard to foreign policy, India has pursued an independent line in her own national interest and in the interest of world peace, and has sought to maintain friendly relations with all countries. This has been a positive policy and, though sometimes criticised by others, has been vindicated by subsequent developments. This policy, which has borne some fruit already, will, no doubt, yield further results and should be pursued. Certain small foreign establishments continue in India. The Congress has declared that these must revert to India, and our policy must be so aimed as to bring this about by peaceful means.

India's policy with our neighbour countries has been very friendly, and we have welcomed the recent developments in Nepal.¹⁵ Unfortunately, we cannot say this in regard to Pakistan, with which our relations have been full of difficulty.¹⁶ We have repeatedly endeavoured to find a solution of the many

14. There was a demand for forming the Telugu-speaking areas into an Andhra province. In the Punjab zone the Sikhs wanted a State of their own, while in Bombay city and the Maratha-speaking districts there was a demand for a separate State of Maharashtra.

15. With the restoration of King Tribhuvan, a coalition government was installed on 18 February 1951 with equal representation to the Ranas and the Nepali Congress under the interim constitution, and with a provision for the election of a constituent assembly.

16. The recent violations of the ceasefire line, the breaches of the Agreement between India and Pakistan, Pakistani propaganda and Zafullah Khan's reference to the "other measures" threatened in Kashmir suggested that Pakistan was planning a war against India.

issues on which we are at variance, but without success. The chief among these issues is that of Kashmir. In spite of the aggression of Pakistan and the continuous provocative propaganda there, we have endeavoured to find a peaceful settlement in accordance with the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. That policy holds and we cannot permit the Kashmir State to be disposed of in any other way. We owe a duty to the people of the State as well as to ourselves and we have to discharge it fully.

30. The world is distraught and moves from one crisis to another. India is affected by these world crises and cannot escape their consequences. We live in dangerous times and a false step may well prove perilous to us. India can only play an effective part in the cause of peace in this tormented world by adhering to her ideals and building up her strength as a united nation. Separatist and fissiparous tendencies weaken the nation and make it ineffective and, at the same time, come in the way of all progress. These difficult and precarious times demand a large unity of purpose and endeavour and cooperation in achieving the objectives we have placed before ourselves.

2. A Planned Approach to Problems¹

That is why tolerance is made in this election manifesto to one of the basic things that Gandhi used to say, not by Gandhi only but by all the great men of the world. More particularly, it has been the immortal lesson

I am presenting to the House what is called the draft election manifesto. I am not quite sure that it has been correctly termed. It would be a little more correct to say that this is proposed to be the basis of the election manifesto. The essence of it, the major part of it, the actual manifesto will, of course, contain what you approve of with little minor changes, minor additions, etc. Anyhow, it is for this House to agree to this basic provision which this draft contains. Now I do not propose to go through it or to refer to all these matters. But I do wish to draw your particular attention to one or two paragraphs of it. Some people may think that these are just the politician's flourishes when he talks of high principles. I am afraid the charge against the politicians is justified. Everywhere, all over the world, they talk about high principles and sometimes they laugh at them or, at any rate, do not act up to them. At least during one period of our recent history, we did not laugh at them. We did not merely talk about high principles but we endeavoured to live up to them. That

¹ The first outline of the Five-Year Plan published on 7 July 1951, involved an outlay of Rs. 1,400 crores. Its emphasis was on self-sufficiency in food, agriculture, irrigation, power and transport and it sought to lay down the pace for more rapid economic and social development. A revised draft was published in

Speech while introducing the draft election manifesto at the session of the All India Congress Committee at Bangalore, 14 July 1951. File No. G-63B/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

was the period under the leadership of Gandhiji, which impressed the world greatly and gave great strength to our country.

Therefore, we talk in this manifesto about the moral and ethical basis of national life and political action. It is not merely a flourish. We feel that it is the essence of any step that we may take. In fact, if our public and political life has not got that moral and ethical basis, then I have no doubt that we shall fall gradually, and certainly we shall not progress.

Nevertheless, during the last few years, owing to a variety of causes, there has been some degradation in our public life. It is no good hiding facts. We have to meet that evil and get rid of it. We have become progressively rather narrow in our outlook, think of the small things of life and forget the big things. That is not the way which leads to the progress of a nation. Therefore, it is important that we lay stress on this and remember this even in the dust and fray of an election. It is important that we stick to it even though we might lose any single election or the whole election.

It is better to try to keep your soul than to win a particular election by dubious methods or through dubious persons. A nation's history is not concluded by one election or another. Ultimately, it is made by the quality of the human material in that nation. If we submit to a degradation of that human material, then that nation goes down. It just does not matter who wins an election or who loses it.

That is why reference is made in this election manifesto to one of the basic things that Gandhiji used to say, not by Gandhiji only but by all the great men of the world. More particularly, it has been the immemorial lesson of India that it is duty that comes first, and rights and privileges flow from it. In this acquisitive modern world of conflict, one is always talking about rights and privileges, and one seldom talks about duties and obligations. The result necessarily is conflict. There are, of course, rights and there are privileges for which we have to fight and we have fought, but even so, if we forget our duty, then those rights and those privileges will not remain long with us.

The manifesto says that any progress that the country can make will depend upon a planned approach to those problems. The Planning Commission has recently issued its report.² A few of you might have seen it. But the Working Committee has had no time to consider it. I hope that the A.I.C.C. will have an opportunity to consider it some time or the other. Of course, I am one of

2. The draft outline of the Five-Year Plan, published on 7 July 1951, involved an outlay of Rs. 1,493 crores. Its emphasis was on self-sufficiency in food, agriculture, irrigation, power and transport and it sought to lay down the base for more rapid economic and industrial advance and reduction of unemployment. A revised draft was published in December 1952.

the signatories of that report. But the report at the present moment is meant for public consideration, public criticism and for public suggestions, so that it may be finalised at a later stage after the receipt of those criticisms. But whatever that report may contain, the fact that a Planning Commission should function and that the country should proceed on the lines of a planned approach to a solution of its economic and other problems is affirmed in the manifesto. I want it, no doubt, to remain in the public mind. This is so because some people criticise planning altogether. Why it is so, I am always unable to understand.

There can be no other approach, no other intelligent approach, to the problem, except a planned approach, which means the consideration of all our problems and resources in their entirety for the whole country and then a decision as to what should be the first, the second, and what should not be done at all. If we were a country with inexhaustible resources, then perhaps no question of planning would arise, but far from having inexhaustible resources we are unfortunately a country with very limited resources. It is so easy for you and me and others to say what we have done for this country. It is not so easy to do it because the resources are limited. Therefore we have to pick and choose, what we can do and what we cannot do, and what priorities to give and that is the business of an expert. Think about the whole problem in its entirety, in the sense both of the whole of India and in the sense of all the problems together, then decide and follow the decision after we have approved of it.

Therefore, planning is essential. Also in planning you have to decide how far we must accept the demands of the present and how far we must think of future progress. Progress ultimately depends on what you save in the present. If you consume all your resources today, then you have nothing left for tomorrow's progress. It depends on what you save today. The greater the saving the greater the possibility of progress tomorrow and in the future. Again, progress depends in a measure on what you attempt to do. For instance, we may spend money on a thing like a river-valley scheme, which gives no returns today, but which means heavy returns three or four years later, heavy returns in the shape of hundreds of thousands of acres of irrigated land or hundreds of kilowatts of electric energy.

Today, a nation's ability to progress is measured in many ways, one of which is the electric power available. Our power supply is very limited. Our irrigation is fairly extensive but considering the size of the country, it should be much greater. Therefore we have to choose.

Should we not suffer hardships today so that we may build up something for tomorrow's progress? It is a hard choice, but it is an inevitable choice. If you do not save today, if you do not tighten your belt today, then you will have to tighten your belt tomorrow or the day after, whether you want it or

not. So we have to be intelligent enough and strong enough to think a little of tomorrow's progress, and not spend all our substance today. To what extent, is a matter for us to decide—how far we can go, and how far we can make the nation go.

Ours is a democratic State. If we had been an authoritarian State, then a decree can be issued from the top and the people will have to obey, whether they suffer or not. We cannot go that far. We have to get the people to agree.

Again, in any planned scheme, it is of the essence of that scheme that we should have a very large measure of not only public approval, but support and co-operation. You cannot do great things in a country without that large measure of public support and co-operation.

The biggest thing in India is agriculture. One of the major social changes for which we can take credit is the zamindari abolition scheme in various States. Unfortunately, we have been held up for reasons, sometimes beyond our control. Anyhow, it is a big thing. But that does not solve the entire problem.

At the present moment, apart from the zamindari abolition, about 60 per cent of the land in India is self-tilled. If zamindaris are abolished in the whole of India, presumably hundred per cent will become self-tilled or something like that. But that does not solve the problem because the holdings are fragmentary. There has been a great deal of talk about consolidation of holdings. But this question will have to be considered in the sense of increasing production, both from the point of view of individual farmer and from the point of view of the country. It is possible for the individual with great effort to produce more. There may be some State farms, but the obvious way and easier way for large farms to function is by cooperative farming. Ultimately, the only way is to take to cooperative farming, because the small farmers' holdings are uneconomic. They live a hard life with just enough to live on. Therefore some kind of cooperative farming is necessary. In that cooperative scheme, each individual or each cultivator will not lose his ownership. He will retain that and he will get a share out of it, whatever the method may be. Probably, it may be best to aim at a village being the unit of cooperative farming, not necessary always; but it may be desirable to infuse the community spirit in the village too.

In this manifesto, and in the Planning Commission, we have to make an approach in regard to agriculture. Even so we do not solve the problem and you have to find some room for the extra people on the land. Some talk of dispossessing some of the big landholders and distributing their land to the agricultural labour. Certainly, if you have got free land to distribute, you can do it. But obviously, you have not got enough land for distribution to all the landless labour in India, which is an enormous proportion of our population.

So, while certainly land should be given, where this is possible, to landless labour on cooperative lines, the real way is for that landless labour or part of it, to find other avenues of employment, other ways of being productive and not being just a burden on the land, and more especially when you have the modern technique of land cultivation. It is quite possible that less number of people are required for that work. The only way you can absorb the extra people is by giving them some kind of work in industries—big industries will take some of them. That does not solve the problem. Ultimately, they have to be absorbed in small-scale and cottage industries.

Now, if you have small-scale industries and cottage industries, you must not think of trying to work them according to some out-of-date or rather primitive technique. Otherwise, they cannot compete. The State should encourage them and give them protection, all that I accept. Ultimately, you will have to make it a more economic proposition. Therefore, small-scale and cottage industries should be run according to the best technique available to them, and if it is not available, it is up to the State to find, through research, the best technique suitable for it. I may tell you that already we have in view some very significant improvement in cottage techniques, which, if introduced, will make a considerable difference in cottage industries. That is the way, so far as agriculture is concerned. You cannot separate agriculture from industry, from transport. They are all big issues because the solution of agricultural problems, apart from what you do to the farmers, means development of industries also. For the development of transport and agriculture, you will have to consider all of them together. One thing, it is not found in this manifesto, but it is mentioned in the Planning Commission report and it is also in my report, which you considered earlier today. It is the question of population in India and the necessity for trying to prevent its rapid increase by methods, what are called family planning or more correctly, birth-control. Some people are rather frightened of those words, but the fact is, they are live issues in India today. You need not put it in the manifesto, but the fact is, the people will have to think about it. That is why the Planning Commission has put it down for the people to think about it. The whole thing is, the more we improve in our public health, people will live longer. It is a good thing, but from the population point of view it further burdens the country.

In our public health we have done nothing very great. But, the progress even so is considerable. Malaria control, better water supply and better

See *post*, pp. 399-418.
4. The population of India was 356,891,624; the percentage of increase in the population in 1951 was 13.4 as against 14.3 in 1941.

sanitation we have. The death rate in India has decreased considerably. It is a very important factor. It shows how the public health measures are producing results. It also means that the population will increase a little, if people do not die quite as early as they did previously.⁵

Coming to industries, I have already indicated the importance of small-scale and cottage industries. The key industries should be owned or controlled by the State.⁶ We must do that progressively as soon as we can do it. Any other important industry that we wish the State should own, we shall take up provided we have the resources to do it.

Anyhow, we have our economy divided into public sector and private sector. The public sector is a State-owned sector but the private sector will be organised by private enterprise. Even that private enterprise cannot be a free and what is called *laissez faire* private enterprise. *Laissez faire* is almost a dodo; you know dodo is an extinct bird. So he who thinks in terms of *laissez faire*, lives in the past which has no meaning today, certainly in India. Therefore, any private enterprise has to be coordinated very much to the plan. It must fit into the plan, it must be subjected to certain controls too, because the public and private sectors must run smoothly and be coordinated to each other. Gradually, presumably, the public sector grows. It is for us to decide according to our capacity.

Some people talk about nationalization as if that solves the problem. Nationalization is a good idea provided you think about it in terms of reality. It is a very easy way of throwing out a slogan and imagining you have solved the problem. Nationalization according to the Congress can be carried out after paying some compensation and after you are ready with the resources to take it up, i.e., with trained men, material and money, etc. Otherwise, you merely talk about something, but you do not profit by it because you are not prepared to profit by it. Therefore, we should adopt nationalization at the time when we are ready for it, but we must be ready for it in every way.

It is more important that the country's resources, such as they are today, should be employed in starting new enterprises, than in acquiring some odd and rather out-of-date profits. Because, if you apply all your resources to acquiring them, then the new ventures do not come up. Of course, if something is important for you, have it by all means.

We have acquired some transport services. I think that has resulted in better efficiency. I have no doubt that it was a good move and it should be

5. The average death rate of 33 per thousand in 1951 was double that of Japan and France and thrice that of Australia.

6. The Directive Principles of State Policy declared that it was the task of the State to see that "the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment."

extended. But the ultimate test is not a slogan but the social purpose we have in view.

A plan must have a social purpose. Social purpose may best be defined as the cooperative objective of the Congress. If you have that social purpose in view, test everything by that social purpose, and if that social purpose is served by additional nationalization, you go and nationalize. If you think for the moment something else is better, how best in the existing circumstances you can go swiftly towards that objective and end in view, test it.

We have made, as you know, great progress in scientific establishments and in the scientific work we are doing. That is something basic and fundamental because out of it modern industry and modern life come. If we do not progress there, we are just the slaves of other people who make progress in science. There are one or two significant aspects in scientific research, and the application of science to industries done during the last four years.

With regard to heavy industry, we have to concentrate on action for the future. We are going to permit none of these small factories to be built up. The country needs basic industries. We want iron and steel. We want fertilizers, we want machine tools, we want heavy chemicals and the like. These are basic necessities on which the future development of industry of the country is based.⁷

I should like to say one or two words about our duty to minorities in this country, especially in elections. It is a heavy duty which lies on the Congress. We must see that they get their place. Having a secular State has certain consequences; if you call the country a secular State, but do not give free opportunity to the minorities in the country, then we are just deluding ourselves.

Remember your duty to women in this country. I may tell you in all honesty that I believe there is more in the women in this country than in the men. The women of India have a tremendous potential. Given the opportunity, they have shown their aptitude. It has been our misfortune that in many ways, socially speaking, they have had tremendous handicaps. We must remove those handicaps and give them all opportunities of progress. I am sure our progress will be much faster if women are given responsibility. Indeed from any point of view, the younger generation is obviously moulded more by the women than by the men. It is highly important that women should know their job, and have an opportunity of doing it. I hope a large number of women will be returned to our legislatures in this election.

Part A, Part B and Part C States have been created, as you know, as a transitional arrangement through the necessities of history and administrative

7. The public sector had five units with an investment of Rs. 29 crores at the commencement of the first Five-Year Plan.

development. Obviously, there must be no differentiation, but the fact remains that there is a difference between some States in the north-east frontier of India for instance and big States like Mysore. There is no comparison. But we must put an end to all these differentiations. The difficulty arises from the absence of legislatures in many areas. Where there is a legislature and a Ministry, obviously there should be no differentiation whatever, except for the fact that there are certain covenants.

Now about linguistic provinces.⁸ This is an old story though much has happened since then. We have to consider the problem certainly not only on a linguistic basis, but also on economic, administrative and financial grounds. They are all important. It is no good having a State and then get bogged down to difficulties. If the people concerned are clear about it, there the matter ends. But it is difficult for the Government to impose something unless there is consent and agreement. If these are there, we shall certainly proceed according to the Constitution and appoint a boundary commission.

Planning and the election manifesto lead us to the conclusion that if India is to progress, we have to work hard and tighten our belts. It is not pleasant to say this to the public. We are not offering them any great advantages at present.

All that we can offer them and offer ourselves is really hard work and the joy of working for something worthwhile, that is, the building up of the New India. I am sure that we can do it, but I am also sure that we can only do it if we keep these ideals in view and work hard for them!

8. A Linguistic Provinces Commission was set up on 17 June 1948 to report on the question of formation of the provinces of Andhra, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra; the financial, economic, administrative and other consequences thereof; and their approximate boundaries.

3. The Goal of a Cooperative Commonwealth

...Now there are two or three subjects about which I should like to say something. A question was asked: "What is a cooperative commonwealth?" Well I do not propose to attempt to answer it. It is asked: "What is the

1. Speech intervening in the debate at the A.I.C.C. meeting on the draft election manifesto, Bangalore, 14 July 1951. File No. G-63B/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L. Also published in newspapers, 15 July 1951. Extracts.

difference between cooperative commonwealth and communism? Frankly, I cannot precisely and definitely define these terms because these terms often have somewhat different meanings in different minds, and it is quite possible that the meaning you may have in your mind today, you yourselves may change six months later as your ideas develop because if you look at it as a final picture, there is no finality in society. The very ideal of a cooperative commonwealth is a fairly distant ideal in existing circumstances. But it is a good enough ideal and it contains elements of equality of cooperative working, of what our Constitution says on the objective given in our Congress Constitution, that is, what the Constitution of India or the Congress constitution says. It seeks to convey the kind of society—a society without differentiation, without barriers, a society in which human beings have equal rights and cooperate with each other for their own and the public good and so forth. We can say a great deal about that, but it is all bound to be vague. We have to work it out. You may write an Utopia. Others have written Utopias and you may write another as a mental exercise, but in effect what you want is to deal with present-day conditions in keeping with your ideal, and that problem comes up again when you think of planning. We are asked, "What is the meaning of planning?" Planning is an attempt to lay down broad social purposes and the method to attain them. What is a social purpose, you have asked. I would say that the immediate social purpose, the immediate objective today is to provide food, clothing and shelter to everybody in India. That is number one—the very first primary necessity; number two—health, education, etc. You go step by step, and how am I to do it? You set down how I have to do it. We have to remove the difficulties and disabilities which come in the way. Where there is an obstruction, we have to remove it. Supposing small holdings prevent growth, we try to have cooperative farming and so on. One member said that planning means complete control and dictatorship. That is not correct. Planning might be dictatorial, or authoritarian or autocratic. It has been so in some countries. But planning will be democratic, certainly in theory and, I hope, also in practice. We have seen democratic planning; it is in some measure in a large measure in some countries. Now you may say how far democratic planning takes a country or you may say how far democracy in a particular country takes it. The mere fact that you and I like democracy does not necessarily mean that ultimately it would produce all the good you expect India to make any progress with everybody having a little plot.

2. The Congress Constitution stated that "the object of the Indian National Congress is the well-being and advancement of the people of India and the establishment in India, by peaceful and legitimate means, of a cooperative Commonwealth based on equality of opportunity and of political, economic and social rights and aiming at world peace and fellowship."
3. Krishnan Naik said that planning could not be effective without complete control.

results. If that particular type of democracy does not produce results, we may have to change that type. All that lies in the womb of the future. But we do believe in the essence of democracy and therefore, even at the cost of some apparent slowness in the progress, we stick to democratic methods.

Autocratic and authoritarian methods are swift, but we do feel that in attaining that swiftness we lose something of infinite value. We lose the growth of the individuality. We believe in individual human beings growing and we lose that, if we adopt authoritarian methods. I believe that unless we realise the individuality of the human being, ultimately the race is bound to decay.

These are basic facts and let us accept them. We are endeavouring to have a system of democratic planning. Democratic planning, indeed any planning, involves a certain measure of control, not absolute control, but a certain measure of it, may be a growing measure, which is cooperatively decided upon by the people concerned—some control of industry. As a matter of fact, any society is hedged in with and surrounded by controls. There are numerous laws and bye-laws. I have no doubt you have bye-laws in the Bangalore Corporation. That is restriction, but it is put down by agreement and we may agree to it. We are asked to keep to the left of the road and not go to the right. Well we submit to it. Nobody will insist on the freedom of the people to go to the right of the road. Well you may go to the right but then your end will be swift when you will come into collision with another vehicle.

Now again some proposals have been made. For instance, there is an amendment that land should be distributed equally among the people, and there should be a ceiling on the size of the holding.⁴ What exactly does that mean? You gladly distribute land. We do not want some people to have a great deal of land or anything else and others to have nothing of it. We have to move towards an agrarian society, it is true, but when some people talk about equal distribution of land, what does it mean? Where is the land to distribute? You seem to think that there is plenty of land which you can distribute. It is all right in a country like, let us say, Siberia, the Soviet Union, with vast expanse of territory and a small population. But in our country the largest number of anything are human beings, and suppose you distribute land equally among all of them; well each one of them will get a small patch of land—I do not know how to work it out—may be a quarter of an acre. Do you expect India to make any progress with everybody having a little plot?

4. Raghavendra Prasad Sinha suggested that all land over 30 acres belonging to any landlord should be taken over and distributed to landless labourers for cooperative farming. R.V. Swaminathan felt that accumulation of thousands of acres in the hands of individuals not interested in farming came in the way of agricultural production.

That is not a progressive suggestion. Again, how are we to get all this land? You can either get it by expropriation, by taking it without compensation, or give compensation and then distribute the land. Our Constitution tells us not to expropriate without compensation. If you think in terms of giving compensation—I am not talking about big zamindaris, but about people with one acre or two acres or five acres whatever it is, whose land is sought to be taken away for equal distribution, enormous funds will be required, and ultimately you will be producing a state of affairs which is socially unsuited for any progressive society.

You may remember that in another connection I told you that we have suggested cooperative farming as far as possible, for a village or a group of villages. But the land cannot support all the people in this country. They must go to industry—small-scale and cottage industries and the rest. If you read the history of India, you will find that the poverty of India had risen during the British period. Since the British came here, more and more people had to fall on the land because industries were suppressed and poverty had increased.

One member talked about foreign policy.⁵ In a document of this kind we have to say something about foreign policy because you must be clear about it in your own mind. But it is not desirable for you to discuss any particular foreign problem in a document of this kind unless it has an immediate bearing. For instance, what is happening in Tibet is not quite clear.⁶ We know something; we do not know something else. New developments are taking place. Why should we discuss it when we are not quite sure what is happening and what is not happening? Why should we put in a long paragraph about the United Nations? We are all in favour of the United Nations. We are supporting them, but we also know that we have difficulties with them.

Then reference was made to prohibition.⁷ A member has asked why extension of prohibition is not mentioned and why prohibition should not be enforced in other places too. Frankly, I am a little afraid of taking any step, however desirable it may be, which may completely upset our economy. Suppose you wish to choose in a particular area, either a river-valley scheme or prohibition? What will you choose? You can have prohibition later when you have developed your resources better. That is the difficulty. Do not talk of some kind of reforms which may be desirable but which for the moment

5. Mahabir Singh said that the election manifesto should state India's foreign policy in unequivocal terms and insist on keeping aloof from power blocs and military commitments.

6. In October 1950, Chinese troops marched into Tibet.

7. Radha Raman said that the manifesto should reiterate the policy of introducing total prohibition in the whole country as soon as possible.

may block our capacity for development. It is not easy to balance these things and come to some conclusion. Then we move to the question of rehabilitation. Mr. Alghur Shastri made a proposal that governments do not spend their money wisely in rehabilitation and we ought to have given this programme of rehabilitation of displaced persons to the Marwari Relief Society or like organisations. Well, the natural inference from this is that the Marwari Relief Society is such like gentlemen who run the society are to run the Government of India and the Governments of the States competently and cheaply. Why waste money? Some people have suggested that wherever the word should appears in this manifesto it should be substituted by "must". This of course is not only a question of language, but something more than language. Sometimes people feel that by using a strong language they achieve something. They seem to think that because they do not like Pakistan, and if they use a strong language against it, they will hurt it somehow. As a matter of fact, the strong language is completely a weapon of the defenceless and the weak and the people who are incapable of doing anything. Because they cannot do anything, they shout; they use a strong language. Documents which responsible organisations put up or responsible people write should always be in a restrained language which shows strength behind them. In regard to the formation of linguistic provinces, I think there is some slight misunderstanding on the part of some friends. The language used in the paragraph is, I think, clear enough. Some people object to the word covenants. When reference is made to covenants, it is a reference made to a fact in connection with Part B and C States. What will happen in the distant future I do not know. I have given an undertaking and I have to keep my word, so far as I am concerned and my Government is concerned. It does not go beyond that. That does not limit the powers of the State. It is merely a clarification that has to be put in the public mind. I am entirely sympathetic with the desire of my friends who are anxious to have linguistic provinces as soon as possible. It is not lack of sympathy but a certain inherent difficulty that comes in the way. In forming a linguistic province there is a border; there is a boundary between two sides; where is the boundary to run? The difficulty arises if the parties on either side have different views about it. Naturally the parties concerned must come to some kind of agreement, not about petty details but about major details. Why do you expect the Government of India to come down with the big stick to

8. Gopikrishna Vijayavargiya demanded that the covenants signed by the Centre with the rulers must be repudiated.
9. Kaleswara Rao wished that linguistic provinces, if economically feasible, should be set up as soon as possible.

coerce the parties into submission? If they do so, bitter memories will be left behind. When a new province is to be created, it has to start from scratch. All kinds of new problems—economic, financial and administrative—arise and these should be worked out. It is not good just taking a headlong dive and then seeing whether one can swim or not. The Government of India does not want to coerce any large section in this process. It wants to do it amicably and after due consideration of financial and other aspects of the questions. One thing I may say? Mr. Kaleswara Rao¹⁰ frightened me by something that he said. He said that the Hyderabad State should be disintegrated. I may tell you that that kind of thing is not going to help his object in getting a province, that is, Andhra. We are going to do no such thing. If he talks like that, there will be no Andhra Province at all. What the future of Hyderabad State will be, I cannot say. But to talk casually in this way, of dissecting huge areas, quite apart from the other factors involved without realising the economic, social and other consequences, is so most irresponsible, the worst of every kind. Some member referred to military training. Capt. Pratap Singh¹¹ wanted military training instead of singing and dancing. I can assure him that nobody is going to request the gallant Captain to sing or dance. May I say that the last sentence¹² about art and literature and drama has been put in not as a flourish but as a very deliberate attempt to turn the mind of the people to something that is of essential importance for the growth of the country. May I say with all deference and due apology, even the Congress Party has not paid sufficient attention to this aspect of national life? But it is of the highest importance that you do not, shall I say, suppress these cultural aspects in the nation's life; because if you do it that means the next generation will be stunted with regard to culture. That is a bad thing, if a stunted generation grows from the cultural point of view, from the point of view of appreciation of beauty. May I say again with all respect that in India the appreciation of beauty and culture has gone down very much? But I may say that I find greater appreciation of art and culture in South India; develop these things but you cannot mix up military training with art and literature. Coming to military training, we talk loosely. All these matters require large sums of money. Again you have to choose. If you want a kind of compulsory military training how much money you are going to spend on it?

10. A. Kaleswara Rao (1881-1962); Congress leader from Andhra Pradesh; member, Madras Legislative Council, 1926-30, and Assembly, 1937-39; Speaker, Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 1956-62.

11. Kaleswara Rao wanted that Hyderabad should be broken up linguistically and the respective areas attached to new linguistic provinces.

12. Lal Awadhesh Pratap Singh.

13. Achal Singh suggested that the words "music and drama, singing and dancing" should be dropped.

May I tell you that we have started schemes of voluntary training?¹⁴ We said if anybody wants military training we will give to him. But there was very poor response. Our Commander-in-Chief started it and we were all enthusiastic about it. In cities and principal centres of population we give free military training to young men twice a week. They can come for a couple of hours. But the response was small and progressively the number of those who sought voluntary training grew smaller and smaller. Do you want me to introduce a kind of conscription of military training and force this down on the people? It is difficult. If people want training we will give it to them. As for large-scale compulsory training, it requires a great deal of money which is to be found somehow or other.

Much has been said about cow-slaughter and Gandhiji's name has been invoked in this respect.¹⁵ Now we must keep two points very clearly in our mind. We are apt always to get them mixed up. Gandhiji, of course, wanted not only the stoppage of cow-slaughter but the stoppage of killing of animals of every kind. Nevertheless, Gandhiji was dead against stoppage of it through legislative measures. He wanted to do it, and his methods of doing were different. He did not want somebody sitting in Delhi to pass a decree. The gentlemen who want this kind of a decree to be passed go against the whole approach of Gandhiji to the question. We all want something to be done about it, but the question is, how to do it? If you do it in the wrong way, possibly you will not succeed. Possibly you will create such problems that a large number of cattle may die simply, not because of slaughter but of hunger, or simply because the cattle problem is not dealt with properly. Therefore, you will have to look at the question constructively, than stop cow-slaughter.

As a matter of fact you know that in a large part of India it is practically stopped through the municipal bye-laws and the like. The process is fairly rapid and it is improper for the Government of India to take action. It is for the States, considering the circumstances, to take action. What we ought to do and propose to do is, to have constructive activities which are of a greater help in stopping the cow-slaughter than merely a negative attitude.

You do not solve the major problems by saying, "no, no". But what would you suggest? You would suggest a negative attitude which will produce difficulties. I ask those who advocate banning of cow-slaughter whether they have considered why in India, which respects the cow, the condition of the

14. With the object of stimulating interest among educated young men in the defence of the country a National Cadet Corps had been organised in 1949. A Territorial Army was inaugurated in October 1949.

15. Raghunath Singh wanted cow-slaughter to be banned altogether throughout India. Banarasi Das urged strongly a ban on cow-slaughter. Govind Das, while reaffirming his faith in the plea that cow-slaughter should be banned in India, said that it was not the opportune moment to press that demand.

cow is much worse than in almost any other country in the world. Why is it? It is worth considering. Go to any country. In America the cow is a healthy, well-protected and well-respected animal, dealt with carefully. In India the cow is in a terribly bad state. Something must be wrong about our thinking or about our action. Let us adopt constructive measures to deal with the problem and increase milk supply and other products. That is important rather than saying "no, no" and leaving things to chance.

The Bombay Government has developed a magnificent scheme for the supply of milk to the great city of Bombay.¹⁶ That gives me more hope of dealing with the problem than all the resolutions you may pass. My colleague, Mr. Munshi, has introduced a very complicated Bill relating to the general cattle protection and what not.¹⁷ It is to be carefully considered. The point is that we should have a constructive approach to the problem. It is for the State to consider what they can do.

You talk about India. What exactly is India? Do you think that India is a little patch of territory? India is a great big thing and parts of it are very different. A friend coming from Madras wants me to wear *chappals* and *dhoties* and cotton clothes when I go fourteen thousand feet up in the Himalayas. Just a week back I was in the cave of Amarnath in Kashmir. Well, it was very cold there and I had to wade through snow. Am I to wear *chappals* or *dhoties* and cotton clothes there? Life is different.

Take the tribal areas. We were talking about prohibition. It is a good thing. But have you any business to impose prohibition in the tribal areas where the whole life of the people revolves round certain customs, dances, etc.? You may break up their life. If you suddenly impose prohibition you will have revolution there. We cannot think of India as a regimented unit. India is a vast country. Any kind of social interference involves the person's freedom.

I come to the question of control and consolidation of holdings. There is a paragraph dealing with cooperative farming, etc.¹⁸ One cannot discuss the hunger problem in an election manifesto. I suggest that you read the Planning Commission Report which considers the whole problem and you can discuss it and criticise it. There are two broad opinions diametrically opposed to each other in regard to controls and it is clear that you have to make your choice

16. The Aarey Milk Scheme, a project of the Bombay Government, was inaugurated on 4 March 1951.

17. The Cattle Preservation Bill.

18. On cooperative farming the manifesto said: "Increased agricultural production is absolutely essential for putting our national economy on a firm basis. Small and uneconomic holdings stand in the way of rapid advance in agricultural production. The line of advance should therefore be cooperative farming with the object of making the whole or a substantial part of a village, a unit of cooperative management." See *ante*, p. 5.

very carefully. It is equally clear that there is no middle way. Either one has these controls or one does not. There is no middle way. Some controls may seem to be unnecessary. It is true. But I am now talking about the general approach to the question.

Some one said that controls were the result of conspiracy between Government officials and capitalists. Well, there may be some conspiracy sometimes between some government official and some capitalist, because there are a large number of people all over the country and you cannot always prevent them from misbehaving. But it is remarkable that the loudest cry for the removal of controls is today from the capitalists. It is they who are continuously shouting "remove controls", and whenever we have attempted to remove or relax controls they have profited. It is always the big capitalists and the middle-men who have prospered and who made money during those days of lessening of controls and the like. So if anybody imagines that it is in the interests of the capitalists that controls are kept, it is completely opposed to facts.

But there is no doubt that controls, considered by themselves, cannot be liked by anybody; just as the deprivation of personal liberty and freedom cannot be liked. There is no doubt also that controls have brought in corruption¹⁹ to considerable extent. All these facts are well-known, all quite agree with it. But having said that you must also consider what the absence of controls means. It is all very well to say "remove controls" because a number of people are inconvenienced. I say that public feeling regarding controls is quite in favour of it, and quite powerfully too. There will be a great deal of upsetting if we remove controls. Suppose you remove controls, the structure of economy collapses, the purchasing power collapses, the price structure collapses. Who is going to answer? If you remove controls, the prices shoot up and the whole national life collapses and everyday life collapses, then who will answer that question? It is a terrible question that will be put. No government can ever answer it. It is not a simple matter to talk of removal of controls. I tell you there is no way except controls and there will be controls so far as we can see.

This persistent talk of "no control" must stop and stop absolutely so far as the Congress is concerned. We cannot have it and we cannot talk in two voices. Some people seem to think that if Congressmen urge for the removal of controls, control will go. Having bestowed our greatest thought on it, we cannot talk of removal of controls lightly. I can understand your taking the plunge and we take the risk and then the devil takes the consequences. That is all right. But if you decide in favour of controls, then you must not whisper

¹⁹ Purushottamdas Tandon had said that he felt that the controls were responsible to a great extent in spreading corruption and bribery in the country.

or hint at decontrol at any time because then you are undermining the very policy that you have decided upon. It may be that you disagree with it, but if we have any common approach to an important question, then it must be a uniform approach, and later whenever the time comes, if you want to change your policy, change it. But there must not be a whisper which undermines that policy because then you are neither here nor there, and you will fall between two stools.

I am not going to remove controls. And obviously on a question like this, it is the duty of the Government, it is the duty of the Planning Commission more than anybody else, to consider the various aspects of this important matter. There is the human aspect, the economic aspect, the political aspect and the social aspect of this major issue that is of great national importance. It is for them also to consider the result of stopping controls — in regard to the A.B.C.D. and so on of every problem, and then decide about the policy. It may be justified in the larger good. I tell you that in these matters, we have considered for months, and again and again we have discussed, but still the opponents and critics tell us again and again to remove controls rather loosely. We do not put forward any of these proposals in a spirit of light-heartedness. Why should we seek to impose something which is not wanted and court unpopularity in the country? We are putting forward these controls because we feel compelled by the thought we have bestowed upon it, by our intellect, by our mission, and by our conscience that what we do is in the best interests of the future of our country. And I do submit that brushing it aside without realising the concentrated effort that has been given to it, the very earnest and sustained thought that has been given to it, is not being very fair to those who have given thought to it.

I submit that, we have to reach and arrive at right conclusions. After all when the need for controls is over, it is for you to say that to the Government, it is for the Congress Working Committee, it is for the Planning Commission to say so. We do not want controls, of course. But there is no other way. Any minor control can go if necessary, but the major thing at the moment is food and cloth. It is not possible for us to think of removing these controls.

What the future holds in its womb, I cannot say. It is dangerous to hint at it, because, if you hint at it, the middlemen profit by it and all kinds of men make money the moment these rumours go about. You know some people have a knack of making money by everything. It is curious how they do it, and it is one of our problems how to check it. Some people make money with extreme rapidity, no doubt at the cost of some other people.

So I would beg of you to consider these proposals in all their wider aspects. If you do not realise the difficulties involved in removing these controls, you will be taking very grave risks. I am convinced that a very large part of our difficulties which we are experiencing today is due to the fact that

at the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948 we had a good deal of de-control introduced which was one of the biggest disasters committed. We have not recovered from it yet. If we venture into that field again, we get completely submerged and I cannot take the responsibility for that, and I do not advise you to make yourselves responsible for that.

Well, Dr. Pattabhi wants me to say something on linguistic provinces. We said: "Where such demand represents the agreed views of the people concerned."²⁰ I sought to explain to you the implication of the word "agreed. Obviously it refers to the people concerned on the two sides of the proposed border. That is, if one province is cut into two, it means two parties are concerned. They must generally agree. It means there must be broad and general agreement. Then you can go ahead....

20. The manifesto said that "Where such a demand represents the agreed views of the people concerned, the necessary steps prescribed by the Constitution, including the appointment of a Boundary Commission should be taken." See *ante*, p. 12.

GENERAL ELECTIONS

II. Selection of Candidates

1. The Right Kind of Candidates¹

The election manifesto of the Congress has laid down the present aims and objectives of the Congress and what it will seek to do through Governmental and other means. It is essential, however, that the choosing of candidates, and all other matters connected with the election, should be carried out in furtherance of the aims of the Congress and in the high spirit of the manifesto. Candidates should be chosen with great care and should be men and women of integrity, who by their past record and present professions, have shown that they believe in and act up to the principles and objectives proclaimed on behalf of the Congress. In particular, care should be taken that the choice of suitable candidates is not affected by the predominance of any group or clique in any area. The Central Election Committee will take every step to prevent this from occurring and to ensure that the right kind of candidates are chosen. In doing so they will, whenever they consider necessary, invite for a particular State or area persons who may help them in the impartial choice of candidates for their State or area. The Central Election Committee will take steps, wherever necessary, to have an investigation made without delay into any complaint made of wrong selection or improper procedure.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru and passed by the Congress Working Committee, Bangalore, 10 July 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. To Chairmen, Pradesh Election Committees¹

September 19, 1951

Dear Comrade,

We have often stated that the coming general elections are unique and on a colossal scale. The work of preparation for them is tremendous. The burden of this work falls on the pradesh election committees and the Central Election Committee. Time is limited. We can only attain a measure of success in this work if we set about it in an organised way and not leave matters to the last moment.

1. Misc. File/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

This work may be divided into three parts:

- (i) General propaganda of Congress principles, manifestoes, etc.
- (ii) Choice of candidates; and
- (iii) Arrangements for the actual polling.

3. For the present, I am addressing you on the subject of choice of candidates, which is the most important aspect of our work. We have stated often enough that we should take great care in choosing our candidates and that they should be men and women of integrity. The future, not only of the Congress but of the country, depends upon the quality of persons elected to Parliament and to the State Assemblies. We can take no risks in this matter and we must not be swept away by party, group or like considerations. We must choose persons who can represent worthily Congress principles and ideals, who are men and women of proved integrity, and who have the ability to discharge the responsibilities of membership of the legislatures. I am quite sure that it is better for us to lose a few seats than to try to win them by compromising with any of the above principles and standards. If the public know that we are strictly following these principles, that will go a long way to raise our candidates in their estimation and will, of course, bring credit to the Congress.

4. I should like you, therefore, particularly to bear in mind the following factors:

- (1) Candidates chosen by us should not only possess integrity, but be known to do so. We must not put forward any person who has not got such a reputation in the public mind. Thus, any person who has been connected with any anti-social practice, such as blackmarketing, etc., should not be selected. Any person whose past record is considered to be bad from the Congress point of view should not be selected, even though he might be considered locally to have chances of winning the election.
- (2) The major struggle in India today, in the elections or elsewhere, is between the Congress, as representing a non-communal and secular State, and communal bodies which have an entirely different approach on this issue. These communal bodies often talk in terms of nationalism and sometimes even pretend to stand for social and economic progress. Essentially, however, they represent reaction in every way and they attract to themselves the socially reactionary groups and classes. They are likely to be financed by these classes. Their candidates, whatever they might say, represent every kind of reaction in India—political, economic and social. With the Socialist Party we have some differences, but there is also much in common. But there is almost nothing in common between the Congress

approach and the communal approach. Therefore, Congress candidates must be chosen with particular care so that they might represent fully the non-communal character and approach of the Congress. Persons who have been connected with communal organisations should therefore be suspects from this point of view. This is important, as there has been a certain infiltration, in the past, of communal elements in the Congress.

- (3) The Congress does not wish to exclude anyone who stands for its objectives and manifesto. But we should adopt as our candidates persons who have a progressive social outlook. A mere silent acceptance of our manifesto is not enough. Thus, persons representing large vested interests are seldom likely to have this social outlook. Sometimes they might even, directly or indirectly, represent particular vested interests. Care should therefore be taken not to put forward, as candidates, any persons who are likely to represent a reactionary economic policy.
- (4) There has been a great deal of complaint in many States about the formation of groups and cliques within Congress, and a majority group pushing out, or making ineffective, a minority group. We have decided to pull together to the largest possible extent and therefore, in choosing candidates, we must not proceed on clique or group lines, but choose the best persons available. Indeed, we should make a special effort to have representatives from the minority groups who are in the Congress or who, having left it recently, may come back to it.
- (5) It is obvious that a member of a legislature can only function effectively if he or she has a certain ability and capacity. It would be completely wrong to choose persons without that ability or capacity.
- (6) In every State a list of persons should be made who, by virtue of their experience and ability, might be required to assume responsibility of Government later on. A special effort should be made to get these persons elected. It would be unfortunate if our outstanding Congressmen, from the point of view of governmental and legislative work, are left out.
- (7) The election to the Upper House at the Centre, namely the Council of States, will take place much later, but it is necessary to keep that in view even when selecting candidates for the Lower House. In this way some persons might be reserved for the Upper House.
- (8) It is not only a matter of honour for us, but something of great practical importance, that we put up representatives of the minority communities in adequate numbers. Separate electorates and reservations

have been given up,² and this has increased our responsibility in this respect. If we fail to discharge this responsibility, critics will be entitled to say that joint electorates have failed, and that we cannot adequately protect the interests of the minorities. The principal minority is the Muslim, and we have to make special efforts to put up good Muslim candidates, even taking the risks of the loss of a seat or two. We have also to remember the Sikhs, the Christians, the Parsees and the Anglo-Indians. Normally we should try to give them representation in accordance with their population. In selecting candidates for the minority communities, election committees should consult representatives of those communities who are Congressmen or nationalists. It may even be desirable to co-opt to the election committee for this purpose some representative of a particular minority community.

- (9) I have often laid stress on women being made our candidates. I am told that suitable women candidates are rare. I am surprised to learn this, and I am inclined to think that this is a man-made reason. We must remember that there will be large numbers of women voters who would normally prefer a woman candidate. In any event, we should try to put up women candidates. I would suggest as a rough measure, that a woman might be set up from each district.
- (10) It is not necessary that we should select only from those who have sent applications. We have reserved the right to invite people to stand. Indeed, some of our best Congressmen would and do hesitate to put forward their names. Election committees should think of such persons and directly invite them to stand, even though they have not sent in their applications.

5. These are some important matters which I should like you and your election committees to bear in mind. It is on this basis that the Central Election Committee will proceed and it is desirable that your approach should be the same. We should like to be satisfied about the quality of the candidates and we shall test your list, in so far as we can, in accordance with the standards set out above. The more your proposals conform to these standards the easier it will be to get them passed by the Central Committee.

6. In view of the fact that considerable numbers of old Congressmen have recently left the Congress and are likely to come back soon, it is desirable, wherever possible, to associate them with the Pradesh Congress Committees. If this is difficult in a formal sense, then the association can be informal. We

2. Separate electorates came into existence under the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909. They were abolished by the Constitution of 1950.

should make every effort to function as a united Congress giving satisfaction to all within the Congress. That will result in adding to our strength greatly, giving us the best of candidates and in drawing public support.

7. I should like you to share this letter with all the members of your election committee.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Presidents, Pradesh Congress Committees¹

September 19, 1951

My dear Comrade,

I enclose a copy of a letter I am addressing to the Chairman of your Pradesh Election Committee.² Perhaps you are the Chairman. In any event, I should like this letter to be considered by your executive or your pradesh working committee. I have laid down certain important principles to be kept in mind in selecting candidates. I would beg of you and your committee to appreciate the importance of this approach and the necessity of acting in accordance with it. This letter is not just a routine letter to be filed, but something that has to be considered carefully and acted upon.

2. There is another matter to which I would like to draw your attention. I attach great importance to the removal of the spirit of faction from the Congress organisation. We have suffered in the past from groups, majority or minority, and we have also had a considerable number of resignations from the Congress in recent weeks or months. It does not matter much if any person, disagreeing with our policy or ideals, goes out of the Congress. That kind of thing happens normally in all organisations. But it does matter if any good Congressman leaves the organisation, although he agrees with its principles. It matters still more if we create an impression in the public mind that there are factions within the Congress, or that worthwhile persons find it difficult to function there. We have to remove such ideas and to demonstrate that we welcome all good Congressmen, and that our doors are open for them always.

1. File No. P-27(A)/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See the preceding item.

3. That was the spirit and direction of the Bangalore resolution of the A.I.C.C.³ We have to act upto it, not merely in a formal way, but more positively and so as to produce a definite impression that we want this done.

4. It is likely that a number of Congressmen, who have recently resigned, might express a wish to come back to the Congress. They should be welcomed back and no difficulties should be placed in their way. If we adopt a policy, this should be done whole-heartedly and not with hesitation and reluctance.

5. The U.P. Pradesh Congress Committee recently considered these matters and passed a resolution to welcome back those who have left and to keep their places vacant for them.⁴ On their coming back they could thus easily revert to their previous positions. If there is any constitutional or technical difficulty about this, it should be got over. Constitutions are meant to help work and not to hinder it. I would, therefore, urge you to adopt a similar policy and to invite those who have left to come back and, when they come back, to treat them as old comrades who return to their old places in the organisation.

6. We have had many complaints in the past about conflicts and difficulties both in pradesh Congress committees and in the districts. All this requires looking into and, wherever necessary, reorganisation. We should not hesitate to do so. The measure of success that we have in building up a strong and united Congress organisation will be the measure of success not only in the elections, but in the other important work that faces us. How to do this reorganisation, it is for you and your committee to determine, because conditions differ in different States. But I am sure that wherever this is desired, it can be done. It should begin, perhaps, with pradesh Congress committee itself and its executive. After that some of the districts might be considered. Even where some constitutional difficulties arise, much can be done to associate people in committees and in our work by invitation, and informally. The whole point is to create an impression in the Congress and in the public generally that we are all cooperating together to further the great work of the Congress.

7. Recent events have shown that some members of the Congress have functioned almost as if they were members of the Hindu Mahasabha or some like communal organisation. Indeed, some people have actually resigned from the Congress and gone over to the Jana Sangh. This itself is significant because a real Congressman should be as far removed from the communal organisations as anything can be. Our chief opponents in our work and in the elections are the communal organisations. Among these, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram

3. See *post*, p. 131.

4. On 16 September, the U.P.C.C. decided not to fill for the time being vacant places in the elective bodies of the Congress caused by the resignation of seceders. Those returning would be required, however, to give an undertaking that they were no longer members of any other political party.

Rajya Parishad⁵ and perhaps some others of a like nature, are not likely to attract much public sympathy, in spite of financial and other support that they get from reactionary and anti-social elements. But the Jan Sangh⁶ which was recently started, and which puts forward what appears to be a broader appeal, is likely to prove a stronger antagonist. The R.S.S. will undoubtedly support it, if not directly, then indirectly. The Jana Sangh whatever they may say, is an intensely communal organisation, narrow in outlook and with entirely wrong ideas from the Congress point of view. I am quite sure that if these communal organisations gather any strength in the country, it will be dangerous for the future of India. Therefore, we must stand foursquare against all these manifestations of communalism.

8. This means that our Congress committees, specially the superior ones, should make it perfectly clear that any member who sympathises with these communal organisations is no true Congressman. There have undoubtedly been infiltrations in the past from these organisations into the Congress. Indeed, some rather remarkable cases have been brought to my notice. It is necessary, therefore, to reorganise our committees from this point of view also.

9. I shall be grateful to you if you will let me know what steps you are taking in the matters referred to above.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The Ram Rajya Parishad was founded in 1948.
6. On 29 April 1951, a Hindu communal party, the Jan Sangh (People's Party) was established at Calcutta, with S.P. Mookerjee as the President. In June 1951 another party called the Bhartiya Jan Sangh was formed at Jalandhar in the Punjab. The two parties merged at a national convention in New Delhi on 21 October 1951.

4. To Chairmen, Pradesh Election Committees¹

September 21, 1951

Dear Comrade,

I have sometimes noticed in the papers that efforts have been made in some provinces to come to some arrangement with other parties in regard to the elections. I remember reading about some talks to this end with a group representing the old Muslim League. I do not know if anything came out of these talks. I would, however, strongly deprecate any electoral arrangement of

1. Misc. File/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

this kind with any group with different ideologies and programmes from those of the Congress. In particular, any association with a communal group, Hindu, Muslim or other, must be avoided.

2. Should some special situation arise in regard to the representation of minorities, I would suggest to you to refer the matter to the Central Election Committee.

3. In choosing representatives of minorities, preference should always be shown to persons who have associated themselves, preferably directly, or at any rate indirectly, with the Congress movement. Thus, among Muslims, Congress Muslims or nationalists should naturally be preferred. This would apply to other communities also.

4. I have already indicated to you that, in making these selections from minorities, we should associate in our election committee some prominent Congress representatives of that minority.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
October 9, 1951

My dear Deshmukh,²

We have been considering, during the past few days, lists of Congress candidates from various places. The question of independent candidates has come up before us in various ways. Of course any person can stand as an independent candidate, but the question before us was about those who stood as such with Congress goodwill. We found that this creates all kinds of difficulties, apart from the fact that when this principle is accepted, then many people claim that privilege and it is difficult to draw a line. As a matter of fact, we have got a number of cases like this before us and we do not quite know what to do with them, unless some more or less precise rule is laid down.

A person standing as an independent candidate and agreeing, if elected, to join the Congress Party in the legislature, is for all practical purposes a Congress candidate. If a question is asked about his candidature and what he is going to do after being elected, the answer had to be that he will join the Congress Party. If that is so, the line separating him from a Congress candidate

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Deshmukh was Finance Minister in the Central Government.

becomes very thin and in fact hardly exists. It might even be said that this was some kind of a ruse. That is not quite straight dealing.

I discussed this matter with Rajaji this morning and he was clearly of opinion that it is far better for you to stand as a Congress candidate. Morarji Desai passed through Delhi today and he was also of the same opinion. In fact he said that he discussed this matter with you sometime back and you were then of opinion that this would be the best course. Also, considering that you have been a member of the present Government, it would be natural for you to stand as a Congress candidate and any other course might appear as a little odd.

You mentioned that perhaps it might be easier for you in the elections if you stood as an independent candidate, because the Socialist Party had said that they would not oppose you then. I hardly think that this will make any difference. The Socialist Party's opposition would not count for very much there. But there is likely to be other opposition and all kinds of questions will be asked as to whether you are joining the Congress Party later or not. It seems to me that it will be far better for you and for us to face the electorate frankly and avoid any confusion on this issue.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Deshmukh took the Congress pledge, but did not contest as a Congressman.

6. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
October 10, 1951

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of the 9th. You are quite right in telling me that the step you had taken was with my knowledge and concurrence. I am not against that step at all. Indeed nobody is. There is no question of a candidate being set up against you. I wrote to you after a talk with Rajaji and Morarji Desai. They pointed out that the Congress would be able to help you more effectively if you stood as their candidate. There will probably be an election anyhow, even though the Socialist Party may not put up a candidate and the Congress would like to help you fully in that election. If you stand as an independent, you will have Congress sympathy, but they can hardly go out to work for an independent candidate. This might inconvenience you more.

1. J.N. Collection.

If you prefer to stand as an independent candidate, there the matter ends and you should certainly stand as such.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
October 10, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

After my talk with you yesterday, I wrote to Deshmukh² and suggested that it might be better if he stood as a Congress candidate and not as an independent. As he had already told us in writing that he would, if elected, join the Congress Party, there was not much difference between the two courses, and to be a Congress candidate appeared to be a straighter course. We could also be able to help him more.

He has written to me in reply that he prefers to stand as an independent and would not like to stand as a Congress candidate. Apparently, he thinks that if he stood as a Congress candidate, he would have more opposition and trouble. I think he is wrong there. However, that is his opinion. I am writing to him that so far as I am concerned, he can certainly stand as an independent candidate and he will have our sympathy. I do not wish to go back on what I said to him before. I had only pointed out to him something that appeared to be more feasible.

Deshmukh's letter to me left a slightly unpleasant impression in my mind. There is nothing wrong in it, but you know how such impressions are sometimes created.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

8. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
October 11, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

Your letter of the 9th October giving me a full account of the electoral position regarding Muslims.² I confess that this is so complicated that it is a little difficult for me to understand it or to come to any conclusions. We shall discuss this with you when you come here and perhaps Sri Prakasaji will be able to help.

I am quite clear in my mind that obviously communal Muslims should not be set up on behalf of the Congress. There may be a rare case of a person who was previously communal, but has more or less convinced you of his change in this respect. You may, if you like, accept him. But the mere fact that a person joining the Congress a month ago after a long communal career does not entitle him to stand as a Congress candidate. If I have no other suitable candidates, I would prefer allowing a communal-minded Muslim to stand as an independent candidate and not oppose him.

Our first choice for Muslim candidates should be Congress Muslims, that is old Congressmen. Our next choice should be younger Muslims not tainted with communalism, even though they might not be full Congressmen.

However, we shall discuss this when you come here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Medhi was of the view that increasing the representation of the minorities would lead to many complications and would result in the Congress losing a number of seats. He feared that there would be "positive opinion in certain areas where suitable Congressmen are asked to stand out to give place to non-Congress Muslims where the Muslim votes are in a minority."

9. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
October 11, 1951

My dear Prakasa,

I am sending you a letter from Medhi, Chief Minister of Assam. This is a

1. J.N. Collection.

long and detailed letter about the Muslim electoral position in Assam.² It is not very easy for me to grasp it. Probably you know the situation much better and can advise us. When Medhi comes here, we can have a talk with him.

I am entirely against Congress setting up as their candidate a Muslim who has played a leading communal part in the past, even though he formally joins the Congress now. If I cannot get a more suitable candidate, I would rather not run a candidate for a seat and allow an independent Muslim to stand for it.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Medhi had written that a number of Muslims, who were prospective candidates, had not the Congress ideology, and until the question of elections came up, were communalist in their outlook. Some of them had no chance of getting elected and the Congress would unnecessarily lose its seats in areas where there were others like the hill tribes and plains tribals. Meanwhile, Mohammad Saadulla, who had for long been a leader of the Muslim League and had recently joined the Congress Party, was pressing for twenty Muslim candidates being put up on behalf of the Congress.

10. To R.K. Patil¹

New Delhi
October 11, 1951

My dear Patil,

Thank you for your letter of 10/11th October. I am glad you have written to me fully about your thoughts.²

First of all, I want to tell you that I was and am in no way opposed to your standing as a candidate in the elections. I was only somewhat reluctant to lose you in the Planning Commission. That was perhaps a selfish desire. Of course, I attach value to the Planning Commission and think that it has a great part to play in the future. But I realise completely that you can be of great service in a wider sphere of public life, such as a member of a legislature. I do not want you to feel that I come in the way there. That really depends a great deal on the conditions in your province. About that, it is difficult for me

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nehru did not want Patil, who was then a member of the Planning Commission, to contest the State Assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh. But Patil desired to contest, the main reason being that he felt he was losing contact with the people and was keen on serving the country in a better way.

to give an opinion, except that I do not like the present conditions there. It is quite possible that your presence there would make a great deal of difference for the good. You can still consider this question and consult your colleagues in the province as well as Nanda.³

About the Planning Commission, much that you say is perfectly true. Obviously, it will have to play a different role in future, if it has to function effectively. I cannot say now exactly what shape it might take. But it will have to be more closely associated with the execution of the Plan. It may well be that a Member of the Planning Commission comes quite a great deal in touch with the public in future.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Gulzarilal Nanda, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission.

11. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1951

Nan dear,

I have just replied to your telegram about the Princess Elizabeth. I could not make out what you had in mind. There is no reason why we should not conform to the usual courtesies. What these usual courtesies are in Washington, I do not know. Should you have any doubt about any matter, you should refer to us.

As we are members of the Commonwealth, we should naturally treat her with somewhat greater intimacy than would be done by a country outside the Commonwealth. At the same time, being in the Commonwealth, we are a Republic. I do not see why any difficulty should arise in regard to any procedure.

The U.P. Congress Committee is, I believe, putting forward your name for election here. You will remember that I was not very anxious that you should contest an election here. Partly this was due to my desire that you keep out of this election business. I am fed up with the kind of things that are going on and the kind of persons that are selected. I do not like you to be mixed up with this business.

With love from
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

12. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1951

My dear Deshmukh,

I have just received your letter of today's date.² I do not see at all why two brothers should not stand from the same district. I knew nothing about your brother standing or not till your letter came to me. I shall enquire into this matter.

Ever since I was foolish enough to accept the Congress Presidentship with all that it implied and more especially this election work, I suffer more and more from disillusion. It is a heart-breaking business. I cannot run away from it and yet I cannot make too much difference. Some difference I can make. So I carry on putting as good a face as possible on it.

I shall try about your brother. I imagine that the fact that he is your brother really does not come in the way. That is probably an excuse. In any event, do not mix up your standing with this other matter, although I quite appreciate your reactions to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Deshmukh wrote on 14 October that he should not like to contest the election as a Congress candidate or otherwise if on account of his candidature for Parliament his brother, who was a long-standing Congressman and who had applied for a Congress ticket for an Assembly constituency in Kolaba district, would lose his chance of contesting.

13. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
October 15, 1951

Nan dear,

...Some days ago I wrote to you and advised you to give up the idea of standing for election here. I was so fed up with the way elections are being handled and the wild scramble for nominations, that I felt that you should not stand. Now you write to me that you would very much like to stand for

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

Parliament. That makes a great difference. You had not told me so before at any time. If you really want to stand for Parliament, then certainly I would not like to come in the way.

Standing for Parliament presumably means your coming here much earlier than you intend doing. Actual polling is some time about the middle of January, but there are so many other things to be done before.

I am writing this brief letter to you now. I shall write to you more fully or perhaps telegraph after three or four days after consulting some people here. Pantji came today. I am terribly busy with Parliament and Congress and Working Committee meetings. Parliament drags on, though it may finish tomorrow....

With love from
Jawahar

14. To Morarji Desai¹

October 22, 1951

My dear Morarji Bhai,

In the rush of work and engagements here, I could not discuss some matters with you which I had very much in mind. One of these was in regard to the Bombay list. I had a brief talk about this with B.G. Kher and Gilder.²

I am worried about two patent omissions from this list. I should have thought that the inclusion of Abid Ali³ and Pardivala⁴ was very necessary and would have added not only to the strength of the list but also to favourable popular reactions. Both of them are good men. Abid Ali is a very old Congressman and labour worker and on that ground alone his claim was very strong. Then again the fact of his being a Muslim should also incline us to put him in. I find that his exclusion has been very much noticed and criticised not only in Bombay but in other parts of the country, where he is well-known.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. M.D.D. Gilder, Minister for Public Health, Bombay Government, at this time.
3. (1899-1973); trade union leader of Bombay; participated in National Flag Satyagraha, 1923, Bardoli Satyagraha, 1928 and Salt Satyagraha, 1930; imprisoned several times during the freedom struggle; member, A.I.C.C. for over fifteen years; member, Legislative Council, 1949-52; member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-70; Deputy Minister for Labour, Government of India, 1952-62; President, Indian National Trade Union Congress, 1968.
4. H.R. Pardivala (1905-1990); barrister and trade union leader; member, Congress Socialist Party; arrested during Quit India movement, 1942; member, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1946-51; left Congress in 1954.

Pardivala again is a man of obvious ability and popularity. He is the kind of a man whom I would have invited to stand.

I have a feeling that the nominations have been partly governed by other considerations, that is those pertaining to groups. I think in this matter we should rise above this group business.

Another aspect that has been troubling me is our opposing Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya. Both from the national and the international points of view, she is an outstanding figure who has been one of the founders of women's movement in India. Before she joined the Socialist Party, she played an important role in the Congress. As a Socialist, she has been rather passive, but she has done extraordinarily good work in Delhi and elsewhere to develop cooperatives for the refugees. We have been cooperating with her both as a Government and as individual in this work. To try to keep her out would be resented by large numbers of people, who would criticise us. As a matter of fact, the All India Women's Conference is deeply agitated over it, and I am getting many protests and appeals from Congresswomen from various parts of the country. I know that Mrs Raiji⁵ is a good woman, but, from various points of view, it is difficult to compare her from the point of view of work with Kamaladevi. It is also a pity that one member of the All India Women's Conference should oppose another. The Women's Conference has very largely cooperated with the Congress in the past and it would be a pity to create this conflict within it.

I know that there is a difficulty in allowing candidates pertaining to an opposition party to go unopposed. Nevertheless, my own advice in the U.P. was that if Narendra Deva stood for election, he should not be opposed. He has such a high status in the U.P. as a scholar and a straightforward man that any opposition to him in this context hurts the prestige of the Congress. That argument applies, I think, to Kamaladevi also.

I should like you to think over these matters and consult some of your colleagues. I am not so much concerned with the individual aspects, but rather with general reactions in the country. I should like those reactions to be as favourable as possible to the Congress so as to strengthen it.

I find that the person suggested to oppose Dr Matthai in Travancore is rather a poor specimen, not much thought of in Travancore. He is a lawyer, but he is doing business of a commission agent. He has often come to Delhi to get licences, etc. for his firm. It seems to me a pity that we should put up such a person to oppose Dr Matthai. We should have a strong candidate, who is respected. The name of a college principal has been suggested to me. From

5. Jayashri Raiji (1895-1985); social worker associated with various women's organisations; imprisoned during the Quit India movement; Vice-President, All India Women's Conference; member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57.

all accounts he is highly respected and has been pro-Congress almost all his life and is a habitual khadi-wearer. I am, therefore, suggesting his name to the Travancore people.⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. C.P. Mathew, Principal of the Union Christian College, Alwaye, won the election after the nomination papers of John Matthai were rejected on technical grounds.

15. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
October 22, 1951

My dear Bidhan,

I had a visit today from Pratap Guha Roy² and another person who complained that they had been left out of your list, or rather not considered at all. I referred them to you and told them that you would no doubt give every consideration to what they said and then decide.

I am receiving all kinds of representations from all kinds of persons, chiefly Congressmen and women about Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya. All these people tell me that it will be highly improper for us to oppose her. She is one of the founders of the women's movement in India and has played a leading part in it. She is known very well in India and in foreign countries. She has done very good work in Delhi and round about in building up cooperatives for refugees. Although a Socialist, she has not taken any active part in politics for some time past. She is now standing as a Socialist candidate in Bombay. The Bombay P.C.C. want to put up Mrs Raiji against her. As a matter of fact, even Mrs Raiji is unhappy about this because she has worked with Kamaladevi in the Women's Conference.

I think that there is a great deal in these arguments and our opposing Kamaladevi would bring discredit and a great deal of criticism on us.

Yours,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1887-1982); member, Yugantar Party; later member, Swaraj Party; suffered long imprisonment during freedom struggle; Deputy Chairman, Vidhan Parishad, 1952-65 and its Chairman, 1965-69; edited several Bengali newspapers.

16. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
October 22, 1951

My dear Prakasa,

I have been thinking about the Assam position² and have also met Fakhruddin and Siddhinath Sarma³ and had a talk with them. It seems to me that there is something in what Fakhruddin says. Separately, Siddhinath Sarma supported it.

I am not much interested in percentages, although they may have some value. But the patent fact is that at present in a House of 70 or 80, there are 16 Muslims in Assam. The next Assembly is going to be 108. To suggest that there should be only fourteen there appears to me, on the face of it, not only wrong but something that will be bitterly resented and criticised. It will create great bitterness among the Muslims and they might very well turn *en masse* against the Congress and support various other parties like the Communists, Socialists, K.M.P., etc.

Medhi's attitude, generally speaking, appears to me to be exceedingly narrow and unwise. For fear of a few extra Muslim seats, he wants to do something which might irritate large numbers of Muslims there, including even those Muslims who are nationalist or who have been in the Congress. That is a poor bargain and it will have dangerous potentialities, apart from being wrong in principle.

We cannot get rid of the facts of the situation in Assam. Nor can we create an artificial situation which does not reflect, by and large, those actual facts. If we disappoint the Muslims generally very much, there will be all kinds of intrigues between them and the tribal areas and others. We must on no account produce a sensation among the Muslims that we do not trust them *en bloc* and we consider them outside the pale. If they feel that there is no hope in the Congress for them, then inevitably they will look elsewhere, and they are strong enough in numbers and otherwise to make a big difference.

Therefore, we must act with some justice towards them in regard to the number of seats. At present the Assam Congress has suggested fourteen. I think this is totally inadequate. We must give them more seats than they have

1. Misc. File/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. In his reply on 23 October 1951, Sri Prakasa complained that Fakhruddin always talked of "our claim". He said, "We can claim so many seats" which meant Muslim candidates were ever so much better than Hindu candidates.
3. Went to jail several times during nationalist movement; Secretary, 1937-50, and President, 1950-52, of the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee; member, Congress Working Committee, 1950-52; member, Assam Legislative Assembly, 1937-46; again elected in 1952 and was Minister of Public Works.

in the present Assembly, that is more than sixteen. Eighteen seats seems to be the very minimum and it might well be one or two more.

As for the Muslim candidates, first place should obviously be given to such Congress Muslims as might be available. Tayyebulla⁴ is a very loyal person and it would be a great pity to drop him after all that he has done. He may not be a strong candidate. But still we owe something for his long service.

I am told that Akram Husain Saikia⁵ opposed Saadullah and put up a brave fight. A man like that should certainly be given a chance. There may be a few other Congress Muslims.

The remaining Muslims should generally be chosen from the younger lot with progressive ideas. Their past association with the Muslim League need not by itself go against them unless they have been very active and aggressive. Circumstances are bringing about a change in the Muslim mentality and we have to help this change to grow. If we take progressive young men and make them feel they have a place in the Congress, we will expedite this change.

Saadullah is not at all a safe man and yet, in all the circumstances, I do not very well see how we can leave him out. Outside he might prove dangerous.

I am afraid that some of our Assam friends are very narrow in outlook and do not see much beyond the tip of their nose. They should be made to understand that the Assam situation cannot be dealt with by three or four seats being wangled this way or that. It has to be a larger approach of winning over people and their confidence.

Siddhinath Sarma mentioned a name to me of a Sikh in Assam. I think he is Wariam Singh or some such name, who is a very old Congress worker.

Then there is the question of women to be remembered.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. M. Tayyebulla (1894-1966); participated in non-cooperation movement; lecturer, Jamia Millia National University, 1922-24; member, All India Khilafat Committee; General Secretary, Assam P.C.C., 1926-31 and President, 1940, 1946 and 1948; member, Assam Legislative Assembly, 1947-52; Minister for Public Health, Excise, 1948-1950; member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-64.
5. A Congress leader from Dibrugarh; had been to jail during the freedom struggle.

17. Elections in Hyderabad¹

In selecting candidates for election from Hyderabad, it must be remembered that this State has very special problems to face and is a category by itself owing to recent happenings there. Apart from the general considerations for the selection of candidates which have been laid down, the following important considerations should be borne in mind:

1. There has been some agitation for the disintegration of the State and for parts of it to be added on to other States, such as Andhra, Maharashtra and Karnataka. Any such division and disintegration would be fatal for the State and would also create tremendous problems both for the State and the neighbouring Provinces. It would completely upset the balance in South and Central India. We cannot lay down any hard and fast rule for the future, but we can say definitely that there is going to be no such disintegration for the next five or ten years at least. If this is so, and we must take it to be so, then no reference should be made to the division of the State during the coming elections and no candidate of ours should advocate it. Indeed he must proceed on the basis of the present State continuing, as it necessarily must. Therefore, any candidate chosen must not be one who has stood strongly or stands now for the partition of the State.

2. Hyderabad has not only a national but an international significance. The communal question in Hyderabad therefore requires special watching. Previous to the police action, the State was governed by a Muslim minority group which looked upon itself as some kind of a ruling race. The position has been reversed since the police action and there is a tendency for the Hindus there to look upon themselves as the dominant group. Muslims in Hyderabad have felt down and out. They had a very bad time immediately after the police action and horrible occurrences took place especially on the Osmanabad side near Maharashtra. It is of the utmost importance that these communal Hindu elements should not be encouraged. Unfortunately, these elements are present even in the present Ministry. Hindu communal elements in Hyderabad have usually functioned through the Arya Samaj there.² The Arya Samaj in northern India and elsewhere is normally considered a social and non-political organisation. In Hyderabad, however, it has a political and communal record. Some recent events have shown that some of its prominent

1. Note to Lal Bahadur Shastri, member of a sub-committee under the Central Election Committee, 23 October 1951. Misc. File/1951 A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. The Arya Samaj was a movement for Hindu religious reforms.

members function in a very narrow communal way. Care must therefore be taken not to put in the list of candidates any person who is known to have functioned or to function now in this communal way.

3. Land reform in Hyderabad is of great importance.³ Communism there can only be tackled effectively by a proper land policy. Therefore, any person selected should be in favour of a radical land policy and should not represent reactionary feudal elements.

3. Jagirs were taken over by the administration in September 1949 under the Jagir Abolition Regulation Act and their integration was completed by March 1950.

18. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
October 25, 1951

My dear Pantji,

This election business is making me lose my faith in Indian humanity or, at any rate, in a large part of it. I could never have imagined that many of our people could have sunk quite so low as they have done. I fear I am getting a little indifferent and am only longing for the time when all this is over. Bihar, of course, is the supreme example.

It has struck me that Shah Nawaz Khan² would be a very desirable person to have in Parliament or in Assembly. He is a first-rate man for whose capacity and integrity I have the highest respect. If he had continued in the Army, he would have been one of our seniormost generals now. Everyone in the Army who knows him and has worked with him, English or Indian, speaks very highly of him. My own experience of him bears this out.

I wonder if it will be possible to provide him with a seat in the U.P. Presumably, the only places which would be suitable are in northern U.P., places like Bijnor, etc. I am sure he would be a winning candidate in any such place and a popular one.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Shah Nawaz Khan, who was the Commander of the Indian National Army during 1943-44, contested as a Congress candidate from the Meerut constituency and was elected.

19. Telegram to Bisnuram Medhi¹

Your telegram dated 26th October.² We realise fully complicated position in Assam and hope to come to decisions in consultation with you. So far as persons like Umaruddin³ are concerned, you are perfectly justified in not accepting him because of his antecedents.

In view of strategic position of Assam and character of its population, it seems to me essential that goodwill of mass of tribal folk and Muslims should be obtained. Without their goodwill a few seats more or less in Assembly have no significance. It would be highly injurious for Muslims in Assam as a whole to feel that they had been unjustly treated and are not trusted. This will lead to instability both in province and in Assembly. Therefore it is important that we should not create any such impression and give them few more candidates, which ultimately does not make very much difference. Even elections may be affected against us if general body of Muslims feel frustrated and decide to support opposition candidates like Socialists, K.M.P. or other groups. We must therefore take broad view and create feeling of confidence in us among Muslims as well as tribal people.

Of course, any persons who are obviously communally minded or reactionary should not be set up as our candidates. But some young people even though originally connected with Muslim League may have changed their outlook because of circumstances and may have progressive views. Such persons should be won over.

The point is that we must show our *bona fides* towards minorities. It does not matter if we lose two or three seats provided we create this impression. This will ultimately strengthen Congress and State much more than any attempt which creates grave dissatisfaction among large groups.

I have consulted Buragohain⁴ and this telegram has been seen by him.

1. New Delhi, 27 October 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Medhi reported that the formation of a stable party and Government would be impossible if more communal-minded former Muslim Leaguers were selected as Congress candidates.
3. Muhammad Umaruddin; member, Assam Civil Service, 1929-1947; elected to Assam Legislative Assembly, 1952.
4. S.N. Buragohain (1904-1953); member, Assam Assembly, 1943; Minister for Local Self-Government, Excise and Labour, 1945-46; member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-53; Deputy Minister, Works, Mines and Power, and later Power, Production and Supply, Government of India, August 1950-52; Deputy Minister, Works, Housing and Supply from May 1952 till his death.

20. To Morarji Desai¹

October 27, 1951

My dear Morarji Bhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th.²

I have been much troubled about the Bombay list of candidates. I have met any number of people from Bombay and roundabout. They have been Congressmen and non-Congressmen, politicians and those not in political life, but mostly Congress people. Not one of them has had a good word to say about this list and they have advanced what appeared to me to be fairly valid arguments. Having regard to the importance of Bombay as a great cosmopolitan city, it naturally attracts more attention than other places; an election there is more symbolic than other elections. This widespread criticism, and sometimes condemnation, of the list can hardly be ignored. I pointed out to you what appeared to be obvious omissions. But the thing is deeper than that.

You may be right in saying that there is no love lost between Abid Ali and Patil, but surely our choice should not be governed by the personal likes and dislikes of other individuals. Indeed, it is said that in making this list S.K. Patil³ has kept out people whom he does not like, even though they might be very competent and otherwise suitable. That surely is not a good test.

I should have thought that Abid Ali was an obvious choice, more obvious than almost anyone in Bombay, especially for a constituency which was largely labour. He has all the normal qualifications and more. He has been a very good Congressman and a labour leader; he is a member of a minority community which we wish to encourage; he has suffered a good deal for the cause; he is well-known and should normally be considered a good candidate. I should think that, without doubt, he is a far stronger candidate than Gandhi⁴ who is opposing Asoka Mehta. I am almost certain that Gandhi will lose that seat. Abid Ali might win it. I am told that even Gandhi goes about saying that he is likely to lose.

You know Bombay people better than I do, but Pardivala has seemed to me to have both ability and earnestness and a measure of popularity.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Morarji Desai wrote that Abid Ali declined to stand from the constituency offered to him where his chances were good. He wanted not only a particular constituency for himself, but all candidates of his own choice. Pardivala was not a popular and suitable candidate from the Parsi community. Morarji also objected to Nehru's suggestion that Narendra Deva and Kamaladevi should not be opposed by the Congress. He thought that elections should be fought on principles and not round personalities.

3. President, Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee at this time.

4. V.B. Gandhi (1896-1969); businessman of Bombay; councillor, Bombay Municipal Corporation; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57, 1962-67.

As for Kamaladevi, the principle that you suggest has force, but not so much force in India as, say, in England, where politics are much more developed and people joining parties have very precise ideas about various policies. They have a long background of political growth. Our politics, especially today, are exceedingly fluid. Even the Congress tends to be fluid and we take the most amazing people into our fold and make them candidates. My experience of recent days in scrutinising candidates' lists has been one of the most depressing that I have ever had. I find it difficult to become enthusiastic about large numbers of people whom we are likely to set up as our candidates. Many of them are third-rate from any point of view—Congress, education, intellect, service of any cause or any other record. Then their behaviour in many cases has been little short of scandalous. Bihar is the supreme example where, in spite of every pressure, the prospective candidates view each other with intense bitterness and enmity. Delhi streets have been full of bands of Bihar candidates roaming about and sometimes coming into conflict with each other. What will happen to Bihar, I do not know. It is quite possible that we might have to write it off completely and leave things to individuals. Even if by some slip of hand we get some superficial agreement, the essential conflicts and low standard of politics there will continue. The whole thing turns round caste divisions—Bhumiyars, Kayasthas, etc. I have felt recently as if I was in a den of wild animals.

This is the background of our candidates. We can hardly talk of any high principle.

I wrote about Kamaladevi to you not because she was a Socialist, but because she was one of the founders and leaders of the women's movement in India, with a very big reputation both here and, to some extent, abroad. Any number of M.Ps including our Deputy Speaker, have been pressing me not to oppose her. Members of the Women's Conference, many of them Congresswomen, have come to me and grown quite excited about it.

My own impression is that unless something is done, we shall lose a large number of Bombay seats. There is such widespread disapproval of these lists, and many individuals in it, and a general criticism of the quality of the persons put up by us. A few of them appear to be quite unknown to the public.

As you hint at in your letter, the whole thing appears to revolve round S.K. Patil and his wishes. Patil is an excellent organiser and has done good work for the Congress. But the amount of opposition that has been built up against him is something formidable. I have asked many Bombay people, including some who work with S.K. Patil, about this Bombay list. There have been two answers: one, that it is a bad list and must be changed or else our credit will fall still lower in Bombay and we shall lose many seats, the other

reply has been that they would like to see changes in the list, but they do not wish to fall out with S.K. Patil.

This is not a happy position.

This leads me to a wider issue. Why has Congress lost its pre-eminence in Bombay? We all remember its popularity in Bombay and perhaps as an ideal it is still popular. But I think it is quite certain that the B.P.C.C. is very far from popular and there is a general impression that it is controlled by a narrow clique, and any person who cannot fit into that clique has no chance of survival. S.K. Patil is the *bete noire* of large numbers of people. In many provinces we are gradually succeeding in removing barriers between Congress-man and Congressman and there is some attempt at harmonious working. In Bombay this is hardly possible in present circumstances.

You will be coming here soon and we shall discuss these matters then.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

GENERAL ELECTIONS

III. The Campaign

1. Quiet Strength and Avoidance of a War Mentality¹

...We are going to have a general election on a big scale, which will perhaps be the largest in the history of the world.² About seventeen to eighteen crores of men and women will vote, and so it is very important. It is obvious that it is a tremendous thing for the future of our country. All these things are true but when I agreed to come here, it was not with the elections in mind. I know that there is a great deal of talk of the elections these days, and not merely talk but also a sort of fever in people's brains. Temperatures run high and lead to all sorts of things, quarrels, etc. which would perhaps not happen otherwise. But in spite of the fact that these elections will be a big factor and will have far-reaching effects, it does not create any anxiety in me because there are far more important matters before the country. The question of elections is important to my mind, not from the point of view of victory or defeat of particular individuals but on what platform the campaign ought to be fought. It cannot be on mere lip-service to principles or tall promises, for candidates and parties do tend to make all sorts of promises during elections. It is difficult to avoid that. But yet an effort has to be made to put our principles before the people so that they can understand them and vote accordingly, sifting the real promises from the tall talk. It is difficult for everyone to understand and to believe whether a party or a candidate is likely to fulfil what is promised.

Ultimately a certain amount of confidence and faith have to be placed in the party or its leaders who have contacts with the people, and these circumstances have to guide their choice. But some attention has to be paid to their principles. There are many ideologies before the nation and a choice has to be made with an understanding of the world situation and our role in it. This is the first thing. Secondly, it is obvious that to some extent, the choice will be based on personalities and individuals and the principles and ideologies may follow that.

Anyhow, the elections do have a special importance if you look at them in the overall picture, and not from the narrower point of view of parochial and caste prejudices. It seems to me that the greatest danger in these elections

1. Speech at Ramlila Ground, New Delhi, 29 July 1951. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Original in Hindi. Extracts.
2. In the first general elections spread over from October 1951 to May 1952, 173,213,635 people voted and 59 parties set up over 17,000 candidates to contest more than 3,800 seats in Parliament and the State legislatures. In addition, many thousands contested the election as Independents.

will be if the people look at them in a narrow-minded way and elect their own kinsmen or candidates of their own castes, without paying any attention to the bigger issues. Please remember that in the coming elections seventeen crore people will vote. But the constituencies will be very small and the danger is that any caste which is in a majority in a particular area will choose its caste men. It may be that they are within their rights, but this narrow-minded way of electing a candidate will mean that the future Parliament will be full of men of low stature, of individuals who think all the time only of parochial interests, of their own caste and locality and not of the entire country and its problems. This is something which all of us ought to consider. One great service the Congress has been able to do to the country is to raise the people above parochial interests and to put the larger issues before them and produce an awareness in them. It will be dangerous to relegate these larger issues to the background and get bogged down in a morass of petty quarrels and issues of caste and creed and locality.

As you know, in the last few months especially many developments have taken place within the Congress. There is a talk of people leaving the Congress and of internal changes in the party. I made an effort to set right the perspectives, and achieved some success in all this.³ It is true that I am not happy about many of the developments that have happened. However, such changes will go on. The question is how we look at this situation. My effort has been not to look at these larger issues from a personal angle, but to understand what their consequences will be to the country and whether they will create the right atmosphere.

It is obvious that personal matters do come into the picture. But ultimately the thing to remember is where do we take the country, in which direction we draw the country's attention and what sort of atmosphere we create so that the common people, who normally do not pay much attention to these matters, may start doing so when they are affected. These are the questions which are constantly before me.

The country will become strong to the extent that we succeed in our efforts, and if we do not, the country will become weak. It is obvious that whether you see the internal conditions in the country or the external, you can understand that this is a time when there ought to be a quiet strength in us to

3. The demand for a more radical social programme led to the break away of some Congressmen and their formation of opposition parties in U.P., Travancore-Cochin and West Bengal. It was announced on 3 May 1951 that the Congress Democratic Front, headed by Kripalani, had unanimously decided to dissolve itself with immediate effect due to personal appeals of Nehru and Azad. However, on 17 May, Kripalani resigned from the Congress and formed the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party.

face any enemy attack or face our internal problems. We have specially to make every effort, to make the economic condition of the country better, because ultimately the lives of the people are most directly connected with it, and more important than the economic situation is the defence of the country, because if we cannot protect our country, it is obvious that the question of the economic condition does not even arise.

In this connection, you may have heard that some time ago, a year and half ago, we formed a Planning Commission which presented a Five-Year Plan.⁴ It has not yet been finalized and such things can never really be absolutely final. It is a draft for the common public to think about and to present its criticisms and views. Then the final plan will be drawn up by the effort of not merely the Government at Delhi but of all the provinces, and more important, by the involvement of the common people because ultimately, the biggest question before India or any other country is how the people can make progress, not one or two individuals but how everyone can go ahead, how to increase the wealth of the country, and how to ensure the equitable distribution of that wealth.

When you think of four hundred million people, this question becomes very large and, it is obvious, complicated, with a thousand angles to it. So we are examining this important issue, and I invite you also to do so by reading the draft which will be published in six or seven days—not only in English but in other languages too—and by trying to understand its broad principles you must help us to finalize it.

Our mind is full of this Five-Year Plan and the economic problems of the country, and at the same time we are confronted with this great question of elections. Making proper arrangements for it is in itself a fantastic task, as you can imagine. Then there have been various other things. Pakistan has been making strange threatening noises. This is nothing new but this time they have been more vociferous in their threats. In this connection, I would like to congratulate the citizens of Delhi and the people living round about and in West Punjab for not giving in to a feeling of panic or worry. We have gone about our daily lives and occupations as it is obvious that we cannot bring all that to a standstill. We have to be extremely vigilant, but there should be no question of panic, as our brethren in Pakistan are giving way to panic. As you can imagine, this is an extremely important matter. Whenever there is a question of war or external danger, the matter becomes important. We can argue about the right and the wrong of it, but apart from that, war itself is wrong because it brings tremendous ruin in its wake. People in high positions might sit in their offices and issue threats and take decisions and

4. The Planning Commission presented an outline report on 9 July 1951. See *ante*, p. 14, fn. 2.

send in armies, but ultimately the burden is borne by the hundreds and thousands of common people. Therefore, I do not want to make statements like the ones that appear in Pakistani newspapers.⁵ It would be very easy to make such statements, and undoubtedly you will applaud me and express your strong feelings. But all of us must understand what our tone ought to be during such moments, what our duty is and how we can defend our country, and at the same time avoid doing anything which can hasten disasters instead of staving them off. Therefore, whatever I say to you in this connection, will be well considered, and not be a mere passionate speech or a threat.

As you know, we decided some time back to send some of our forces to the borders of East Punjab. Why did we decide to do so? We saw a possibility of danger there. There is so much talk of war in the Pakistani newspapers, and even in the statements of responsible statesmen the mention of *jehad*, etc., that after that no Government could keep quiet. For some time we ignored them, thinking that they did not mean very much in reality and that the people of Pakistan were deliberately being misled, and unfortunately they are adopting the wrong methods, and that nothing much would come of it. But whether there is any real danger or not, no nation can afford to ignore it completely and not to take adequate measures to protect and defend the country against any danger that might arise. So after a great deal of thought, we made what we thought were proper military arrangements, so that we could be completely prepared in case there is an attack. Secondly, we felt that if we are prepared, the threat of an attack may be reduced.

Therefore, the steps we have taken are with a view to maintaining peace and not out of a desire for war. As you know, we did not make a public announcement of this, nor did we inform you or exhort the people here or near the borders to be prepared because we did not want to give the impression that there was likely to be a war. When the news reached Pakistan, immediately there was a hue and cry in the world forum and within Pakistan projecting India as an aggressor.⁶ They wrote to us about it⁷ and we replied saying they were completely mistaken and that our policy has always been to maintain peace and that we are completely opposed to war. But we said, that we had been compelled to take these steps because of the preparations on their side and the threats that were being bandied about. In spite of this, you may have perhaps heard that they are having black-out exercises in Lahore and Rawalpindi and Sialkot and in some other important cities as a precaution against an air attack. Then they are going in for civil defence, measures like digging trenches, etc., so that in case of an air attack, people can take shelter in them. You can

5. See *post*, pp. 237-238.

6. See *post*, pp. 311-312.

7. See *post*, pp. 317-318.

imagine how much worry it must be causing to the people. After all, there are common people in every country and they must be worried and in a panic that there is going to be war and that their affairs will become topsy-turvy. I have heard that many people have left the cities and gone into the rural areas.

So, why does this happen? I can understand that it is to some extent because of the panic and worry among the people. But the Government of Pakistan is encouraging this. I cannot say what the Government of Pakistan think in their heart of hearts or what they wish to do or what they will do in the future. But I do know two or three factors. The first is, and you too must be aware of this, that a war between India and Pakistan will be a great disaster. Leave aside the matter of victory or defeat. There is no doubt that it will bring great ruin....

It is for this reason that, right from the beginning, we have followed the policy that so far as our strength will permit, we will try to maintain peace in the world. The big powers, who are full of passion and anger, are annoyed with us for not going along with them in preparing for war. We may tolerate their anger, but we cannot give up our chosen path. People often tell us that we have chosen a strange path which angers the big powers, and that if we do not cooperate with them they will not help us and we will have to stand alone. The big powers put pressure on us to join them because after all, they feel, there is no principle involved in our stand. In politics national interest takes precedence and if there is to be a war—though I have my doubts about that—it is better to be aligned with the big powers. Some want us to bend this way, and others in the opposite direction, and they think that it is in our interest to do so. It is possible that we may get aid and money and goods. But, in spite of all these arguments, we have tried to follow our own path. I feel that though this might have made a few people or countries and their Governments unhappy with us, there is definitely respect for us in their hearts that we do not easily succumb to pressure and give up our ways....

...But the undeniable fact is that Asia has awakened and its countries are in a state of resurgence. India has played a great role in this awakening, in the last thirty or forty years, and the other countries have looked to us and learnt a great deal from us and then set about in their own way.

In this situation, I come back once again to the original question. It is extremely important for us to maintain peace, make our country strong and try to prevent wars from breaking out in the world. Looking at this picture and our history and our policy, anyone can understand that it is absurd to say that we wish to fight with Pakistan. The trouble is that Pakistan has been taught absolutely wrong ideas, and so their thinking is wrong. If they were taught a different lesson, then the situation will change immediately, because after all there is not much difference between them and us. You hear constant talk of war and see preparations for war. You may not perhaps know that

about eight or nine days ago, in the midst of all this talk of war, a hockey team went from East Punjab to Lahore at their invitation and a match was played between their police and ours. People came to watch in great numbers—more than ten thousand—and the Indian team won the match. Well, that was not really the important thing. The match was played in a spirit of great friendliness and it was a strange spectacle to see how the people welcomed them with open arms.

Now look at these two pictures. On the one hand, there is a barrage of abuse and on the other, the moment there is an opportunity for meeting, old memories surge back and there is friendliness. This imposes a big responsibility on the leaders and on the people in the Government as to which way they should lead the people—towards war and ruin or towards peace. People may be of different kinds, quarrelsome and peace-loving, but a country's policies are important. It is regrettable that the Pakistani leaders are misleading the people. It is an old story. I do not claim to be a first-class man nor are they so. But the difference is that though I am an ordinary man, I have been given a very high position and having lived for the last twenty to thirty years in the shadow of Mahatma Gandhi, I have grown somewhat in stature, and like me thousands of people learnt some lessons which we can never forget. The lessons that our brethren on the other side have learnt were of a different kind which were absolutely wrong.

You must have seen in yesterday's newspapers that at a public meeting the Prime Minister of Pakistan made a very passionate speech and brandished his fist saying that that was their symbol. What can I say? It is their prerogative to select their symbols. We too chose our own, which, as you know, is the *Asoka Chakra*, a symbol of peace and culture and civilization, an ancient symbol of religion and spirituality. It does not necessarily mean that you and I are worthy of that symbol. But at least we try to follow that path and that has an effect on the nation.

I want you to understand, especially now, as there are rough winds of war danger blowing—though I would like to mention that I do not think these will lead to war—that the steps we have taken will themselves prevent a war. But we have to be fully prepared for war. I do not want that at a dangerous time like this, all of you, living in Delhi or elsewhere in India, especially in north India, should contribute even a little towards creating an atmosphere as has unfortunately been done in Pakistan. You must believe that in this debate between India and Pakistan, we are right and Pakistan is wrong. I am convinced that on the Kashmir issue also, we are right and Pakistan is wrong. But even with this conviction, we have to remember our responsibility. Even though we are right, we should take no wrong steps or create a wrong atmosphere which may lead to fighting. Our responsibility is great, and we have to ensure that even if Pakistan makes mistakes, we should take no wrong steps. You must

also remember that strong rumours float about which create passions. Just three days ago, you might have read in the papers that in Bengal, on the borders of Pakistan, there was an attack on the passengers of a train and immediately the people became greatly agitated. This is a very dangerous occurrence which is happening all over again. When we made enquiries, we found that the whole thing was wrong. The fact was that a few smugglers had a row among themselves. So, you must not believe in rumours. Yes, we have to be vigilant and prepared and do our duty.

We have specially to remember what our basic principles and policies are. Our policy is to live together in peace and amity, irrespective of caste or creed, and to ensure that every citizen gets full rights whether he is a Muslim, Sikh, Hindu or Christian and whether he is in a minority or a majority. We must not follow the communal policy of Pakistan. We may frequently hear voices in the streets of Delhi and elsewhere which can easily instigate communal trouble and violence. Please believe me that no individual or organization could help Pakistan more in her militant attitude than the actions of those who raise communal issues.

Whether it is a communal organization or any other, I am amazed that an individual is so devoid of understanding and intelligence that he raises the issue of a Hindu nation. It is not enough for such individuals that Hindus are in a majority here. All the doors are open to them and no one can take away their rights. They do not believe in our principle of secular State in which all religions have equal rights, and they want to create a Hindu nation and regard Muslims as our enemies. Where is their wisdom that they think of such divisions?

Leave aside principles, such talks instigate our youth and lead them into wrong ways which will detract them from the position and respect that we have built for ourselves in the world in the last thirty years, and give us a bad name. Secondly, it will weaken us because if we try to follow that path at all, believe me, it will lead to our country being fragmented into a thousand pieces. The unfortunate thing is that our country had been prone to this kind of fragmentation time and again. We lost our freedom because of communalism and groupism, and because we forgot the fundamental and larger issues. Our social set-up, caste system, etc., have also kept us divided and built tremendous barriers among ourselves. Now if you want to progress in this dangerous world of today, whether it is political progress or economic, we cannot do so by putting up barriers between small groups of men.

Let me give you an example. Suppose we wish to increase production from land, as we do wish because it is very important to increase the production of foodgrains, etc., it cannot be done by individuals farming small pieces of land. No individual can hope to earn more than what he needs to survive by cultivating small pieces of land. I do not mean to say that individuals should

cultivate a hundred or five hundred acres each. You must remember that one of the first steps that we took was to start the process of putting an end to the zamindari system. We would have completed it a long time back, but unfortunately legal complications have come in the way which are responsible for the delay. Anyhow, it will be put an end to. We are seeing to it that small farmers will own the land that they cultivate but if each individual gets not more than an acre or two as his share, then it will neither do him nor the nation any good. The best thing is that a hundred or five hundred farmers in the village to get together to form a cooperative among themselves and do farming, because big farms give a better yield. I have given you a small example. You can apply it to other tasks. If we divide ourselves into small localities or castes or organizations, then the nation cannot make much progress.

This is a very fundamental point. Those who raise communal issues and try to instigate the people are in reality stabbing the country at the back. India can never hope to make any progress without unity. Consider the way the world is moving and how fraught with danger it is, and the thing that the world likes about India and why it respects us or why we have sometimes fallen in its estimation.

Nowadays, Pakistan is trying to give us a bad name everywhere in the world, and why do they succeed? It is because they go to other countries and speak of the activities of our Hindu communal organizations. Nothing can do us more harm than the statements of our communal organizations. Pakistanis point out to them and say that India wants to attack Pakistan or that we wish to absorb Pakistan in India and that we are narrow-minded. All this produces an effect on the United States. It is strange that we should say such things. You have to realize that it is absurd to talk in a communal vein with a view to creating internal disharmony. If we wish to make our country strong and face Pakistan or anyone else, it can only be by being firm on our principles and not by following Pakistan's policy. The communal organizations here seem to feel that they can combat Pakistan only by copying their ways, which is absurd because that is a wrong way, and all of us must understand that.

You may rest assured that, as far as the security of the country is concerned, we will make all possible efforts. At the same time, it is necessary that there should be complete peace and unity in the country, no communal quarrels or tension or panic. This is very essential. I do not know if you remember, when about three and a half or four years ago, Pakistan attacked Kashmir and their troops had almost reached up to Srinagar, there was absolutely no panic among the people in Srinagar who went about their work calmly. Not a shop was closed down. Such is their courage. Ultimately, it was their courage, not merely the army, which saved the people of Kashmir. It is a strange thing that Kashmir is discussed as if it were a personal property which can be handed over to India or Pakistan. Kashmir is a land of forty million people and it is they who

will decide. It is entirely against our principle to put any kind of pressure on them. Pakistan has shown, by sending in her troops, that she wants to forcibly occupy Kashmir.

I shall say just one or two things more and then stop. I mentioned right at the beginning, about the various weaknesses which have crept into the Congress. It is obvious that in any organization, whether it is the Congress or any other, there has to be discipline because without discipline no organization can work. But it is also obvious that discipline does not mean that the will to work should be sapped or that the workers should be stifled. Discipline means that the work should increase and not decrease. Now there are big problems facing the Congress. We should not panic about them or get worried. My view has always been that there is only one organization in the country, the Congress, which can really serve the country. I know that there are great difficulties. It is possible that there are internal dissensions. It is obvious that I do not like such things, but I do not let them worry me. Ours is a live country and we should not easily panic, and if one method fails, then we should try another. Many things may happen in the future which may surprise or distress you. But I would like to tell you that you should remain confident and let nothing worry you, so that we can go ahead on our chosen path. There is no doubt that India is facing tremendous problems, but at the same time I am quite confident that we will successfully overcome them and solve these problems if we remain firm on our principles and do not get carried away. So please remember those principles and do not get panicky about small quarrels.

2. The War Scare Created by Astrologers¹

A couple of weeks ago, I resigned from the Congress Working Committee.² Please remember that I resigned not from the Congress but from its Working Committee. I have mentioned at various places my reasons for resigning. I did it for one thing to strengthen the Congress and in the hope that once more new blood may flow through its veins and that it may function as a live

1. Address at a public meeting organised by the Delhi State Congress Committee, 6 September 1951. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Original in Hindi. Extracts.
2. On 10 August 1951.

organization. People have been indulging either in futile debates and criticism or resting on memories of old achievements and are unwilling to do any work now. I wanted to shake them out of their complacency and to arouse their minds a little into thinking about important issues.

Well, I do not know about other matters but at least in this I have succeeded a little—not so much I as circumstances. After all, what impact can the resignation of an individual or his making a noise have at any time? But sometimes, when the time is ripe, even a hint can have a tremendous impact. So, when in my opinion, I saw that the time was ripe, I gave a small hint and it had an effect. Or rather, circumstances had an effect because my hint was more in the nature of a spark. Circumstances are forcing us, you and I and all of us, to consider whether the nation's health is sound and whether it is on the right track or not. What do you make of the impact my decision has had? One is that there is a desire in the country to do something and to understand things better, an anxiety that perhaps what we are doing may not be quite right, and whether the nation's inner springs which had perhaps been suppressed or crushed somewhat in the past do not get dried up completely. This spirited response had had an invigorating influence on me, whatever the outcome of the meeting the day after tomorrow may be. So this is perhaps one reason why today's meeting is not a quite suitable occasion, quite suitable because it is not proper for me to speak at length about what is likely to transpire in the A.I.C.C. meeting. I shall certainly give you some hint.

I have heard rumours that people are under the impression that there is likely to be a war.³ Just now when I was coming here, a few ladies who were with me in the car, told me that the news in Delhi is that war will start on the 9th. I said I have certainly not heard this, I am completely ignorant about it. Who started this rumour? Whose prediction is it? Is it some great astrologer who has predicted this? They said they did not know but there were rumours to this effect. Anyhow, I have no objection to people discussing things because, after all, in a large city like this, there are all sorts of people and those who have too much leisure usually indulge in this kind of imaginary nonsense and spread them around either to frighten the people or merely to pass their time. I would not worry so much if it were merely a matter of rumours and a certain uneasiness in the minds of the people because only the weak-minded listen to gossip. If war is to start on the 9th, then you have barely three days left and you should be preparing for it. How can you have time to waste? But it is absurd, and I do not know who starts these rumours. Some part of the responsibility lies with our newspapers because a few days ago I read in one of the newspapers in Delhi, it had been shown very convincingly, by articles

3. A newspaper in Delhi had reported an astrological prediction that war would break out between India and Pakistan on 9 September 1951.

and statements from astrologers, or perhaps if the editor himself who had turned an astrologer, that Pakistan was about to attack and that there would be war. Perhaps the date was also mentioned. In their opinion they thought they had written about a very interesting event which would boost the sales of their newspaper. Two newspapers of the Punjab copied this newspaper. There is a newspaper in Bombay which goes so far in search of news that ultimately what they publish does not have relation to facts. What they publish is either outright falsehood, or even if there is a grain of truth, it is so garbled as to sound false. This talk of war also started with two or three newspapers, was copied by others, and exaggerated. It was written about Amritsar. What is all this? I hear that the astrologers are earning a great deal these days because the very rich are willing to pay.

It is necessary for us to consider how we propose to run this country. Are we going to act according to what these astrologers tell us? Have you ever paused to consider that if it had really been in their power to predict the future, would they have to come to you for money? They could have had a great future. They would not be in search of a few rupees here and there, but could have carved a much better future for themselves. It is absurd to fall into their clutches and unnecessarily get into a panic. So I want that we should understand these rumours a little. What I cannot tolerate is foolishness. What do we wish to make of our country? Do we want to make it a nation of brave people or a nation of sheep who would run helter skelter on the advice of astrologers? What is all this?

Once upon a time we dreamt of India's freedom, and for years men in this country ran after it like mad men and sacrificed everything that they had. They were not men who ran after astrologers and if they had, we would have certainly not got freedom. But that dream did not consist merely of removal of the British rule. That had to be done, that was the first step. But much more was to follow, like the removal of a thousand and one ills that beset this country, the removal of poverty and the lightening of the burden of the people. All this was to be done gradually because nothing can be achieved magically. It involves hard work. We wanted to raise our country to the status of a great power, a country which follows the path of truth and be an example to the world of our ability to exist peacefully as a nation irrespective of castes, creed, race and profession. This was our dream and, as I have often said and written, this India was really a great country once upon a time. We cannot exist as a second-rate nation. India either falls or reaches the pinnacle of glory—it cannot be a middling country. Our history stands witness to both—of India touching the pinnacle of power and glory and of falling into an abyss. You can see both aspects in the history of India.

Anyhow, I thought that our days of degeneracy were over and once we were free from bondage, a new era of greatness would begin when we would

rise very high in stature, that we would make great progress in every direction, produce more wealth; that the people would be better off; and that in every respect, mentally and spiritually, we would be a great nation which would bow to none, never take recourse to deceit and lies, and follow internally and externally, a policy of truth and integrity.

We have taken our motto from the *Upanishads*—*Satyamev Jayate*—Truth shall prevail. We have certainly chosen the right symbols. Our flag is an extremely beautiful one and the motif on it is a constant reminder of our ancient past. It is the Ashok Chakra. Our national anthem is a song, a beautiful song, written by Rabindranath Tagore. Its words proclaim our love for our country and the world. Often such songs are full of bitterness towards others. In our national anthem, there is nothing but love. You must have heard it a thousand times, sung by people or played by a band or an orchestra. It is the opinion of many people, and I have confirmed this in other countries too, that of all the national anthems, ours is the best musically. As you can see, there is verve and strength and softness in it, with no jarring tones. When you hear it, it conjures up an image of strength combined with gentleness, as a nation or an individual ought to be. So we have chosen our symbols well, no doubt. But after all nothing is achieved by mere symbols; we have to work for it.

So, as I was saying, we dreamt of making our country a first-rate one, in its principles, and performance too. Mahatma Gandhi has shown us the path. But much has happened in the last few years, which has distressed us and filled us with shame. Whatever happened in Pakistan pained us but it did not fill us with shame. It angered us but we were filled with shame about our own actions. There have been many such instances, and if they are an indication of the state of a country's mind and heart then they lead one to think that this country, comprising as it does of small men with small minds, can never become great. But there was faith and confidence that this was a temporary phase and that there are a number of people in India who hold their heads high and look up to the stars, who remember the old principles and are awakened and braced, who are capable of going ahead very rapidly. This thought used to give us confidence and strength....

The world of today is in a strange state of flux, whether you take the United States, Europe, Asia or Korea where nobody can predict what is likely to happen. But we can form an opinion. As you know, we took a decision a few months ago that we shall be fully prepared for an eventuality of an attack on India. We did this, first because a country ought to be fully prepared and secondly because such a state of preparedness in itself will stave off any threat to our security. There can be an attack only if there is an impression that a country is not prepared and there is a desire to take advantage of that. But if a country is prepared, others are more circumspect and there is no desire to gamble. Therefore, we made full preparations and there is not the

least need for you to lose a night's sleep or to make any changes in your daily activities. This does not mean that we can become complacent because there is no room for complacency in the world of today. A country which falls prey to easy living and complacency becomes weak, and is exposed to danger. So we have to be prepared and vigilant at all times. But all this panic and frightening others is not a sign of a brave people and as I said, there is absolutely no need for this. Please note that today is the sixth of September and there are three days to go for the ninth. If nothing happens on the ninth, you must stop believing in astrologers or newspapermen. You must then realize that what they say about the imminence of war is absolutely wrong. If there is to be a war, I shall duly inform you of it. You must not listen to rumours. The problem is that some people take undue advantage by spreading such rumours.

You must consider the problem of the communal organizations too. Which way do they look? What are their ideals and principles? It is worth examining this. It is not enough for me to name them as being communal organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha, the Jan Sangh or the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. These are absolutely absurd and bad. By bad I mean organizations which look in the wrong direction and generate wrong emotions which will undoubtedly harm the nation. I can tell you all this but your minds must grasp why they are bad. After all, I have no enmity with them. I want them also to fight for India's cause. I feel bad that people should be so foolish as to do things which are patently harmful to the nation.

If they dislike the Congress, they can join some other organization and form a platform. I am not constraining them to come into the Congress, though I believe that the task of the nation's progress can best be done by the Congress rather than these small, petty organizations which have sprung up recently and spend their time shouting slogans or abuses. That is not the way to ensure a country's progress. Sometimes I read reports of meetings held by these communal organizations in Delhi and I am amazed that they should use such a language in a city like Delhi whose culture and civilization date back thousands of years into the past. At least some semblance of civilized behaviour ought to be maintained. I cannot understand where these people come from with no manners or culture, and only know how to abuse....

After all, why do I say that these communal organizations harm the nation? As you know, Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress have stressed the danger of communalism for the last thirty or thirty-five years. What did it mean? It had some meaning during the freedom struggle and thereafter too because in India—it is true of other countries too but I am talking especially of India—if we are not careful to bear in mind constantly that we have different races and religions in our country, and that each one of them ought to have the freedom and opportunity to live here as citizens, and therefore if we follow any other path,

then undoubtedly the first thing that will happen is that India falls in the esteem of the world. You can easily check this by seeing the impact these communal organizations have produced in different parts of the country. One feels that there is a sign of weakness and the country is backward. Ever since Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress started stressing it, respect for India went up in the world.

If we give in to communal tendencies, India becomes weak. There is no doubt about that. And the weakness is not superficial but deep. This business of communalism may start today between Hindus and Muslims, but it does not stop there. It spreads among the Christians and Sikhs, and so it goes on. You must remember that we have a large Christian population in the South from ancient times, for the last fifteen or eighteen hundred years. Apart from this, if you go to Madras, you will find the Brahmins and the non-Brahmins quarrelling among themselves. What I mean to say is that once communalism starts, it spreads very rapidly and becomes a source of weakness in our body-politic. Perhaps the caste system may have had some meaning when it started, and it welded the country together into a common system. But that was thousands of years ago. For centuries now, it has been a source of weakness in our country, and undoubtedly it was a major factor in India being in bondage when external forces came in and conquered us. The moment this tendency starts, it spreads from caste to caste and even to professions. I speak from experience when I say that. It can immediately break up India into thousands of fragments from within and make her weak. Undoubtedly, what happened long time back can happen once again, and India will be in bondage. Please do not think that now that India has achieved freedom, it will be maintained on its own. Freedom can never be maintained without effort and unless people are constantly vigilant and protect that freedom it slips away. If internal weakness and dissensions spring up, the nation falls and becomes a prey to external enemies.

When I hear what these communal organizations say, I can think of only one explanation and that is, these people have understood neither the history of India nor that of the world. They cannot understand what can really make India strong. Even respected elders say all sorts of things like, bring in the army in Bengal, etc. One of our respected Members of Parliament who has been a Minister⁴ gives such careless and irresponsible speeches that I feel amazed at them. It is amazing that he should make such irresponsible statements in a communal passion. Let us admit that he has forgotten how India became weak and backward in the past. But he ought to be at least aware of the realities of today which any politician must understand so as to decide what he can say and what he cannot.

4. S.P. Mookerjee.

Let me tell you that if anything weakens us, it is not what Pakistan can do to us, whatever atrocities it may commit. What weakens us is the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha constantly making speeches which are against the spirit of international law and our agreements with Pakistan. We have no proper answer when Pakistan complains about such statements. By indulging in such talks, the wrong that Pakistan does gets covered up. We may complain to Pakistan about their actions and quite justifiably so. But, on our side, when the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Jan Sangh, etc., issue all sorts of statements and a list of their activities come to us from Pakistan, we have no logical explanation for them except to say that in a free country, we cannot really stop anyone from saying what he wishes to say. Our Constitution gives full freedom to everyone to say what they like, whether it is right or wrong or stupid. But why this irresponsibility?

There are many important problems before the world and India. I hear that the municipal elections are taking place in Delhi these days. Those who are prepared to compromise their integrity and forget their principles in order to win an election, or for a momentary gain, are dangerous. If we fight an election or try to run an organization by such methods it may bring momentary gains but ultimately the damage will be enormous. You must bear this in mind and beware of communal voices when they are raised. You must clearly understand how harmful such things are. If these voices are ever dominant in India then without any doubt, India will be broken up into thousands of fragments and once again the factors which made India weak and backward in the past and made her lose her freedom will raise their heads, and we will fall, instead of going ahead.

It may sound very nice to some people to hear it said that we will create a Hindu *rashtra*, etc. I cannot understand what it means. Hindus are in a majority in this country and whatever they wish will be done. But the moment you talk of a Hindu *rashtra* you speak in a language which no other country except one can comprehend and that country is Pakistan because they are familiar with this concept. They can immediately justify their creation of an Islamic nation by pointing out to the world that we are doing something similar. Hindu *rashtra* can only mean one thing and that is you leave the modern way and get into a narrow, old-fashioned way of thinking, and fragment India into pieces. Those who are not Hindus will be reduced in status. You may say patronisingly that you will look after the Muslims or Christians or others, as in Pakistan they say that they will look after the Hindus. Do you think any race or individual will accept for long the claim that they are looked after while we sit high above them? Is this what your Constitution guarantees? We have proclaimed to the world that every citizen of this country has equal rights whatever religion or caste or creed he may belong to and everyone is an equal shareholder in India's freedom. You believe in this, then what these

communal organizations say is wrong, fundamentally wrong, useless and harmful and ought to be suppressed.

Nowadays Hindu religion is much talked about. If these communalists had been its advocates in ancient times, then Hinduism could not have attained the grandeur it did. Hinduism took pride in its strength and welcomed diverse thoughts from all over the world into its fold, and yet it maintained its status and stood firm as a great religion. Now we have this new breed of advocates of Hinduism who are extremely narrow-minded and ignorant people. They try to tell me about Hinduism. I know much more than they do about this religion.

Recently some people had come to me in connection with the Hindu Code Bill and started a hunger strike at my door-step. I sent for them and asked them what they wanted. They said that what we were doing is against the *shastras*. I said, "You talk of the Hindu Code Bill. Have you ever read it?" They did not have any idea what it was all about except that they had heard that it was some sort of an attack on the *shastras*. Secondly, I said to them that as I know much more about the ancient Hindu *shastras*, why should I not do what I think is proper? I have read about those ancient times and written about them. In my view, there is a difference between the fundamental principles which form the basis of Hindu philosophy and religion and its mere superficial elements. Yet they dare to come and teach me about Hindu *shastras* just because they have a large caste mark on their foreheads. Caste marks do not bring wisdom. If, by some misfortune, the reins of the government pass into the hands of these new saviours of Hinduism, they will land themselves and the country in a deep abyss.

So you must consider these facts. We cannot see any issue in isolation. Life's problems are always inter-connected. Whether it is a political problem or something connected with your day-to-day lives or professions or unemployment, or whether it is a social problem, none of them can be isolated. Ultimately they are all connected with one another and influence one another. If someone claims that he would like to go ahead rapidly in the political field but does not want any changes in any other field, I cannot accept that such a thing is possible. Yes, in some special instances it may be possible. For instance, during our freedom struggle against British rule, I can accept that every individual was fighting for a political end. But even there you will find that those who were afraid of social reform and progress did not readily jump into the political arena because they were scared.

Similarly with democracy. People pay lip-service to democracy but there is fear of the people in their hearts. They are scared of what the people can do if they are given the reins of power.

So what I want you to understand is that the major problems of the world, whether they are political or economic or social problems, are all connected with one another—they cannot exist in compartments. You cannot say now

that we are free, there are no more political problems. There are numerous problems. The political question now is of our relationship with other countries. Then there are economic problems, of how the country is to progress and how to remove the ills which beset the country and its social problems.

You will see that those who are most backward economically and socially, will often resort to abusing other countries merely to show that they are very brave and strong. They abuse Pakistan, standing at the crossroads in Delhi and say that they will attack, and all sorts of things.⁵ Or, for instance, they may express disapproval of the United States, and another group may show anger towards the Soviet Union. So politics boils down to abuse of other countries. There is no personal danger to an individual in this, though it may cause damage to the country. This is absurd, but they try to show themselves to be brave and impress the people that they can abuse Pakistan with impunity, though it is obvious that abusing is no sign of courage. There is no danger in it to them. Anybody can start abusing and say that Jawaharlal is very slack in the matter of Pakistan and that he believes in appeasing Pakistan.⁶ How am I to judge myself? What can I say? But whether Jawaharlal appeases or not, he is quite clear in his mind about one thing and that is that the work of a nation cannot be conducted by indulging in abuse, but by civilized methods. This is the first principle.

The second principle is that an individual's or a nation's strength does not lie in blustering or abusing but in acting calmly and with firmness. Shouting and abusing is a sign of helplessness. It does not show bravery. It is crude to shout from the rooftops or to indulge in abuses. It is not the way of gentlemen nor is it a sign of great strength. Therefore, I tell you that these communal organizations keep clamouring constantly for action because they are not the ones who will be directly involved. They will be sitting at home while others will have to do the fighting. So you must understand these aspects.

5. The Hindu Mahasabha observed a "Kashmir Day" on 2 September 1951 in big towns and cities all over the country in reiteration of its "policy of reciprocity" towards Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.
6. S.P. Mookerjee, speaking at a public meeting at Kanchrapara on 28 July 1951, said: "It is the weak and vacillating policy of Nehru which has worsened the Kashmir situation and emboldened Pakistan to take up a defiant attitude." The only solution, according to him, was the abandonment of the policy of appeasement.

3. Combat Communal Reaction¹

...It is not surprising that elections do generate a great deal of interest everywhere. In our country this is the first time these elections are being held on such a large scale. Millions of people will take part and, in a way, it is a tremendous challenge to us. For one thing, it is a test of our organizational capacity. It will show whether we can organize such a big task calmly or whether we make a great deal of noise. There is need for tremendous organization for this. Secondly, people all over the world are watching how we vote and whom we elect and what we expect from them. That is, as a nation, what are our goals and ideals and where do we wish to go?

You must be aware that in the time of elections, every candidate talks big and makes promises in the air. Every party takes out its election manifesto in which they go as far as they can in making promises. Some of the manifestoes have surprised me and made me happy. There are some parties in the country which are intensely backward in social and economic policies and yet in the election manifestoes they have put out things which make them appear far advanced on the path of socialism. Even the Hindu Mahasabha, which is so backward in these matters, has in a roundabout way, incorporated some socialistic principles² though its members are in no way concerned with such ideas. In fact, they become extremely perturbed whenever socialism is mentioned. As the elections are coming close, their brains have worked feverishly to produce some phrases and expressions to impress the people. These trends are in evidence everywhere and all the parties will try to follow them.

The Congress is definitely on this path. But you must not look at this picture merely in the context of elections, though elections are no doubt important. We must look at the picture of India in its entirety, and though we have our own problems, we must try to have a wider vision. You are well aware of the complicated world that we live today, and the tremendous problems that confront us and affect our lives and the future of the country.

Recently, you may have seen that in San Francisco a peace treaty was signed with Japan.³ Many countries signed the treaty. We were also invited

1. Speech at a public meeting in Lucknow, 16 September 1951. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Original in Hindi. Extracts.
2. In the Hindu Mahasabha's election manifesto, issued on 13 August 1951, the party's aim was defined as "Hindu Socialism", or a "judicious and golden mean" between capitalism and socialism.
3. The 52-nation conference convened at San Francisco to terminate the war with Japan ended on 8 September 1951, when the Japanese peace treaty was signed by all the Allied nations with the exception of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

but we refused to go. Why? Why did we not accept it? What are our views on this matter? What is our special connection with this treaty? These are big questions. I will not go into all of them here, but I want to merely hint at the connection between these big problems and our daily lives because they are concerned with war and peace in the world. Such things are bound to affect our country. We do not intend starting a war or taking part in one if there is a war. But nobody can predict what may happen, except that it is extremely dangerous and will bring ruin upon us. Half the world will be ruined and the other half will certainly be powerfully affected. Therefore we are interested—leave aside the larger principles, etc.—our self-interest dictates, in trying to prevent a war which will harm us, and all our plans for the development of the country will come to a standstill.

So, the question of a peace treaty arose in Japan. As you know, we have no enmity with Japan. We want Japan to make progress and we wish to have friendly relations with them. Now I hope that we will be able to conclude a separate treaty with Japan, a simple treaty without any conditions attached, except to cooperate in the field of trade and establishment of diplomatic contacts. We were not against this peace treaty. But we felt that the manner in which it was prepared was unsatisfactory. We felt that it would not bring peace to Asia, but in fact increase tensions. We did not wish to be responsible for that because there can be no peace in Japan or Korea unless the big powers surrounding them stop interfering in their affairs. I am fully convinced that the line we adopted in the matter of Japan is absolutely correct, and I will even go so far as to say that others will gradually come to accept, even if they do not agree with us today, that we have done no harm to anyone and in fact we have kept the door open for further improvement in relations.

I spoke about Japan. The problems in Europe relating to war and peace are many. I will not talk to you about them, though it has become a part of my duty nowadays to take into account all these problems and take decisions on them. Our foreign policy has come in for a great deal of discussion in the last three or four years, and you must be aware of this. We are often asked why we do not side with this power or that. Our answer is quite simple. We wish to have friendly relations with every country, provided that it has no conditions attached. We do not wish to enter into any military alliance. We shall express our views on each issue independently and not be pressurized by any other power into saying things against our will as is happening very frequently in the world today. This is broadly our foreign policy and I am sure that it will benefit the world as well as us.

Then take the question of Pakistan or of Kashmir which concerns us very closely. In the last two months, Pakistan has been making a great deal of noise that Indian forces are stationed on their borders and that India is about to attack them. Well, anyhow, there was an exchange of correspondence on

this between me and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and there have been further discussions too. But we must understand this issue of Pakistan and connected with it that of Kashmir. Some people say that I am trying to appease Pakistan or that I am bowing down to them or whatever it is. I am prepared to accept that I do not show stiffness because I have the strength to accept any challenge coming from that side. I am prepared to appease Pakistan or any other nation, provided our principles are not affected. It is strange that people who did not lift a finger during the freedom movement and sided with our opponents, should suddenly become very brave and demand that we should march on Pakistan. After all, it is not they who will have to fight.

So we must try to understand why some people keep talking about war all the time like this without any thought as to how it will affect the country or the world. Even parties which can be reasonably expected to show a sense of responsibility unfortunately betray a complete lack of intelligence. One of them is the Hindu Mahasabha and there are some other communal organizations. However much I try using the intelligence that I have—which, without boasting, I can claim is not mean—I simply cannot understand how anyone can dispassionately be a part of communal organizations. I can understand people, getting carried away by momentary passion, riot, and even commit murder. But communalism is something that has no relation to the modern world. It may have been relevant in some past age and, though these organizations try to hide under the cloak of nationalism, as a matter of fact, there is no connection between them and the modern world. The one strong feature of these organizations is that they are opposed to all progress and there can be no doubt that no nation can make any progress by following their ways.

There are enormous problems before us, and it is obvious that the biggest of them is the economic problem, the problem of development, of removing unemployment and poverty from the country, of increasing the wealth of the country by more production and ensuring its just and equitable distribution. These are big problems which confront every country in the world but specially so in a country like ours which is so poor. We have to constantly look for solutions to these problems. These problems are not peculiar to our country alone but confront practically all the countries of Asia, whether you go to Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran or any other country in this region. All these countries have become extremely backward in the last hundred or hundred and fifty years. Just a couple of hundred years ago, they were great nations, rich in resources. But they became weak and backward, and the countries of Europe took advantage of that. Europe is not to be blamed for this. I am not prepared to accept that Europe was to blame. The weak are to be blamed. A progressive, developing country cannot be blamed for wanting to expand. Our country had become weak and the reasons are not far to seek.

The very issues which the Hindu Mahasabha is advocating today had weakened us earlier. Anyone who reads the history of this country can understand why our country had become weak or how we had gone ahead. We must take advantage of our previous experience. There are three kinds of people in this world. One is the type which benefits from the experience of others. The second is of those who learn from their own experience. The third type learns neither from its own nor from others' experience. Those who benefit from others' experience are intelligent people. Those who learn from their own experience may not be very far-sighted, but they are cautious. Those who do neither are totally devoid of intelligence.

So we have the experience of hundreds of years of Indian history and of the world, especially of the last two or three hundred years. We can learn something from it, and from what can weaken or strengthen a nation. Why were we, such a rich nation, reduced to the present-day poverty? How can we make our country wealthy once more and make our people better off? There cannot be one definite answer to all these questions but there are many ways open before us and if we wish, we can learn many lessons from our previous experience.

There have been many upheavals in the world in our lifetime. There were two big world wars, between 1914 and 1919 and between 1939 and 1945. There were great revolutions in two of the biggest nations of the world—Russia and China. All these developments teach us so much. They teach us lessons which are political, economic besides so much else. That does not mean that we should imitate the Soviet Union, China or the United States. We have to run our country in our own way. Our roots are in our own soil which we cannot pull out. But we must still learn from the experience of other countries and understand the world.

Nowadays there is a cold war between two countries—the Soviet Union and the United States. It is our good fortune that we have friendly relations with both the countries and we shall try to maintain that. Now take the situation between these two countries. There is bitterness between them but there are many similarities also between them. They have developed in the same way with the help of machines and their emphasis has been on industrialization. The United States is a different world altogether. But it is a world of machines, not of human beings, though there live several crores of human beings too. They produce everything through machines, and the wealth that they are able to produce is enormous. It is amazing how much they are producing. But the question arises as to where all this wealth is taking them and how it affects their human beings. Will the human beings also become like machines? If you go to the Soviet Union, you will find that they have also made tremendous progress in the last thirty or forty years. All the countries of Asia and Europe have changed and the people are better off.

On the other hand, you see there certain aspects which are not very appealing. Anyhow, we do not have to imitate anyone. But the fact is that two hundred years ago, when the British came to India, we were in such a state of chaos that we were completely unaware of what was happening in the world. We used to think that we were great, and continued to be immersed in our own thinking or in pursuit of comfort and ease. The world made progress and we remained backward.

Take some very small instances. The world had known printing for hundreds of years, but it was done here only after the British came and that too very gradually. We used to get books here from the time of Akbar or even before that. But we did not learn the art. Take watches, which are very useful and extremely easy to make. India could not produce watches. They were being made all over the world, in Europe and the United States. It is not that we could not produce them in India. It is obvious that we could—we do know—but we were steeped in false pride and full of hostility towards the new age and kept our minds closed. We were not prepared to learn anything new. We could not make watches and print books, and when the new age brought new weapons of war, it became dangerous because the new armies could easily conquer us. This is just what happened. We grew weaker when there was tremendous progress made by the people in Europe, in their weaponry, armies and science. The result was that a handful of people came and conquered our brave soldiers who fought with outmoded weapons.

In short, we had become extremely backward. There is nothing more dangerous for a nation than to close its mind to the outside world and feeling very superior, hold other countries in poor esteem. We had decided against overseas travel because we considered it as running counter to the teachings of our religion. Then we became bound by all sorts of taboos regarding food. Untouchability grew. In short, our attention came to be more and more diverted towards such trivialities which left no scope for initiative in new tasks, and in the meantime the world went ahead. The face of Europe changed completely. Culturally and intellectually, Europe made tremendous strides. The countries became very rich and their armies grew powerful. They did not acquire all this wealth overnight from somewhere. They produced it by their hard work and by developing their machines. Then they started exporting what they produced to our country and drained us of our wealth. Europe became a centre of the world, in wealth, in industry, in science, and everything else. It began to attract the wealth of other countries and great nations like China, India and Iran were completely subjugated.

So you must understand that India fell because of her narrow-mindedness and a foolish pride in old traditions. We became independent, certainly because of the nation's courage, but to some extent because of circumstances, the most important of them being the appearance of Mahatma Gandhi on the

scene. Many other factors contributed, but this was the most important. He breathed new life into us and showed us a new path. The moment we became free, we began to feel that our work was over and all we had to do was to reap the fruits of our sacrifices. Even those who had made no sacrifices suddenly became claimants to the benefits. We began to divert our attention towards the demands of the various parts of the country when we ought to have been concentrating our energies in constructive, development work. It is obvious that everyone wants something. But how are all these demands to be fulfilled? You must consider this....

...We must bear this in mind that a country can progress only in proportion to the work that we put in—by the right kind of work, in constructive tasks. There is no other way, whether you have capitalism, socialism or communism or whatever ism it is. There has to be hard work behind all this in order to produce wealth.

All the systems are only various methods of distribution of that wealth. But the fundamental thing is to work hard and produce more from the land and factories and industries. What is the difference between India and the United States? It is not that the United States had a great deal of wealth from the beginning. They produce an enormous amount every year from their factories and land with the help of machines. These are the important problems. They followed science and this is their reward. We closed our minds and ears and so became backward. Our farmers are by no means useless and the soil is rich. Why then do we produce only nine or ten maunds of wheat from one acre of land when in other countries the production per acre is twenty to thirty maunds? Even in India in some places we have managed to produce that much. But our average is only nine maunds. The United States produces three or four times as much as we. Therefore, their wealth also increases three or four fold. We can easily solve our food problem if we increase our production even by 10 or 15 per cent. It is obvious that it can be done because it has been done elsewhere in the world, whether it is because they use better fertilizers or whatever it is. We can solve our food problem very easily and the prices will also come down immediately.

I want you to understand that we cannot progress by the calculations of astrologers or by performing a *mahayagna* to increase our wealth and freedom. This is a dangerous thought. I do not believe in astrology. But whether it is true or not, it is dangerous to believe in such superstitions because it impairs logical thinking. People start believing in stars and astrologers. It is a strange thing that astrologers cannot help themselves and remain poor. So I want to combat this thinking which prevents us from utilizing all the strength and resources at our disposal to make progress and lays stress on looking backward or believes in petitioning the government for everything.

This has been in my mind for the last few years, and I felt that of all the

important things that needed to be done in India, the most important is to imbue a scientific thinking among the people. Science must be taught not only in schools and colleges but scientific research must be developed and encouraged so that we need not copy others. We can find ways ourselves. We must encourage scientific thinking as in other countries and therefore we started a programme of opening science laboratories. It is a grand scheme and at the moment there are about ten to eleven huge laboratories all over India. There is one each in Lucknow, Delhi, Poona, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore, Jamshedpur and there are some in other places. They form the basis of our scientific progress.

I wish to tell you that the most valuable asset in our country is not politicians like myself—but our young boys and girls who are scientists and are for the first time getting an opportunity to work. In fact, our laboratories all over the country can gradually stand comparison with the laboratories in the United States and England. We can take advantage of the research done in other countries too. We can gradually start producing whatever we need ourselves if not today, certainly within five to ten years, instead of helplessly looking to others. Therefore, we laid this foundation of scientific research. But even more beneficial can be the combined work of all our young scientists working all over the country in our laboratories. I feel that the greatest good they can do is to encourage scientific thinking among the people of India towards the scientific and technical world of today. As I said earlier, it is wrong to destroy our ancient roots. These should remain and we must cherish the values that gave us strength and earned the respect of others for us in the past.

We must not blindly copy others. But, at the same time, it is important to understand and adopt the techniques of the modern world and the things that it produces. Science ultimately produces weapons of war too—modern warfare is the heritage of science. However much we may boast and feel proud of our army, they are like child's playthings unless we learn to use modern weapons and modern science and technology.

If you mention these facts to communal organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha or the R.S.S. or the newly formed Jan Sangh, they will not say that science should be given up. They will agree that science is a good thing. But it is not enough to say that science is a good thing. Our minds should be scientifically trained and that thinking should have an effect on our lives. A millionaire can hire engineers and scientists to run his factory and make money. But that does not lead to a country's progress. These traders and merchants do not have the capacity to think scientifically. They only know how to make money which they do by all sorts of means. That is different. You do not make progress by hiring a few foreign or Indian scientists. For instance, you may own a motor car and hire a driver to drive it, but you may be completely ignorant of how a motor car works. We cannot then produce a car

unless we have a scientific or technical mind. There is no doubt that there are first-rate minds in India. They should be given opportunities which they are not getting.

These communal organizations do not advocate giving up science, but their minds look backwards to a time which has no relation to modern science. Now take Lucknow, for instance, which forms part of the heartland of India. You may have a picture of Lucknow and its near about places in your mind. But India is a very large country and there are many differences between its various parts, in dress and climate, etc. If you go to Kashmir or Ladakh, you will be unable to bear the cold. If you go to Madras, it is totally different. But there is something which has bound the whole country together for thousands of years, which is a very invaluable bond. But there are many differences of climate, dress, traditions, religion and food, etc. There are bound to be such differences in such a large country. India can now become great only in one way and that is by maintaining her unity. There is no other way. At the same time, we must accept the differences and give them an opportunity to flourish. We must have complete freedom in the country, irrespective of religion and caste. We must not concede what these communal organizations want to have i.e., a nation of Hindus where people of other religions can also live only as a lower order. What we dislike about Pakistan and her policies and complain about is repeated by some people here which surprises the world. They do not understand that if such things are wrong in Pakistan, they are wrong here too. In fact, they are wrong in a greater degree because we have been brought up on totally different principles. We cannot follow the way Pakistan does even if some people wish us to. We cannot follow that path even if we tried, and will only succeed in breaking up the unity of the country.

There are many things in India which weaken us. In ancient times perhaps they may have given us some kind of strength but there is no doubt that those are the very factors, like the caste system which weakened us. They have come down to us from ancient times but they are all barriers and the moment you lean towards communal principles or religious differences, it has an immediate effect, as it is. Then there are differences between Brahmins and non-Brahmins. In short, it is such a snake-pit that the moment you start anything, all sorts of quarrels and fights burst forth from it.

So this is not merely a question of principles. It is a basic question. You must understand this. I am taking up so much of your time because I consider it of the utmost importance to suppress and root out communalism in India. I would even give our economic problems only second priority. All our reactionaries are lined up behind these communalists and pretend to serve the country, but in fact to promote their own interests. Therefore, it is a very dangerous thing if communalism is allowed to grow even a little in any form because it grows surreptitiously, not openly.

I became even more worried when I see these elements spreading in the Congress also. I am extremely perturbed because if these sentiments spread to the Congress, there will be no other organization willing to stand up for the principles for which the Congress has stood. We keep passing resolutions but many of our Congressmen have shown by their behaviour and in practice that they do not believe in them and look elsewhere. It has become even clearer when some of the most important members in the Congress lay bare their emotions which bear no relation to Congress principles. This has become a very serious matter, and whether their emotions are right or wrong is a different matter, but we are deceiving ourselves. It will be criminal if I deceive you or the nation. You have the right to accept it or not, and you can even remove me. But I am helpless if you do not do what I say. I have to keep trying to make you understand. But if you dislike it, it will be my misfortune. I will be deceiving you and be unpatriotic if I do not say what is in my mind quite clearly. You can accept them to the extent that you like. If you don't it will be my misfortune.

So, if the members of a party or an organization hold some principles but do not believe in them or do something else in practice, the organization becomes weak. These impressions have been seen in our politics for a long time, but I became worried when they started appearing in the Congress. Anyhow, I expressed my views, and my fears proved to have been well-founded because certain members openly expressed views which were absolutely against Congress principles and its policies. Therefore I wish to put this before you.

...We do not wish to dominate any other country or to become the leader in Asia. But we do want to have friendly relations with the countries of Asia and others too. All this will be useless if we allow ourselves to be influenced by narrow-mindedness and communalism. We will cut ourselves off from the world which is marching ahead. Then we shall undoubtedly fall and be conquered once again. You can do what you like in your own homes. But if the mind of India looks in the wrong direction, and especially if our young people go wrong, I get worried. My work is almost over. I may perhaps live a few more years. So I worry about what the future holds for India. These thoughts came to my mind and so I spoke to you at length about them.

Take the question of Kashmir. You know what the quarrel is all about in Kashmir. It is obviously not a Hindu-Muslim question in Kashmir. It is not even an Indo-Pakistan problem, in a sense. Ultimately, it is only the people of Kashmir who can decide for themselves. If they ask us today to withdraw our forces, we shall undoubtedly withdraw them because we shall never maintain our forces anywhere against their wishes. We went there because the people of Kashmir had invited us, and we are still there because they want us to protect them. Anyhow, the final decision will be taken by the people of Kashmir. The majority are Muslims, so the decision rests with them largely.

You can imagine what the effect would be on Kashmir if we suddenly started following a communal policy in other parts of India, or for that matter on Burma or on Afghanistan or on any other country in the world? Have you ever considered how foolish we would look? We will give up our principles and become weak and shall lose our friends too. Therefore, all this shouting and threats will not work. I get helpful advice everyday that I should march the armies here, there and everywhere. God knows why they think it is so easy to march our army and start a war with others. I feel that by sending our forces to the border, when there was a great deal of talk about war in Pakistan, we have averted a war. We did not send the troops with the intention of fighting or mounting an attack but to face an attack if it comes. We averted a war, otherwise there would undoubtedly have been an attack. When there was an attack on Kashmir, we made great efforts to prevent it from spreading. It was strange that there was a war between the Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir and yet we maintained peace with Pakistan.

But I have made it quite clear in the last year and a half that first of all, we are prepared to come to an agreement not to resort to war to solve any problems, if they are also willing to make the same promise. We must try to solve our problems by peaceful methods even if it takes a little longer, but there should be no wars to solve them. I had told Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan that and I can say this on behalf of India. He was hesitant and even when he said something it was hedged in by all sorts of conditions.⁴ I repeated that, whether they were willing to say it or not, it would continue to be India's policy not to try a military solution to any problem. We shall certainly fight if there is an attack. I also told them that if there is another attack on Kashmir, they must not think that the war will be confined to Kashmir only—it will immediately become an Indo-Pakistan conflict. The result of my saying this was, according to me, that if there was a plan to attack it was staved off. I do not know what will happen hereafter. We must be careful. But I feel that the threat of war is less than it was two or three months ago. We must be vigilant because the atmosphere in Pakistan is very bad and the danger of something happening is ever present. You must remember that there is not much difference between the people of Pakistan and us. After all, we have been citizens of undivided India till recently. There are both wise and foolish people there as well as here. The common people are very friendly and if we meet again, old

4. In his letter to Nehru of 19 July 1951 Liaquat Ali Khan observed that conditions like the use of military force in Junagadh, Hyderabad "and more recently in Nepal," the "continued denial by force of arms to the people of Kashmir of their right of self-determination" and "repeated threats to the security of Pakistan by the massing of Indian troops against its borders" prevented India's claims to desire peace from being accepted.

memories will immediately be revived. But the atmosphere has been so completely vitiated in the last two to three years by deliberately spreading falsehoods and creating passions among the people that even the Government is finding it difficult to control the situation. Anyhow, I hope that there will be no war and we will certainly try to avoid a war. As I said, I feel that the danger is becoming less but it is there, so we have to be fully prepared.

You will see from the outline I have drawn of the problem of Kashmir and all around as to what our policies are and what the communal organizations are likely to do and where this will take us. It will cut you off from the rest of the world. I have not talked about the chaos it can create in the country. There may not be a war for we can prevent that. But everything will become topsy-turvy. It is the height of foolishness to say such things in the name of Indian nationalism and Hindu *rashttra*. It is absolutely wrong. We must realize this and not be deceived or taken in if they are presented in a different garb.

Apart from this, the main problem is economic. You may perhaps know that recently, about two months ago, our Planning Commission in Delhi has produced a plan. It has not been finalized—it will probably be ready in a couple of months....

Have you seen what is happening in the country? The communists had started an orgy of violence in Hyderabad and Telangana. I am glad to say, that it has been brought under control. Is that a way to solve problems, by murdering a few individuals or by holding out threats?

As far as the goals are concerned, the difference between communism and socialism is very marginal. The goals promised by socialism are very good, at least I think so, and I am sure you too feel that way. But the question is how to reach them without causing undue harm and upset in the country and without any spiritual and moral deterioration also. ...We have to look for ways and means of achieving our goals, keeping in mind our resources and our present condition and capacity and then a decision about our future course of action. This is the meaning of planning. We must plan in order to use our resources in such a way that our capacity to work increases and becomes like that of the Soviet Union or the United States. That is what planning is all about....

You must have seen the Congress election manifesto. It is not very long because we are afraid to make it too long-winded. But my desire is to do more than what we have said in the manifesto and exceed our targets. But ultimately how effectively the plan is implemented depends only to some extent on the Government and largely on the people of India. You must get rid of the idea that the Government can do everything. The Government can initiate the tasks but they cannot be completed unless people in their millions participate in them. If you need roads and wells and buildings and canals—I am talking of small schemes in our villages—we do not need machines from

the United States to undertake them. They can be made, with the help of the Government by the people themselves in their villages. When millions of people work like this in villages, the results will be spectacular. We have to shake up the entire country. I was telling the Chinese Ambassador,⁵ when he met me, about the big river valley schemes like the Mahanadi, Hirakud, Damodar Valley, Bhakra Nangal, etc. by which we are trying to build dams on these rivers and divert their waters into the canals for irrigation and electricity. These are very fundamental to the progress of our country. I asked him if they were doing anything like this in their country. He smiled and said that they also wanted to undertake them, but did not have the necessary machinery. They too have a great deal of human machinery. So they are using that manpower to build canals...We must also do this in our country and create a climate for hard work in villages and towns if we wish to change the face of our country. It is the duty of the Government to clear the way and help with material. When the Government and the people work together, the task becomes easy and the country progresses very rapidly. If I am convinced that the people of this country will give their support in great numbers—I mean your participation in your leisure hours and not that you should give up your own work—we can achieve a great deal within these five years and even try to complete the Five-Year Plan in three years. Once we succeed in transforming our human wealth into a real asset, we shall have no need to look back.

It can be rightly said that our sights are turned in the direction of a socialistic pattern of society. There may be some difference of opinion about how we are going to do it, whether democratically or by violent upheavals. But we are going in that direction. Some people might say that we should go more rapidly and I have no objection to that. I shall always welcome every effort at progress. What I cannot tolerate is if someone tries to pull me back. I will go as far as I can—and if I stumble and fall—I shall get up and go again. Ultimately, there is no doubt that all of us want the country to make progress and so all of us must work together, without bothering about party affiliations. You must do this without giving in to greed for money or power. You will be doing the country, the Congress, and yourselves great harm if you give in to avarice.

Now the question has arisen as to what we should do with those who had left the Congress. The Congress is considering the matter. We have to look into the rules and precedents. But, at all times, my view is that we should keep our doors open without compromising our principles or independence of action. If there are able workers among those who had left, we should certainly take them back. But it is obvious that if they come back and start indulging in groupism, etc., that will not be proper. All of us have to work together in

5. Yuan Chung-hsien.

harmony. We cannot bargain like petty shopkeepers in these matters. We must forgive and forget and work together once again. So we invite all our colleagues who have left to come back and participate in the great tasks that we are going to undertake. If they do not come back, we shall feel sorry. But if they come back, it should be with honour and they should not be kept in a corner. So we have to bear all these matters in mind. I shall repeat once again for the benefit of all the Congressmen present here from various districts that we often get complaints from various places. Whether they are true or false, I do not know and I cannot go into that. But at one time I remember we used to take pride in the fact that not a single complaint went out of our P.C.C. to the A.I.C.C., not a single complaint in eighteen or twenty years. So we must try to curb this tendency within our organization by getting rid of our defects and by not complaining constantly and fighting, but trying to tackle our problems by mutual discussions. Only then can we do anything big. The elections come in the category of big tasks, and we have to conduct these successfully but always keeping in mind the real tasks that lie ahead. If wrong men are elected, the real tasks will be neglected. Election is after all only a tool to pave the way for our future work...

4. An All-Out War on Communalism¹

...The country has many problems. This province of yours has had to bear tremendous burdens in the last four or five years since India became free. First of all, the moment freedom came, a part of India had to be separated and Pakistan came into being. Then came the terrible disasters and hundreds of thousands of refugees came here from Pakistan, and a huge number went from here. The whole country received a great shock but the worst tragedy was this old province of the Punjab was to be divided into two and everything was uprooted. It is not very easy to set right such a development. The people of this province have faced a terrible disaster. Four years have gone by and in these four years, I have come here often to see what was happening. I always found that the State has been making progress and trying to stand on its feet once again. I want to congratulate the people of the Punjab on the courageous way in which they have faced these difficulties and come through.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Ludhiana, 30 September 1951. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Original in Hindi. Extracts.

Do you know what the ultimate test of a nation or a human being is? They cannot be judged in happy times because anybody can show equanimity when he is well off. The real test of a nation is in times of adversity which gives courage and strength to it. If you read the history of the world, you will find that when a nation fights for its freedom and goes through difficulties, makes sacrifices, it becomes very strong and wins freedom. But after that, gradually the difficulties are forgotten, and the sacrifices too. People become ease-loving, and the softer they grow the weaker the country becomes. In fact, it becomes so weak that once again it faces the danger of falling a prey to invading forces. Adversity may be bad, but it makes a country strong and helps it to make rapid progress.

When India as a whole faced tremendous difficulties the Punjab bore the brunt of it. The question was whether we as a nation and especially your province would become strong or helpless and weak. You and I cannot answer this question. Ultimately, it will be left to history and the historians to find the answer as to how India, and especially the Punjab, fared in the face of adversity, how we succeeded in rehabilitating the millions of refugees who had been uprooted and how the places which were desolate are flourishing once again. But I think on the whole we have benefited from it though it is sad that millions of our brethren had to undergo many trials and tribulations.

Anyhow, four years have gone by and I think in these four years many great events have taken place and perhaps the biggest of them is the rehabilitation of the millions of our refugee brethren. We have not been able to make the kind of arrangements that we would have liked to have made for all of them. But at least three or four hundred thousands have been settled on land, new cities have come up, and more are coming up, and I am fully convinced that the people who came here will ultimately make the country and especially your province richer, because, it is not gold or silver which constitutes wealth but human beings, strong and hard working and intelligent human beings who are a nation's wealth.

Therefore, whatever has happened in the Punjab is perhaps ultimately to its advantage. As you know the problem has not been fully solved. This province has become a border province—it is on the borders of Pakistan. The people who lived together till recently are now ranged on both sides of the border and threaten one another. It is regrettable, but what should be our course of action in such circumstances? Should we also give way to anger and try to take revenge or should we remain calm and not do anything wrong?

Many of our brethren in Pakistan had to face terrible difficulties and they came here. Well, anyhow, they are welcome here. Their difficulties have pained us. But please remember, what pained and humiliated us in the eyes of the world was not what happened in Pakistan but the mistakes that we ourselves made. If we do the right thing, and do not make any mistakes, then believe

me, no outsider can harm us. So, I have come to you to share my feelings with you as all of you have also gathered here from various places to do the same. I am happy to see so many zamindars and farmers among you.

I have been wondering what to say to you? I have not come here to bargain or to ask or to give something. I felt a desire to come and meet you and to feel the pulse of the Punjab. I wanted to see how strong the people are here or whether they have been crushed by their difficulties or become soft and comfort-loving, and have forgotten how to work. So I came to feel your pulse because I too am a kind of a physician in the field of politics. You and I have seen one another and some of us have met also. What should I say to you now? It is a very long story. If you look at the world and our neighbouring countries in Asia and others in Europe, you will realize what the situation is. The world faces enormous difficulties. You have to measure the rate of progress in India against that background.

We must now think what we have to do. The country is free and that is a good thing, but our freedom will be complete only when the hundreds of problems before us are solved. The biggest problem before us is the economic problem, the problem of poverty and unemployment, of uplifting the masses. Another big problem is that of land, as it is in other countries and of increasing the trade and industries in our country. Your city of Ludhiana is full of small industries and we want to encourage them. These days the momentum has slowed down in the Punjab—it has to be increased because ultimately whatever we produce constitutes the country's wealth. These are big problems and we have to plan properly so that the country can progress fast.

I want you to look at the plans drawn up by the Congress and understand them. Elections are coming up and many people will make tall promises to win your vote. I have come to you not to make any promises on behalf of the Congress. I cannot make any promise except one and that is, we will pit our entire strength in the service of the country. If I want anything from you it is only that you should bend your energy to the problems before the country and the world and then decide which way you wish to go. I have been rather perturbed by the fact that people think everything can be done by shouting slogans. Please remember that today's world is tough and merciless—it is a revolutionary world. It cannot function on slogans. It needs tougher things, strength and sacrifice. So at a time like this, which way should we go?

Mahatma Gandhi had shown us a path. We followed that path and ultimately succeeded in getting independence. The moment we become independent, the people thought that their task was over and that we could leave that path. I am amazed at the new winds of change which spread a kind of poison all over the country. Those were the people who were responsible for the creation of Pakistan. When they left, we thought that poison of communalism had gone too. Unfortunately they left that poison behind.

The Muslims are not in such vast numbers, especially in your province, that they can spread the poison of communalism which has gone to Pakistan. But I am amazed that our young people should be drawn once again towards the same course which had weakened and misled India and ultimately broke her into two. They do not realize that communalism is the most dangerous poison for India just now.

You cannot say that communalism is bad when practised by the Muslims and good if the Hindus or Sikhs practise it. If it is bad, it is bad for everyone as undoubtedly it is. You must understand why it is bad. Ours has been a great country from ancient times. It has made a name for itself in the world. Certain periods in its history had been great and during the periods of its weakness, It had fallen and lost its freedom. You and I have seen it in that state. Why did we become a slave country? After all, there has never been any dearth of bravery or intelligence among our people. The fact is that we have not learnt to work in harmony. We fight very easily about small things and let our caste system and religion divide us, with the result that we become weak and our enemies take advantage of that. This is what the history of India and the world teaches us. The period when the British came here also shows the same thing. Therefore, the first lesson that Mahatma Gandhi taught us was to stop these fights among us on religious grounds. Whoever lives in India, to whatever religion he may belong, India is his country. He is the child of India and so he should serve his country and also get equal rights, whether he is a Hindu or Sikh or Muslim or Christian or anything else.

This is the tradition in the modern world. It is the people of Pakistan who started this practice of one nation for the believers of one religion. This is absurd and cannot last in today's world. But the people in our country have started imitating them by forming communal organizations among the Hindus and the Sikhs. Some of the Hindu organizations are making a great deal of noise and proclaim to the world that they will found a Hindu nation, as if no one except Hindus live in India.² It is obvious that Hindus are in a majority here and it is equally obvious that the country will be run to a large extent according to their views. But the moment you start associating this country with one particular religion, you start digging at the roots of the country's stability and sow the seeds of dissension that will break up the country further. All our grandeur will disappear.

So I am amazed to see our youth being led astray like this. The world is also amazed that the country which produced such a great leader and won her independence in such a unique way, should forget the lessons taught by him

2. The Hindu Mahasabha's election manifesto, issued on 13 August 1951, defined its object as the "establishment of a Hindu Raj in Bharat with a form of government in accordance with Hindu conceptions of policy and economy."

immediately after independence. We certainly continue to sing his praises and shout Mahatma Gandhi *ki jai*. But we forget his teachings, especially the lesson of communal harmony. There is nothing more dangerous for India than communalism. These communal organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the new organization called the Jan Sangh follow principles which can have only one result and that is to create dissension and disunity in the country. They talk about nationalism and Indian culture to confuse and deceive the people as if the others wish to suppress the traditions and culture of India. It is absurd. The first lesson to be learnt in the world of today is that the reason for India's downfall was that she had retired into a shell. The world made progress and India remained backward. The country which puts up barriers remains backward.

...What is the most dangerous evil for our country at the moment? There are many dangers. You may say Pakistan is a danger. It is true that there may be a danger from the side of Pakistan. But we are not scared because if that danger arises, we can face it without any problem. But the real danger is not from outside but from within. If we are weak from within, and there are internal dissensions, anyone can come from outside and conquer us. Therefore, I am surprised as to how any intelligent human being can propagate communalism. Take our problems today from all sides. There is Pakistan on one side, Burma on the other and Malaya, Indonesia, Ceylon, etc. Then there is Afghanistan beyond Pakistan. In most of these countries like Afghanistan, Indonesia and Malaya, Muslims are in a majority. But they are very friendly towards our country and we cooperate with one another. If we were to adopt a communal policy, we will lose our friends all over the world and we shall be erecting barriers once again. The world will look upon us with hatred.

Then, as you know, Pakistan is a big problem. Pakistan attacked Kashmir. Who is fighting whom in Kashmir? It is true that our forces fought there and fought very bravely too. But what is the Kashmir issue? It is not a Hindu-Muslim question. In fact Muslims were fighting against Muslims there. We have adopted in our Constitution the greatest principle of Mahatma Gandhi, of equal rights to all Indian citizens, irrespective of caste and creed. On the other hand, Pakistan was created on the basis of the two-nation theory, of there being two nations of Muslims and Hindus. If you take it that way, there are not two but dozens of nations in India. Pakistan is still being run on this principle and so it is extremely difficult for any non-Muslim to live there.

The fighting in Kashmir is not so much a military battle but rather about the principle whether Kashmir should accept India's principle of a secular State or Pakistan's two-nation theory. This is the real thing and the Muslims who are in a majority in Kashmir have accepted our principle, nearly fifteen to twenty years ago. In the days before the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim League tried very hard to pull Kashmir to their side. Even Mr. Jinnah tried

and failed, because the people of Kashmir were fighting for their freedom and they saw how the Congress was fighting for India's freedom. They had no particular relationship with the Congress. But they liked the principles for which the Congress stood. Therefore, the freedom struggle which started in Kashmir eighteen years ago leaned towards those principles of the Congress and our contacts grew. If you notice, the same people in Pakistan who claim their right over Kashmir are responsible for the atrocities committed on the Muslims of Kashmir. The question is, where were these gentlemen when the freedom struggle was going on in Kashmir earlier? I am not talking of the present but of the time before the creation of Pakistan, of ten, twelve years ago. What were the leaders of Pakistan doing at that time to help the freedom struggle in Kashmir? Far from helping them, they were opposing it by siding with the Maharaja of Kashmir. It is a strange thing. This is certainly not a Hindu-Muslim problem. The people of Kashmir were fighting against the Maharaja's rule for their freedom. The Maharaja was a Hindu and the majority of the population was Muslim. It was not a Hindu-Muslim problem. If you go to Nizam's Hyderabad or elsewhere, in Gwalior or Rajputana, the people, Hindus and Muslims, were fighting for freedom together. Where was the question of a Hindu-Muslim problem? When, in Kashmir, the common people were fighting against their Hindu ruler, the Muslim League leaders were siding with the Maharaja to some extent, not because he was a Hindu but because the leaders of Pakistan have always been opposed to freedom. You can see that in the last few years, hundreds of Indian states have merged into the Indian Union and now there are only large provinces in independent India. But some of these states joined Pakistan too, like Bahawalpur and others near Baluchistan and some others on the border. There was no question of any freedom in those places. Compare them with the states which joined India. The condition of the states which joined Pakistan is now worse than before. The leaders of Muslim League and the elder statesmen in Pakistan have never had any sympathies for any freedom movement. They got Pakistan by inciting the people in the name of religion.

When the people of Kashmir were fighting for freedom the strange aspect was that the present-day Pakistani leaders were then siding with the ruler. Now they are against him, but at that time, they were with him and used to raise their voice against the National Conference and Shaikh Abdullah. Now they have suddenly become great advocates of freedom and say that the National Conference and Shaikh Abdullah are the stooges of the Indian Government and that they are suppressing the Muslims. It is a strange story.

So, the question that arises in Kashmir is whether the Muslims of Kashmir should adopt the principle of a secular State or opt for Pakistan's two-nation theory. All right, suppose our Constitution and our laws had not guaranteed equal rights to all the citizens of India, whether they are Hindus, Sikhs or

Muslims, the question of Kashmir would not have come up at all. Kashmir would have automatically gone to Pakistan. Even if the question had arisen, how could we have asked Kashmir to join us if we were trying to create a Hindu *rashtra*? The people of Kashmir would have seen that there is no place for the people of other religions in India. You must consider how much damage the communal organizations, like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or Jan Sangh can do to India if they get a foothold or become strong. They will destroy our relationship with our neighbours, the Kashmir issue will get worsened and there will be dissensions in the country and it will ultimately lead to caste and communal fighting.

Elections are being held in Kashmir to elect a legislative assembly.³ They have already been held in some parts of Kashmir and they will take place shortly in Jammu. Now everyone has the right to stand on his own feet and to stick to his views. I have no complaint. But there is a communal organization in Jammu called the Praja Parishad⁴ which has contacts with the R.S.S., and its chief task is to oppose the Government headed by Shaikh Abdullah. I have no objection even to that. But on the one hand, they pose themselves as great propagators of Hindu culture, on the other, they are helping Pakistan. If you wish, you can read the accounts of their activities and meetings and statements which are given wide publicity, because those newspapers know that all this will help Pakistan. This is the height of foolishness. The people of Jammu, that is, the Hindus, obviously do not like Pakistan. But in their narrow-minded foolishness they indulge in actions which help Pakistan. They are making our case in Kashmir weaker. If Kashmir is with us today, it is because of the Kashmiri Muslims. The Praja Parishad and the communal organizations will ruin Kashmir and make a gift of it to Pakistan by their deeds.

Therefore, the big problem before us is communalism which creates unnecessary barriers and destroys the country's unity. The country cannot make any progress and undoubtedly this path will lead us to destruction. This is a very special problem for the people of the Punjab because it is a border province and you have many responsibilities. Secondly, the majority of Muslims have gone from here or have been thrown out. Very few remain. It is regrettable that they were thrown out. Anyhow, now there are only Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab. Even a dull-witted person can understand that if there is no harmony

3. In October 1950 the General Council of the National Conference of Kashmir passed a resolution asking for elections to a constituent assembly for drafting a constitution and simultaneously functioning as its legislature. In May 1951, a constituent assembly was convened on the basis of which elections were held and the assembly met on 5 November 1951.
4. Deriving inspiration from the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Praja Parishad declared its opposition to a separate flag and a constitution for Kashmir and wished that the State be brought fully under the Indian Constitution by repealing Article 370.

between the Hindus and the Sikhs of the Punjab, if they do not care for and help one another, all of them will be ruined. This is not a secret. It is a known fact.

Then what is this foolishness that we foment bitterness and hostility and are ready to fight over petty matters? The problem is that the good qualities among the Punjabis become their bad points also at times. Their passion and enthusiasm can easily be channelized into wrong ways. I read the newspapers published here and they are full of such silly stories. Instead of fostering unity, turning the people's attention towards constructive work and educating them about world affairs, the newspapers are mostly reporting complaints and allegations of one section and one group against the other. This should be stopped.

Yours is a great province. You have many responsibilities, you have the ability and the capacity to do good work and make progress. Why do you waste all this? The Sikhs have a special place in the Punjab and they are spread out in other provinces too. In fact, you will find Sikhs settled all over the world for years. You will find them in far off places, in China, in the United States, in various parts of India, though the majority of them are in the Punjab and Pepsu. Therefore, they must have special rights in the Punjab. But that does not mean that they should try to lower the status of others in the Punjab. After all, the moment you try to suppress others, the result is that both are suppressed. If all of you help one another to raise yourselves, everyone can go very far. India has risen because all her people have worked hard together. If one province wishes to be independent and tries to suppress others, then none of them can be free. If the Hindus feel that they can go ahead without the Sikhs, or if the Sikhs wish to make progress by suppressing the Hindus, both are foolish. It is absurd and cannot be done. All of you have to work together, all of you have the same rights and status.

So you must think about this. Recently we had a census here and I was amazed that there was fighting going on and people were being forced to write down what language they spoke as if these census papers would turn the Punjab or India upside down.⁵ What happened ultimately? We said that the forms of census received back from here should be torn up. We will not look at them because they had no value. The language or languages of the Punjab cannot change because you have written something down in the census papers. Gradually, languages do change in fifty to hundred years' time, but it is foolish

5. During the first census operations in free India, which began on 9 February 1951, information was sought on the languages known besides one's mother-tongue. This led to a bitter controversy in the Punjab and Pepsu. A section of Hindus asked the people to mention Hindi as their language instead of Punjabi. This caused resentment among the Sikhs. Strong pressure was also put on certain sections of the Scheduled Castes, who had regarded themselves as Hindus, to declare themselves as Sikhs.

to think that the Government can forcibly bring in a new language by law or destroy the old one. A language is a live thing which grows with the people. Therefore it is absurd to fight about such matters. I cannot understand it.

It is obvious that Hindi has been chosen to be the national language. The other languages of India like Bengali or Gujarati, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu, etc. are great languages too. But we have decided upon one common language for the whole country. That is Hindi—not scholarly Hindi which most people may not understand, but the simple, commonly-spoken Hindi-Urdu, Hindi-Hindustani or whatever you may call it. Nobody can suppress Hindi. Why this fear? But I know that in most parts of the Punjab, the commonly-spoken language is Punjabi, and whatever anybody may say or write, this does not change. This is absolutely certain and I cannot understand why the Punjab should not continue as before. It is absolutely wrong to think that anyone can go ahead only by suppressing the others or that one language can progress only when other languages are suppressed. It is wrong. Languages grow by being nurtured, not by opposing them. Punjabi or Gurmukhi cannot flourish by warring with Hindi. In fact, these languages can grow only by nurturing them. Hindi cannot flourish by fighting with the other languages. If it does, it will fall. Languages grow with use. This problem has been there for years in the Punjab. As I said, some people are fighting for Hindi and others for Gurmukhi and the fight is often carried on through the medium of Urdu. Is it not funny that the advocates of those languages know neither Hindi nor Punjabi. So you can see from this how wrong it is. These languages are our national treasures. We should try to make them grow. There should be no fighting over this issue. The more our national treasures grow, the richer our cultural heritage becomes. Therefore there should be full effort made in the Punjab to make both Hindi and Punjabi grow. There should be no attempt to suppress others and it is the duty of every citizen to know both the languages of this province. And if you do not know Hindi, which is the national language, you cannot take full part in the work of developing India. This is how I look at this problem. These are small problems, but great heat is generated over them and people get agitated in this province. These problems can be easily solved by mutual consent.

There is another question which bothers our Sikh brethren a great deal. I often get letters about the condition of the gurdwaras in Pakistan. I understand their perturbation. But you must also realize that apart from trying to put pressure on Pakistan to keep those gurdwaras safe and well maintained, we have no other option, except perhaps to set out with our army to Pakistan. So you must understand realities. We cannot divorce ourselves from them.

I would like to ask you another question. You may have the right to demand that the gurdwaras and the temples in Pakistan should be safeguarded. But at the same time, it is our duty to keep the mosques here safe because

this cannot be a one-sided affair. How can we complain to them? Immediately they point out the condition of the mosques in Delhi and we have to keep quiet. The civilized course would be to do our duty in safeguarding the mosques, and other religious centres here and then demand that our temples and gurdwaras in Pakistan be protected. These problems of yours in the Punjab which generate so much heat are not really so insurmountable. If you can direct your energies towards other areas, undoubtedly the Punjab will go far.

...There has been fighting over Kashmir and it could erupt again if there is another attack. But ultimately the fate of Kashmir can be decided only by the people of Kashmir. The fact that is becoming increasingly clear is that the people of Kashmir, that is the Muslims, are against Pakistan. If you go to Kashmir—I would say all of you, who can, should go there—you will see for yourselves that Kashmir has made more progress, in spite of the war, in the last few years than other parts of India. I feel happy to see their rate of progress and the regret is that the other parts of India should remain backward. Land reforms have been introduced there which have given immediate relief to the peasants. In a sense, it is a minor revolution. All sorts of developments are taking place. You will find a tremendous enthusiasm among the people and a will to work. On the one hand, there is tremendous progress being made in Kashmir and the people are becoming more enthusiastic supporters of Shaikh Abdullah's Government day by day and on the other side, in what is known as 'Azad Kashmir', there is hardly any progress made there, and groupism and dissensions are rampant. That is the crux of the problem. The people in Pakistan are feeling perturbed that the people in Kashmir are turning against them. Therefore they are making noises in the Security Council and elsewhere to somehow pressurize the people of Kashmir to come under their control....

I regret to say that some of our people in Amritsar, Ferozepur and Gurdaspur, the city folks, left their homes and came away with some meagre possessions because they were perhaps frightened that there might be another war. Anyhow, they went back after a few days. I therefore do not wish to say much about this shameful conduct of those people. It would be better if in future, such weak-hearted people chose a safer place to live in. There is no place for cowards in India—ours is a strong country. No one can say when we shall have to face danger and from which direction. So we must be prepared. But the more important thing is to go about our tasks calmly and without fear. There are tremendous problems before us, of poverty, land, unemployment, trade and industry, etc. We must tackle all these in order to increase the country's wealth which in turn will make the people better off. These are big tasks and we are drawing up plans which you should see and understand and try to help.

There are numerous refugees in the Punjab, and I am happy to see many of them settling down to work and becoming an important part of the Punjab. There are lakhs of them in Delhi also. They were given loans for starting business, and nowadays, since trade is not very brisk, it has been suggested that the instalments which have to be paid back should be postponed or written off. Now I cannot promise anything definite. But I can tell you this much that this is not a problem which concerns the Punjab alone but affects the whole country, and is extremely complicated. There are great difficulties in writing off those loans. But I have no doubt that the Government of the Punjab will give you more time and some concessions too, wherever necessary.

Nowadays, as you know, there is great talk of elections and as I said right at the beginning, I have not come here in connection with the elections. They merely give me an opportunity to reach the people and to put my thoughts before them. So I seized this opportunity. But elections are important because the future of the country depends on whom you choose. Therefore, it is important that the people whom you elect should be strong and honest and firmly abide by their principles and beliefs. You must not elect dishonest people merely because they happen to be known to you or are influential.

As you know, unfortunately there is a long tradition of internal dissensions in the Punjab. This disease has grown in the Congress also and groups are springing up which abuse one another and incite the people against one another and write articles in newspapers. At least Congressmen must not indulge in such activities because they are against Congress principles.

Anyhow, this is an old story, and in this connection, as you know, the Ministry in Punjab resigned on our advice and for the last two and a half or three months, we have had President's rule here.⁶ You must try to understand why we took this step of advising a Congress Ministry to resign. I shall not go into the details. It is obvious that it led to the Congress getting a bad name and yet we did it because we thought that it would be better for the Punjab and also for the Congress in the long run, even though it may give a jolt at the moment.

We do not wish that the Congress should win any election by deceit or foul play. If it wins by standing firmly on its principles, it is good and if not, we prefer to lose. I have absolutely no desire that you should vote for the Congress under pressure or under any misapprehension. I want that if you understand and accept the Congress principles and feel that the Congress is an important organization for the country, only then should you vote for it.

Why did I agree to become the Congress President again? I feel that considering the situation in the country, it is extremely important to give utmost priority to unity and give a sense of fusion to various parts of the

6. The President proclaimed an emergency under Article 356 of the Constitution and assumed all administrative powers in the Punjab on 20 June 1951.

country and put an end to communalism. There are a great many organizations and parties in the country, some good, some bad, but I cannot see a single one which is strong enough to shoulder the burdens of the country. If the Congress were not in existence, the country would be divided into numerous little parts and organizations, each pulling in different directions, thus weakening us. We would be unable to do anything either in the country or the world. I feel that in spite of its weaknesses and defects, it is the Congress which has the ability and the strength to run the affairs of the country and therefore I am doing the work of the Congress with renewed vigour. I accepted this new responsibility in spite of all my other work and preoccupations. In such a situation, elections are certainly important.

Now, when I am advocating unity in the whole country, I find that there is tremendous disunity in the Congress in the Punjab. I want everyone to come together. I do not mean that there should be haggling over principles. I have not come here to bargain, nor do I wish that the Congress, in the Punjab or elsewhere, should indulge in such activities with other organizations and parties. I am not worried about winning or losing the elections. People feel, and rightly too, that the Congress will win in these elections. But I am not bothered. The challenge is in fighting for our principles and that is a kind of victory in itself. So we must put an end to infighting in the Congress and try henceforth to march in step. The A.I.C.C. office in Delhi is willing to extend their full cooperation in this matter and we shall form a special committee to go into the lists and select the candidates who are good and leave out others against whom there are well-founded complaints. We will scrutinize the lists fully. We shall not say that we will give so many seats to any particular group. That is absurd. We will choose the best from the lists, irrespective of which group they belong.

I would like to mention one thing more in this connection because there are a number of complaints which are being published in newspapers too, against the previous ministries, about the dishonesty and mistakes and corruption on the Government side. These complaints are commonly heard. When I heard, I said that I am willing to inquire fully into all individual complaints. But we cannot inquire into complaints made in the air. I shall repeat this. I am not going to appoint an inquiry committee. But if there are any complaints made to me which have any basis at all, I shall definitely have an inquiry made and take action if they are proved true. This is what I can say on behalf of the Government. As far as the Congress is concerned, we have to work apart from the Government. If there are any complaints which seem true against any of the candidates, we shall not include them in our lists. We will do a very careful scrutiny.

All these issues are before us. These pose a big problem before the country. I have come here after a fairly long time, and I do not know when I shall be

able to come again. There are all sorts of responsibilities on me. I feel that I am good for a few years more and so long as I have the strength, I shall certainly continue to work. But ultimately the burden will have to fall upon younger shoulders. People come and go, but the country goes on. It is immortal.

I therefore want that our youth should be strong and capable, in order to hold aloft the torch of freedom and march forward. Our generation has carried it some distance. But the journey never ends—there are only various stages. So we need strong men to take us forward on this journey. There ought to be many such strong men in Punjab if they look in the right direction and do not allow communalism to grow in the province. Our communist brethren have ruined the principles of communism by reducing it to the level of hooliganism and resort to physical violence. Therefore, it is our duty to oppose them. We shall not stand in the way of any ideology, but we will certainly prevent feuds and violence as it is the duty of any Government to do so.

So the youth of the Punjab must understand these issues and march ahead because the more intelligent and capable minds we have, the farther our country will go. It will not make any progress if there is persistent shouting and screaming.

5. The Relevance of Mahatma Gandhi¹

Elections are a strange phenomenon. They are necessary in a democracy and without them, democracy cannot work. But at the same time, extraordinary developments happen during elections. As a matter of fact, the parties are expected to put their ideologies and principles before the people so that they may choose between them and vote accordingly. But instead of expressing their views on larger issues, the parties often get bogged down by petty issues and quarrels, hurling lies at each other and indulging in deceit. How are we to focus attention on the larger issues? At least today is an occasion for us to pause a little and make an effort to take stock of where we are and where the country is going and where we ought to go. If we are not clear in our minds, then it is obvious that we will be led astray by momentary passions into wrong paths.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Delhi, 2 October 1951. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. Original in Hindi. Extracts.

All sorts of problems, national and international, come before me every day and then my thoughts wander away to those years when we were engaged in our freedom struggle and used to have all sorts of dreams about the future of independent India. We used to dream of bringing about a revolution in the country, of eradicating poverty and unemployment, and a great many other things. Then I wonder how far we have succeeded in fulfilling those dreams. There is no doubt that our country is now free, by whichever yardstick you measure freedom i.e., political freedom. What we have attained as a result of that freedom has to be examined.

So I think about that and my attention is drawn towards the ideals that Mahatma Gandhi gave us. However small and weak and unworthy we may be, years of training and living with a great man did have an impact and raised our stature somewhat. We certainly grew in stature, our country grew in stature, and respect for our country went up tremendously in the world. I often think that if you wish to understand what India stands for at the moment, you cannot do so properly from within the country. We are so involved in our work here that it is difficult to be objective. We are after all a part of it. The good points and the bad can be seen clearly only from a distance. We can know them better from a distance.

By a coincidence, I was at a meeting just an hour or so ago. A very famous person is visiting us at the moment. This meeting was arranged for him to meet our Members of Parliament and to give them a talk. He has been the Prime Minister of Indonesia, our neighbour, and he has played a very important role in the revolution that took place there. His name may be familiar to you—Dr. Sultan Shahrir. He came here a few days ago and our relationship with him has been so close that it does not seem as if a stranger is visiting us. It is rather like a younger brother paying us a visit. He meets me often and we have long talks. He said in his speech that he had been in Delhi for a few days² and that he had earlier visited Bombay too for a day or two.³ He said he had seen many things, both good and bad and heard many complaints about the Government. He said he was reminded of his own country where similar complaints were often heard. He was returning from a tour of Europe and wherever he had gone, he had heard complaints. So you and I must try to understand India—and it is absolutely essential for us to do so—because we have to be clear in our minds about where a large country like ours is going and what our duty is. It is absurd to think that we can achieve anything by shouting slogans or by hooliganism. No country can ever hope to achieve anything or take the right action by such methods.

2. Sultan Shahrir came to Delhi on 23 September 1951 from Karachi on his way home from a tour of Europe and West Asia and stayed for a week.

3. He went to Bombay on 30 September 1951.

It is a fact that today, India and the world are facing tremendous problems. Leave aside the question of war and peace. There are tremendous problems which are bound to affect all of us. One of them is the nature of our relationship with Pakistan. There is a great tension at the moment. Then there is the question of Kashmir.

But let us leave these questions aside for the moment. The basic question before us, as before other countries too, is how to ensure the welfare and progress of the millions of people who live in our country. How to lighten the tremendous burdens that they are carrying. It is a big problem which can be solved neither by magic nor by shouting. Ultimately they can be solved only by working together. So how are we going to solve the big problems that confront us? What methods are we to follow? You may elect some people, as you will in a few days when we shall have the general elections for Parliament, and if good people are chosen, it will help. But when you vote, you have to be sure of the candidates' ideologies and principles. You must consider these matters carefully because democracy can work only when common people in their millions try to consider these large issues and understand them. They must understand a little the trends in the world too. I do not mean that you must read at great length about world affairs or try to analyse what is happening in Iran or Korea or Germany, Japan and India. These are very complex matters. But we must understand some of the broad issues of today's world if democracy is to work and we must recognize broadly our responsibilities too.

After all, what is the meaning of democracy? It certainly does not mean a license for everyone to make a great deal of noise. License is not freedom. It means that if we have a right to freedom, then it entails certain responsibilities too which we have to shoulder. Both these things go together. You cannot divorce rights from the burden of responsibility, because our country works by our effort and it is our responsibility to make it work. If the country is poor, it has to produce more and create wealth. We have to see to it that the wealth produced does not remain in a few pockets. We have to ensure its proper distribution by law or by some other method.

In short, we have to understand what our responsibilities are and in which direction we have to go. It is easy to paint a rosy picture to beguile the people. But the time is past when we could talk in the air. We have to understand what our resources are and how best to utilise them for the benefit of the people and how to augment them so that the people can be better off.

I mentioned to you about my talks with Dr. Shahrir just now. He has spoken to me on many subjects. Apart from that, I get many opportunities of going abroad. There is much that we can certainly learn from other countries and also beware of many troubles. Then my thoughts go to the last four years since independence and the difficulties and problems which had come before us and the ones that have been solved and others that still remain. Well,

history will judge in the years to come our achievements and shortcomings. As you know, I have no hesitation in acknowledging the failures and shortcomings of my Government, nor do I try to hide them. Why should we hide anything or be afraid? A defect does not become a virtue by being hidden away. We must try to understand and remove them. We may be able to keep certain issues away from others for some time. But how can we hide them from one another? ...

But I would like to point out at the same time that nowadays many people talk a great deal about our Government's shortcomings and what we have done or not done. They make big promises about what they will do. They make these promises confidently because they are unlikely ever to have the opportunity of fulfilling them. So they can say what they like—they are not going to be believed in any case. It is my regret that they will never be put to the test because if they were, it would at once become clear how empty their promises are. But what is really worth noting is the situation in our neighbouring countries.

There is Pakistan, but leave that aside. There are Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Tibet, China, Burma, Malaya—all the countries of Asia. I compare the events in those countries in the last four years with our country's events. It is not good to compare and it is certainly not proper for me to speak ill of them here. There were certain developments which happened in those countries which I wish should have happened in ours too.

But when I look beyond Asia at the picture of Europe, then I certainly do not feel pessimistic. On the contrary, I feel that what we have achieved in the last four years has been quite spectacular. That does not mean that what we have done is enough or what we should boast about it and feel proud. What I am pointing out to you is that we must realize that what we have achieved, compared to the other countries, is something we can take pride in—especially the strong foundations that we have laid to build the future of independent India.

No problem connected with India or her four hundred million people can be dealt with superficially, with outward fanfare or by taking out processions or by shouting slogans. The edifice which affects millions of lives has to be built on strong foundations, not of bricks and mortar, but of human beings, of their understanding, cooperation and ability to work together. We can build a strong edifice only on such foundations. Now if you compare this, as I do, you will realize that when the time comes for the history of this period to be written, these years are certainly not such that any Indian need feel ashamed of them. On the contrary, much has happened, in spite of tremendous difficulties of which we can justly be proud.

I am not saying that we should boast about it. I merely want that we must understand these aspects. Most of my life has been spent in this work,

and it is obvious that my working days are almost over. A very few years are left though my mind and brain are still active and my enthusiasm for work is undiminished. But as I grow older, I look back to see what has been achieved and what remains to be done. I try to understand and prepare a balance-sheet in my mind of the good and the bad. As you can imagine, I have no particular desire for any new position. In any case, what bigger position can I aspire to, when I am already occupying the highest post in the country? You are clapping without understanding the matter. What I was saying was that you have already put me in the highest position i.e. the Prime Minister of India, and now you have made me the Congress President also. Both are no doubt very high positions. But what I regard as even greater honour is the love and affection and the confidence that you and the people of India have given me. When I have already been given so much, what bigger honour can I now expect. I am not bothered about all this.

What I am worried about is something else and that is how to continue the task that we, my colleagues, and I undertook almost thirty to forty years ago, bearing in mind the picture that we had of the future of India and the dreams that we dreamt. That dream came true to a very large extent. So I want that in the few years that are left to me, you and I and all of us may be able to do something. Thereafter the burden of working for India will fall on other younger shoulders. It is important that they should realize their duties and responsibilities because shouldering India's burdens is no easy matter. It is a tremendous responsibility for which the younger generation must prepare itself adequately. No one can hope to undertake this task merely with enthusiasm. It has to be understood properly because you have to face it.

There are all sorts of forces working in the world of today—both good and bad and inimical. They have to be faced and overcome. How can you do that unless you understand these forces? You must have read something of Indian history. What do you learn from it? It is obvious that of the thousands of years of our history, four or five thousand years of history are recorded, but it goes back much farther—there were some periods in our history which were glorious and shining, when men of the highest calibre lived here, and their precepts have not lost their value till today. Great men lived here, great not only in India but regarded as such all over the world, and those were the days when our country stood out brilliantly in every walk of life. India's fame had spread throughout the world.

Then there came a time when the country began to go downhill, it was subjugated, its wealth plundered. You will find great ups and downs in the history of our country, just as had happened in other countries of the world. The only difference is that it has been a special characteristic of this country that it does everything in a significant way. When it rises, it goes very high, and when it falls, it falls very low. There is no intermediate level for it.

...There have been two great men in our country in the recent past. There have been many others too who were great but these two were specially so. One was obviously Mahatma Gandhi who was very great, and almost equally so was Rabindranath Tagore. He did not come into the political field but he was a man of exceptional qualities. He was no ordinary poet. He was a great poet. Both these great men were the products of our country, as all of us are. They were the spiritual heirs of our country. What I mean is that they carried in their blood the great qualities handed down by the generations for thousands of years in our country. They were the shining examples of everything that India has stood for down the ages.

Take Mahatma Gandhi. He showed in himself the true image of India, whether you take India of today or India of the last five thousand years. It is a little difficult for me to explain this to you clearly. But I am sure you understand. Why did he have such a tremendous impact on the common people? After all, he was not very handsome, or particularly strong. He was a thin man, who could fall down at a mere push. What was there in this man whom we called the Mahatma, though he did not even think of himself in that light or boast about himself. He considered himself to be a very ordinary man. There was no pride in him nor any desire for power or position. He was extremely simple in his way of living, so much so that he did not want to be better than the most humble folk in the country and always identified himself with them.

Well, all this was no doubt true. But I am trying to draw your attention towards an important fact. Why did Mahatma Gandhi have such a tremendous impact on the people? It was due to his goodness, his greatness. But that was not all. He was very wise and intelligent but that was also not the reason. There have been many learned and wise men in India, perhaps more learned than him, with higher qualifications and what not. There are many others who consider themselves very influential, and perhaps they are, I do not know. They might be respected in their own areas but they do not influence the whole country.

So what was it in Mahatma Gandhi that he had such a tremendous impact? It is a long story. There were many qualities in him but one special quality which I would like to point out is that he was the essence of the spiritual strength of India—an essence of the things which have contributed to India's strength. He fought against the weaknesses of India. Is there any individual here who is above the pressures of religion and politics? In the beginning, religion began to be brought into politics by our brethren who now live in Pakistan. Though they went away, they cast their shadows here and the poison has been spreading. Organizations are formed in the name of religions. What is it all about? What is religion? Does religion mean sporting the biggest caste mark? Or who sports the longest pig-tail? You may sport a caste mark

or a pig-tail, if you like, but if you try to gauge a person's good or bad qualities by such things, you are wrong. As you know, these external symbols bear no relation to a person's qualities. So what is religion? Usually people deceive others by artificial symbolism and rituals in the name of religion.

Now it would be very difficult to meet a more fundamentally religious man than Gandhi. I am not religious. I am an ordinary man but I have the mind to recognize one. I have seen a great deal of the world and met both great and small men. Among them Gandhi was one who truly reflected the high ideals and nobility of India, though he did not consider himself as anything special. Look at the things that he laid stress on and the ones that he fought against. Many voices were raised against him, people who thought that his views were against our religion and the *shastras*. In their opinion, religion was a thing with which to keep a nation shackled as India had been for the last two to three thousand years, with no scope for progress or change. They did not realize that India's history shows that so long as our nation was free, with her eyes and mind wide open, with a window on the world, and she exchanged knowledge with the world, India was a great nation, progressive, and wielded an influence over the world.

I spoke about Indonesia just now from where Dr. Shahrir has come. If you go across the seas to Indonesia, every brick and mortar will bear witness to the influence of India's culture and civilization. Who were the people who went there? They belonged to a nation which is now in the shackles of religion. They went with the message of India, of her arts and culture, and carried it to every corner of the world. They made great progress and yet they were the people who later prohibited travel across the seas saying that it destroyed religion, and propagated various taboos against eating, drinking, etc., and ultimately turned religion into a kitchen ritual. Where was its spirituality? Taboos about food and untouchability, keeping women in purdah and all sorts of prohibitions for men—this is what our religion became, a mass of rituals and taboos, and it was not surprising that we fell as a nation. We became backward while the other nations went ahead and made progress in a thousand ways. We were imprisoned in our own narrow-mindedness and, like frogs in a well, refused to let the light in from the outside world! So we became backward, a great country like ours, with thousands of years of history behind it and with a rich heritage of literature which is capable of shaking the world to its foundations even to this day. We became so strong and great a nation in the olden days because of the foundation that we had been given in the form of our philosophy and spirituality. A nation can remain free only so long as its mind is free and not in shackles. The moment a nation shackles its mind, whether in the name of religion or whatever it may be, narrow-mindedness increases and the nation stops growing. This is what happened in the history of India. We started with great ideals and yet we let them grow dim by

imposing a rigid code of rituals and customs which prevented our minds from thinking for ourselves. We began to learn about our ancient wisdom by rote and failed to grasp its essence. So we fell.

As you know, there was a time when many races came into India from outside. A great historian has said that India is like a large ocean in which other cultures of the world have mingled and been absorbed. It is quite true that this was India's greatest strength. India's strength in the olden days was based on very firm foundations. Great men from Greece came here. Alexander came and before that, many of their great philosophers came. They came and taught India something but they learnt far more from India. Our philosophy reached Greece and Rome and other countries. Ours was a vibrant, live nation and no foreign invasions could shake it from its firm foundations.

Then came a time when we began to shrink within ourselves and tried to tie ourselves up with all kinds of restrictions. We became weak not only in the inner, spiritual matters but even in basic things. The countries of Europe made great progress and all sorts of events happened there. Even in military matters, while they went ahead, we were still almost at the bow-and-arrow stage in our thinking.

What was the result? A handful of men came with all kinds of new weapons, and though we faced them with great courage, ultimately courage was of not much use against powerful weapons. You cannot fight against guns with bows and arrows, however courageously you may fight. The Rajputs and the Marathas undoubtedly showed great bravery, but I am amazed to read in history that in spite of all their bravery and courage, you could not find trained and skilful soldiers among them. What is even more amazing is that they did not even possess a map of India. They were in possession of half of India and did not have a map of India. The British came, fully armed with a complete map of the country. They sent their spies everywhere, to each of the States and gathered all the information. And our Rajputs and Marathas in their pride thought they could vanquish any enemy. The world was changing and they were left with their bravery and their pride. They were deceived by their own people in their courts. We were deceived by our own people. This is how we lost to our enemies, not by being defeated in wars.

In short, the moment a nation separates itself from the mainstream of the world and does not learn what is happening elsewhere, it falls, it becomes weak. Nowadays thousands of newspapers and books are published here. Do you know that when the British came, printing was unknown here? In the rest of the world, thousands of books and newspapers were being printed. Printing had been known for hundreds of years, but it did not strike anyone here to use it for the purpose of administration and learning. I am giving you small examples to show how nations become backward and cannot hope to make any progress by men shouting and recriminating.

Then Gandhiji came and drew our attention to the fundamental principles on which the culture and tradition of India were based and which had contributed to her growth. He told us that all other things were superficial and irrelevant and we should give them up. We gained in strength by this message of his—and to the extent that we followed the path shown by him, we became strong. His message was, first of all, the unity of India and the ability to work together, irrespective of caste and creed. This was the greatness of India once upon a time. There was absolute fearlessness. We were prepared to open our minds to new ideas and thoughts and to let them flow through our country because we knew that we stood on the firm soil of India and no storm or stress could shake us. Only those who are on weak ground or on sandy soil are afraid. They are afraid to let in new ideas lest their minds should get confused. Those who stand firmly by their convictions can have no fear. So, the greatness of India in the olden days lay in her fearlessness. We listened to the people and their thoughts and absorbed them and exchanged our views with them, as it happens among live nations.

So Mahatma Gandhi laid stress on those fundamental issues. The world has changed a great deal in the last three or four hundred years but the fundamental principles do not change. Mahatma Gandhi drew our attention to them and warned us not to get involved in superficial issues in the name of religion.

Then, as you know, he said another great thing which was that our Harijan brethren should be treated properly, that untouchability should be given up in India. How can you and I ask for independence if we continue to keep our brothers in bondage? he asked. It is absurd and our nation cannot make any progress. In fact, India fell undoubtedly because a few people in India tried to suppress the common people. Why then should the common people help us towards our goal? What is their interest in attaining freedom if they can only hope to exchange one master for another and continue to remain slaves?

So these are the basic facts which Mahatma Gandhi taught us—communal harmony and peaceful cooperation—in order to achieve freedom. He said that we must give up our caste consciousness.

What did he do for our women? If you read our history, you will find examples of women of the highest classes stultified by the purdah system. The country had made them lifeless though they could not extinguish their spirit completely. But they were kept under all sorts of restrictions. Mahatma Gandhi quietly fought for their emancipation and they came out into the open to fight shoulder to shoulder with men for our freedom. They came in their millions which goes to show the powerful impact that Mahatma Gandhi had on our entire social fabric.

His influence was not merely political but spiritual too. He took the students also in hand and started a new system of education. He had a great deal to

say about our food habits and tried to educate the people about the number of calories they should take in a day.

When a country goes ahead, it has to do so in all fields. It is wrong to think that now that we are politically free, we need not worry about other matters. It is obvious that we have to think about economic and social matters.

As you know, a Bill was presented in Parliament called the Hindu Code Bill which created a great deal of tension. I am extremely sorry that due to want of time, we have not been able to make much progress on that Bill during this Session. But I do not wish to keep you in the dark. Some people say that this Bill will have adverse repercussions during the elections and that we will lose votes. Yet others feel that it will influence the voter in our favour. But I am not terribly bothered about its effect on the elections. I will not go into the details of the Bill but I feel that the fundamental principles underlying it are extremely important for the progress of India because until these social bonds are loosened a little, and until our women all over the country find the path of progress open to them, the country cannot go very far. I have absolutely no doubt on this score.

When a picture of India, of a progressive India, comes to my mind, it is not in compartments, political, economic, social or of trade and occupations. All these things are linked together and affect one another and a nation which is alive leaps forward and spreads itself in all directions. It excels in the field of art and craft. It would be childish to think that the glorious periods in our history were because of our great military exploits and victories. A period is glorious when the country is so alive that it bursts forth in every direction, in its art and culture and all its work.

So looking to all this and the situation of the world today, I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that our country will make progress only when we start developing fully in all directions, and therefore, so far as I am concerned, please do not think that I am likely to show any laxity in the matter of the Hindu Code Bill. I do not wish to keep anyone in the dark. I have adopted it and shall fight for it till my last breath and I hope that it will be passed. If anyone does not wish to vote for the Congress because of this, they are welcome not to.

We have spent a lifetime struggling against the British and in tackling insurmountable problems, and years passed when it looked as if we would never be able to achieve anything at all. Our goal used to seem very distant. But we drew strength from our principles and the dreams that we dreamt. If we were to give up a principle which we believe in because we feel it might upset some people or that we may lose votes, it would be a retrograde step for the Congress. It can happen when the Congress functions to win votes only and not for any principles. I am not in the least bothered whether we get

votes or not. If I am convinced that something is right, then we shall certainly get votes because votes are cast for the right cause. Then why all this fear?

These days you must have seen in the newspapers that there are many problems before the nation. In my statements, I am laying great stress on one thing in particular—communalism which is rearing its head in some parts of the country. It is worth taking note of it, because people get carried away easily, especially the foolish ones, whether they live in the villages or in the cities, though I do feel surprised that any individual who calls himself educated should lend himself to such foolishness. My mind cannot comprehend this. After all, I may not be very intelligent but at least I am not a fool and have some ability. At least I have the capacity to see into others' minds and gauge what they are thinking. I can understand my opponent's arguments. I do not close my mind and eyes and ears. But when I hear the kind of views that are expressed by the representatives of the communal organizations, I am amazed that educated people should express such views which seem extremely foolish to me and can lead to the downfall and ruin of this country.

So you must understand this and not get into a passion, sometimes in the name of religion and sometimes in the name of culture or nationalism. I cannot see any special merit or display of civilized conduct if people get excited over such matters and even if there is any it does not show through, as most of their arguments and debates are full of invectives and innuendoes. If Indian culture has come down to this level then sooner India bids goodbye to this culture the better it would be. Our people forget the few fundamental facts that any educated person can understand in any country. I feel sorry about this because every citizen of this country, man or woman, young or old or rich or poor, is treated by me alike. I am friendly with everyone. His or her religious beliefs and inclinations do not bother me. After all, we cannot have only 'yes' men in the country. I do not want 'yes' men. I want fresh minds with differing viewpoints but at least with some basic intelligence.

As I said earlier, if you go out of the country and look at it objectively from outside as others see, you will find that they simply cannot understand, however much they try, what these communal organizations in our country are all about and what they mean when they express all these ideas. They simply cannot understand it because it is completely alien to today's world. Communalism may be found in some measure in most the countries, but it is slowly disappearing due to pressures of the changing world. In our own country, the Congress took the lead in trying to combat it and succeeded a great deal. But the Muslim League came in the way of our efforts.

Do you remember who started these communal trends in the Muslim League? It was the British Government. People forget very quickly why it was started. It was because they saw that it would undoubtedly weaken India which could perhaps never achieve independence. Therefore, the British

Government encouraged communalism through the Muslim League. It is now a matter of history. Many of our brethren were misled and the poison spread far and wide, bringing a great disaster upon us and ultimately led to the partition of the country.

So we must learn from experience and understand where communalism is likely to lead us. Instead, we are involving ourselves in the same behaviour. Muslims are in great numbers in India—nearly four crores of them. It is obvious that, as in every nation, there are both good and bad Muslims. But it is equally obvious that whether they are good or bad, their communalism cannot harm India today. There may be incidents here and there, but it cannot harm us as a nation because it has neither the strength nor the will. We need not consider Pakistan which is a nation based on communal principles. What surprises me is that the same poison which had caused so much damage to India is being sought to be spread by the Hindus and Sikhs, who do not seem to learn any lesson from our past history. This is not a question which concerns merely the Hindus and Muslims or the Sikhs. It is obvious that it goes beyond that. It concerns the four hundred million people of India, and this business of caste and religion has grown so much in the last five or six years that it is dividing the country into small compartments. This is the one single vice which has always led to India's downfall in the past, because we did not have unity among us and refused to help one another, with the result that the moment an enemy came, he could easily defeat us as we did not fight unitedly. So Mahatma Gandhi had laid stress on unity and it was that which made us strong.

Once communalism spreads even a little in this country, it will not remain confined to the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. It will spread. If you go to the South, you will find differences between the Brahmins and non-Brahmins, characterized by the same bitterness and hatred. We have to combat these tendencies. I can give you any number of examples. There are a number of Christians in the South. They are not new converts but had embraced Christianity nearly two thousand years ago. Christianity came to India even before it reached Europe and there are Christians in Travancore and all over the South in their millions. These are the facts worth considering. The glory of this country in the past lay in the fact that our doors were always open. We used to take pride in our adaptability which gave us strength. We were in no way inferior to others in our culture. We had complete confidence in ourselves and so we could look towards others without fear. But now the situation is such that if we encourage, for political or economic reasons, fissiparous tendencies in the hope of gaining a victory, then India will undoubtedly become weak. There is no question of principle in this. India will weaken its very roots because this is a disease which spreads, and apart from the fact that it is fundamentally wrong, it weakens, and ultimately makes us slaves of others.

...The fact is that our country is very large, and the people living in such a vast country should be broad-minded. Individuals must not feel that the entire country revolves around them. For instance, if the people of Gujarat or of West Bengal insist that the rest of India should do exactly what they do, it would be absolutely wrong. West Bengal is no doubt a beautiful State, but so are Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu and the Punjab. There are various provinces, but underlying all of them is a tremendous unity which binds us together and the diversity adds richness and beauty. So why should we force them to become identical?

You must think of India as an extremely beautiful tree or plant with different types of leaves and flowers. Now if anyone were to say that there should be only one type of flowers or trees, it does not seem very wise to me, apart from the fact that different kinds of soil breed different plants and trees. If you go to Kashmir, you will find an extremely beautiful tree called the chinar. Now you cannot grow the chinar in Delhi. However much you may try, there is no way of growing it in any other part of India. Therefore it is narrow-mindedness to think that all of us should become identical in our food and dress habits. What will be the result if you do that? You cannot succeed in doing so as the country will come to a standstill. Also, you create a spirit of anger among the people of the different provinces and create dissensions when you try to coerce them.

Take yet another question—the question of Hindi. We have adopted Hindi as our national language and it is proper that we should have one common language. There is no doubt about that. But if you try to force it down the people's throats in the South where Tamil and Telugu are spoken, the result will be that they will turn against Hindi. They will feel that they are being forced to learn Hindi, so they will not learn it but continue with Tamil or Telugu though they are prepared to learn, if it is done with love and affection.

I was in the Punjab yesterday and the day before. A strange debate has developed there as to whether we should have Hindi or Punjabi there. I could not understand it. I asked them whether it is some kind of a joke. Where is the question of competition? We have a great wealth in the shape of our languages. Why should people wish to reduce that wealth? Punjabi is as rich a treasure as Hindi is which is our national language. But I cannot understand this effort to suppress one or the other, instead of helping one another and learning from both. Take Urdu, for instance. Do you know the origins of Urdu? If it has a place of origin, Urdu belongs to Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Lucknow and to that area. It originated there and grew. It is our own language. But there is a strange, uneducated view that it is the language of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan cannot even speak Urdu properly. They speak a type of broken Urdu. So I am surprised that there should be any competition between Urdu, which constitutes a rich treasure, and Hindi. Both are part of our own

heritage. It is true that we wish to make Hindi the national language. We must make all efforts to do so, but that does not mean that we should suppress Urdu, Punjabi, Bengali or Gujarati. It is absurd to do so, and the moment you try to suppress other languages, believe me, Hindi will certainly not make progress because people would resent it.

Therefore, we must accept the unity in diversity in our country and try to gradually extend that unity because in the modern world, the means of communication are many like the cinema, the radio and what not. Please remember that no language grows by force. No language has ever grown till this day by governmental pressure. Languages have to be alive and grow with the people. The Government can certainly help a little or even obstruct it. We must help them to grow.

Some people say that we should have a Hindu *rashtra*. What does a Hindu *rashtra* mean? Or does it mean anything at all? Hindus are in a majority in India, and it is obvious that in an independent country, nobody can suppress the majority. The country will be governed according to their wishes. But that does not mean that they can suppress the minorities. The liberties of the minorities are guaranteed absolutely. It is wrong to think that the Hindus will be regarded as superior to the Muslims or Sikhs or Christians. There is no State religion in India. Pakistan has that but it is wrong.

In a nation, all its citizens should have equal rights, whatever their religion. This has been put down in our Constitution, and the Congress has followed this fundamental principle all these years....

I am not bothered about your vote. I am more bothered about your mind and heart and that you should grasp this fact. I am worried that what has been achieved after tremendous difficulty and sacrifices—our freedom—should not slip away or get weakened, and that we may again become backward. We will become backward unless we constantly follow a progressive path. Communalism will certainly set us back and bind us down, especially the sort of communalism shown by some of these Hindu and Sikh organizations nowadays.

There is yet another problem in our country—the socio-economic problem where progress is urgently called for. There is a great deal of difference between the rich and the poor. We have big jagirdars and zamindars and the old princely states who no longer have political rights, but are extremely rich and quite capable of using that wealth in wrong ways. These zamindars cannot come into the open and ask for votes because nobody will vote for them. So they work behind the scenes and help these communal organizations with funds for their own ends. There is a clear link between such socially retrograde elements.

My greatest regret is that we have not been able to abolish the zamindari and jagirdari systems in the last four years in spite of our repeated declarations. I know that around here, in Delhi and the Punjab, even small landholders are called zamindars, but I am not talking about them. I mean the zamindari

system, the taluqdars, the big zamindars and jagirdars. For years we have been trying to abolish them but we are in a strange dilemma. We passed all sorts of laws and then the courts intervened and stopped them. Then we had to amend the Constitution which created a good deal of commotion. Anyhow the Constitution was amended⁴ and the matter has again gone to court.

The British have left some good as well as bad legacies, but, if you will forgive me, the worst is the lawyer's profession. I am thoroughly disgusted. I do not mean that all lawyers are bad. Many of them are honest people who do excellent work. We looked at the problems from a particular angle, from the politician's viewpoint and drafted, what I think, a first-rate Constitution. But the lawyers have incorporated all kinds of clauses which have reduced its effectiveness and now the courts are delaying matters further. There are court injunctions for every small matter. So this is the situation.

In my opinion, jagirdari and zamindari systems must go from India. But I am sorry that it has been delayed. If these landlords had been intelligent, we could have come to some agreement because after all, these large princely states did precisely that and got more than adequate, in fact very generous compensation in the form of privy purses. Why were they given so much money? This was done in order to have peaceful agreements as dissensions would have been harmful. But it is absolutely certain that the zamindari and jagirdari systems cannot exist any longer in India or in Asia or anywhere in the world. This is the broad truth. If people do not understand this, what is to be done? The Hindu Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or the Jan Sangh may thrive on the funds they get from them but there is no power in the world which can perpetuate the system. Then what is the point in sticking to them and fighting for it? There can be only one result and that is if it cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement, then it will be done by other methods, which leave no room for agreements or for compensation. It has to be done. The choice is only between doing it by mutual agreement, giving them compensation and letting them sink or swim in the current that is likely to engulf them.

You can see what is happening on the borders, in China and Tibet, Burma, Indonesia and other places. Take Kashmir. Whenever I go to Kashmir, I feel proud as well as a little ashamed. I feel proud that in the last three years, in spite of the war and tremendous difficulties, there has been so much progress in Kashmir. They have successfully solved the land issue in a few months' time and here we have been involved in court cases for years. All these developments are taking place all around us, and it is futile to think that

4. The Constitution was amended to validate zamindari abolition legislation in U.P. and Bihar.

nothing will happen here. This has to be done and will be done. But care has to be taken to do it fairly so that the loss to any individual is minimal.

So, the union of these two forces, communalism and the reactionaries like the jagirdars, has taken place because, as a matter of fact, neither of them want any change in India. They are scared of progress and revolution, whether it is economic or anything else. They may pay lip-service to it. I happened to glance through the election manifesto of the Hindu Mahasabha which has words like socialism in it. I do not know if they understand the meaning of those words or whether they have deliberately used them to deceive the people because there is a tremendous distance between a communal organisation like the Hindu Mahasabha and socialism. It is against their fundamental principles to adopt or practise socialism. It cannot function that way, but perhaps they have used them to please the people or mislead them.

Now I would like to draw your attention to another matter. The communalists want a Hindu *rashtra* and I have heard that they often go and scare and threaten the Muslims in Delhi saying, "get out from here. We need the space for our refugees. Why don't you go to Pakistan." Well, I do not know with what intention they do that or what they hope to achieve because it is pretty obvious that if they continue to behave in this way, they will be severely dealt with. As far as my Government is concerned, they will not be given even half a chance to do such things. We will put our entire strength against them and fight, because one thing is quite clear—and I am prepared to challenge them on this point—that if they indulge in communal activities, they are my mortal enemies and there can never be any question of compromise. I am prepared to come to an agreement with anyone except any such individual, an Indian, who raises a hand against another Indian in the name of religion. I shall fight him to the very end.

There seems to me no limit to such foolishness. Now, I ask you if you raise communal cries on one hand and on the other hand, make demands that something should be done in Kashmir and say Jawaharlal has not acted firmly then I wish to know how will the people of Kashmir react? Have they ever paused to consider who lives in Kashmir? Its population does not consist of the members of the Jan Sangh. The population of Kashmir consists of 80 per cent Muslims. Do you think the Sangh or the Indian forces will go and enslave the people of Kashmir? We went there at their invitation to protect them and to help them in their fight for freedom. The moment they feel that they do not need us, we shall come away. We have not gone there by force nor will we stay there by force. Ultimately the fate of Kashmir will be decided by the people of Kashmir, that is, by the Muslims of Kashmir. Can the Sangh members hope to please the Muslims of Kashmir by telling them that there is no place for Muslims in India? They can do so only when they take leave of their senses.

The Jan Sangh has established a branch in Jammu by the name of the Praja Parishad. How can they openly side with Pakistan? So they do everything they can to help them which is extraordinary. For instance, the fight against Pakistan is being fought by Shaikh Abdullah and his Government....

Anyhow, Shaikh Abdullah is a symbol today of the principle what we hold dear and which is against Pakistan's two-nation theory. He stands for a secular State in which people belonging to all religions can live in harmony. Now the Sangh people are out to malign Shaikh Abdullah and say all sorts of things against him with the result that it helps Pakistan in the Kashmir issue and everything else too. So there is great fanfare in the Pakistani newspapers about the activities of the Sangh in Jammu.... These tactics will definitely weaken our country.

Then they say they will make a Hindu *rashtra*. I do not know who will be responsible for running its affairs. I cannot see anyone intelligent enough to do so. Perhaps they are hiding somewhere. Look at our neighbours. Leave aside Pakistan for the moment. There is Afghanistan with whom we have a very close relationship. Afghanistan is a Muslim country. Indonesia is a country of Muslims. Burma is a Buddhist country. What will these neighbours of ours think if we establish a Hindu *rashtra*? We have a little influence in Asia today and our voice is heard with respect. What will our relationship be with those friends of ours if the members of the Jan Sangh or the Hindu Mahasabha hold the reins of power? Who will listen to us then? I am merely trying to point out the various aspects of the question to you. I am therefore amazed that in this grand old city of Delhi, such absurd ideas should be bandied about, and people should think that they can influence the politics of the country by making all sorts of noises. I am not really bothered about the elections if you ask me. I am more bothered about capturing your minds and hearts. After all, I will be in your midst for a few more years and will go when my time comes. But the work of the nation never ends. The reins will soon pass into your hands, into the hands of the youth in the universities and other places. If their minds are swayed by wrong thinking, what will India's condition be? This is what worries me. So I lay stress on this point again and again that we must be sure where we are going.

I have told you in great detail about the various aspects of communalism. I call it by another name—fascism. You can yourself see this from the speeches, ideas, actions and statements of the people who are advocates of communalism. They are just like the fascists who brought Europe to the brink of disaster. Fascism is a strange beast which works, not with its intellect, but preys on the emotions of the people and incites them into doing all sorts of things. Though there may be some short-term gains, ultimately the result would be similar to what happened to Hitler and fascism in Europe. I do not want India to follow that terrible path because the world of today is a terribly dangerous and

merciless world. So the moment we take a wrong step, we stumble and fall. There will be nobody to help us to get back on our feet. I am therefore laying special stress on these dangers today.

We have learnt many lessons from Mahatma Gandhi and it is better to remember them instead of merely adding the word *jai* to his name. The greatest lesson that he taught is that we must maintain unity and equality in India, that all Indians should have equal rights, that nobody may feel, no matter what his religion is, that there is no place for him in India or feel threatened, because all this militates against our honour. Ours is a great country not because we are militarily very strong, though our armed forces are excellent. When Pakistan threatened to create trouble, we sent in our forces quietly. We raised no hue and cry nor did we ask you to join in any clamour. If we had done that, we would have only tired ourselves out and it would have gone wholly against our grain. They wanted to frighten us with threats, but could not. We are ready for any eventuality. So we must decide whether we shall act as behoves a great country or act like a small nation of fishwives. We must therefore always remember the lessons taught by Mahatma Gandhi and march ahead on the path of progress.

I would like to tell you one thing more. I have become the Congress President just recently. It means a new burden. Anyhow, it could not be shirked as circumstances have forced me to accept it. So I shall carry the burden cheerfully and the work will be done as competently as I can because slackness will not pay. It will have to be done fairly actively. But once again, everyone's attention is absorbed in the elections. Elections are important because they will have an effect, I agree. But the question in my mind is how to make the Congress once again a healthy and a vibrant organization which can take on the tasks and burdens of the common people and work for their uplift, and not remain bogged down with the task of contesting elections only. We must make certain changes in the Congress committees so that all the members get involved.

I have even invited those who have gone out of the Congress to come back because we need people who are willing to work in the organization. The work will no longer be confined to holding public meetings but we should do what Mahatma Gandhi stressed so much—constructive work—because ultimately the nation's progress is closely linked with our work as Congressmen. As you know, the Planning Commission has drawn up a Five-Year Plan and we have kept it on a rather low key because we do not wish to talk big. But we should like to go beyond it and we can do it if we get the cooperation of the people. So I want that the Congress should pay attention, apart from contesting elections, to constructive work and to the Five-Year Plan. We must therefore work hard and put an end to all the internal squabbles.

Jai Hind.

GENERAL ELECTIONS
IV. Miscellaneous Matters

1. To R.R. Diwakar¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1951

My dear Diwakar,²

Your letter of August 4th about election broadcasts. This is a difficult question and my mind is not very clear about it. I have written to Rajaji to consult him.³ It might be desirable to have a small meeting of a few of us to discuss this matter. I am almost inclined to think that it is better to ban all election broadcasts, including those from the Congress, as there are far too many parties and it is difficult to draw the line.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 16(55)/51-PMS.
2. Diwakar was at this time Minister for Information and Broadcasting.
3. See the next item.

2. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

I enclose a letter from Diwakar about facilities to be afforded to various parties for election broadcasts.

When consulted previously, I had suggested that it might be proper, to some extent, to follow the British example and give some time to recognised parties for one election broadcast each. But the more I think of it, the more difficult this seems, because there are far too many parties and one does not know where to draw the line. I am almost inclined to think that no party, including the Congress, should broadcast specifically for election purposes. However, this is a matter which requires careful consideration and perhaps it might be desirable for some of us to meet and consider it.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 16(55)/51-PMS.

3. Collection of Funds from Industrialists¹

Sir, the honourable Dr. Kunzru put a question² which you were pleased to say was not wholly relevant. Nevertheless, though your ruling, with all respect, is perfectly correct that it may not be relevant to this occasion, it is desirable that facts should be known as far as we can find them.

As soon as this matter was brought to the notice of this House by the motion for adjournment that Dr. Kunzru proposed, though it was not allowed here, I got into touch with the Uttar Pradesh Government to find out what the facts were. The Chief Minister happened to come here. He knew some of the facts but not all. So, he communicated with his colleague Mr. Chandra Bhan Gupta,³ another Minister whose name has been particularly mentioned in this connection. Mr. Chandra Bhan Gupta thereupon sent him a note which he passed on to me giving the facts.

In brief, the facts are that two gentlemen connected with the sugar industry wished to see him and asked for an interview and saw him on one or two occasions and in the course of the interview they suggested that they and perhaps their colleagues would like to help the Congress Party in the elections. Mr. Gupta told him that they were perfectly welcome to do so and that their help would in fact be welcome if they thought it proper to do so. As regards the question asked by Dr. Kunzru, I shall read out that passage particularly.

During the course of these talks, Shri Hari Raj Swarup asked me whether there was any chance for non-Congressmen to seek election on the support of the Congress. I told him about the practice that the Congress had been following in the past and the principles that govern the decision of this question. I gave him to understand on the basis of my experience of the Congressmen that cases of those non-Congressmen might also be considered

1. Reply to debate in Parliament, 14 August 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1951, Vol. IX, Part I, columns 287-293.
2. Kunzru wanted to know whether C.B. Gupta, the Minister of Supplies of the U.P. Government, had denied that he had promised any sugar industrialist that he would be selected as a Congress candidate if he collected funds.
3. C.B. Gupta (1902-1980); member, U.P. Assembly, 1937-39, 1946-67, 1969-74; Minister in the U.P. Government, 1947-57; Chief Minister, 1960-63, resigned under Kamraj Plan; Chief Minister again in 1967 but resigned soon after and became leader of Opposition, 1967-68; Chief Minister, 1969-70; leader of Congress (Organization) Legislature Party, 1970-74.

who were men of integrity and character and public service and were prepared to abide by the Congress ideals and discipline, and were also popular otherwise in the constituencies from where they proposed to seek election. I gave the instances of Hriday Nath Kunzru and Mukhtiar Singh. I however made it clear that it was for the Central Parliamentary Board to lay down the guiding principles for inviting applications to the seats.

JN: Dr. Kunzru or Balakrishna Sharma⁴ can see it or any other individual member who wants. But I do not see why it should be made a part of the record of the House.

4. (1897-1960); a Hindi poet and a Congressman from U.P.; member, Central Assembly, Constituent Assembly, Provisional Parliament; Lok Sabha, 1952-56 and Rajya Sabha, 1956-60.

4. Distinction Between Official and Election Work¹

I agree generally with Home Secretary's note. It is clear to me that Ministers, whether Central or State, should clearly distinguish between their election activities and their other activities. Sometimes no doubt they overlap. Even in such cases they should be considered generally as election meetings. Any election meeting or other activity should be paid for by the party or the individual and not by Government. Nor should Ministers charge their travelling expenses or daily allowances for journeys which have, for their main purpose, the election campaign.

I would say that normally all expenses connected with public meetings should be borne privately and not by Government, except on rare occasions when the meeting is entirely governmental.

I think this matter should be mentioned in Cabinet. The Home Secretary's and my notes can be put up for Cabinet.

1. Note to Home Secretary, New Delhi, 29 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

5. Appeal for Subscriptions¹

A peculiar set of circumstances led to my election as Congress President. I hesitated because I felt that I might not be able to do full justice to this high office and because I did not think that it was normally desirable for the Prime Minister to be the Congress President. However, circumstances left me no choice, and I accepted this honour and responsibility till such time as other and better arrangements could be made.

2. Meanwhile, I am sometimes placed in an anomalous position. As Congress President, it is my function and duty to appeal to the public for funds for Congress work. As Prime Minister, I have refrained from making appeals for funds except for the Prime Minister's Fund or some relief or memorial fund. I have avoided making requests to individuals for donations, and such appeals as I have made have been general appeals to the public. It is clear that nothing should be done by a minister which might cast a reflection on his work or which might create any misunderstanding in the minds of the public. It is important to bear this in mind all the time but more especially when elections are near and funds have to be collected.

3. Yet, public work has to be carried on by public help. The broader the basis of this public help, the better it is for the organisation concerned. No great organisation should subsist on help from a limited number of persons.

4. As Congress President I make an appeal to our friends and sympathisers to subscribe to the Congress funds both for organisational work and the elections. They may subscribe to provincial funds for this purpose, but for the moment I am appealing for the Central Fund. It is my hope and desire that the Congress should become an effective organ for public service and that it should be organised from this point of view. The vast scale of the elections will, of course, consume a great sum of money.

5. I suggest that a percentage of provincial collections for this special purpose, which may be fixed at 25 per cent, should be sent to the Central Fund. Some of our States are prosperous, others are not so and require help. Apart from this, general organisation expenses have to be met at the Centre.

6. I do not want any moneys to be sent to me directly. I would request that donations and contributions be sent either to the Treasurer of the All India Congress Committee or to the General Secretaries of that Committee.

1. Statement to the press, 27 September 1951. Published in the newspapers on 28 September 1951.

6. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi

September 29, 1951

My dear Pantji,

You will remember that when you were here, the story about some kind of a deal with the sugar factory owners caused a bit of a sensation. There was a question in Parliament and in the course of the answer, a part of a statement by Chandra Bhan Gupta was read out by me.² I said nothing else. I confess that I did not like this whole business and there has been plenty of criticism in the press about it.

I have today received a letter from Vijayalakshmi. Immediately on her arrival in New York, J.P. Srivastava,³ who was there, asked to see her to have "a private and confidential talk" with her. It appeared from this talk that his son telephoned to him from Kanpur to the effect that C.B. Gupta had been there and demanded a large sum of money from him as a contribution towards the elections. C.B. Gupta is reported to have said that those who did not pay would be "sorry" and would "end up in jail." J.P. Srivastava said he saw Gupta before he left. Gupta had asked him to arrange to bring back 2000 jeeps from there for use in the elections. Vijayalakshmi adds that while they were actually talking, he received a telegram from his son which, he said, contained news of "further threats" from C.B. Gupta.

I have given you the story more or less in Vijayalakshmi's own words. I am alarmed and distressed that this kind of thing should be said and repeated. Could you kindly enquire into this matter?

I enclose a copy of a letter I have written to Sampurnanand.⁴

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 124-125.

3. J.P. Srivastava, a former member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, was an industrialist in U.P. He had gone to the U.S.A. for the purchase of some machinery.

4. In a letter to Sampurnanand on 29 September 1951 (not printed), Nehru had enclosed a cutting from the *National Herald* which reproduced some sentences found in a Hindi text book prescribed for VIII standard students. One sentence read: "*Mairai Mandir Men Hari Rahta, Tairi Masjid Men Shaitan*" (God lives in my temple and Satan lives in your mosque). Nehru wrote that "surely these are hardly suitable for a text book or for any book."

THE CONGRESS PRESIDENCY

1. Disapproval of Groupism in the Congress¹

In the course of the long struggle for freedom, the Congress functioned as a national front leading that struggle. In the changed circumstances, after the attainment of Independence, the Congress has naturally to function more as a disciplined political party working for the attainment of its objectives and the implementation of its economic and other programmes. Nevertheless, it still continues to be a great national organisation, which is something more than a mere political party and which seeks to bring into its fold all those who agree with those objectives and the policies and programmes which it has proclaimed from time to time in its resolutions. The election manifesto has laid down, in a short compass, many of these present objectives. All those who agree with the general aim of the Congress, as well as these objectives, should find a welcome place within its ranks. The critical situation in the world, as well as in the country, demands vision and the widest cooperation for the solution of our problems. The Congress invites this cooperation and would welcome all those who wish to cooperate in the great task ahead including old members who have left it.

The Congress does not approve of the formation of groups within its fold as this would impair the strength and efficiency of the organisation. The Congress discipline must be maintained and where any charges of irregularity in the working of the organisation are made and appear to some *prima facie* justification, these should be investigated in a prompt and impartial manner.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru, and adopted by the Congress Working Committee on 10 July 1951 at Bangalore. J.N. Collection. The A.I.C.C. session at Bangalore was held on a requisition signed by 21 members to consider the growing disunity in the Congress.

2. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
July 19, 1951

My dear Rafi,

Your letter of July 17, together with its enclosures, was only seen and read by

1. J.N. Collection.

me early this morning.² I am, no doubt, partly at least at fault for this delay in seeing the letter. That letter apparently reached my house before my return from Bangalore. It was not marked confidential or personal and was in an ordinary cover, which was opened in my office. The letter was put with numerous other letters in a file. Unfortunately it got stuck up with a letter from Jairamdas and so I overlooked it during the first rapid survey to see what were the urgent matters to be dealt with.

Later that day I received a letter from Ajit Prasad Jain. This I saw immediately on arrival.

It was only when the newspapers announced that you had sent the letter that I felt that there must have been some mistake in my office or some mix-up in my papers. Dr B.C. Roy also told me of this.³

I wanted to send for you and Ajit yesterday. But I discovered from Dr. Roy that he was meeting you and I thought, therefore, that I might see you a little later. You are coming to have lunch with me today and I shall have a talk with you then.

As you know, I do not wish to and indeed I cannot come in the way of any final decision that you might take. But you also know that these questions are not merely personal, but have a much larger significance. That significance becomes much greater in view of recent developments vis-a-vis Pakistan. All these matters have to be carefully considered. I need hardly say that it would distress me greatly if you left us. That distress would be personal as well as on public grounds. We have been close colleagues for over thirty years now and, in spite of differences of opinion, nothing has come in the way of our affection and esteem for each other.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Kidwai had written that he was resigning from the Cabinet and had requested Nehru to relieve him of his duties as Minister as soon as possible. Kidwai was unhappy over the chiding of Nehru against groupist tendencies at the A.I.C.C. session at Bangalore. He found that the Congress leadership was not prepared to come to terms with dissident Congressmen who had demanded a special session of the A.I.C.C. for considering the reconstitution of the Working Committee.
3. B.C. Roy sought to prevent Kidwai and Jain from leaving the Congress.

3. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
July 19, 1951

My dear Ajit,

Your letter of the 17th July reached me that evening.² I did not immediately reply to it as Dr B.C. Roy was, I understood, having some talks with you and others. I wanted to see you today, but I am told that you have gone to Simla.³ Please come and see me soon after your return.

Whatever the personal aspects of this matter might be, public aspects have to be given greater consideration both by you and me. It would distress me greatly if you left the Ministry over which you have presided so ably. But apart from my distress, I have to consider also, as you must also consider, the public interest in this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. A.P. Jain Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Jain wrote to Nehru that he had decided to resign from his membership of the Congress as well as from his office as a minister as he felt that there was no place for him in the Congress.
3. Jain had gone to Shimla to participate in the meeting of the Joint Rehabilitation Board, but was called back before it was over.

4. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
July 20, 1951

My dear Rafi,

I feel that there should be no delay in my taking some action. I intend, therefore, to issue a press statement, preferably this afternoon, so that it might appear in the evening's papers.² I enclose a copy of my draft. Tonight I should like to issue a brief statement about your and Ajit Prasad's resignations from the Government.³ I enclose a draft of this. I should like this to appear tomorrow, 21st morning.

1. A.P. Jain papers, N.M.M.L.
2. See the next item.
3. See *post*, pp.135-136.

I had a brief talk with Ajit Prasad on the telephone yesterday and I intend speaking to him again today and telling him of the steps I intend taking.⁴

I have called a meeting of the Delhi Congress workers, about 25 or 30, this evening in my house.⁵ I want to speak to them frankly and discuss matters with them. I also intend addressing a public meeting in the course of the next four or five days.⁶ I shall fix this up after meeting the Delhi Congress people.

Please let me have your reactions as soon as possible. I feel that if one has to take a step, it should not be delayed. Mahavir Tyagi and Keshav⁷ came to see me and they were also anxious that I should do something in this matter soon.

Yours ever,
Jawaharlal

4. Nehru intended to request them to continue as Ministers even after their resignation from the Congress.
5. No report of the speech is available.
6. See *ante*, pp. 61-69.
7. K.D. Malaviya.

5. The Cause Greater than Personal Feelings¹

Soon after my return to Delhi from Bangalore,² I was informed by my colleagues, Shri Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Shri Ajit Prasad Jain, that they had resigned from the Congress and, as a consequence, they also sent me their resignations from the Government. At any time such a step taken by my colleagues, with whom I have been associated for a large number of years in the national struggle and later, and whose work I have valued greatly, would have been a matter of great concern to me. At the present time with all kinds of crises facing us and a situation which calls upon every Indian to be alert and to cooperate for the good of the country, this step was particularly distressing. We had gone to Bangalore to strengthen ourselves.

What was done at Bangalore might not have wholly been to the liking of many persons. Indeed, I have to confess that I would have preferred that some

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 20 July 1951. *National Herald*, 21 July 1951.
2. On 17 July 1951.

further steps had been taken by the A.I.C.C. But there can be little doubt that the A.I.C.C. and the Central Election Committee advanced to some extent in the right direction. A criticism is made that resolutions are not acted upon or implemented. That criticism has some weight if we look at the past. Nevertheless, the first step is to resolve what we have to do and the next step is to do it. I have little doubt that the resolutions of the A.I.C.C. were passed in all earnestness and with the full intention of being acted upon. Certainly, in so far as I am concerned, that was and is my intention and I think I can say that about many of my colleagues.

In view of this, it seems to be peculiarly unfortunate that some friends should take hasty action and not help in producing the very results that they aim at.

I have no objection at all to persons of different views forming their own groups and parties. Democracy progresses in this way. But there are two factors to be considered. One is that those differences must be real and not personal. Secondly, that the situation today demands the greatest unity of effort and everything that weakens that unity of effort is to be deprecated.

I earnestly hope, therefore, that all Congressmen and others will take the resolutions passed at Bangalore as evidence of what is going to be done and not merely stated, and will not, even for reasons which they may consider justifiable, take any step which, in the context of today, is peculiarly inappropriate.

To innumerable comrades of mine with whom I have shared good fortune and ill-fortune alike in the past I make this appeal. It is an appeal and it is something more than an appeal, for I should like to put behind that appeal such authority as I have, not as Prime Minister, but as a Congressman of thirty-eight years' standing. We cannot permit ourselves at this juncture to be swayed by personal feelings or likes or dislikes. The cause is greater than us.

6. Withdrawal of Resignations¹

Shri Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Shri Ajit Prasad Jain have sent me their resignations from the Government. They have made it clear that these resignations are not due to any difference in regard to policy but are rather a

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 20 July 1951. Newspapers carried this statement on 21 July.

consequence of other steps that they have taken.² Those other steps can be considered separately. I received their offer to resign with regret because I have valued their work in Government and I was therefore reluctant to accept these resignations more especially at the present juncture. I requested them therefore to withdraw their resignations and I am glad to say that they have accepted my advice.

2. Kidwai and Jain in their letters of resignation from the Cabinet, had made it plain that they were not resigning because of any differences with the Prime Minister.

7. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi

July 21, 1951

My dear Rafi,

I have just received your letter as well as Ajit's. You know that I sent you the draft of my statement to the press before I issued it and you raised no objection to it.² In fact, you agreed to my issuing it.

You object to my saying that your action has been hasty. It is true that it has not been hasty, if you look at the past year or two. I was not thinking of that, but rather of the immediate haste after Bangalore. Surely no harm could have come if you had stayed your hand for a few days till I had come back and you and Ajit had spoken to me. Both in my capacity as a Congressman and as Prime Minister, I was obviously intimately concerned with any step that you might take and I think it would have been due to me, in the normal course, quite apart from the friendship, that you might have stayed your hand for two or three days. When I saw you last at Bangalore, I did not get any impression that you were going to take such action.

However, this is not a matter for argument. I was merely mentioning it so that I could explain what I meant.

From what Dr Roy told me after his talks with you and Ajit Prasad and others, it appeared to me that in the event of certain enquiries being conducted by him into the charges³ made by Ajit Prasad, Ajit would be prepared to reconsider his resignation from the Congress and in fact to come back to it.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 134-135.

3. It was alleged that no inquiry had been held into corruption and "the partisan" handling of the last organisational election in which bogus membership had helped the election of Purushottamdas Tandon as Congress President.

Dr Roy has written on this subject to Ajit Prasad also and sent me a copy of the letter. If this is so, then the question of finally leaving the Congress or coming back to it is still open and dependent on certain circumstances. In this event, how can you or Ajit consider your dissociation from the Congress as final or join any other political organisation. I can understand your resignation from the Congress continuing as a pending matter subject to some future events happening. But if it is supposed to be final, then what was said to Dr Roy has no point and in fact contradicted.

I think, therefore, that you should certainly not join any other party at present and await developments. One cannot take up self-contradictory attitudes.

You can issue the statement,⁴ the draft of which you have sent me, but I would suggest some changes in it which I have marked in the draft.

They are not vital changes so far as your argument is concerned, but they avoid certain statements which might come in the way of any other future action that you might consider worthwhile.

I am issuing my brief statement to the press about your resignations from the Government being withdrawn.⁵

May I suggest that in future it might be understood between us that any step taken by you or me concerning each other or affecting each other should be preceded by mutual consultation. That is the only way to function; otherwise constant difficulties arise.

Yours ever,
Jawaharlal

4. Announcing the withdrawal of their resignations from the Cabinet, Kidwai and Jain issued a statement on 21 July in which they reiterated their disapproval of the working of the Congress organization and criticized the Congress President, characterizing him "as the antithesis of everything that the organization stands for". They had agreed to remain in the Cabinet on the understanding with the Prime Minister that they would be free to work in political opposition to the Congress.
5. See the preceding item.

8. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1951

My dear Ajit,

I am afraid that your joint statement has created a mess and made matters a little worse than they were.² What exactly should be done now is not quite clear to me. When you come back, please come and see me, as we must discuss this matter thoroughly.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. A.P. Jain Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. In the joint statement issued by Kidwai and Jain on 21 July 1951, they both disagreed with Nehru who had called their resignation "a hasty action". They clarified that since Nehru, despite repeated appeals, had failed to restore democracy in the Congress, they had decided to resign.
3. Tandon was incensed by the statement and issued a rejoinder emphasising that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet were responsible to the Congress, and should carry out the policies from time to time laid down by the Congress. If the Prime Minister gave Kidwai and Jain liberty to work in political opposition to the Congress it would create an impossible situation. He accused them of insulting the Congress President and said that the Working Committee would take note of it.

9. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1951

My dear Ajit,

Thank you for your letter of July 21st.² I enclose a copy of a letter I wrote to Rafi Ahmed.³ This will partly meet the points you have raised.

I must confess that it surprised me exceedingly that you and Rafi should take a step without waiting for a day or two for me to return from Bangalore.

I am sorry that the joint statement by Rafi and you has been issued. I do not think it does much good to carry on such an argument. But as you two had decided on that, I did not wish to come in the way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Jain had stated in this letter: "I do not think I shall ever go back to the Congress, but I might make it clear that my dissociation from the Congress does not by any means imply that I propose to join any political party or group."
3. See *ante*, pp. 136-137.

10. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1951

My dear Purushottamdas,

I am sorry that Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Ajit Prasad Jain have made personal references to you in the statement they have issued.² This business of carrying on a controversy on a personal level is most unfortunate and can only lead to further difficulty and friction. I was hoping and still hope that somehow we shall be able to get over these personal difficulties and even get Rafi Ahmed and Ajit Prasad to withdraw their resignations from the Congress. When I came back from Bangalore, I found that Bidhan Roy was in Delhi and had been meeting Rafi Ahmed and Ajit Prasad and discussing matters with them. I did not interfere at all as he was dealing with the matter in his own way. Just before Bidhan went away he told me of his talk and I understood from him that he would be writing to you later. Because of this I did not deal with the Congress aspect of the question. I met Rafi Ahmed for a while one day. I have not met Ajit Prasad at all since my return.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Kidwai and Jain had stated in their statement: "Is there any parallel in the world where the President of an organisation is the very antithesis of everything that the organisation stands for? What is there in common between Shri Purushottamdas Tandon and the policies of the Congress—economic, communal and international?"

11. To K.M. Munshi¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1951

My dear Munshi,

Your letter of the 22nd July. I agree with you that the joint statement issued by Kidwai and Jain is very unfortunate and creates a bad impression. I think these matters have to be cleared up in the near future.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

12. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1951

My dear Purushottamdas,

Thank you for your letter of today's date.² I should like to meet you in two or three days' time to discuss a number of matters that have arisen. But I want to make one thing quite clear. I think it would be improper for any member of the Cabinet to belong to a political party which is functioning in opposition to the Congress. The newspaper report to which you refer (I have not seen any positive report of this kind yet) cannot be correct, in so far as I am concerned.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Tandon stated that it would be an "impossible situation" if Nehru were really a party to any such understanding as Kidwai mentioned in his press statement that he would be free to join any political party though he might continue in the Cabinet.

13. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
July 23, 1951

My dear Purushottamdas,

I have your letter of July 23rd. I am glad you have drawn my attention to the press statements which I had not seen. During the last two days, owing to stress of work, I have not been able to read the newspapers with any thoroughness.

I am afraid that I have made rather a mess of things and I must plead guilty to some extent at least. After my return from Bangalore I was overwhelmed with work and at the same time I was anxious, for a variety of

1. J.N. Collection.

reasons,² to get Rafi Ahmed and Jain to withdraw their resignations both from the Congress and the Government. I found that Bidhan Roy was having long talks with them chiefly about the Congress. I left that to him. I met Rafi once in between and had some general talk with him. In the course of this talk I told him that I would like him and Ajit Prasad to remain in Government and come back to the Congress. If they were dissatisfied with future events, or the functioning of the Congress, or if they complained that the Congress resolutions were not properly implemented, it would be open to them to resign then. It seemed to me improper that they should act in haste like this. In particular I said that I could not conceive of their being in Government and opposing the Congress outside either by joining a party hostile to it or otherwise. As far as I can remember, Rafi said that he appreciated the difficulty. There the matter rested and I did not pursue it further because Dr Roy was carrying on conversations. I have not seen Rafi Ahmed since then and I have not seen Ajit Prasad at all since my return. I had however some telephone conversations with them.

Dr Roy reported to me later that Ajit Prasad had told him, in the presence of Rafi Ahmed and some others, that in view of the new situation that had arisen vis-a-vis Pakistan, he felt that it would not be right for him to take a step which might lead to difficulties. He further said that if proper arrangements were made to hold enquiries in three or four of his charges, he would withdraw his resignation from the Congress, regardless of what the result of the enquiries might be. Dr Roy told him that he would be prepared himself to enquire into them, if the Congress President was willing to entrust this to him.

This was reported to me by Bidhan Roy. It seemed to me that there could be no difficulty on your part or anyone else's part for any charge made to be enquired into by Dr Roy. I had no idea what the charges were, and they were not even mentioned to Dr Roy. Anyhow Dr Roy said that he would write on the subject, to confirm this arrangement, to Ajit Prasad and would later write to you and possibly Pantji also.

Later, from Calcutta Dr Roy sent me a copy of a letter he had written to Ajit Prasad. I am sending you this copy, as this gives a fuller record. Indeed it gives more than Dr Roy told me at the time.

2. Nehru was of the view that the resignations of Kidwai and Jain from the Congress should not entail severance of their connection with the Government. He drew this distinction on the support of a ruling given by Rajendra Prasad in his capacity as the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly. Damodar Swarup, a Congressman, who had been returned on the Congress ticket to the Constituent Assembly from the United Provinces, had resigned from the Congress and joined the Socialist Party. He sought the advice of Rajendra Prasad whether, after ceasing to be a Congressman, it would be incumbent upon him to resign the membership of the Assembly. Rajendra Prasad ruled that although he had been elected on the Congress ticket, he was selected in his personal capacity as one who could make a useful contribution in framing the Constitution.

After Dr Roy's conversation with me, I felt that there would be no particular difficulty in Ajit Prasad as well as Rafi Ahmed and others remaining in the Congress or coming back to it.

A day or two later I issued a statement to the press which you may have seen.³ The same day I drafted a brief statement about the withdrawal by Rafi and Ajit Prasad of their resignations from Government.⁴ I sent a copy of it to Rafi Ahmed, who informed me on the telephone that he had no objection to it, but he would like to consult Ajit Prasad. I telephoned the context of this statement to Ajit Prasad at Saharanpur or Simla. He said he quite agreed with this statement and I could issue it, but as Rafi wanted him to come to Delhi, he was doing so. The next day, I think, early in the afternoon, I telephoned to Rafi Ahmed and asked him if he had seen Ajit Prasad. He told me that Ajit Prasad had been there and had just gone back to Simla. He said that I could issue the statement and he was sending me his own and Ajit Prasad's letters. I received these letters as I was leaving office very late in the afternoon and read through them hurriedly. In Ajit Prasad's letter he said that his dissociation from the Congress did not, by any means, imply that he proposed to join any political party or group. In Rafi Ahmed's letter he did say that "I am free now to associate myself with any political party. I do not say that I will not return to the Congress, but there is no such prospect in the near future."

I did not, in my hurry, attach any particular importance to this, except as some kind of theoretical assertion. I had in my mind the talks with Bidhan Roy. I wrote to Rafi Ahmed immediately reminding him of his and Ajit Prasad's talk with Dr Roy and saying that these could only mean that both of them would come back to the Congress if a certain procedure was followed. I further told him that he could certainly not join any other party, as this would be a self-contradictory attitude.

Having sent this letter, I issued my brief statement to the press about their resignations having been withdrawn.

It is therefore true that Rafi Ahmed had written to me that we would be free to join any political party. In the circumstances I had not attached much importance to it and as a matter of fact I had written to him clearly that I did not think this right or possible.

I am exceedingly sorry that in my haste I have helped in creating a mess and that you have become personally involved in it. I hope you will forgive me for this lapse.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. See *ante*, pp. 134-135.

4. See *ante*, pp. 135-136.

14. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1951

Nan dear,

Much has happened here about which I should like to write to you and even now we are in the midst of a pretty severe political crisis, or rather many crises. There is of course the Indo-Pakistan war-scare and there is the Rafi Ahmed Kidwai crisis, in which I have got rather deeply involved. Meanwhile, Dr Graham is here and all manner of other things are taking place which absorb my time.

So I do not write to you, as I would like to....

I do not quite know what to write to you in answer to your letter of the 6th July. I feel rather tired of it all here and yet we are just at the beginning of a strenuous period in Parliament and elsewhere. As the Chinese say, if you ride a tiger, you cannot dismount.

All my efforts to bring about some kind of cooperative working in the Congress have failed and indeed the latest development has got me into some kind of trouble. The hatreds and animosities are too deep and even the crisis with Pakistan has not been enough to overcome them. As you know, my sympathies are largely with Rafi. But he is a very unsafe friend, for he acts in such a way as to embarrass one. Repeatedly my plans have been upset by what he has said or done. He has a great affection for me, but he just cannot restrain himself and thus he plays into the hands of his opponents. I do not myself know clearly how things will shape themselves in the course of the next few days, but I fear that it is no longer possible for Rafi to continue in the Cabinet. He has himself made this very difficult.

The Indo-Pakistan situation is pretty bad. And yet, oddly enough, the other day an Indian police hockey team went to Lahore to play a match with the police there. A large crowd witnessed it and the Indians won. There were many exhibitions of friendship and hospitality and apparently no sign of ill will. All this was not reported in any newspaper in Pakistan or India. But we had a report from eyewitnesses. We seem to be driven into a tragedy without any adequate reason for it. It may be avoided still. Meanwhile, in Delhi all kinds of communal organisations function aggressively.

Dr Graham goes on calmly listening without saying much himself. He does not even refer to the last resolution² of the Security Council.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Of 13 January 1949.

I had your telegram about the Japanese peace treaty. My own reactions are against signing that treaty.³ We shall however give it every thought. To sign it means to put an end to the policy which we have thus far pursued. Bajpai is strongly in favour of signing. Panikkar, Radhakrishnan and Krishna Menon are equally strongly opposed to it.

With love from
Jawahar

3. India did not sign the treaty or participate in the San Francisco conference for discussion of the treaty. India signed a separate peace treaty with Japan at Tokyo on 9 June 1952, which ended the state of war with Japan.

15. To A.C. Guha¹

New Delhi
July 25, 1951

My dear Guha,²

You asked me a question today and wanted an answer. The question related to West Bengal and the Congress there. According to you, a number of Congressmen there have been dealt with unfairly and are thinking of leaving the Congress.

I am not intimately acquainted with Congress conditions in West Bengal, except that I have received various complaints at different times. I can only answer your question in general terms. I think that it would be unfortunate for Congressmen to leave the Congress because they feel that they have not had a fair deal. At the present moment especially, we should not encourage any disruptionist tendency. As you know, the Central Election Committee has made it clear that they will take special care in the choice of candidates for elections. They propose, wherever necessary, to consult with persons or groups in the Congress who are not represented by the majority in any area. The idea is that everyone should have a fair chance and that no group or clique should keep out a deserving person from being a Congress candidate.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1892-1983); Congress leader of West Bengal; member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52 and Lok Sabha, 1952-72; Deputy Finance Minister, 1953-54 and Minister of Revenues and Defence Expenditure, 1954-57.

16. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi

July 25, 1951

My dear Purushottamdas,

I have your letter of the 25th July.² I entirely agree with you that the situation that has been created by succession of events requires clearing up. Of course, this has to be done and, in so far as I am concerned, I shall do it. But this matter has become much more complicated than it originally appeared to be and far-reaching consequences might be involved. I have been giving careful thought to it. I shall let you know as soon as I decide upon any course of action.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Tandon wrote that the situation that had been created by the misunderstanding that had arisen about Nehru's position by Rafi Ahmed Kidwai's repeated declaration that he had joined the Cabinet after informing Nehru of his "intention to work against the Congress" and by Kidwai's "irresponsible" attack on the Congress and its President, "needed an immediate clearing up."

17. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi

July 26, 1951

My dear Rafi,

I have given a great deal of thought to the matters we discussed yesterday. I saw Ajit today also. As a result of our talks and the thought I have given, I have drafted two letters, one addressed to you and the other to Ajit. These letters, I think, give a fairly full and frank account of what has happened and of the present position. I am very anxious that whatever step I may take, or you may take, should be clear to the other to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding. I am therefore sending you the draft letter so that you can tell me if it is a correct account and statement of facts. If you agree with it, I suggest that you send me a draft reply. We should then meet to clear up any matter. I should like to meet you and Ajit together, if possible, tomorrow,

1. J.N. Collection. A similar letter was sent to Ajit Prasad Jain.

Friday, the 27th at 7 p.m. If this does not suit you, I could meet you late at night at 10.30, as I am going out to dinner. But I would prefer 7.

I am sending copies of these drafts to Ajit also.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

18. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
July 26, 1951

My dear Rafi,

Soon after my return from Bangalore, I heard vaguely that you and Ajit Prasad were thinking of resigning from Government. I was sorry to learn of this. Dr B.C. Roy, who was here then, saw me and told me that he was having some talks with you and Ajit Prasad. As he was having these conversations, I thought I had better leave it to him. I was also terribly busy during that day or two. I saw you later and had a talk. I pointed out to you that your resignation and Ajit Prasad's from Government, at this juncture particularly, would be harmful. Both of you were, in my opinion, valuable members of Government and your departure would make a difference. I expressed my wish therefore that both of you should continue. Indeed I wanted both of you to continue in the Congress also. You had no particular grievances against the policies and programmes which were not implemented. I suggested to you that you might wait and see how far the latest decisions were implemented.

I further pointed out to you that it would be improper for a Minister to range himself openly against the Congress and condemn it in public.

You told me in reply that you appreciated the difficulties of the political situation and certainly did not wish to add to them. You had felt however that as you were resigning from the Congress, it would not be fitting for you to continue as a member of Government.² If I so desired, you would reconsider your resignation from Government. You added that you appreciated the difficulty, which I had pointed out, about Ministers joining a party hostile to the Congress or ranging themselves otherwise against the Congress. Our talk then was a general one.³

1. A.P. Jain Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. In the joint statement, it was mentioned: "Our appointment as Ministers was not dissociated from our being Congressmen. It therefore became imperative that we should also resign from the Ministership as a consequence of our resignation from the Congress."

The next day, Dr Roy reported to me that he had had further talk with you and Ajit Prasad and a proposal had been made by Ajit Prasad that if certain enquiries were conducted by him (Dr Roy) in regard to certain complaints, he would be prepared to come back to the Congress, whatever the results of these enquiries might be. Dr Roy told me that this appeared to him to be your attitude too in this matter. When I heard this, it seemed to me that there was no great difficulty in carrying out your and Ajit Prasad's wishes. Indeed if any responsible person particularly desires an enquiry into a specific matter, that enquiry should be given. I came to the conclusion therefore that there was no barrier left to your withdrawing your resignation from Government and I hoped that somewhat later as soon as the enquiry matters are decided, you and Ajit Prasad would also withdraw your resignations from the Congress.

The next day, I issued a general statement to the press.³ That was addressed to Congressmen. Only a brief reference was made in this to your resignation and Ajit Prasad's from Government. I asked you then if I could issue a brief statement that on my advice you and Ajit Prasad had withdrawn your resignations from Government. Ajit Prasad had gone to Simla. I telephoned to him and he agreed to my doing so. You were agreeable also, but you wanted to have a talk with Ajit Prasad before finalising this. Ajit Prasad came from Simla and went back soon. I could not see him.

Thereafter I received letters from you and Ajit Prasad agreeing to my statement being issued. I was terribly busy then and going off for an engagement. I glanced rapidly at your letters. I noticed that Ajit Prasad had said in his letter that in no event did he propose to join any other political party or group. In your letter, you stated that having ceased to be in the Congress, you considered it yourself free to associate yourself with any political party, though you could not say you would not return to the Congress. These sentences of yours struck me as odd and in view of what I had previously said and what Dr Roy had told me, what you had said appeared to me self-contradictory. I wrote this to you therefore, rather in a hurry, and added that you should certainly not join any other party at present and await developments.

I thought this had cleared the position and I issued the statement about your and Ajit Prasad withdrawing your resignations from Government. I am afraid I acted in haste and I should have taken the trouble of clearing up the matter much more than I did. I rather took things for granted, which was neither fair to you nor myself nor to others.

Then appeared the joint statement issued by you and Ajit Prasad to the press. On reading this carefully I was distressed and felt that it was most

3. See *ante*, pp. 135-136.

unfortunate. I felt this specially because a personal element was brought into it in criticism of the Congress President. Whatever your views might be on matters of principle, this personal criticism seemed to me totally inappropriate.

Brief references appeared in the press later to the effect that you had made it clear to me that you would be free to join any political party, even though you continued in the Cabinet. On reference to your letter I found that you had done so. I think in my hurry I had not attached great importance to what you had written. But as in my reply I had also made it clear that this did not seem to me a possible position, I thought the matter had ended there.

All this has given rise to a good deal of public confusion for which, I must confess, I am largely guilty.

The question arises now as to what should be done. I discussed this last night with you and pointed out to you that my mind was quite clear that a Minister belonging to our Government should not align himself in any way against the Congress. Congressmen have always a certain right, within limitations, to self-criticism. But a Minister, leaving the Congress and joining another political party opposed to the Congress or otherwise attacking the Congress, would create an impossible situation. You saw the difficulty, though you did not wholly appreciate my argument. You said however that you had no wish to embarrass me or the Government in any way and you would still press me to accept your resignation from Government. You had not joined any party yet nor had you decided to do so. But there was no doubt that your sympathy lay in a certain direction. It was because of the critical political situation that you had agreed to continue in Government till such time as this crisis lasted. You were even prepared not to join any other party. But you added that it would not be fair of you to say that you could be completely non-political and not express your views occasionally.

In view of these difficulties and your desire not to embarrass me in any way, you were perfectly prepared to press me to accept your resignation from the Government.

I have given a great deal of thought to this matter for obvious reasons. I think it is definitely unfortunate for you to leave Government at this stage, although everyone knows that this has nothing to do with any governmental difference of opinion. At the same time your formal or informal association with non-Congress groups would not only, as I have said above, be against the general principles, which should apply in such cases, but might also frequently create misunderstanding and conflict. Therefore, I have been, most reluctantly, driven to the conclusion that I should not press you to remain in Government. I know that if I did so, you would find it difficult to say no to me. But that would not be fair on my part and it might produce embarrassing situations for both you and me from time to time.

While I have come to this decision, I would nevertheless ask you to continue in Government for the time being till other arrangements can be made and till I am prepared to relieve you of your charge.

I need hardly tell you how sorry I am that this should happen and that you should leave the Congress of which you have been one of the builders in our own province. I hope that the parting with the Congress is not for long and that it may be possible for you and others, similarly circumstanced, to come back to it and join your old comrades.

I have written to you at some length because I wanted to get all the facts straight. Owing to my haste and thoughtlessness, and taking things for granted, I have helped partly in creating grave misunderstandings. I do not wish to repeat this performance. Hence my desire to be clear and explicit.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

19. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
July 26, 1951

My dear Ajit,

We had a talk today and I told you how I felt about the matters that have been troubling us during the past few days. I have been naturally distressed by all these recent developments. I dislike the idea of old colleagues, like Rafi Ahmed and you, resigning from Government where their work has been so much valued. I dislike both of you going out of the Congress. I dislike, above all, the way in which all this has happened and the part which I have played leading to certain misunderstandings. I wanted at least these misunderstandings cleared up.

To some extent there is much in common between you and Rafi Ahmed in this matter. At the same time there is also a marked difference in many ways.² I have today written a long letter to Rafi Ahmed, in which I have mentioned various facts and developments which have taken place during the last few days.³ As I do not wish to repeat all this here, I enclose a copy of that letter, as part of it applies to you also.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Kidwai had decided to join the Krishak Praja Party and organise it. But Jain had no intention of joining any opposition party.

3. See the previous item.

You will notice that I have been reluctantly compelled by circumstances to agree to Rafi Ahmed's wish to relieve him from Government, though I have asked him for the present to stay on.

The same considerations do not apply to you wholly and I therefore put it to you that you should continue as a Minister. In view of the situation existing today, your leaving us would undoubtedly put us in difficulties and be harmful to the cause we work for. That is an adequate enough reason and you appreciated it fully. Nevertheless you hesitated, not for political or like reasons, but out of a sense of loyalty to some of your friends. I can very well understand that position. But, in the circumstances, the demand of public work must come foremost and I feel therefore that you must not press me to relieve you from your charge. At any rate I should like you to continue in it so long as we have to face a crisis.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

20. To N.V. Gadgil¹

New Delhi
July 27, 1951

My dear Gadgil,
Your letter of July 26th.

Now I think it will be very unwise for any of us, either you or me or anyone else, to approach leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha, the R.S.S. or like organisations for the purpose you mention. Their activities here have been so aggressive,² offensive as well as vulgar, that any approach to them will be gravely misunderstood both by them and by the public.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Hindu Mahasabha, which renewed its agitation, was believed to be planning riots, particularly in West Bengal, Bihar, the United Provinces, Rajasthan and Hyderabad so as to frighten away Muslims and turn Hindus against the Government when action was taken against the rioters.

21. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
July 31, 1951

My dear Ajit,

Ever since you sent your resignation to me from the Government and I asked you to withdraw it, and you accepted my advice, quite a number of complications have grown. We have discussed these matters. You have again suggested to me that you might resign but I see no reason why you should do so and I would certainly not like you to do so.²

I had hoped that after the long talks you had with Dr B.C. Roy, you would not press for your resignation from the Congress. However, that is a matter for you to decide. Circumstances change and bring about new decisions.

As a matter of fact you had written to me, even before the withdrawal of the resignations, and made it clear that your dissociation from the Congress did not by any means imply that you propose to join any other political party or group.

The question which has been troubling me for the last few days has been this: Should a Minister of the present Government associate himself with a rival party? It seemed to me clear that this would be wrong. In your case this question did not arise.

For the present, I should like to tell you that I do not wish at all to accept the resignation which you have suggested. At any time I would have been most reluctant to do so, because you have done and are doing valuable work in Government, and the question of rehabilitation of the displaced persons is of vital consequence not only to those millions but to all of us. At the present moment, in particular, it would be most unfortunate if you left this work. Therefore, I would ask you not to press your resignation, but carry on your work with the earnestness and ability which you have shown during the past year and more.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. A.P. Jain Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. As Nehru complained that the joint statement of Kidwai and Jain "smacked of personal element" and Purushottamdas Tandon communicated his reactions to Nehru through the press putting Nehru in an embarrassing position, Jain offered to resign from the Ministry.

22. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
July 31, 1951

My dear Rafi,

Thank you for your letter of July 30. I am, indeed, sorry that you should leave Government, because I have valued greatly your work there. I am sorrier still that our long comradeship of over 30 years should come to a turning point. I do not say that it will break and I am sure that it cannot break. Nevertheless, it does make a big difference that you should take the steps you have taken or propose to take.

I am sorry that you have finally decided to resign from the Congress. My own advice to you has been that, whatever your differences and objections, still it was not right to resign from the Congress, and much less so to join any other political party which was hostile to the Congress. However, that is a matter which we have discussed often and about which you feel strongly and so there is nothing more to be said about it at present.

You refer in your letter to what you wrote to me on July 21, when you made it clear that you considered yourself free to associate yourself with any political party. When I got this letter, I had in my mind various talks which I had had with Dr B.C. Roy, who had been having conversations with you, Ajit Prasad and others. These talks had led me to the conclusion that your resignation from the Congress was not final and might be reconsidered. I did not, therefore, attach much importance to what you wrote to me. Even so, I wrote in reply that I did not think this would be the correct position and that you should not join any other party. I thought that this had disposed of the matter. I was wrong in thinking so and I should have taken the trouble to meet you and try to clear up the position one way or the other. Unfortunately, owing to very heavy work that day, I could find no time.

Quite apart from the other questions involved and the merits or demerits of any matter, it seemed to me all along that it was not at all desirable for a Minister of the present Government to function openly against the Congress.

We need not pursue this matter any further. In critical times, we have to make difficult decisions. Those decisions should not be influenced by personal factors because the issues are greater than persons, although persons count and must inevitably count.

I am, therefore, regretfully accepting your resignation. I shall let you know when and to whom you should hand over charge of your ministry.

1. Published in *National Herald*, 3 August 1951.

I cannot forget the last 30 years and more of our working together and the comradeship between us that has grown up during this long period.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

23. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
August 3/4, 1951

Nan dear,

I have not written to you for some time. I do not quite know what to write, for there is so much to write, as yet very little of real importance, that one cannot easily put down on paper. I can give a list of facts of occurrences, but you can read about them in the telegrams or newspapers. I have just drafted my latest telegram² to Liaquat Ali Khan — this is becoming an interminable business, and yet sending telegrams is certainly better than declaring war.

Rafi Ahmed has at last left Government and Congress. So have a good many others, especially in the U.P. This is sad and yet there was no way of keeping him. He had made it impossible. His going away weakens Government in some ways and is particularly unfortunate at this juncture.

The Congress is in a bad way. Not because of defections, but rather because of some inner disease which eats into it. The wrong people run in and take it in a wrong direction. It passes the right resolutions, more or less, but functions differently. Tandonji, whatever his virtues, has proved a bad and obstinate President, without any vision or understanding. The Congress weakens and yet no one else gains real strength. Kripalani's Praja Party is a bit of a flop. I do not think that he and Kidwai can pull together. The Socialist Party has not made much of a mark. What then? I do not know.

I am troubled and cannot see my way clearly. I doubt if I shall continue in the Congress Working Committee. If I go out of it, that will create another major crisis, for whatever my failings, I still hold the crowd. The other day I addressed an enormous meeting of over two lakhs in Delhi in pouring rain. I spoke for an hour and people remained till the end.

We are living in dynamic and dangerous times. Here in India we still have both the external crisis with Pakistan and the internal crisis over the Congress during the next few weeks. I have no clear idea of what the outcome

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *post*, pp. 349-351.

of either of these will be. So, we labour, not knowing what the result of our labours will be.

Parliament reopens in another three days or rather two. The last session I suppose so, and yet no one quite knows what developments might take place during these fateful months. We function when we have clear objectives — something to function for. If that goes, then functioning itself becomes rather meaningless. But do not imagine that I have arrived at that stage. I am still in adequate bodily and mental health. Only something seems lacking. I do not quite know what.³

With love from
Jawahar

3. Vijayalakshmi replied on 6 August 1951 that Liaquat Ali's approach was getting more aggressive and "completely divorced from reason", and implications of things like the "clenched fist" were "contrary to international behaviour." Referring to Kidwai she wrote: "Of all the men I have worked with perhaps I know him best and though I admire many things about him, I confess there are moments when my faith in him is sorely tried."

24. To Keshav Deva Malaviya¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1951

My dear Keshav Deva,²

I have your letter of the 3rd August. I am sorry for the recent developments. I suppose they have become inevitable. I am afraid all of us are apt to think in rather narrow terms about biggish things. And so while we may be right in regard to a particular smallish thing, nevertheless we might be wrong about bigger things.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Minister of Development and Industries in U.P. Government at this time.

25. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1951

My dear Purushottamdas,

I am enclosing a formal letter of resignation from membership of the Congress Working Committee and the Central Election Board.² I need not tell you that I have done so after the most earnest and anxious thought. It has been no light matter for me to take such a step. From the purely personal point of view I would have resigned long ago. But I realised fully that this was much more than a personal matter and it might well have far-reaching consequences. So I hesitated and tried to avoid doing so. I thought again and again and considering every aspect, and ultimately came to the conclusion on that that I must resign. It is no pleasure to me to do so. But I am convinced that I do not fit into the Working Committee and am not in tune with it. Such a position is artificial and unnatural and can do no good; it can do much harm.

You will forgive me if by resigning I cause you embarrassment. But the embarrassment has been there anyhow for both of us and others and the best way to deal with it is to remove the cause.³

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. G-68C/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Not printed.

3. Tandon replied on 9 August requesting Nehru not to precipitate a crisis. On many occasions, Nehru had himself counselled Congressmen to meet new and difficult situations—both internal and external — by united efforts. His resignation would create a schism and weaken the solidarity of the Congress. Tandon offered to give up the Presidentship of the Congress if it could help Nehru to stay on. But Tandon expressed no desire to meet Nehru's wish for the reconstitution of the Working Committee. He would place Nehru's resignation before the Working Committee.

26. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

I enclose a copy of a letter I am addressing to Purushottamdas Tandon today.² This letter may not please you and might even come as a slight shock. You will forgive me for this. I am not acting in the slightest hurry. I doubt if I have thought about anything more than about this matter. I came to the conclusion that I must wrestle with myself. The responsibility was mine and the decision must be mine.³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. See preceding item.
3. On 7 August 1951, Rajagopalachari replied: "I do not understand this. You should relieve me before you do all this and confuse and destroy the Congress. Please do not go mad."

27. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1951

My dear Maulana,

I enclose a copy of a letter I have addressed to Purushottamdas Tandon today. I have written this letter after months of thought. Recent events have made me think even more intensely on this subject. I came to this definite conclusion by myself and without any aid or pressure from outside.

I had thought of resigning from the Working Committee at first. It did not strike me that I should resign from the Central Election Board also. But, on second thoughts, that seemed to follow, and so I have resigned from both.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

28. To Purushottamdas Tandon¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1951

My dear Purushottamdas,

Thank you for your letter of August 9th which I received this evening.²

As I have already written to you, I have been giving a great deal of thought to this matter and considering all aspects of it. I do not think that I have been influenced particularly by individuals or what happened to them. What has troubled me were certain drifts in the Congress which, I think, are harmful both to the Congress and the country. I have believed, and I continue to believe, that it would be tragedy for the Congress to fade out or become unimportant. I have, therefore, been opposed all along to any attempts to weaken the Congress as such or for people to resign from it, even though they might have disapproved of much that was happening. From the same point of view I have been long distressed at the attitude of some persons which indicated that they wished to drive out others from the Congress who did not fit in with their views or their general outlook.

You will remember that ever since the A.I.C.C. meeting at Ahmedabad in January last, I have been trying in my own rather imperfect way, to grapple with this problem. People called it my attempts at unity. That was only partly correct. My attempts have failed and I admitted failure at the A.I.C.C. meeting in Bangalore.³

This has distressed me greatly because I feel that the Congress is rapidly drifting away from its moorings and more and more the wrong kind of people, or rather people who have the wrong kind of ideas, are gaining influence in

1. File No.G. 11/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Tandon wrote: "I am aware that our course has not been entirely smooth and some minor points of difference regarding the organisational set-up have arisen; but on matters of Congress policy I feel that there has been on the whole general unanimity and the Working Committee has functioned with great goodwill and successfully guided the Congress during the eventful period which has elapsed since the Nasik Congress."
3. Nehru asked the Congress Democratic Front, formed in September 1950 by Kripalani, P.C. Ghosh and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai in opposition to Tandon, not to withdraw but to work from within the Congress. On 17 May, Kripalani resigned from the Congress and Nehru's appeal to him on 28 May was of no avail. At the Ahmedabad session of the A.I.C.C. in January 1951, Nehru brought forward a unity resolution. At the A.I.C.C. meeting in Bangalore on 13-15 July, Nehru moved a resolution for "averting the impending crisis in the Congress." See also *ante*, p. 131.

it. The public appeal of the Congress is getting less and less. It may, and probably will, win elections. But, in the process, it may also lose its soul.

Because of all this, I thought hard as to what I should do. I could not conceive myself to be a willing spectator of this gradual decay or even a passive and inert spectator of it. Naturally, I did not wish to do anything which itself would injure the Congress. That was the problem before me not only now, but for months past. Ultimately I came to the conclusion that I could serve the real objectives and ideals of the Congress better by being outside the Working Committee. That first step was quite clear to me. Subsequent steps were not so clear.

I am fully conscious of the consequences of the step I am taking and even the risks involved. But I think those risks have to be taken, for there is no other way out.

I have mentioned some wider considerations. Apart from these, or in addition to them, I have felt, as I have already written to you, completely out of tune in the Working Committee. I felt this very much in Bangalore.⁴ I am convinced that I can be of no effective service in the Committee at this stage. I come in the way of others, and have a feeling that others come in my way.

When this is the position, I think we should be straight with ourselves and with the public. A frank approach ought at least to help in a fuller realisation of the problems and difficulties before us.

I am more conscious than anyone else can be of the critical situation which the country has to face today. I have to deal with it from day-to-day. This situation itself has had a double reaction upon me and, in the balance, it has confirmed the decision I have arrived at.

There is no reason you should resign the Presidentship of the Congress.⁵ This is not a personal matter.

4. When Tandon became the President of the Congress, Nehru and Maulana Azad proposed Rafi Ahmed Kidwai for the Working Committee, which as a convention used to be constituted after informal discussions among the top leaders. However, Tandon refused to include Kidwai. At the Working Committee meeting in Bangalore in July 1951, Nehru demanded that the Committee as also the Central Election Committee be reconstituted to make them broad-based and representative. Tandon refused and offered to resign. Nehru, who initially declined to join the Working Committee because of Tandon's refusal, subsequently changed his mind.
5. Tandon requested Nehru to attend the Working Committee meeting on 11 August when he would place his own resignation before it for consideration.

I do not think it would be proper for me to attend the meeting of the Working Committee.⁶ My presence will embarrass me as well as others. I think it is better that the questions that arise should be discussed in my absence.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. When the Working Committee met on 12 August, no compromise formula could be found. All members of the Committee had tendered their resignations to the Congress President. "Mr. Nehru is not an ordinary member of the Working Committee. He represents the nation more than any other individual today. Apart from the fact that accepting his resignation would weaken the Congress, I cannot take such a step without referring the whole matter to the A.I.C.C.," said Tandon in a statement. The A.I.C.C. was summoned to consider the situation.

29. Resignation to Strengthen the Congress¹

I am fully confident that the Congress alone can pilot the destiny of the nation at the present juncture and also for many years to come.

Even in the past, the Congress was the only cementing force which maintained the unity of the people in this vast country. I want to tell you that the work of the Congress is not yet over and it has to play a very significant role in the future.

There is a great need for strengthening the Congress with a view to facing internal and external problems. No doubt, there are some shortcomings in the Congress, but there is no other party in the country which can take its place. Gandhiji taught the people the great lesson of silent and selfless service. It was this lesson which won the Congress the love and confidence of the people, and if the workers adhere to this lesson, the country is bound to march ahead towards progress.

Question: Why have you resigned from the Working Committee?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is not easy to talk on such matters, particularly in these difficult times. I want to make it clear that my resignation from the Working Committee is not a resignation from the Congress and certainly not an indication

1. Address to Delhi State Congress workers, New Delhi, 13 August 1951. From *National Herald*, 14 August 1951.

of my desire to leave the Congress at any stage. Whatever the final outcome may be, I have tendered my resignation with the object of improving matters and strengthening the Congress. Therefore, the Congress workers and the people need not feel perturbed over it.

I appeal to you, the Congress workers, to carry on the work of the Congress in the same missionary spirit as in the past and thus face the future with courage and confidence.

30. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi

August 17, 1951

My dear Bidhan,

I have your letter of the 15th August.²

I thought I had adequately explained the position to you and my own reaction to it. It is not a question of my not being able to work with Tandon for temperamental reasons. I am not temperamental in this sense. But it is a fact that our general objectives and outlook differ and, in a moment of crisis involving serious decisions, this difference comes in the way and affects work. Also that because of recent developments, it has become more difficult for me to work with him. So far as the present Working Committee is concerned, there is no chance whatever of my going back to it, as it is. That would simply mean that I become completely ineffective not only in the Committee but elsewhere. It will neither be good for me nor for the country.

The issue is not a personal one, though it may be represented in personal terms. Which viewpoint and outlook are to prevail in the Congress—Tandon's or mine? It is on this issue that a clear decision should be arrived at and any

1. *With B.C. Roy and Other Chief Ministers* by Saroj Chakrabarty, (Calcutta, 1974), pp. 187-188.
2. Roy wrote to Nehru, after discussing with him the Congress crisis a few days earlier at Delhi, that it was impossible for Nehru temperamentally to work with Tandon and the atmosphere of the Congress Working Committee had not changed for Nehru to contribute usefully to its functioning. However, he felt that one person should be the head of both the Government and the party or that there should be close liaison between the two heads. If that were impossible, the alternative was to have a Congress cabinet in which the head of the administration could have an effective voice in the Working Committee.

attempt to shirk it will simply mean that the issue will arise every month in an acute form.

I am convinced that the way the Congress has been working has led to a progressive deterioration in many ways. It is becoming narrower and narrower and with the wrong outlook. I do not wish to help in this process. Whether I can help the Congress or not adequately from outside, may be open to question. But I have not a shadow of doubt that from the point of view of the larger interests of the country, I can do more effective work from outside the Working Committee than from continuing as a member of the present Working Committee.

If the communalists gain greater control of the Working Committee, then it will mean a straight fight with them all along the line. As it is, the Working Committee, to some extent, tends that way and that is one reason of my being not in tune with it.

On the general question of the Congress President or the Working Committee exercising any kind of detailed control over the Government, including the appointment of Ministers and the like, I am quite clear that this cannot be accepted. Certainly I am not prepared to continue as Prime Minister on those conditions.

I have seldom been clearer in my mind about any decision that I have taken than I am now. The mistake I made was to defer that decision for too long a time. It is now for the A.I.C.C. and if necessary, for the full session of the Congress, to decide which kind of lead and guidance they approve of. It is no good having a dual and conflicting leadership and any attempts to work out a patchwork scheme will fail.

Yours,
Jawahar

31. The Isolation of the Congress¹

Friends, we are meeting on a somewhat unusual occasion and for an unusual purpose. Normally we meet to consider our parliamentary work as well as

1. Remarks at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party, 21 August 1951. Based on a report in *National Herald*, 22 August 1951.

other matters affecting the party. On this occasion we are not meeting for parliamentary work or for anything directly concerning the party, but rather for other matters which, certainly indirectly, concern us all very much at any rate, all those who are Congressmen and members of the Congress Party here. I had not thought at first of requesting you to be present here to hear me say something, because I do not think it particularly necessary and it seemed to me somewhat embarrassing for me to discuss these matters or to say much about them before you, much less before the public. As a matter of fact, there is nothing much to say; that is to say, there are no secrets for me to tell you. Nevertheless, I found that some members came to me and they expressed a feeling as to what was happening, a certain feeling of confusion. My own mind was so clear on this subject that I thought that everyone would share that clarity, even though they might not share my opinion.

Now, to a large extent, I am personally the immediate cause of certain recent developments, so I thought that I owed it, more especially to the members of the party, to try to put before them, as briefly as I could, what I had in mind and why I acted as I did. The immediate development which has led to what is called a crisis in our internal Congress affairs is the resignation I offered from the Congress Working Committee and the Central Parliamentary Board. Now, most members present here who take interest in Congress politics—and I imagine everyone does because we ourselves are a part of that great organization—must know that for some time past, certainly since the beginning of this year, I have been trying to put forward before the Congress organization certain ideas, certain approaches, a certain outlook. To some extent I met with a measure of success, but the feeling grew in me that I was failing in my endeavour and the kind of thing I was aiming at was somehow slipping from our grasp.

Although in this matter individuals have to be considered and discussed, and individuals somehow crop up in any discussion, in any context, nevertheless, what I had in mind throughout had very little to do with individuals and was rather based on what I thought was an objective appraisal that had led me to certain conclusions. I gave great thought to them, not only recently but throughout this year, and even before. After all, many of us were so terribly busy with our work in Parliament and the situation in the country that we did not do much direct service, if I may say so, to the Congress. Speaking for myself, quite frankly, apart from my preoccupations, I did not feel it would be right for me to interfere in the Congress organization except when broad matters of policy were discussed in the Committee.

Either one interfered and assumed some responsibility or one did not interfere at all. At that time we were fortunate enough to have Sardar Patel with us and the affairs of the organization were far closer to his mind. He shouldered that responsibility in addition to the many other responsibilities

that he had, and so I felt even less the need for me to go into these matters. Of course, as usual with us, whenever major matters of policy were discussed in the Committee, Sardar Patel and I and our senior colleagues took part. But on the whole I kept away. Apart from an expression of opinion from time to time, I did feel then, and discussed it often enough, that something was progressively lacking in the country so far as the Congress was concerned and that the situation was slipping away from us.

There was a certain drift, and a drift not in the right direction. Part of it was inevitable. That had to be in the circumstances. One had to expect that; one could not expect our functioning at that high level when our movement for freedom was at a high pitch. There was bound to be a certain reaction after the attainment of freedom and the terrible consequences that followed — partition, etc. Nevertheless, all of us, or many of us, did feel that the Congress was somehow losing that friendly atmosphere and that appeal to the general public that had come to it for a long period past.

Now, I attach more importance to that atmosphere than even to any particular decision about any particular matter, because it was that friendly atmosphere which gave us strength in the past and which kept us in living touch with masses of our people. And so this feeling of isolation grew within me—the isolation of the Congress from the people. Isolation is a strong word, but something to that effect was happening. And always I was thinking of how to deal with the situation, not in connection with the election because the election was far off, but in connection with our work.

This feeling became acuter and acuter, and when within the Congress conflicts arose more and more, I felt that that was a weakening factor in the Congress because I could not go to the public and talk on the larger field of unity, which we have done for all these years, when within the Congress itself there was a growing disunity. It was immaterial whether the disunity was of a small percentage or of a large percentage. It did not matter really whether some persons went out of the Congress or came into it though it did from the point of view of the impressions on the public; sometimes a small number created a big impression in a certain context. At other times, it does not matter even if a big number comes or goes. So I felt that that seeming growth of disunity within the Congress made it difficult to make the proper appeal to the wider public.

The Congress has served many functions in the past but perhaps, if I may say so, its chief function has been that it has been a cementing factor in India. It has brought together various parts of India, various provinces and States of India, and various types of people, groups of people, various people following various religions. It has brought them together on a common political platform and to some extent on a common economic platform, but chiefly political. In other words, it combated one of the most serious weaknesses

that India often suffers from, that is, a feeling of going to pieces, a disruptive feeling. That, I think, is our most serious weakness now as in the past, which has come up against us. The greatest service that the Congress rendered to this country was to overcome these barriers in a large measure, not completely, but in a large measure, and it was to the extent that we overcame those barriers that we grew in strength and the nation grew in strength.

You can describe the overcoming of barriers in various terms — whether it was overcoming a provincial barrier or a communal barrier — we stood by non-communalism, we stood for the underdog generally, for removing the barrier between the have-nots and the haves. It was this attempt to cement the various factors. Of course, you cannot cement all over the place—when there are essential differences like, say, economic differences, one has got to acknowledge them. In the modern world you cannot say there are no differences, because there are, but, nevertheless, on the political plane, it was a tremendous cementing force—and it was largely because of that that we succeeded. Many people may have thought that having attained our freedom it was not necessary to lay stress on that cementing force because we have achieved independence. But I have a powerful feeling that we are losing touch with the larger masses, that we are too busy with our work in Parliament and assemblies, in Congress committees, or are too slack. Whatever the reason may be, there it is. The obvious thing was to get going with the public. In getting going with the public, the difficulty arose that you have to be in a fit condition in the organisation before you can approach the public effectively. All this reasoning drove me back to the organisation and, if I may say so with all respect, all this reasoning had very little to do with any individual. It was an impersonal analysis of the situation.

Individuals came in because sometimes individuals become the symbols of some idea or of some group or something. So, at the beginning of this year, at the meeting of the All India Congress Committee in Ahmedabad, I put forward a resolution which, you will remember, was unanimously adopted.² It was called the Unity Resolution — I did not like that particular description much. Before this, if I can go back to the Nasik Congress, I put forward a number of resolutions dealing with the broad policies of the Congress or of the country, because I was agitated in mind as to whether the Congress was

2. The Ahmedabad resolution of the A.I.C.C. held from 29 to 30 January 1951, condemned the formation of groups, because they tended to create factions and disrupt the organisation. See *Selected Works*, (second series) Vol. 15 Part II, pp. 115–116.



SIGNING THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN, NEW DELHI, 7 JULY 1951



ADDRESSING THE A.I.C.C. SESSION IN BANGALORE, 14 JULY 1951

still firmly adhering to those broad policies or it did not.³ I wanted to put the matter clearly before the Congress. The Congress adopted all those resolutions without much difficulty. In fact, there was hardly any opposition except on minor matters.

Naturally this made me happy, but in spite of that, the other aspect of it troubled me. Resolutions were all right but the other aspect was not all right. So, as I said, when the All India Congress Committee met at Ahmedabad, some of us discussed this matter in the Working Committee and elsewhere. A resolution was put forward which was again passed. Now, a strange series of developments took place in which persons and individuals were involved, and it is hardly necessary for me to go into them, but the fact remains that as a result of these developments, I came to the unhappy conclusion that my efforts during the year had failed and not only were we where we were originally, but when an effort fails, the result is worse than the previous position.⁴ All this troubled me greatly, and I gave my earnest thought as to what I could do in the matter.

The efforts failed. Well I do not want to go into the matter, but if I may say so briefly to some extent I think I was wrong in the approach I made. It might have been better. Other people were wrong in the sense that many others were really not keen on these efforts succeeding. They lacked warmth; they lacked imagination and appreciation of them. They did not go against them but they did not attach any importance to them. Many others did things which directly came in the way of those efforts succeeding, although they showed themselves as being interested in their success. In that they acted wrongly. All these things happened. We need not go into the matter but the

3. Following the election of Tandon as the Congress President, the A.I.C.C. met at Nasik in the third week of September to consider the basic policies of the Central Government. It passed resolutions for bringing changes in the Congress constitution for the re-introduction of paid membership, appointment of a Central Election Tribunal and a Central Credentials Committee, vesting the Working Committee with adequate emergency powers and setting up a machinery for selecting candidates for legislatures and for regulating parliamentary activities.
4. Shortly after the adoption of the unity resolution the question of electing the five members of the Congress Election Committee arose. The Kripalani-Kidwai Democratic Front had tried at Ahmedabad to achieve a mutually acceptable list of candidates to be elected to the C.E.C. so that their supporters might not be passed over in the general elections, but the Tandon group refused. On the recommendation of Maulana Azad, the election of the five members was postponed. When, following the meeting of the A.I.C.C., the Democratic Front was dissolved in response to the appeals of Nehru and Azad and, reportedly, on the promise made by Nehru to the leaders of the Democratic Front to secure adequate representation for them in the C.E.C. at the Delhi meeting of the A.I.C.C., the Tandon group, backed by its majority remained adamant. This led to Kripalani's resignation from the Congress and his subsequent efforts for the formation of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party.

point is that I had a sensation of failure, failure not only personal—for me that would not have mattered much—but a sense of national failure.

I have a further sensation of growing ineffectiveness within myself in dealing with the situation that we had to face.

Of course, nobody who feels ineffective feels happy. Because if you function in any field, you can only function with some strength and confidence, but if you are merely carrying on, if I may say so, that is to say, the mere routine functioning is not enough. You must have the sensation of functioning. The moment you think you are functionless then you are a dead person carrying on some dead routine. I began to get that sensation about myself. That was a bad thing.

I also knew that I had a certain influence in the country. A very large number of people could be influenced by me and I could be influenced by them, quite apart from my position as Prime Minister or anything else. Because of this, I had a great responsibility, much greater than if I were an ordinary individual who could do anything he liked. Nothing would please me better, speaking from the purely selfish point of view, than not to have these responsibilities, and live a more or less secluded and retired life, may be giving advice to others through books and other methods. That was not the trouble at all. But that was impossible because one had grown into something else. One's history is different; One's urges are different; and it was impossible largely because one is placed in a position of responsibility, and one cannot run away. One can run away from many responsibilities, but one cannot run away from the responsibilities which come from the faith of the people. It is quite impossible.

There can be no greater treason than to betray a trust that has been placed by the common people. Obviously, I could not run away and I have no intention of running away. But when I began feeling that I was being trusted and looked up to, it became a difficult problem for me and, what is more, I felt that a time would arrive, if this process of drift continued, for me to become even more ineffective or totally ineffective; and that would be bad, and if I may say so in all modesty, bad for the country too. Because even I, as an individual, had some quality of cementing and binding together forces and people and groups in the country and, therefore, I could not be indifferent in a matter of importance, regardless of my individual view of this or that; and I did not like this kind of gradual fading out of the picture when people expected me to be of help in a difficult situation.

I have tried to put before you as frankly as I could the ideas that moved me till I came to the firm conclusion that I should resign from the Congress Working Committee and the Election Board. Now what connection that had, it is for you to determine. But my mind was absolutely clear, and I want to tell you that although during the last many months I had been greatly per-

plexed often enough as to what to do and what not to do, I have had not the least bit of perplexity in my mind since I decided to resign from the Congress Working Committee. It was a logical act of reasoning if you like, but it was much more than that. It was an instinctive and elementary urge to do the right thing which I felt and I did it, and the moment I did it, I felt a great weight lifted from me. Why did I do it? Nobody could say that I was a fool not to realize that my doing it would create difficulties, or shock many of my comrades and colleagues and create difficulties at a moment when grave crises surround us, whether it was the Pakistan crisis or Congress or elections or anything else. Nevertheless, I came to the conclusion that that was the only thing to do, and the only regret at the back of my mind was that I had not done it earlier. Why? Because the earlier I had done it, the sooner would that particular matter have been resolved and there was, at the back of my mind, also the idea that if I had not done it now circumstances would compel me to do it a month later, two months later, three months later, and I felt, hard as it was today, from some points of view, it would be infinitely worse two or three months later. So I came to this fixed conclusion and I have, since then—it was two weeks or more since that happened I think—worried the least about that matter than perhaps most members present here because it was so obviously, from my point of view, the right step to take.

I will follow up another line of thought behind all this business. I had a feeling, ever since the Nasik session, and before, of different pulls in the country and different pulls and ideas in the Congress. That was why I brought forward certain resolutions in the Nasik Congress to clarify as to what the Congress stood for and they were adopted without any difficulty. Nevertheless, I had a feeling that they were not acted upon in the country as they should have been, if they were thoroughly believed in, and there was always a pull in a different direction, and people seemed to say or to whisper, "Well, these are fads of Jawaharlal Nehru. Let us humour him and let us go our way." Well, frankly whenever I heard this, it hurt me. Whether they were my fads or not, in my opinion, they were of the most vital consequence to this country and it was completely and wholly wrong for the people, and for the country, for all organisations to trifle with vital matters, and the worst thing of all was to say one thing and to act in a different way.

That is not right for a great organisation, as it is not right for an individual. Therefore, it was far better for the organisation, or for the group or for the individual, to say clearly and explicitly what it stood for, what it wanted, what its objective was.

Resolutions were passed again and again, and, somehow, that fog remained in people's minds and in Congress activities—that confusion due to looking in more than two directions at the same time—and that weakened the Congress.

We have lost, unfortunately, a good deal of the idealism that we had in

the past and, consequently, we were losing also that force or urge that comes from pursuing an objective of importance.

This confusion in the Congress mind naturally weakened it still more. Pretences might have been kept up. So far as I am concerned, I spoke frequently in Parliament and outside about these matters, about my ideas and what the right policy should be internally and externally. In some matters, I was dead clear. If you discuss with me certain matters affecting the unity of India, like communalism, I am dead clear on that. There were other things on which I am dead clear also. If you want to discuss with me some economic policy I may have to take into consideration the practical possibilities of the question and other difficulties. There was a conflict in my mind about these matters. So far as I am concerned I have explained my position from time to time in Parliament, before the Congress and before the country. I do not think that I am in doubt as to what the Indian people expect of the Congress, often enough many people in the Congress are speaking in one direction and acting in the other direction.

I hope that our great organisation will never become a strait-jacket for people to think in one particular direction only and not in another direction. A great organisation like the Congress should have a certain vision, certain tolerance of minor variations and all that. Nevertheless, it is not right, I think, for a great organisation to speak and act in two ways in regard to important matters of the moment. This attitude is most unfortunate, especially in the present crisis, when the country is faced with problems like the Indo-Pakistan crisis. There are certain organisations which are continually talking against the Congress. Some of them are communal parties. It is not good enough for us to remain completely silent, nor is it good enough to speak in an equivocal way which might be interpreted in two ways. In regard to certain problems we have to take up a strong attitude. We cannot adopt a compromising attitude in all things. In regard to the Indo-Pakistan crisis, we have no doubt that it should not be met in a compromising way but it should be met in a firm way.

I referred a little while ago to the way we should produce a proper sensation in people's minds, that there should be, as there was in the past, a degree of, call it what you like, an imaginative, psychological approach to the people's minds, not merely a kind of dead, logical argument, but some thing that appealed to their minds and their hearts, something that was akin to them, in the endeavours or in the steps that we were taking.

Now, I wondered what we could do, apart from resolutions, which would produce that sensation to some extent, which would make them think that we have taken a turn, if you like, in our activities and in a right or better direction. Well, you cannot do sensational things always, and sensational things sometimes defeat their purpose. Nevertheless, one had to do something, not merely pass resolutions. I came to the conclusion, right at the time of the Ahmedabad

session, that the action that was necessary from this and from several other points of view, was a reconstitution of the Congress Working Committee. And that, again, had little to do with individual merits or demerits.

Maybe, in the reconstitution, the changes may be great or small. But thinking always in terms of the public, of the reaction in the public mind of the Congress being an adaptable organisation and not a rigid thing living in its own groove, I suggested that. At that time, some people approved of the idea; others did not. However, it was talked out. Ever since then I felt it more and more that one of the right approaches was this reconstitution or reconstruction of the Congress Working Committee. Mind you, again if I may say so, it was not a question of putting an odd man in and an odd man out. That may follow. But it was the approach, to make people feel that some difference had been made to produce that psychological atmosphere, not of a slurring over these matters. And so, I have been stressing that.

Right through, I have been stressing on this—in writing, in speeches, and privately—but I could not convince all my colleagues about that matter, too, I feel, and that too convinced me again, that my membership of the Congress Working Committee served no useful purpose at this stage and that it would be desirable for me to be out of it. First, and I shall be quite frank with you, by my going out of it, the very sensation and shock it would create, in spite of certain risks and dangers, was good for the country. It has got into a rut, into a way of thinking, into a way of action, into a fearful apprehensive way, which was not good for it. We have millions and millions of people and for their sake we have to venture out, get out of the rut, even if it involves taking risks all the time. And so I said, in the balance it might do some harm. I do not know—but it could do a great deal of good if it shook the Congress out of its complacency, and the group and the cliques functioning here and there and the rest of it. So I took that step.

The position that arises is this, if I may tell you how I look upon it. I have already told you what great importance I attach to the Congress, in spite of all that has happened, as the one cementing force that can keep the country together and carry it forward. Attaching that importance to it, you can well imagine that I will be the last person to do anything which would weaken or injure the Congress. Any step that I take, at any rate, in my thinking, is meant to strengthen the Congress. Because nothing could be more deplorable than to see this mighty organisation just gradually fade away and become smaller and smaller. Smallness does not consist in numbers. Smallness consists, in an organisation of this type at any rate, in the spirit or the fire within that organisation. Some of you here may remember how we functioned before, let us say just at the beginning of the noncooperation movement.

In numbers, active Congressmen were few, but it did not matter at all to us whether we were few or whether we were many. We were prepared at that

time, our minds were such that without the least hesitation we were prepared to challenge the world; half a dozen of us had the spirit within us. We challenged anybody and everybody, the British empire and all the other empires put together. We did not look for numbers behind us. Well, that was a big thing produced by a great and unusual man who was with us and who made us, simple people, rather big. I am not at all in the slightest degree afraid of numbers; numbers come if you are worthy of numbers and they slip away in spite of your efforts if you do not approach those numbers rightly and in that particular way which the masses understand.

I think that the thing to be absolutely clear about is which way the Congress looks and which way it is going, and this should be declared in words of one syllable, if I may say so, which can have no two meanings. There is a tendency, and a natural tendency for us, to seek peace; by peace I mean concord. We ought to seek that, of course. But when this kind of an organisational peace is sought by covering up differences, by slurring over them, not knowing what we are or what we intend to do, then we do not get concord or peace, but merely get a continuing confusion which leads you to trouble some time or other.

People come to me, have come to me at the time of the last meeting of the Working Committee, and they were rather angry with me, my friends and comrades, as to why I had thrown this bombshell, why I had created all this trouble. And they said let us think of this, let us take one or two men in the Working Committee, let us do this and let us do that. Well, I ventured to tell them that they were misjudging me. I am not interested in one or two men in the Working Committee. I am interested in a new approach to the masses of India, in the people of India feeling that the Congress has taken a new turn. I am not interested in adjustments, this way or that way, in a majority or a minority. That has not been my way and I have not functioned in groups throughout my Congress career.

If a change that may be made does not produce that psychological impression in the country, then it is not worthwhile. It does not matter if one, two, or three men go out. Above all, I said for heaven's sake, don't slur over the problems. That would be not dealing fairly with the country, slurring over difficulties, slurring over different approaches and different outlooks, covering them with common cloaks, because the result will be that we won't get any movement in the Congress or in us—some persons pulling this way or that way. So, the first thing that the Congress has to decide is, both by word and by action, which way the Congress is going, what it stands for, without a shadow of doubt. And that, of course, includes the negative, what it completely opposes, all the things, methods, whatever it may be, like the communal approach or any disruptive force in the country.

I think that I have done one service to the Congress by bringing this issue to the fore and, perhaps, compelling people to think about it and to come to

some decision. If the decision is wrong, this is better than no decision and consequent confusion. We know where we are. On the other hand, if it is a right decision—as I hope it will be—then it is all the better, you take a right decision formally, and after full discussion, and then very little in the nature of doubt is left in the public mind. And immediately, I think you will find that the atmosphere in regard to the Congress will change in the country.

But having lost the grip and the strength immediately you come back—and I see you are coming back to this very argument—you are coming in touch with realities, with the real problems. And when you come in touch with the real problems, life returns. That life returns when you are faced with real difficulties. So, I am glad this crisis in Congress affairs has come because it has to some extent made clear the people's stand. It will make the people, the general public, and the Congress realise how the organisation flourishes by making people think about it—not by making people forget about it. We make them think about it by our activities. Unfortunately, these activities have been few, unless they are in the assemblies or in a Parliament. Apart from that, the actual activities have lessened considerably. That is why the public interest has lessened. It is not a small feat to force the public to think of the Congress and to make them realise what the Congress is. The fact of the matter is that the Congress is still a very big force in the country and is very largely going to affect the country and its future.⁵

5. After this speech, the Congress Parliamentary Party passed a vote of confidence in Nehru.

32. To K.G. Mashruwala¹

New Delhi

September 3, 1951

My dear Kishorilalji,

Thank you for your letter² of 1st September and for sending me the full

1. J.N. Collection.

2. K.G. Mashruwala did not like the idea of convening a special session of the A.I.C.C.

statements of Vinobaji³ and yourself.⁴ I am glad you have sent me these statements, as the press have not given them fully.

I think you have stated the position correctly and with clarity.

About the special session of the Congress, I am inclined to think that it would do good. This does not mean that the A.I.C.C. should shirk the issue. I think that the A.I.C.C. should face it boldly and decide, as you suggest. A special session would merely confirm and give more substance to that decision. My inclination towards a special session is more from the point of view of bringing large numbers of Congressmen together and giving them an opportunity of confirming a decision and of being parties to it. It seems to me that this would help in revitalising the Congress to some extent.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In his statements Vinoba Bhave was anxious that the leadership of Nehru be accepted for he stood for the "positive neutrality for India in the international sphere" and he was an "enemy of communalism." He believed that Nehru was anything but a "dictator". He suggested that the Congress "should combine the posts of the central party and the Congress President."
4. Mashruwala had stated: "In my opinion, as between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Tandon, the latter's is an unprogressive bloc, and if the Congress is not to be dissolved formally, it should perceive the wisdom of giving a line-clear to Mr. Nehru. It must not seek to have him with fetters."

33. On the Change of Leadership¹

The members should ponder over the resolutions. During my long political association with Mr. Tandon, I have not agreed with his views and approaches but I have affection and regard for him. There is, therefore, no personal

1. Speech at an emergency secret meeting of the A.I.C.C., Delhi, 8 September 1951. From *National Herald*, 9 September 1951.

question. But for personal regard and affection for Mr. Tandon, I would have taken this step much earlier.²

I have come to the decision to resign after great deliberation and think it is unfortunate that the Congress has moved away from the common man. It is no use being complacent. I am not blaming anybody. In fact I have never said that the members of the Working Committee are not working properly and that I have anything against them. What I really want is that a change should come about in the Congress, so that the Congress may be a live organization.

The situation arising out of my resignation has no doubt shaken up the Congress. My resignation has created a situation in which the Congress has come to occupy the mind of the people; not even the talk of war in Pakistan has received so much attention. I am wondering if I can at all accept the resolution. I have always felt that combining the offices of the Prime Ministership and the Presidentship of the Congress is undesirable.³ Even then, I have realised that having created the hiatus, it is not proper for me to say no to the decision of the A.I.C.C. I cannot run away from responsibility.

I would like to call a plenary session of the Congress about three weeks hence at Delhi.⁴ The Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee feels that it can be arranged even within a week's time.

The members of the A.I.C.C. should think over the problem and come tomorrow calmly for discussion.

2. On the day preceding this A.I.C.C. meeting, following considerable discussions, a compromise formula was evolved that the A.I.C.C. should first accept Tandon's resignation thus causing automatic dissolution of the existing Working Committee and then request him to form a new Working Committee in accordance with Nehru's wishes. However, Nehru rejected the formula saying that he would be ineffective within the Committee under Tandon's Presidentship. The Working Committee met without Nehru and passed resolutions accepting Tandon's resignation from the Congress Presidentship and requesting Nehru to assume that office and guide the country. About 12 persons in an assembly of nearly three hundred voted against those resolutions.
3. On 9 August 1950, Nehru had said that he was "quite convinced that it would be improper for me to accept this great honour and responsibility of the party Presidentship so long as I remain Prime Minister." See *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 15 Part I, pp. 94-95.
4. As desired by Nehru, the A.I.C.C. agreed to a plenary session of the Congress in Delhi from 17 to 19 October 1951.

34. To G.G. Jog¹

New Delhi

September 8, 1951

My dear Jog,²

I have your letter of the 7th September.

I am rather surprised at your question. If your question means anything at all, it is this: that I say something in public and mean something else. That surely has never been my practice. I think people should remain in the Congress, work for it, reform it and try to strengthen it. I do not think that the other organisations that have grown up can play a very effective role.

You can certainly see me in Delhi when you come here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A Congressman of Kanpur.

35. Faith in the Cause¹

I want that some sort of a wave of enthusiasm should sweep the country, the like of which had swept the country during our fight for freedom. It may not be possible to have a wave of that intensity, but something on that line we must have.

At Bangalore it had been declared that the door of the Congress would always be open for the dissidents.² Those who do not agree with the principles of the Congress are free to go out. Nor will any dissident be forced to come back.

Congressmen should function with the spirit of sacrifice and enthusiasm with which the Communist Party is working. I am not referring to their ideology, for in my opinion the Indian Communists had functioned in a wrong manner in the past. What I want is that Congressmen should learn from them

1. Address to the A.I.C.C. Session, New Delhi, 9 September 1951. From *National Herald*, 10 September 1951.

2. See *ante*, p. 131.

to work among the masses, going from door to door and village to village, in a spirit of selflessness.

Yesterday you were good enough to express your opinion in regard to my election to the Congress Presidentship. I was naturally touched by it. I shall not say that it was completely unexpected because there had been talks about it previously.³ Nevertheless, it was not wholly expected either and my mind was not completely prepared for it or for its consequences. I had been asked questions about it by the public and the answer I gave to them was a true reflection of my mind then. I did not think it right or proper for me or for any Prime Minister to undertake the great responsibility of the Congress Presidentship at any time, much more so at a very critical time like the present. The amount of sheer physical work or mental work involved in it was tremendous and I have enough work—more than enough. At the same time, I said that if some kind of emergency arose, I would not shirk the responsibility.

When yesterday my name was suggested and immediately accepted I did not quite know what to do. In the circumstances it was difficult for me to say 'no'. Nevertheless, I put it to you yesterday that you may think over it calmly and sleep over it, and then sit again to consider this matter. I myself wanted to consider the question and I have given a good deal of thought to it. Well, whatever thought I gave I realised that it is not an easy matter for me to escape from this responsibility.

But I do wish you to understand me just as I wish to understand you, because this is not a small matter. This is a serious matter, and an important matter, and a far-reaching matter. It concerns what we are going to do tomorrow and day after and later on.

The traditions of the Congress in the past were high and whether they must be maintained or not, is for you to decide. If we had been in an ordinary organisation, political or other, we would have succeeded here and not succeeded there; and we would have our ups and downs. But we are not an ordinary organisation even though we change with the changing times.

The Congress has something which puts some element of fire and spirit into us. It is an organisation which enabled us to move the country like a whirlwind and change its conditions. People gathered around us in vast numbers, not because there was a special merit in us but because we became the representatives of a living flame which was lighted in India. With that torch in our hands we went from village to village, hamlet to hamlet, not caring very much about ourselves. When an organisation does not care for difficulties and dangers, nobody can defeat it.

3. At the A.I.C.C. meeting in Bangalore in July 1951, some Congress members of Parliament distributed an open letter to the delegates demanding that Nehru should become President to forge a united Congress to fight the elections.

In the past we achieved big things because we did not balance our individual future or anything else. Because we went ahead, regardless of petty consequences, we achieved great results. Now, coming to the present, what are we going to do and how do we do it? Conditions are different today and obviously, we cannot repeat history. Nevertheless, conditions are what the people make and this business of looking up to fate and stars, this business of going to an astrologer to know what is going to happen is a business of the people who are incapable of doing anything, apart from lacking in intelligence. There was an astrological forecast that an Indo-Pakistan war would break out on 9 September, and I was surprised that some papers in Delhi and Punjab had published it, and there were fools in this country to believe it. People took their belongings and migrated from some border areas, because somebody looked at the stars and forecast the future, somebody published it and some people believed it. Are we to fashion our own destiny or believe what such fools tell us? So far as I am concerned, there should be a strict law debarring people from going to astrologers.

The question is: what are we going to do about it? Are we going to shake up this country or not? Are we going to create a powerful atmosphere in this country by a powerful thought? If you too create a powerful movement in this country, if you fight for a cause regardless of consequences, take it from me, the people of India will flock to you and fall in step with you.

Whether it is domestic or foreign policy, whether it is internal policy dealing with economic problems or whether it is the question of a secular State and the like, we must be clear about these matters. Congress resolutions are clear, but you know very well that people's minds are not so clear. They become clear enough when you talk to them and talk to them clearly. It has become essential that there should be hundred per cent clarity about it. So far as the Congress is concerned, we should declare war against all those who are against the principles and resolutions of the Congress, whoever they may be. I do not mean in the sense of armed fighting or war. What I want is clear thinking so that every one may know what the Congress stands for.

The advent of independence suddenly brought a new state of affairs for which, in a sense, mentally we were not prepared. We were not prepared to think along the lines of functioning constructively. We have functioned negatively, naturally because we formed the permanent opposition against British imperialism, the services, the army, the police and the like. Then, we were suddenly placed in charge of that army, the police and the rest of it. We cannot possibly continue to function in the old way. But, as a matter of fact, many do function that way. Many of us go about criticising the services; many of us go about talking against the police. The whole conception of cursing the services and the like is fantastic. What does it mean? It has no

meaning except that the Government is wrong. It had not been easy for many of them to adapt themselves to the responsibility of the Government. Some of them did take the responsibility, but they paid a heavy price for it. In so adapting themselves, they cut themselves off from the people they were governing. We rather stopped functioning as old Congressmen. Some did not keep the habit of constructive thinking. Others forgot their responsibility to the people. Now we have to carry both the responsibilities, otherwise the Congress will cease to function. The Congress to be itself has to keep in constant touch with the millions of people and be the mirror of their feelings.

So, the thought that arose in my mind was this; are we prepared for this kind of approach? I want you to know what we are going to do. I want you to go ahead regardless of consequences, without caring in the slightest degree what happens in the election. If you do not care what happens in the election and think more of the cause, you will win the election much more easily than if you were to care for the elections all the time and forget the real thing. If you compromise with this man or that man in the election and do not care for the cause, you will win something without substance which will slip away from your hands the next day. Elections are important only in the sense that they become a symbol of a fight for the cause. If we do not win the elections but stand firmly by the cause, we will win the elections tomorrow even if we were to lose it today. So, in this spirit we have to go forward; in this spirit we have to judge candidates.

The Congress had in the past unfortunate divisions, splits, cliques and factions. It did not matter much who was to blame for it. The responsibility belonged to all Congressmen. I hope the Congress will now adopt a new method of approach to these problems. The Congressmen should put aside that mentality which leads to factions and cliques.

People used to tell me that so and so was allied to this group or that group and, therefore, I must not trust him. Barring a few persons, I just do not know who belongs to which group. It is a good thing for me that I do not know, and I do not care to know. I want a man for his ability, honesty, integrity and perseverance and if he has got those virtues, I just don't mind which group he belongs to, because I think I am strong enough to pull him from any group or clique and, if not, he must go overboard.

In the choice of candidates, the Congress must select fine men not only from within the organization but from outside, if it could find them. The test must be integrity first, integrity second and integrity third—integrity and ability. Of course, I mean necessarily belief in the cause and the programme you stand for and in the Congress manifesto.

It does not matter if a candidate has greater ability and integrity, but is weaker than another candidate and loses in the election. The loss of a seat or even ten seats in that way will be offset by many more seats because people

will see that the Congress candidates do not sell their souls or their cause for money or for some party advantage.

Some circular has been issued for applications for candidates. That may have to be done, but I am entirely in agreement with Tandonji that the right way to choose a man is to choose a man who does not apply.

Your money will be useful, but do not think you will be chosen. I hope that A.I.C.C. members will talk to their colleagues when they go back to their districts with these basic principles in mind.

The A.I.C.C. members have sufficient material to judge me and I have also sufficient material to judge many of them, if not all. So we know each other and knowing each other, we should decide clearly whether we go well with each other or not. I mean going well in the sense of a battalion or an army marching together.

I am awaiting the A.I.C.C.'s final decision on the presidentship. In response to my suggestion members should indicate their final decision by raising a full-throated cry of *Jai Hind*.

36. To Pratap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi

September 13, 1951

My dear Pratap Singh,²

I should like to include you in the new Congress Working Committee. As you were a member of the last Committee, I can take your consent for granted. I want this Working Committee and all its members to function with spirit and enthusiasm and, at the same time, with great dignity and restraint. We have to create a new atmosphere in the country of strength, firmness and, at the same time, a total absence of the spirit of faction. I hope you will impress this upon all your workers who should give up criticising others.

Please keep this confidential and do not mention to anyone till I issue my statement.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. President, Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee.

37. To B.S. Hirey¹

New Delhi
September 13, 1951

My dear Hirey,²

I should like you to join the new Working Committee. I hope you will agree. As you were a member of the last Committee, I can presume your consent.

Circumstances have thrust upon us a very big problem and I want the new Working Committee to be big enough to face this problem with courage and confidence. I am over-burdened with work, but I consider it my principal duty at present to revitalise the country through the Congress. In this work, I am sure that I shall have your full cooperation.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1905-1961); President, Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee.

38. To Pratap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi
September 13, 1951

My dear Pratap Singh,

Your telegram. I am prepared to come to Ludhiana for a day on Sunday the 30th September. You may begin preparations for this. I shall confirm it more definitely a little later.

In Ludhiana I shall of course address a public meeting². I should also like to address a meeting of Congress workers. To this meeting you should invite all workers, including those who are supposed to belong to Dr. Gopichand's group.

You must remember that my appeal is never made on party lines and I am going to appeal to all groups to combine together. I should like you and your Congress committee to function in a like way and to give up completely running down each other. We have to face very big problems indeed and we cannot do so by behaving like small men and women.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 90-102.

39. Cooperation in the Common Task¹

Five days ago, fate and circumstance, and the wish of the All India Congress Committee, placed me in a new position of high responsibility. Burdened as I have been with heavy responsibilities, it was perhaps sheer recklessness on my part to assume this additional burden and responsibility. Yet I found that there was no escape from it. I was largely responsible for creating a particular situation and I could not run away from this situation; I have to accept the consequences of my own action. I did so in all humility of spirit and in the faith that behind that invitation that was extended to me, there may be a strong desire for cooperation in the tremendous tasks before us. But for this faith in my old and new comrades, I might well have quailed at the prospect of this heavy charge.

There would have been little point in my accepting the Congress Presidentship, even for a while, if I lacked that faith and that belief in the widespread cooperation from Congressmen and others in facing the tasks ahead of us. I did not wish merely to be a stopgap President carrying on a routine administration. If I tried to function in that way, I would have proved false to the trust that was reposed in me.

I have, therefore, given anxious thoughts to my new work which I must add on to my old. During these last few days I have had the privilege of meeting many old comrades and discussing the present situation in the Congress and the country with them. I hope to maintain these close contacts which are essential to our understanding of each other and to the success of our endeavours. I hope also to send them from time to time my own ideas as to how we should carry on our work and strengthen the Congress organisation. This organisation has been for these long years something in which we have taken pride and from which we have taken strength. The turn of events has affected it, as it has affected many other things in India. It has had to face new problems, internal and external. It has lost some of its old vitality because it lost the old urge for action, thinking that the main battle was won. Evils and the spirit of faction crept into it and our energies were diverted into wrong channels.

We have to remedy all this, for the fight for freedom never ends so long as our people suffer in any way. Political freedom and independence have come to us in full measure but the other freedoms are often missing and the struggle to achieve them has still to be carried on. What greater instrument

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 14 September 1951. Published in newspapers on 15 September 1951.

can we forge in this country for this struggle than the mighty organisation which brought us freedom and under whose shadow we have grown up?

This is a great task and we have to function in a big way, if we are to prove ourselves worthy of it. We have to get rid of the curse of faction and of all else that weakens and degrades. We have to develop somewhat the old spirit of joyous adventure in a great cause, put our enthusiasm in our own work and forget the failings of others.

I hope that every Pradesh Congress Committee will reorganise its work and put this spirit into it. In particular, that it will frown upon and discourage faction and groupism and nepotism within itself. The first quality in a Congress worker, and more so in an office-bearer, must be absolute integrity and fair dealing. An office-bearer must not only be a man or woman of integrity but must also have the reputation of being so. Those who cannot function with fairness and without party spirit, must not be put in positions of responsibility in the Congress organisation.

These considerations apply very specially to the choice of candidates for the coming general elections. We want to win these elections and we will undoubtedly do so. Nevertheless, it is far more important to put up candidates who are men and women of integrity and ability and even lose the election than to try to win by dubious methods. We have to conduct our election campaign in a straight manner, standing firmly for our ideals and objectives, and with goodwill even to our opponents. Let us not degrade it in any way by wrong selection or the wrong method of campaigning.

We have to remember that we owe a special duty to our minority communities in this election, as in other matters. Congress committees must therefore see to it that proper representatives of the minority communities, accepting Congress objectives, are put up for election. In selecting them the cooperation and advice of leaders of those communities, who believe in the Congress, should always be sought. Where election committees have not got any representatives of these communities, they should invite them for consultation, whenever necessary.

Many Congressmen have recently left the Congress, because they were dissatisfied with things as they were or for some other reason. The Bangalore resolution² of the A.I.C.C. kept the door open for them and invited them to come back, if they believed in the objectives of the Congress. I repeat that invitation with all the warmth at my command.

Let there be no argument about the past. It is the future that beckons us, and we have to develop the habit anew of putting aside our petty differences in a joint endeavour for a common objective.

2. See *ante*, p. 131.

I would extend my invitation even to those who have functioned outside the ranks of the Congress. Even though our views and activities might differ in some fields, yet we can join together in many other activities for the good of the nation. Surely, there is a great deal in common, in spite of differences, between those who have progressive ideas and want our people to advance rapidly. If we cooperate together even in certain limited fields, we can achieve much.

40. Nehru will Implement Nehru's Programme¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Nehru will implement Nehru's programme. If we achieve results, well and good, and if we do not we do not.

Question: Will you continue to hold the office of the Congress President?

JN: As soon as I find a better person I will relinquish the office of the Congress President. In no case will I continue much longer after the election period.² You can see the recent trend of sheer fault-finding in India's body politic.

Q: What do you think about the Madras resolution of the K.M.P. party?³

JN: I do not want to comment on the Madras resolution of the K.M.P. Party. It will not serve any purpose to criticise each other or generally to tender advice to each other. The seceders spend most of their time in criticising the Congress and the Congressmen, in turn, criticise the seceders instead of doing any positive work, and carrying out the programme the Congress stands for. That is a negative attitude which will not carry anybody very far.

Q: When will you start the Congress election campaign?

1. Interview to the press, Lucknow, 16 September 1951. From *National Herald*, 17 September 1951.
2. In fact, Nehru remained President of the Congress from September 1951 to December 1954.
3. The Kisan Mazdoor Party, under the leadership of T. Prakasam, had given notice of moving a resolution in the Madras State Assembly making charges of corruption against the Congress Ministers.

JN: I am not just an electioneering agent of the Congress. I have other functions to perform too.

Q: Did your appeal for cooperation have any response?

JN: I am satisfied with the response to my recent appeal for cooperation in a joint endeavour for a common objective. It was heartening. My appeal is to the people and not to any group. I want the people to feel in a certain way. They should be up and doing. To Congressmen it is a special appeal. To the Socialists and to others I do not say that they should wind up their party, but that they should join in the national activity common to us. There are many things common, and we shall work with them in constructive activities. I will not come in their way and I would not like them to come in our way.

Q: What do you think about the reorganisation of the State Congress machinery?

JN: We are working in a democratic way. I, however, feel that the Congress should be activated and if this necessitates certain formal and informal changes they should be effected. I also suggest the desirability of evolving a machinery for settling internal disputes and disposing of complaints expeditiously.

The organisational machinery of the Congress, which can be described as very good on paper, can be compared to the state of affairs that had prevailed in a certain Indian state during the pre-independence days. A friend of mine, who was the Dewan of an Indian state, told me that injunctions issued against marriages, on the complaint of interested parties, sometimes remained in force for twenty or twenty-five years and the complaints were not disposed of while the bride and the groom passed their marriageable age and became old.

Q: What is D.P. Mishra's attitude?

JN: I do not want to be personal. Mr. Mishra has not shown any intellectual grasp of anything.⁴ A large number of adjectives and adverbs do not explain anything. Mr. Mishra has helped indirectly to prove my point that there is confusion in the Government and the Congress organisation, but he was giving expression to the view which was patently against the Congress. Presumably, Mr. Mishra is not an isolated individual. Wrong persons have come into the

4. On 20 August, Mishra had sent in his resignation from the Madhya Pradesh Council of Ministers saying that his decision "is solely actuated by the crisis which has been slowly developing in our national affairs, embracing both the Central Government and our national organisation."

Congress and they have been encouraged. That was why he said confusion had entered into the Congress ranks. Mr. Mishra has demonstrated that he had been completely opposed to the Congress ideology and yet he had been in it. That is bad and wrong. There is no doubt that local Congress committees have slackened and have gone wrong in many ways. Sometimes, a wrong ideology has been encouraged as in the case of Mr. Mishra. Congressmen must think clearly and act clearly. The essential thing is the approach and the atmosphere in which the local committees work. If certain policies are to be followed, ways and means must be found to that end. The point is to produce the Congress outlook and local committees should work accordingly. If that necessitates formal reorganization that should be done.

Q: Have you kept five seats vacant in the Congress Working Committee for those who have gone out of the Congress?

JN: I was not thinking in terms of any group. I could not decide all the names and at the same time I did not want to delay the announcement of the Working Committee. I had, therefore, announced some names and the rest I would announce soon. There are some areas that are unrepresented on the Committee and some interests too, as, for example, women. That was all I had in my mind when I kept five seats vacant.

Q: How do you intend to revitalise the Congress if the Congress seceders do not come back?

JN: The effective functioning of the Congress depends on many things. Among them is the return of those good Congressmen who have gone out. The revitalising of the Congress basically depends upon Congress workers and how they work.

I appeal to Congressmen to revitalise the organisation. I want them to work hard for nation-building schemes. And when I appeal to others to cooperate with the Congress, I do not ask them to dissolve their parties and join the Congress. If they join the Congress, well and good, but that is possible and advisable only if the Congress functions in a vital and progressive way.

All that I want is that in the implementation of programmes on which there is no difference of opinion or there is seventy-five per cent agreement, there should be cooperation to the extent of agreement. In this connection my appeal is not to parties and groups alone but to tens of thousands of ordinary men, peasants and citizens, who are not in political parties. Cooperation can be given to official machinery, wherever possible. But I want the main emphasis on non-official work, helped by official agencies. There is also the suggestion to form a Bharat Sevak Sangh which will be open to all, irrespective of parties, and which will be devoted to nation-building work.

41. Elections a Side Issue¹

Congressmen should launch an unrelenting fight against communalism, corruption and economic evils facing the country. I appeal to them to work selflessly and make the Congress a living, vigorous organisation that had infused a new spirit in the nation during the struggle for freedom.

I warn the Congressmen of the communalist kind who have managed to enter the organisation and of those who are there with mental reservations.

In order to reassure the people, there should be an immediate inquiry into all the complaints against Congressmen, whether those complaints are old or new.

I have not come to you to give suggestions but to put before you what is passing in my mind. I want to give you a picture of the hankering quest for the solution of the great problems that are present in my mental vision. There were days when this province had not more than a handful of Congressmen. Those were the men who had dedicated their lives to the cause of the country. And that was the time when the provincial Congress was a magnificent organisation, when we were proud of its unity and strength. That was just after the arrival of Mahatma Gandhi.

The times have changed and the country has achieved freedom. I had to leave the State and it was once in a while I got news from here. Sometimes the news was good and sometimes the news was bad. This worried me. One main reason for the worry was the feeling that the Congress was showing signs of weakness. There was a time when a mere handful of Congressmen worked in the State without giving a thought to the future. At that time they had the strength which arose from the self-confidence that they were working for a great cause. They had faith in their leader and devotion to duty. Then came the days when the Congress became a great army. Its voice became the voice of India and it clashed with the might of the British empire. It defeated that might by boldly facing the enemy and refusing to bow or bend before it. It did not go to the rich and served the poor. It influenced crores of people and therein lay their strength.

When we as young men entered the Congress following the lead of Mahatma Gandhi, we used to say: Till now the Congress was an organisation that merely passed resolutions, now we will work. At that time there were no mental bickerings. We were busy with our work. Now again big problems face us. The general elections are just a minor part of the problem. I was a

1. Address to the U.P.C.C., Lucknow, 16 September 1951. From *National Herald*, 17 September 1951. Extracts.

Congressman and have given a major part of my life to it. Then I was made the Prime Minister and I was burdened with many more responsibilities. But now I am not merely a Congressman and I have to treat all the parties on an equal footing. The most important questions before us are economic questions. In the past we had passed resolutions about them but the times changed and new conditions developed. A Planning Commission has been appointed and its recommendations will become *pucca* in four or five months. There is the question as to what is the task of the Congress and what role it has to fulfil. Now that the British have left our country, I sometimes feel as if the Congress has gone back to the "resolution period" again. We have to think if this great organisation should again become the organisation of the pre-Gandhian days or remain a living, vigorous organisation.

There is some enthusiasm for the coming elections. In the past I have toured the country in connection with the elections. The object of the tour, however, was not victory at the polling booths, though it came about, but to create a storm in the country. The objective was to carry the message of the Congress to every nook and corner, to propagate the Congress ideals. Now, again, we have to fight the elections, but are we to contest the elections like so many other parties? I am not worried about what will happen. What happens depends to a large extent on the Congressmen themselves. The Congressmen, no doubt, will contest the elections. Yet I do not feel like asking the people to vote for the Congressmen. I will do this if the Congress again becomes a living organization, struggling to remove corruption and economic evils and crusade against communalism. If once we resolve to carry this message of the Congress we will again create a storm that will envelop the election work also. But still the elections will remain a side issue. The candidates for the elections are prepared to give any pledge now, though they might break them later on. But the masses have the capacity to discern the sincerity of persons. In the past the faith of the people in us was our strength. They had faith in our honesty and courage. These things the masses discern immediately—not by your lectures but by your deeds and actions.

The Congress is still strong, but there is criticism against us. And that is our weakness. Our critics think that we are after self-interest. This hits us at our very roots. In pre-independence days the people used to come to the Congress at a certain risk. Now there is no danger to face and only profits are to be reaped. This has however proved harmful.

When the great revolutionary organisation of Russia—the Communist Party—became a ruling party all sorts of people tried to enter it. But then the party was very strict about admission of new members. It tried and re-tried each candidate, and new members were taken into the party after very severe tests. Those who were already in the organisation were also tested time after time. I emphasise this because I feel that assumption of power by an

organisation may bring benefit, but it is harmful to the organisation itself. The same thing has happened here. People who for years actively opposed the Congress are now trying to enter it. Some have even succeeded, and hold responsible offices. I have come to know that a Hindu Mahasabha leader had become president of a district Congress committee. This is dangerous. Formerly there was no such danger. The risk that a man had to undergo on joining the Congress was a sufficient test of his sincerity. But now there is no such danger and we have to devise methods to test every new entrant.

A number of candidates have come forward to contest the elections on the Congress ticket. But we have to fight the elections, not for the victory of candidates, but for the victory of certain principles, and we have to check the quality of the candidates in the light of those principles. The first thing is the integrity and honesty of the candidate. We can give some concession where the qualification of a candidate is concerned, but there can be no concession so far as his integrity and honesty are concerned. In order to test these qualities we have to scrutinise his past record and see how he behaved when the country was under foreign domination. We have also to see if there is any suspicion about the candidate of his being involved in blackmarketing or hoarding. Even if there is a shadow of doubt against any person, he should not be given the Congress ticket.

Q: How will it be found out if a person is involved in blackmarketing?

JN: By scrutinising the past record.

Q: Why not an enquiry by the C.I.D.?

JN: It can be done by checking his actions. Such deeds are not hidden from the people. The integrity of the Government officials has also to be checked in this way. If there is the least doubt about the honesty of any official, immediate inquiry has to be ordered. If an official's honesty is doubted by the people, even though he might not be dishonest, he should be transferred from the place where he is posted. Officials have not only to work honestly but the people should also be made to feel that they are honest.

In the case of Congress candidates the best check is to see if the people have confidence in their honesty. If they have a man of integrity and honesty as their candidate fifty per cent success is achieved even before the contest. Again, the candidate has to be a person who believes in basic principles of the Congress, about its policies regarding land and industries. Another important question is his attitude towards communalism. He should be a man with strong faith in anti-communalism.

After the achievement of freedom we had thought that all the communalists had left India and the country was free of the scourge. But the communalists are still there and are now preparing to contest the elections....

A few days ago Mr. D.P. Mishra enunciated his principles and ideals in his letter of resignation from the Congress.² But the causes that he enumerated were all against the basic principles of the Congress. Was it not strange that a man holding a high position in the organisation was all the time totally opposed to its basic principles? There may be more like him inside the organisation. The result is a discrepancy in the words and deeds of Congressmen. This hits at the very roots and fundamental principles of the organisation. If the workers of an organisation say one thing and act otherwise the organisation loses its prestige among the people. It will be better if the people who do not believe in the fundamental principles of the organisation leave it. If within 48 hours after leaving the Congress people go to the platform of the Jan Sangh to ventilate their ideology then it shows that there are people in the Congress with mental reservations. That is to be done away with.

Mahatma Gandhi had stressed the importance of the struggle against communalism not only because anti-communalism was a correct principle, but because there was no other correct path. If India follows communalism the country will surely be ruined. People in foreign countries are unable to understand the communalists here. Of course, they are appreciated in Pakistan. The communalists are backed by reactionary forces, like the princes, which want to preserve the present economic set-up in the country. They have, therefore, to see to it that their candidates are clear on this point as well as about their economic policies.

If you do not keep these things in view, then you might win the elections but you will lose your principles.

Some of the persons who resigned from the Congress a few days ago wanted to come back while others have not decided as yet. We have to look at the question of their rejoining the Congress not from the strict constitutional point of view, but from a different angle. We have to see if their return will strengthen the organisation and create more confidence among the people. At Bangalore we had decided to keep the door open for them.³ I have no doubt that the door should be kept open for those who want to return. We should be ready to welcome them back with honour. We should try to persuade them to come back. But if in spite of our attempts they refuse to come, we can say

2. D.P. Mishra charged Nehru as responsible for weak administration, inconsistent policies, and too much interference in States' affairs. He complained that Nehru did not go into details and was surrounded by flatterers. He had been armed with a Constitution that had given too much power to the Centre and made the States helpless in important matters.
3. The resolution passed at the A.I.C.C. session at Bangalore on 15 July affirmed that the Congress was for all those who subscribed to its ideals and invited those who had left to come back to its fold. See *ante*, p. 131.

that the mistake is no longer ours. If we can persuade our former colleagues to come back to the Congress we would also weaken the enemies of the Congress at the same time.

There are complaints, which are disposed of by different *adalats* in the Congress. Sometimes their decisions are unnecessarily delayed. During the elections there will be a number of complaints. So some sort of a machinery has to be evolved to speedily dispose of them. In some States the complaints are not inquired into. That creates a feeling in the people that attempts are being made to hide mistakes. Therefore, something has to be done to inquire into all the complaints, whether new or old. If the Congressmen want to work then all the bickerings in the district Congress committees have to come to an end. It is a bad omen that youth is not attracted by the Congress. Every Congressman has to think about it.

Congressmen should work as servants of the people and make every one feel that the doors of the organisation are open for them. Their work would weaken the opposition, strengthen the organisation and raise their prestige in the eyes of the people.

42. To Shankar Lal¹

New Delhi
September 20, 1951

My dear Shankar Lal,²

Thank you for your letter. I am sorry to learn that you are unwell.

I agree with you that the worst evil we have to fight today is communalism. I think that, in spite of its weaknesses and failings, the Congress is still the only effective body to do this on a large scale. We should, therefore, strengthen it and try to improve it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A well-known Congressman of Delhi who became a leader of the Forward Bloc after 1940.

43. To P.C. Ghosh¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1951

My dear Profulla Babu,

You have, no doubt, followed the recent developments in the Congress. I do not quite know what your reactions are. For my part, I think that all of us have rather played about while serious matters were at issue. I think that it is quite essential that we should pull together and try to improve the situation. I do not myself see how we can do it effectively except through the Congress. I know the failings of the Congress and of the complications that have arisen. Nevertheless, we have to go ahead and try to improve things. Nothing can be done suddenly or by magic. It is hard work.

I need hardly say that I would like you and all your colleagues to come back to the Congress and take your rightful place there. If you would care to come to Delhi, I would be glad to meet you again and to have a talk with you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

44. To J.B. Kripalani¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1951

My dear Jivat,

I have been wanting to write to you for some time past, but have hesitated to do so because this might appear to be an unwarranted interference. You know, of course, of the developments that have taken place in the Congress and in the country recently. What those developments will ultimately lead to, I cannot say. One can only do one's best in existing circumstances. No magical results flow. At the most a new trend is given to events and gradually, one hopes, that they will lead to right results.

1. J.N. Collection.

I have been greatly concerned in recent months with the growing communal and obscurantist tendencies in India. Our anti-social and reactionary forces are gathering together and cooperating against the Congress. The major issue, therefore, before us, I think, is how to meet this challenge of reaction and bigoted communalism. It would be a great pity indeed if the progressive forces in India split up and undermine each other, thus giving a chance to the reactionary forces.

It was because of this that I felt it essential to work for some kind of a unity in the Congress as well as for a new turn and drive in it. My efforts unfortunately did not succeed as I wanted them to and other developments took place.

Now a new change has come over the situation and it is obvious that the communal and reactionary forces are also binding themselves together for a stiff fight on all fronts. This does not refer to elections only, although these are important, but to other matters also. Naturally I would like all old Congressmen to pull together at this juncture, even though they might differ from each other. It is with this aim in view that I have appealed to many old friends and colleagues who had left the Congress recently. I am glad to say that there has been some response to this appeal.

I do not pretend that everything is all right in the Congress, but I have felt strongly that there is no other effective way of meeting the grave challenge which we have to face. Hence my attempts to get old colleagues back. It is not an easy matter to upset the formal functioning of a great organisation suddenly. This cannot be done by a decree. But I am endeavouring to associate in various capacities Congressmen, who do not hold any particular office in the organisation, in important and responsible work.

You have expressed yourself firmly against your return to the Congress. It was largely because of this that I hesitated to write to you or to meet you to discuss this subject. You have every right to decide, as you have done, and I have no business to try to influence you otherwise. But I do want you to understand how I have been feeling in this matter and how I have been endeavouring to function. Even though you might keep outside the Congress or oppose the Congress, I hope we shall always cooperate in what I consider the major issue today, that is the challenge of reaction and communalism.

I would gladly meet you, and of course I am always happy to do so. But I have not tried to seek a meeting lest this might prove embarrassing to you because you have given a firm decision.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

45. To Master Tara Singh¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1951

Dear Master Tara Singh

I received your letter of the 28th August some time back. I regret the delay in answering it. I have been overburdened with work and unfortunately your letter became mixed up with my other papers.

You will not expect me to discuss past events in Pepsu or elsewhere. This is a transitional period and we have to make the best possible arrangement for this period. No doubt, after the elections, more permanent arrangements would be possible.

We are determined that elections should take place impartially and peacefully. If any unfair tactics are adopted anywhere, we shall certainly interfere and try to stop them.

You will appreciate, no doubt, that we are passing through very difficult times and have to face serious problems and crises. In such a period, I would suggest to you that whatever our political differences might be, we should not encourage disruptive tendencies which weaken the country and cast discredit upon us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

46. To Presidents of Pradesh Congress Committees¹

New Delhi
September 24, 1951

Dear Comrade,

I want to tell you that we have started work in our A.I.C.C. office here in right earnest and we have sought the cooperation of as many people as we can get in this work. As you know, the task before us is stupendous and we have to work in cooperation with all our colleagues, if we are to achieve results. I am, therefore, inviting such Congress workers of experience as are

1. Misc. File/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L. A copy was sent to all the Chief Ministers.

available here to join in this work. I am glad to inform you that the response has been good. We are forming a number of committees in which many Congress M.Ps have joined. I am particularly glad to tell you that Shri Sri Prakasa has taken charge of election work in our office. I do not think we could have had a more suitable or a more experienced head of this important work.

2. The publicity committee has also been appointed. This consists for the moment of Shri Diwakar, Shri Gulzarilal Nanda, Shri Shiva Rao and Shri Feroze Gandhi.

3. We propose to have other committees also, more particularly to receive and deal with complaints. For this purpose we intend dividing India into five zones with a committee for each zone. Members of this committee will not only work here but travel, if necessary.

4. Another suggested committee is a legal one.

5. The question of funds is very important. Some States can probably make adequate arrangements for this. There are other States which obviously cannot do so and have to be helped. It is essential, therefore, for us to build up a central fund. I suggest that such States as have greater resources should send a part of their collections to the central fund. A general rule might be that a percentage of these funds should go automatically to the Centre. You will appreciate that the burden of work on the Centre will be very great. The success of our election campaign depends far more on central work and direction and initiative than even on local work, although local work, of course, is highly important.

6. It is possible that some kind of a general appeal for funds might also be issued. The purpose of this is not only to get such funds as may come in, but to associate the public with this work and not merely to rely on donations from a limited number of individuals. The public should be made to feel that they are partners in our work.

7. We want to have the closest association and cooperation in our work with the States. To further this, we hope to have consultations here in the immediate future with the representatives of State Election Committees as also some others who might be able to put forward a different point of view. The whole object is to pull together in every State and to have the largest measure of cooperation from all Congressmen and the public. I have already written² to you about the necessity for our welcoming back those Congressmen who left the Congress and of giving them opportunities of doing effective work. There is not much point in their coming back if they have no chance to work. They must, therefore, be made to feel not only that they are welcome, but that there is going to be full cooperation.

2. See *ante*, pp. 37-39.

8. In addition to having such meetings at headquarters in Delhi, where necessary, our representatives will visit the States for consultations.

9. You can rest assured that you will have every help and cooperation from us. Ultimately, it is the public that counts and we must work in such a way as to impress the public with our earnestness, integrity and desire to serve it. Our choice of candidates will be a test for us by which the public will judge whether we are true to our ideals or not. To begin with, the test will be how far we function cooperatively and pull together. That will have a powerful effect on the public.

10. We have to face powerful disruptive elements in the country which go under communal or other guise. Generally speaking, the communalists and the pure reactionaries pull together. To face this challenge, we have also to pull together in the Congress. Even in a wider field there should be a measure of cooperation with progressive elements.

11. This is a brief and rather hastily written letter. I hope to write more fully to you a little later.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

47. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
September 25, 1951

My dear Ajit,

Your letter of today's date together with the draft statement. I am absolutely clear that you should not issue this statement. Your last statement did no good whatever and, indeed, did a good deal of harm even to the cause you represent. The present draft statement will also do no good.

After all, statements are issued with a particular object in view. If they did not achieve that object, then they are no good. If they did harm to that object, then the whole purpose is frustrated. If Tandonji raises a constitutional issue, it is for me to deal with it either as Prime Minister or as Congress President, and no one else, least of all you who are concerned, should say anything about it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. A.P. Jain Papers, N.M.M.L.

48. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
September 26, 1951

My dear Sri Babu,

I was told in the A.I.C.C. office this afternoon that Shyam Nandan Mishra² had telephoned from Patna. I was not there then. He gave a message that there was a good deal of dissatisfaction and even some consternation among many people there, because it was felt that Jagjivan Ram and Satyanarayan Sinha had been taken in the Central Election Committee and that these two were likely to represent one particular viewpoint there and not others' views.

I tried to get in touch with him on the telephone but did not succeed. I have just come back from the A.I.C.C. office and I am trying to get in touch with you on the telephone. Meanwhile, I am writing this note to you. I can understand some misunderstanding about my action, but I did not think that you would share this misunderstanding. You should know that I rely upon you more than anyone else for advice in regard to Bihar matters and I propose to consult you at every step. Indeed, it was because of this that, rather deliberately, I did not put you in the Election Committee. The Working Committee is not complete yet.

My method of working is perhaps somewhat unusual. I try to bring in all kinds of people into the fold of work and more particularly those who are not perhaps very intimately connected with me in regard to work. As for those who are nearer to me in this respect, I seek their advice at every stage and they play a much more important part than those who might perhaps be formally in some committee. You will have noticed that I have put Shri Sri Prakasa in no committee. Indeed, he is not even a delegate as he was functioning as a Governor, etc., previously. But he is one of our oldest and most valued Congressmen who is above parties and the like, and who is respected everywhere. He is efficient and knows a great deal about elections. So, although he is not in any committee, he is going to play a much more important part in this business than those who are in the Central Election Committee. In this way, I am trying to get more and more people to function actively. Committees are important, but other people are more important.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (b. 1920); prominent Congress leader of Bihar; member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52, Lok Sabha, 1952-62, Rajya Sabha, 1962-71; Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1951-52; Deputy Minister for Planning, 1954-62; leader of Opposition in Rajya Sabha, 1969-71; Deputy Leader, Janata Parliamentary Party, Lok Sabha, 1977-78; Minister for External Affairs, July 1979-January 1980.

As for Bihar, I rely upon you more than anyone else and I want you to realise that. At one time I thought of sending for you but then I desisted for the moment as this might interfere with your work there. But you can come whenever you feel like it and we can discuss all these matters. What I would like you to be perfectly clear about is this that whatever I have done thus far in no way means that there is any lessening of my reliance upon you. I want your help not only in Bihar matters but in other matters also. Because I was sure of this I did not think of writing to you about it and I waited till we met.

Should you wish to come here, do come. I shall be in Delhi almost all the time except on Sunday next. Apart from this, you can always telephone to me if any difficulty or doubt arises.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

49. To J.B. Kripalani¹

New Delhi
September 26, 1951

My dear Jivat,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th September. It is a good letter and I have read it with care and appreciated some of the points you have made. In all such matters, one has to balance various factors. In the balance, I have come to the conclusion I have and you have to your conclusion.

You refer to the need for an opposition party. I agree. I have no doubt whatever that there will be plenty of opposition in the future. So, I do not worry about this.

There is no difficulty about my writing to you or meeting you. What I referred to was our starting, either in writing or by meeting, the long argument which might not have served any useful purpose.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

CONGRESS SANDESH

[PUBLISHED BY THE CONGRESS CENTRAL PUBLICITY BOARD]

VOL. I

NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 18, 1951

NO. 1


President's Message

The message of the Congress - What is this message now that we have achieved independence? In the old days we gave first place rightly to political freedom, but freedom for us was something more than that. It meant unity and the raising of our backward brothers and sisters and social and economic advance for the masses of our people. It meant an ending of communal and other separating barriers and a policy of peace in the world.

That is still the message of the Congress

Jawaharlal Nehru

October 15. 1951



WITH FRANK GRAHAM, NEW DELHI, 4 JULY 1951

50. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
September 27, 1951

My dear Sri Babu,

I wrote to you yesterday. Today I saw a friend who came from Bihar. I had a talk with him. I do not know whether my talk was satisfactory or not. He told me some things about Satya Narayan Sinha which I had not heard of previously. I had decided to put Satya Narayan in the Parliamentary Board simply because he was the Chief Whip. And it is a normal practice in countries like England, etc. for the Chief Whip to be in election and like committees. As Chief Whip, Satya Narayan has been pretty good. And I thought I had to follow this normal practice even though in regard to some other matters I might not have chosen him. Apart from this, my way of work is to bring in people in responsible positions and make them work. Those who are my intimate colleagues stand in special positions and are consulted at every step, whether they are in a particular position or not. I think that the fears expressed in Bihar are needlessly exaggerated and should not carry weight. I am trying to build up something big and I want every kind of person to help it. I want to immobilise a good deal of opposition and then to go ahead on the lines that the Congress has laid down. I want, as far as possible, to break through the parties and groups that have arisen in the Congress. I may fail of course, or I may only succeed partially. But it is worthwhile doing so.

As I have written to you already, this whole election business is going to be conducted by me on a much wider basis than that of the Election Committee. In fact those decisions will automatically emerge from the consultations that we are having all the time with the representatives of the States, including minority groups in the Congress. The Central Election Committee will play the final role after much of the work has been done.

As I have told you, in regard to Bihar, I rely on you chiefly. It is my intention to have you in the Working Committee a little later. I did not wish to say anything about it at this stage but, as I am writing to you, I might as well inform you. But, apart from this, what I want you to appreciate is that I want your full cooperation in this matter not only in Bihar but the rest of India. You must not imagine that because somebody has been put in this committee or that, this makes any difference.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

51. To Raghukul Tilak¹

New Delhi
September 29, 1951

My dear Raghukul Tilak,

Thank you for your letter of the 21st September.² *Prima facie*, your proposal is attractive. But I am quite sure that at this stage, at any rate, it is wholly impracticable. First of all, there is a good deal of difference in regard to a common programme of action, at any rate so far as the Socialist Party and the Congress are concerned. But the main difficulty is that it is next to impossible, in the present circumstances, to arrive at, what you call, an electoral truce, more especially in the course of the next two weeks or so. Any attempt made might well lead to bitter controversy and a worsening of the situation.

I can conceive later, and apart from electoral truces, the subject of a common programme being discussed, leaving parties to go further ahead if necessary. I should like to do that if opportunity comes. Any such discussion just at this fluid stage would raise all manner of suspicions.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. P.E.C. 21/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Raghukul Tilak, a well-known Congressman from Meerut and later a Socialist, suggested that in order "to recapture the old spirit of the days of struggle and, if possible, harness it to the great task of building and reconstruction" the Congress should seek the cooperation of the K.M.P.P. and the Socialist Party and evolve a common programme so that an electoral truce could be reached.

52. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
October 4, 1951

Nan dear,

I have received three letters from you since you went away, one from Paris dated 13th September and two from Washington dated 13th and 19th September.

...You wrote to me about a conversation you had with J.P. Srivastava. I have communicated this both to Pantji² and Chandra Bhan Gupta.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. See *ante*, p. 127.

...I am not at all worried about the American reactions to our policy. As you say, they have already toned down. I am sure that gradually the wisdom of our policy will dawn upon large numbers of Americans. Anyhow, we are convinced of its correctness and are in no way apologetic about it....

Here, I am entangled in a multitude of activities, governmental and Congress. Parliament sits both in the mornings and the afternoons and is trying to rush through business. We had thought of ending it by the 6th. But it has now to continue for a few days more. Immediately after comes the Congress. My being Congress President at this particular juncture has put the enormous burden of elections upon me. However, I feel in good heart. Perhaps what cheers me most and gives me strength is the response from the people. I went to Ludhiana the other day and what I saw was overwhelming. Papers say that a million people collected there. This is an exaggeration. But half a million must certainly have been there. The whole population of Ludhiana is a little over a hundred thousand. The countryside seemed to have poured in chiefly consisting of sturdy Sikhs.

Two days ago I addressed another meeting in Delhi and there was a vast gathering of over a hundred thousand. I am giving battle openly and aggressively to the communal elements which had grown rather strong because of lack of proper opposition and were giving all kinds of trouble.

With love from
Jawahar

53. To Anugrah Narayan Sinha¹

New Delhi
October 7, 1951

My dear Anugrah Babu,²

I am very much disturbed about Congress affairs in Bihar. You will remember that I had a brief talk with you sometime ago when you came here. Two days ago I had a talk with Sri Babu. In between I have had a number of reports from Bihar. These often contradicted each other or were opposed to each other. Anyhow, it was clear that Congress affairs were in a bad way and there was far too much personal rivalry.³

1. J.N. Collection.

2. President, Bihar Provincial Congress Committee.

3. Factions of the Pradesh Congress played a vital role in selecting candidates out of the 2,200 applications for Congress tickets.

I suppose the personal element cannot be eliminated. But unless we are big enough to rise above it, there is little hope for us. It is difficult for me to advise you or any other senior colleague. I am not in the least interested in individual successes in these elections. I am interested in the success of some principles and in our having proper candidates for election.

It is clear to me that in Bihar unless Sri Babu and you can pull together and, what is more, induce your colleagues and followers to pull together, grave consequences will follow. It does not matter very much as to who is to blame and who is in the right. The result is much the same. The only course open is for both of you to realise this simple fact and conform yourselves to it. Not to do so is to invite discredit on your province and on the leading individuals of that province.

Sri Babu is at present not only the Chief Minister but also the leader of the Party. As far as I can see, he is likely to continue as both. If this fact is clear and is thoroughly understood by everyone, then certain consequences flow from it. He must be treated as such and an attempt should be made to build up a certain discipline in the Congress. You told me when you saw me that you recognised the fact that Sri Babu was the leader and that you had no desire to displace him. I think that you and Sri Babu should meet each other frankly and come to some clear arrangement. I do not mean to say that there should be any bargaining between you two, but that some way must be found for cooperation between colleagues, who happen to be the two leading Congress personalities in the province. It is really a question of frank and friendly approach without reservations.

I spoke on these lines to Sri Babu also. You will be coming here in a week or so and I hope that before that, you would have this frank talk with Sri Babu.

So far as election lists are concerned, they will have little value for us, if they are drawn up merely on a narrow personal basis.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Replying on 10 October 1951, Sinha expressed his surprise at Nehru's letter. He wanted to know what reports had reached him. He wrote that Nehru's letter carried presumptions which were "not based on a judicious and factual appreciation of the realities of the situation as it exists... I have failed to discover in what respect Sri Babu has not been treated by me as the Chief Minister of Bihar."

54. To Ramanand Tirtha¹

New Delhi
October 8, 1951

My dear Swamiji,

I have your letters. I also met your President, Bindu,² yesterday and had a talk with him.

As I thought that you might be coming here, I did not write to you.

I confess that I am greatly distressed at developments in Hyderabad. Apart from the merits of a dispute or as to who is right and who is wrong, the mere fact of such utter lack of cohesion is itself most unfortunate. It cuts at the root of all that I have been saying.

We stand for certain policies, non-communal, economic progress, etc. They are laid down in our manifesto. It is true that many people accept these policies rather superficially. All we can do is to judge them by their past records as far as possible. Thus, any person who has behaved in a communal way during the troubles of 1947 or in Hyderabad in 1948 before or after the police action, should be excluded from our choice. Some persons will be definitely excluded if these tests are applied, that is from the communal or economic progress point of view. Others will be definitely taken in. Many will be between these two groups and some kind of a choice has to be made, having regard to all the circumstances.

But all ideas of progress go by the board if there is constant friction and disruption in the organisation itself. There must be at least some basis for common action. Hyderabad had to send us a list of about 175 candidates. I could understand a dispute about 10 or 20 or 25 names and a common list of say 150. But I find that we have received eight lists from eight members of the Election Committee. This is fantastic. This simply means that none of the lists have any value and we can just go ahead and do our best here.

As you know, I have been greatly distressed about Hyderabad because of the prominence of communal elements among the Hindus. I fear that these elements will bring disaster to Hyderabad if they get a free hand. I am most anxious that proper Muslim representation should be given at least according to their population ratio.

You may be quite right about your criticism of the Pradesh Congress office. Many Congress committees in the country badly require reorganisation. But I have said that just at the present moment, any radical reorganisation will probably upset such organisation as we have got and create many difficulties. This matter can be taken up soon after. We cannot do it just on

1. J.N. Collection.

2. G. Bindu Digambar Rao, President, Hyderabad Pradesh Congress Committee.

the eve of selecting candidates. The course I had suggested was that each Pradesh Congress committee should normally and informally co-opt others and confer with others. Formal changes have to be done formally and that takes a little time.

As you say, I have known you for a long time and, so far as our views are concerned about political or economic matters, there is a great deal of agreement between you and me. But we have to function as something more, and that is, as leaders who can win others for cooperative action and not as persons who tend to create disruption. I want people to come into the Congress and not to push out anybody, unless he himself goes out because of the policies we follow. I should like you to give thought to these basic approaches and try to get some kind of a common pull in Hyderabad. Such a common pull is important in a place like Hyderabad today where there are so many disruptive influences at play. As for economic policy, we have the Congress election manifesto and indeed we can go further on those lines and we must insist on explaining this to the people so that others might not pull us back. Any person who presumes to be a Congressman will hardly dare oppose that.

Nijalingappa³ saw me yesterday and told me that he was going through Hyderabad. I have asked him to spend a couple of days there and talk to you and others, so that the ground might be prepared for some common action. I shall be seeing you later.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. S. Nijalingappa (b. 1902); arrested during freedom struggle, 1942-44, 1947; member, Mysore Congress Working Committee, 1945-46, K.P.C.C., 1946-54, Working Committee, National Congress, 1948-53; member, Constituent Assembly and Provisional Parliament, 1946-52, Mysore Constituent Assembly, 1948-50, Lok Sabha, 1952-56; Chief Minister, Mysore, 1 November 1956-8 May 1958; member, Congress Working Committee, 1960; President, Indian National Congress, 1968-71.

55. To Presidents of Pradesh Congress Committees¹

New Delhi
October 8, 1951

Dear Comrade,

Within a few days you will be coming up to Delhi to participate in the

1. M.P.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

Congress Session and other meetings to be held here.² I want to send you this letter, even before you come here, to tell you of our work and the progress we are making in it.

So far as the Congress Session is concerned, good progress has been made and I hope that everything will be perfectly ready for the delegates reception by the time they come here. Adequate arrangements have been made for the delegates and others. They will all live together in Congress Nagar, which has been named Satyavati Nagar.³ The sessions will be held in an open *pandal*. Our chief difficulty is to provide for a very large number of non-delegates who wish to come here. The *pandal* itself is meant to accommodate about 50,000 persons.

What is more important is the work that the A.I.C.C. office is now carrying on. This has been organised on a fresh basis and I am happy to say that we are having the cooperation of a number of seasoned and well-trying Congressmen. Various committees have been formed chiefly for election work. There is a Publicity Committee and a Legal Committee and a Complaints Committee, but the most important of all is the Election Sub-Committee with Shri Sri Prakasa as Chairman. This Committee sits daily and considers all matters connected with elections. They will examine all lists of candidates forwarded to us and vet them for the Central Election Committee. While final decisions can only be taken by the Central Election Committee, a great deal of the preparatory work is being done by this Sub-Committee. In effect, the Sub-Committee is an extension of the President and Secretaries. Even so, the work is very heavy and is likely to be almost overwhelming in the coming weeks.

Much depends upon the kind of lists of candidates that we receive from various States. If those have been carefully chosen, keeping in mind the directions that I sent you sometime ago,⁴ then there will not be much difficulty in finalising them. If, however, those directions have not been carried out, then a stricter examination of those lists will become necessary. I earnestly hope, therefore, that your Election Committee will always keep in mind the principles governing our choice that I have previously sent to you. We must rise above personal considerations and personal prejudices and try to select the best people representing the Congress viewpoint. Nothing will be more unfortunate than conflicts between different groups resulting in the keeping out of good people and the pushing in of dumb supporters of this or that group. We do not want a dumb Parliament or a dumb Assembly, more

2. The A.I.C.C. meeting began on 18 October, while the Subjects Committee met on 17 October 1951.

3. Named after Satyavati who was a prominent Congress leader of Delhi.

4. See *ante*, pp. 33-37.

especially at this critical time in our country's history. The Congress will be judged not by its majority but by the quality of men and women that it sends up to our legislatures.

I have heard that in some States the choice of candidates is partly governed by the support they might give to prospective Chief Ministers. I am distressed at this. No one need think now as to who is going to be Chief Minister at a later stage. Much will happen before that and if there is too keen a desire to gain that end, that itself is the opposite of a qualification for it.

If there is much conflict in preparing a list in a State Election Committee and various lists come up to us, that reduces the value of all those lists and the work has to be done afresh by headquarters here.

I shall repeat here the qualifications that should govern the selection of candidates:

- (1) The first is integrity.
- (2) The second is clear adherence to Congress ideals and objectives with no reservations.
- (3) The third is ability and competence for the work in the legislatures.
- (4) The fourth is proper representation of minorities and women.

Congress ideals and objectives cover many fields. At the present moment, the test lies mainly in regard to two matters—Congress policy against any form of communalism, and the economic policy of the Congress as generally indicated in the Congress manifesto. The test in regard to communalism is not merely one of pious declaration but of past record. What has been that record of an aspiring candidate during the troubled days of August, September and October 1947? If any person participated in those communal disturbances then he or she is not a worthy candidate on behalf of the Congress. The test of economic policy should relate generally to the Congress policy in regard to land and industries. Those who are opposed to the land policy or who are for vested interests in industry will not properly represent the Congress viewpoint.

I am not referring to details but rather to broad policies in both these matters. It is open to Congress to go further than the Election manifesto, whenever it thinks fit to do so and circumstances permit it. It is open to a candidate to believe in a somewhat more advanced policy. But to oppose the basic policies of the Congress makes a candidate unfit for selection.

To choose a person as a candidate merely because he can afford to pay his election expenses and even though he might not otherwise be wholly suitable, is a bad approach to this problem. We have to be faithful to our public and make them realise that we adhere to certain principles, whether we win or lose. It does not matter if we lose a few seats in the elections, but it does matter very much if we lose our principles which have given us strength. Even from the point of view of what are called practical policies, this is the right approach.

In the choice of candidates, many considerations have to be borne in mind and it is not always easy to pick out the right person. But if we rule out the wrong person anyhow, and apply our general principles in our selection, then the chances of error are minimised.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

56. To U.A. Asrani¹

New Delhi
October 10, 1951

My dear Asrani,²

Lal Bahadur has given me your letter of the 7th October and has also shown me your letter to him of that date.

Much has to be done to the Congress and I think much has to be done to every party in the country to raise its level from the point of view of integrity and the rest of it. I see very little difference in the quality of people in different parties. Nor do I see much difference in the undesirable associations that they make.

So far as I am concerned, I shall certainly do my utmost to raise the level of the Congress. But I am not a dictator and I have to proceed according to some rules and regulations. Apart from this, I cannot take up all this business of reorganisation all over India suddenly and have purges all over. For the present I must necessarily concentrate on election work.

I do not understand how you propose a joint electoral front of parties, which are attacking and cursing each other. We have opened our doors to all old Congressmen, but surely they cannot both come into the Congress and remain in some other party.

You refer in your letter to Lal Bahadur to three instances of what you consider corruption or nepotism. I confess I was surprised to read these because they are so trivial. Do you expect me, as Prime Minister, to try to get the payment of a bill for Rs. 25/- to somebody or to object to some petty appointment on the ground that he was connected with somebody or other. The appointment may be right or wrong. But we must have some perspective and we cannot allow ourselves to get entangled in all kinds of petty matters.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Asrani was a Professor at Banaras Hindu University till 1950.

As for the cinema houses you refer to, the matter has come up before me several times in the course of the last year or two and it was largely at my instance that permission in some places was given. This was because the buildings had been practically finished or were half-finished and it was an utter waste to leave them in that condition. My advice was that where such was the case, permission should be given, but no new cinema houses should be erected.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

57. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1951

My dear Rafi,

I have just been reading a fairly long report of the speech you delivered at Muzaffarnagar.² The speech is a strong criticism of Governmental policy and the Congress. I do not personally think that your criticism is, taking it all in all, correct, though of course there is some truth in it. The criticism is a general one dealing with broad policies, not with individual items.

What I am now writing to you about is that it hardly seems fitting to me that all your utterances should be in the nature of this severe criticism of the Congress and Government. I think I could give some reply at least, but obviously I do not wish to enter into a public controversy with a colleague.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Kidwai was reported to have described Congressmen as "an army of occupation making money for themselves." He also regretted that Nehru's unity appeal lacked concrete proposals.

58. The Message of the Congress¹

The message of the Congress. What is this message now that we have achieved independence? In the old days we gave first place rightly to political freedom, but freedom for us was something more than that. It meant unity and the raising of our backward brothers and sisters and social and economic advance for the masses of our people. It meant an ending of communal and other separating barriers and a policy of peace in the world.

That is still the message of the Congress.

1. New Delhi, 15 October 1951. *Congress Sandesh*, 18 October 1951, a weekly published by the Congress Central Publicity Board.

59. Breaking down the Communal Barriers¹

It has been the aim and declared policy of the Congress since its inception to establish a secular democratic State which, while honouring every faith, does not discriminate against any religion or community and gives equal rights and freedom of opportunity to all communities and individuals who form the nation. The Constitution of the Republic of India is based on this fundamental principle. Any departure from it is a violation of the Constitution and the ideals which have inspired the people of India during their long struggle for freedom. The Congress reaffirms this policy and is of opinion that communalism in any shape or form is a misuse of religion and culture and is exceedingly harmful. Caste prejudices and barriers also encourage fissiparous tendencies and are detrimental to the larger interests of the country. Such prejudices as well as the spirit and practice of communalism are anti-social and disruptive and come in the way of the unity and progress of India and should therefore be opposed.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru and adopted at the A.I.C.C. meeting on 17 October, New Delhi, 16 October 1951, File No. G-16(B)/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

60. Need for a Clear Vision¹

I have called this session of the Congress because there have been so many clouds and cobwebs of misunderstanding in the country and it is necessary to remove them from our minds and, as far as possible, from the country's mind. Nothing is more necessary at the present moment than a clear vision. No one can have clear and definite action unless his mind is clear.

Elections are coming and they have importance undoubtedly but elections will have little meaning if we approach them in a narrow spirit just thinking of our victory in this or that part of the country. The only purpose that I have in this election business is not to get this man in or that man out. Of course that follows. But I am only interested in the elections to make the country ring with the Congress principles and Congress slogans and Congress work. If that does not happen and this is a mere election, then I have no faith in that election and I am not interested in it.

But if we can make this country think and act on those principles for which the Congress has stood then we would have done a good job and I do not care very much what happens after that.

Ultimately the Congress and the country depend on the people's minds and hearts. We have to build up the country. We cannot build up the country by just capturing seats in the State Assemblies and Parliament. And so I am interested in the elections as an opportunity that is given to me to go to the people, talk to them, discuss matters with them and explain things to them so that they may understand our problems and our difficulties and discuss with them frankly our failures and our successes. In spite of the many failings of the Congress and of the Government during the last three or four years, we can say in all honesty that we in India have done rather well and we compare very favourably with other countries. We have not achieved what we wanted to achieve because we had aimed high—and I hope we shall always aim high—and, therefore, a measure of disappointment comes in because we have not achieved what we wanted to. Nevertheless, considering the forces arrayed against us internally, considering all kinds of disruptive tendencies, anti-social elements and all that, I feel our record is one for which we can take legitimate pride.

But I do not want any of us to be complacent. There is nothing to be complacent about in this volcanic, revolutionary and upsetting world. No one knows what tomorrow will bring. We have to be wide awake and not think,

1. Address to the Subjects Committee, A.I.C.C., New Delhi, 17 October 1951. From *National Herald*, 18 October 1951.

as sometimes we are apt to think, that the world goes on. We in Government particularly are apt to be even more complacent with our files and papers and forget that the world is something more than governmental activity. The world is something which you cannot really see. There are all kinds of forces below the surface, moving men's minds and hearts. We have to be wide awake to keep pace with the tempo of events. We have to face the future in this way.

When the news of the assassination of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan² came, for the moment the controversies which we have with Pakistan were forgotten and we thought only of an old colleague coming from this very part of the country with whom we have cooperated in many ways before Pakistan came into existence and with whom, after Pakistan came, I have had the privilege of meeting, arguing, discussing, agreeing and disagreeing.

This news came as a shock to all of us, not only in the personal sense, but also in the public sense, because this growth in some countries of the politics of the gunman is a very bad thing. We have seen this kind of thing happen in the last few months in several countries of Asia, in western Asia even more so. Not so long ago we saw it happen in our own country.³ If anybody or any group or individual thinks that he can advance his ideas or ideologies through the gun, he is obviously exceedingly mistaken. The only result will be disruption and chaos. The whole country should realise it, more particularly men and women of the Congress, who have been trained in the past in a certain line of action, although some of them are apt to forget that past training. We were forced to think of it last night. We can fight anti-social elements which exist in every country only if our minds are clear and our action is united.

Our relations with Pakistan have been bad, although we have tried our best to improve them and to come to some peaceful settlement of our problems. Let us not forget that although many matters remain unresolved, we have, from time to time, come to settlements with Pakistan about particular matters.⁴ We have to go on trying and have no doubt that if we try hard enough we shall ultimately succeed and live down this terrible trial of bitterness that has pursued us and Pakistan since partition. At any rate, I hope that this tragic event that happened yesterday will hush the controversies that exist between India and Pakistan and enable us to view the picture in a truer perspective and, keeping our honour and self-respect and our interest always in view, still enable us to go towards a settlement.

2. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October 1951.

3. The reference is obviously to the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.

4. There were agreements between the two countries: Inter-Dominion Agreement, 4 May 1948, on Bengal boundary dispute, 14 December 1948, on minorities, 8 April 1950, the Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreements signed on 21 April 1950 and 23 February 1951.

61. The Presidential Address¹

It is just over a year since we met at Nasik² and it is right that we should meet again in a full session of the Congress. The tempo of events in the world and in India grows ever faster and a year now represents much more than it used to be in the unhurried days of, what seems to us now almost the distant past. Much has happened in this year and among these many unusual and unexpected happenings is the fact that I stand before you here today as Congress President. You know the chain of events that brought this high honour to me for the fifth time in my life. With the honour came a tremendous responsibility and burden which stronger men than I am would have hesitated to shoulder. But fate and circumstance left me no choice. I claim your indulgence, therefore, and I beg your cooperation not merely during these few days of the Congress Session but in the great and vital tasks which you and I have to face.

At the Bangalore Session of the All India Congress Committee three months ago, I presented a report which was meant to be a brief review of the past five eventful years in India.³ I shall not repeat that here. It seemed to be then that the Congress was slowly drifting in a wrong direction. That was not the fault of any particular individual but rather a weakening of the inner fibre of this great organisation, a gradual infiltration into it of ideas and persons which had been foreign to it in the past. I was deeply troubled by this process and I raised my voice against it. That voice was heard and echoed by many in the country and, as a result, some changes took place of which you are well aware. The fact that I played some part in this changing scene was of little consequence: what mattered was the realisation by large numbers of Congressmen and Congresswomen in the country that something was awry and needed immediate attention. That awakening itself was, I think, a healthy sign and showed that there was still vigour and vitality in the Congress in spite of its sixty-six years and the many vicissitudes that it had gone through, the most dangerous of which was the very successes that had crowned its labours. Subsequent events showed that our fear and apprehensions were not unfounded and indeed had great substance. It is now for this Congress to determine with firmness and clarity which way we should look and in which

1. 57th Session of the Indian National Congress, New Delhi, 18 October 1951. The address was published by the All India Congress Committee in a booklet.
2. The 56th Session of the Congress met at Nasik on 20-21 September 1950 under the presidentship of Purushottamdas Tandon.
3. See *post*, pp. 399-418.

direction we should march. We are yet far from the end of the journey, if, indeed, there is ever any end to a nation's march forward. One major stage has been concluded and perhaps we have loitered too long at a halting place. Events move fast and those who do not move with them are left behind.

Year after year as we meet, some familiar faces are missing and some of the old captains who led us to freedom are no more. This Congress will miss especially that great leader and builder of modern India, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, whose memory will endure and inspire us in ages to come.

I am happy to welcome back to the Congress some who left it not long ago.⁴ I hope that they will play an honoured role in the activities of the Congress in the days to come and the spirit of faction that had invaded the Congress will gradually fade away.

We have met here not to have academic debates about theoretical propositions but to face reality and to chalk out a programme of action. The world today is grim and cruel and the voice of calm and dispassionate reason has sunk to a whisper and is often drowned by strident and passionate cries. The proud culture and civilisation, built up through ages of human effort, still endure in their outer semblance, but somehow they lose the inner content. The values and standards fade away. The quest for truth and beauty and goodness gives place to a race for unabashed power. The tenderness and graciousness, the sanctity and dignity of human life are replaced by callousness, vulgarity and naked force. Hate is propagated as a doctrine and politics and economics have assumed the form of dogmatic religion with all its fanaticism, which tolerates no heresies and persecutes those who differ from it.

This was the phase of fascism and authoritarianism as we knew them. A world war was fought against this degradation of the spirit of man. The war was won but the disease continued.

Communism, for all its triumphs in many fields, crushes the free spirit of man. Democracy itself gradually succumbs to the new cult of force and violence.

What then are we to do? The problem before us has to be viewed as an integrated whole, whether we think of the Congress, of our country or of the world. We cannot, to any large extent, affect the course of events in the world. We can mould our own destiny in some measure and thereby have some slight effect on world affairs. I want you to think of our problems in this perspective and on this broad canvas. We shall soon have general elections in this country on a colossal scale and already the fever of elections is raising the temperature of men's minds. These elections have an importance, but they

4. R.A. Kidwai, Union Minister for Communications and A.P. Jain, Minister for Rehabilitation, who had resigned both from ministership and the Congress on 17 July 1951 rejoined the Congress in October 1951.

are of little significance unless we see them in this larger perspective. What do we aim at and whither do we go? These are difficult questions to answer, but of one thing I am sure, that we shall not function rightly if we lose our own freedom of spirit and the springs of action that come out of it. Those of my generation can never forget the breath of freedom that came to us when our great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, came into our ken. That was something more than political freedom, which came much later. It was a freedom of the spirit that came to us, a fearlessness and a faith in our cause and in our country. Political freedom has come to us and we are an independent country today, but I miss that fearlessness and that freedom of spirit. I miss these not only in our own country but elsewhere in the world. Indeed the predominant sensation in most countries, including the greatest, is that of fear, and fear is a bad companion and inevitably drives to wrong action. Our Master taught us the ancient lesson of India, the lesson of *Abhaya* and *Ahimsa*, and even we, small men cast in a lesser mould, increased in status thereby.

He taught us also the importance of means and that means should not be subordinated to ends. Yet today nations encourage hatred and violence and prepare for the most terrible of wars. The lesson of history is forgotten, that these great wars have a way of following their own unpredictable courses and leading to results which were not desired or aimed at; that in fact wars do not solve any major problem.

We live in an age of science and that is supposed to be the moving spirit of the modern age. It was opposed to dogmatic religion. But dogmatic religion

means should not be ed and violence and y is forgotten, that edictable courses and at in fact wars do not

be the moving spirit a. But, in spite of it, d religions. Science, benefits to humanity, g the mind of man.

on which began two e when even the free he machine and are an happiness, which effort?

which trouble me and er to these questions Unless we have that oblem is a worldwide one or more nations aspiration but avital great deal to learn

He taught us also the importance of means and that subordinated to ends. Yet today nations encourage hatred and violence and prepare for the most terrible of wars. The lesson of history is forgotten, that these great wars have a way of following their own unpredictable courses and leading to results which were not desired or aimed at; that in fact wars do not solve any major problem.

We live in an age of science and that is supposed to be the moving spirit of the modern age. It was opposed to dogmatic religion. But dogmatic religion rules the world today, though they are not called religions. Science, which was a liberating force and which has brought untold benefits to humanity, threatens to destroy everything that it has built, including the mind of man.

Is this the ultimate result of the Industrial Revolution which began two hundred years ago or so and which has arrived at a stage when even the free mind and the spirit of man are becoming affected by the machine and are progressively incapable of that quest for truth and human happiness, which is the effort?

I venture to place before you some of these ideas and many others because I feel that we must find some answers before we can define our own objectives with clarity. Unless we have that answer, life becomes inactive and without meaning. The problem is a worldwide one. Culture and civilisation are not the monopoly of any one country and the hope of peace in the world is not just a pious wish but a necessity if civilised existence is to endure. We have a great deal to learn

because we thought that she represented certain ideals and objectives, the material and spiritual growth of man, and the unity of mankind. We have no desire to impose our ideas on others, but we were firmly convinced also that we would not allow any imposition on ourselves. If those ideals go and the service of India does not represent them, then our pride in India goes also and the urge to serve fades away.

We may be told that all this is impractical idealism, far removed from the cruel reality of today. It is this impractical idealism that brought success to us and it is the so-called reality that people talk about, that has brought great wars and might bring another and a greater one. This realism ignores the rise of great new historical forces which form the dynamics of revolution in the world today. Unless these forces are understood, there will be no correct appreciation of the situation. Gandhiji understood and represented in his own person these historical forces in the Indian context. That was why he was great and that was why he evoked a tremendous response from the millions of India. He understood also what India had stood for, her strength and weakness. His life was, therefore, devoted not only to the political freedom of India but also to the emancipation of suffering and down-trodden masses of people. He was a liberating force for these masses and for our womenfolk. But this mighty force for social justice and racial and economic equality was used without hatred and violence. It was his ambition to wipe every tear from every eye. It appears to be the ambition of many great men today to produce an ocean of tears and blood and in that way to try to solve the world's problems.

Our policies, domestic or foreign, flow from each other or affect each other and have to be integrated to some extent. They cannot be viewed separately. It is not our desire to play an important role in the world or even in Asia. Some people vainly imagine that India aspires to leadership elsewhere. This is a completely wrong assumption. But, as the world is constituted today, international cooperation has become essential and there can be no isolated existence for a nation. Either there is international cooperation or international conflict. Therefore we are driven to cooperation and to have our say when circumstances require it. We would greatly prefer not to interfere in any way in the problems of other countries, just as we would like no interference from outside in our own problems. But we would welcome cooperation and help and, where possible, we would like to give our help in the solution of any problem.

The United Nations Organisation and the great Charter, which was its basis, attracted us because it represented an ideal for world cooperation which had always been our own aim. Indeed we believe that some time or other, if this world is to survive, the idea of One World must take shape. We have given our allegiance to the United Nations even when some of its decisions have surprised and pained us. We still believe that it contains, within itself, the germs of that world order, which is the hope of mankind. But it has

seemed to us that the U.N.O. has somewhat drifted away from what it was meant to be and the intentions of its great founders have not been realised. It was meant to be a universal organisation; it is something less now. This is a serious development and, in considering this, it is immaterial whose fault has led to this change. If the U.N.O. ceases to have that universal background and appeal, then it begins to represent only a part of the world, however big and important that part might be. Instead of a mighty instrument for peace, it would tend to develop into something different. It is, therefore, becoming necessary to reconsider this problem afresh and perhaps to reorganise the U.N.O. on a new basis, keeping to the old moorings, reiterating the Charter, but giving it a wider appeal and making it more in touch with reality.

Perhaps the danger of a world war is somewhat less now than it was previously. Yet fear of that war consumes and paralyses nations and much of their strength and energy is devoted to rearmament. A hungry and impoverished world cries for food and development, but the world's resources are directed not so much to development but to the production of weapons of destruction, and the mind of man is also turned away from constructive and cooperative effort. It is strange indeed that this should be so when the people of every country desire peace and everyone knows the terrible danger of war. Has something gone wrong with our thinking, and have we lost touch with the simple facts of life? Surely, it should be possible for the statesmen of the world to put a stop to this mighty race for rearmament and to divert this energy into more fruitful channels. The alternative is too dreadful to contemplate. Even if that final disaster is somehow avoided or delayed, this continuing process starves and degrades the world. Standards of life are lowered, frustration sets in, and the light of faith in the future, which has carried humanity through ages of suffering, grows dim. What shall we do when that light goes out?

There is aggression and fear of aggression and each feeds the other. Is it not possible to stop all aggression and interference by one country, so that each country can live according to its lights? We may not approve of the ways of another country and our ways might not be approved by others. But we are not likely to bring conviction by force and coercion. The only practical way is to accept that the world is various and diverse and that the people have different faiths and different ways of living. No doubt they will gradually approximate to each other because of modern conditions. To try to impose our system or our way of life on another is to provoke fierce resistance which defeats the very ends in view. There is plenty of evil in the world and evil has to be combated, but this will not be done by methods that are themselves evil, nor will it be achieved through hatred and violence.

If this is a correct approach, then India's foreign policy must be fashioned to this end. It has to adapt itself to changing conditions, but basically it must

hold to these objectives. Indeed, throughout our struggle for freedom, we held to this viewpoint and it is natural that we should continue to adhere to it. To say that India is neutral or passive is completely incorrect. We are humble enough to know that we cannot do much to change the world, but we have a definite and positive approach to world problems and we would be untrue to ourselves if we discard it. We are convinced that any control imposed by one country over another, by whatever name this might be called, is bad and is a danger to peace. We are convinced also that the propagation and practice of racial inequality is an evil and is opposed to the basic principles of democracy. Large parts of the world today are under-developed and lack the primary necessities of human existence. This unbalance has to be rectified, for otherwise it will continually lead to conflict.

The First World War ended the world of the nineteenth century and upset the balance of power which had existed for a long time. The Second World War brought further upsets and a new set of political, economic and financial conditions were produced. It has been difficult for countries to adjust themselves to these new conditions, to the fact that Asia is a changed continent, where there is a mental ferment in vast masses of people and revolutionary changes are taking place. There is a passion for social and economic change in the hope of betterment. The land problem is the primary one for most people in Asia, but there are others also almost as important. These problems are not going to be solved by wars and large-scale destruction. Nor can they be held up by vested interests, either domestic or foreign. Liberating forces are at work everywhere and if they are not given a chance for proper development, they go in wrong directions. These forces represent the powerful urges of millions of people. Any attempt, therefore, to influence a situation must be such as to keep these liberating forces in view and direct them into right channels. To suppress them or to support some out-of-date system or reactionary force, which opposes them, is to fight against the current of history.

In India, as elsewhere, we have these conflicts between reactionary and static elements and dynamic and progressive forces. Essentially it is on the economic plane, but it touches the social life of the people in many ways. Thus, the Hindu Code Bill, which has given rise to so much argument, became a symbol of the conflict between progress and reaction in the social domain. I do not refer to any particular clause in that Bill, which might or might not be changed, but rather to the spirit underlying that Bill. This was a spirit of liberation and of freeing our people, and more especially, our womenfolk, from outworn customs and shackles that bound them. We cannot progress along one front and remain tied up on other fronts. We have, therefore, to keep in view this idea of integrated progress on all fronts, political, economic and social. That progress cannot be based on a rejection of our past, out of which we have grown, nor can it be a mere copying of what others do; it

must be based on our own genius and cultural inheritance. But it has to reject many of the evils that have prevented social growth and it must take advantage of all that is good in the world.

The dominating urge today is that of social justice and the wiping out of the vast inequalities that exist. We have said so in our Constitution, but our progress has been slow. Unfortunately that Constitution, fine as it is, rather comes in the way of swifter progress. Recently we had to amend the Constitution so as to remove an obstacle that had come in the way of land reform. The abolition of the big zamindari system had been the major plank of our programme for many years and we had laboured to that end. But difficulties cropped up continually and years passed without achievement. I am glad that a recent decision of the Supreme Court has removed many of these difficulties⁵ and I hope that progress now will be swift. Some of our States have gone ahead with land reforms, others have lagged behind. This is a programme which applies to the whole of India and we must put an end as rapidly as possible to all such fights in land which bear down upon the people and come in the way of their growth.

That is the first essential step, but it is not enough, for in order to raise the standards of our people, we have to produce far more wealth by our own labours. We would welcome help from others. But it is dangerous to rely too much on outside assistance. This may be denied or it may come in the way of a feeling of self-reliance, which is so essential in a community. This applies more especially to food. We had proclaimed that we had to achieve self-sufficiency in food. Some progress has been made, no doubt, but it is not enough. As our food production grows, so does our population. Food of course is not the only necessity, although it is most essential and, therefore, we have to think of other things also which are necessary for our development. But I am sure that production of foodgrains must be given the first priority. Till we achieve self-sufficiency in this, we shall always be dependent on others and this dependence will weaken us.

Almost everyone talks of planning now. Our Planning Commission has produced an outline of a five-year plan. There is nothing very dramatic about this plan and we have not tried to paint a rosy and idealistic picture of the present or the future. Yet I think that this plan is of great importance. It is in essence a realistic survey of what it is possible to do with the resources likely to be available within the limitations of our Constitution and without a marked break from our existing social and economic framework. The plan has done a valuable service by saying in a realistic way what we can do, if we set our minds and hearts to it, and what we cannot do in existing circumstances. We

5. The Supreme Court, in disposing of the petitions filed by certain zamindars, had upheld the competence of the Provisional Parliament to amend the Constitution. The amendments would not be invalid on the ground of their non-ratification by the States.

have to remember that any advance or progress does not simply take place because we want it. Objectives and vague hopes and wishful thinking, divorced from hard reality, are likely to remain in the air and lead to disillusion. This plan forces people to think not only of objectives but of how to achieve them and of the resources at our command. Whatever some people's views might be, I think that future thinking or planning will largely be based on this five-year plan.

The only way to build for the future is to put aside or save something each year, and use this saving for some kind of progress. This may be improved agriculture, more river-valley projects, more factories, more houses, more education or better health service. Our resources are limited and the most that we may hope to save has been indicated in the plan. Because of this limitation of resources, we have to make hard choices at every step and priorities become important. We have to choose sometimes between a river valley scheme and more housing or more schools. Unfortunately we cannot have all that we want at the same time. The plan recommends one set of priorities. This may be varied, but we cannot go beyond the limits set by our resources as well as the social and political conditions and the Constitution. We have thus to adjust our minds to realities.

Our limitations are obvious enough, but they need not frighten us. It is only by struggling against them that we come to know of their true nature. We may perhaps find that the limitations are such that in spite of every effort, progress is slow. We shall then have to think how far we can remove some of those limitations, within which we are obliged to work at present, that is, we shall be driven to think of more basic changes in our economic structure.

In our river valleys, a vast quantity of water runs to waste, while we lack water elsewhere. We try to build dams and reservoirs so that we can use this waste water to better advantage and irrigate our lands and produce sources of power and energy. In the same way we may have to think how best to spend all the time that is wasted by idleness and unemployment so that we can utilise this as a source of creative effort and the accumulation of national wealth. It is a tragedy and an anomaly that while greater production is wanted, large numbers of people are unemployed.

Whatever plan we might make, the test of its success is how far it brings relief to the millions of our people who live on a bare subsistence level, that is the good and advancement of the masses of our people. Every other interest must be subordinated to this primary consideration. Our Constitution has rightly laid stress on our raising our Scheduled Castes and Tribes and other economically backward classes. This is a duty not only to them but to the nation because only so can we raise the general level of our people. The unfortunate fact must be remembered, however, that, from any economic point of view, probably eighty per cent of our people can be called backward classes.

Our fight against poverty and unemployment and our attempt at the economic betterment of the people thus become major objectives. This is the next vital stage of our journey after political independence. This can only be achieved by social and economic planning so that our resources can be used to the best advantage and increased as rapidly as possible. It cannot be achieved by leaving things to chance or to the vagaries of private enterprise or by the encouragement of the acquisitive instinct. We have had unfortunately an abundance of anti-social practices in this country during the last war and after. This has to be combated on a planned basis and with controls where necessary. Nobody likes controls, but controls of certain commodities become essential when the acquisitive instincts of some individuals or groups come in the way of public good. Private enterprise, therefore has to be related to, and brought into the pattern of, the National Plan. It may be encouraged but it should always function within that pattern. If it goes outside that pattern, then it upsets the plan itself.

I have laid great stress recently on the evils of communalism and separatism. It is this evil that brought about the division of India and it is this evil that culminated in the assassination of Gandhiji.

Communalism and separatism are not new growths in India. We had hoped, however, that the new nationalism would put an end to both. It did so in a large measure and the National Congress was largely instrumental in unifying India. Hindu communalism could not stand up before the unifying appeal of nationalism. But Muslim communalism gradually grew and fed itself on hatred and separatism. It was a throw-back from every point of view. Ultimately this resulted in Pakistan. We had hoped that having achieved its objective, it would give place to a broader outlook in Pakistan. We had hoped also that the essence of Muslim communalism having gone to Pakistan, India would free herself of all types of communalism. We were mistaken. In Pakistan the State itself made this its basis and gospel. In India the communal spirit, instead of subsiding, also grew in the shape of Hindu and Sikh communalism. Inevitably, both in Pakistan and India, this was accompanied by the propagation of hatred against the other. It resulted in western Pakistan in pushing out practically the entire non-Muslim population and from eastern Pakistan a very large number of Hindus. Government policy there coincided with this narrow and bigoted sentiment and there was no check. In India there were many checks, both governmental and non-official. Nevertheless, as a reaction to what was happening in Pakistan both Hindu and Sikh communalism began to play a greater and noisier part in our public life. They tried to frighten Muslims and exploited the vast number of refugees who had suffered so much already.

It is not for us to interfere with internal conditions in Pakistan. We are interested of course in the fate of the minorities there. We have accepted partition and we stand by that. Indeed it is quite absurd and completely unreal

for any person in India to talk about a reversal of the partition. Some people are foolish enough to do so, though it is difficult to imagine how any intelligent person can think in this way. So far as we are concerned, we must oppose this folly which can only bring trouble and disaster in its train. The great majority of our people realise this and normally one would not attach any importance to it.

While we may not be concerned over much with internal developments in Pakistan, we are concerned very much with what happens in India. It is our age-old policy to build up a united India, united not only politically but in heart and mind, so that the various religious and other groups should cooperate together for their mutual advantage and have full opportunities of growth.

Apart from this being our policy, let us examine this question from the practical point of view. Communalism is a narrow and disrupting creed. It is completely out of place in the modern world. There can be no progress in India if we put up communal barriers amongst ourselves. This is not merely a question of Hindu and Muslim but of other religious and sectarian and caste groups also. Once this dangerous tendency spreads, we do not know where it will end and any dreams that we may have of rapid progress in this country will have to be given up.

We have seen communalism at work both in Pakistan and India in its different forms. It is based on hatred and violence and the narrowest bigotry. It attracts to its fold reactionary and anti-social elements who try to prevent social progress under cover of religion or some form of extreme nationalism, which really can only be applied to one community. Therefore it is not merely communalism that we have to deal with, but social reaction in every form. It is because of this that I have laid great stress upon the danger of vague thinking on this vital issue. There are not many who openly profess unabashed communalism, but there are a large number who unconsciously adopt its modes of thought and action. Some organisations proclaim that they are not communal and yet, they have functioned in the narrowest and most dangerous communal way.

Communalism bears a striking resemblance to the various forms of fascism that we have seen in other countries. It is in fact the Indian version of fascism. We know the evils that have flowed from fascism. In India we have known also the evils and disasters that have resulted from communal conflict. A combination of these two is thus something that can only bring grave perils and disasters in its train. It is degrading and vulgarising; it plays upon the basest instincts of man. If India were to listen to this pernicious cry, then indeed India would not only have continuous trouble within her own borders, but would be isolated from the rest of the world, which would look down upon her.

Therefore it is a matter of vital importance today that we must curb and check and put an end to both conscious and unconscious communal thought in India. There can be no compromise with that and no quarter can be given. Only then can we realise true freedom and make progress. Only then can we live up to the old traditions of our country and to the heritage of our great movement for freedom.

In a much lesser degree, we have to face the disrupting nature of provincialism. India is a vast country which has a varied culture. All of us have a rich and common inheritance. We have also, in different parts of the country, variations in that common culture. While unity is essential, an enforced uniformity is not only not necessary but, I think is undesirable. Why should we not keep this great variety which enriches our lives in addition to our basic unity? Most people, living in their particular corner of India, think of India as if it was a mere extension of that corner, and, therefore, want to impose their way on others. But India is much bigger than that part and much richer and deeper. It would be doing great harm to our concept of India, if we tried to confine it in a strait-jacket of a particular point of view or some special customs or ways of life to which some of us are accustomed. There is a vast difference between the people in the southern tip of India and the people living across the Himalayas in Ladakh. Yet they both belong to the infinite pattern of India. Are we going to try to regiment them and make them all of one pattern? We cannot do so, because geography, climate and cultural inheritance prevent this regimentation.

There is also the cry of having what is called one culture for India, whatever that might be. India has a basic cultural outlook of her own, but it has been enriched in the distant past by numerous streams coming from various parts of Asia, and in later years, from the western world. All these are intimate parts of India now and have been woven into her rich and intricate pattern. It is this composite culture which is our proud heritage and which we have to preserve and develop. If we try to deprive ourselves of something that has grown with us and is part of us, we grow the poorer for it and we start a process of disruption which is bad for us politically, culturally, and in the domain of the spirit.

I have spoken about matters which I consider important, though they might not appear so to some people whose minds are filled with some present-day political problem or the elections. But to me all political or other effort is but a means to an end and that end is an all-round development of India both in material and cultural progress. That progress comes only if we discard a narrow and intolerant view of life and develop a broad outlook. In our election manifesto, we have said that an essential part of education should be an appreciation of and devotion to Truth and Beauty in their various forms. Art and literature, music and drama, singing and dancing should be encouraged.

Truth and beauty and art and literature are not the monopoly of any one country or one people. Those who imagine that they are the sole possessors of any of these have probably lost all understanding or appreciation of them.

It was hardly necessary for me to say all this to an assembly of Congressmen, for the Congress has based itself and grown up in the company of these ideals and objectives. But the turn of events has produced confusion in people's minds and diverted them from what we considered to be the right path. It is necessary therefore for us to think anew about these basic principles and to be clear in our minds, both about the ends in view and the means to attain them. It is possible that in the pain and turmoil of today, gradually a new civilisation is being built up in the world. We can help in this only if we hold to our principles and are not distracted by fear or hope of momentary gain.

I have referred to Pakistan earlier in this address. The partition of India and what followed it immediately produced powerful reactions both in India and Pakistan. Millions of people became refugees, not only bereft of all they possessed but with deep wounds in their minds and hearts. It is not surprising that this terrible experience which these millions have passed through and indeed which, to some extent, the whole country has gone through, has produced all kinds of complexes and crises of the spirit. The healing process is bound to be slow, and yet without the healing of those deep wounds, we shall not return to normality. We have to take particular care to rehabilitate all these millions of refugees and displaced persons and make them contented and productive citizens of India. We have to apply that touch of healing also to our relations with Pakistan, which have remained in a continuous state of crisis during these past four years. Indeed, on some occasions, we have come to the verge of war. And yet nothing can be so foolish or so harmful as such a war. Every intelligent person, whether in India or Pakistan, must realise this. But passion and anger confuse the minds of people and fill them with hatred. We have seen, during the past year especially, an amazing exhibition of war hysteria in Pakistan and, because of this, we were compelled to take adequate precautions. Those precautions were not only inevitable in the circumstances, but probably prevented such a dreadful war between two neighbour countries, which have had and must continue to have so much in common. While we take all necessary precautions whenever necessity arises, we must always remember that the objective we aim at is not only a peaceful settlement of our problems with Pakistan but the growth of close and friendly relations with that country which, not long ago, was part of our own country. It is inevitable that some time or other we must have these friendly relations with Pakistan. If so, then we must work to that end without doing anything which we consider wrong or which injures or endangers our own country. I

am quite sure, in this as in other matters, that the right approach on our part must bring right results some time or other.

We meet as Congressmen, drawing strength from the traditions and history of this great organisation, and yet many of us have had doubts about its future. If the Congress is to continue as a vital and progressive organisation, giving the lead to the Indian people and continuing its tradition of service to them, then we shall have to reorganise it and make it fit in with the conditions of today. The Congress is inevitably a party, but it has always been something much more than a party and has drawn allegiance from millions of people who did not formally belong to it or to any other party. We have to retain something of that wider aspect of the Congress, but this should not lead to floppiness and loose thinking and an accommodation of all kinds of contrary opinions within its fold. In regard to principles, political, social and economic, this must be clear. There should be no room for reactionaries in the Congress fold. Nor should there be any room in it for those who seek, through its medium, personal advancement and profit at the cost of the public good.

The coming elections have an importance because they will affect the future governance of this country. But if, in our eagerness to win the elections, we compromise with something that is wrong, then we have lost the fight already and it matters little who tops the polls.

We have to pull ourselves up from narrow grooves of thought and action, from factions, from mutual recrimination, from tolerance of evil in public life and in our social structure, and become again fighters for a cause and upholders of high principles. Let us not attach too much importance to winning or losing an election. If we win a fight within ourselves, then other triumphs will come to us also. But the real triumph will be, as it was in the past, that we have laboured to the utmost of our ability for something that is worthwhile and bigger than ourselves.

62. Muslims and the Congress¹

I saw the other day a copy of a *fatwa* issued by some *Moulvis* in Delhi asking Muslims, in the name of religion, to vote for the Congress. I think the Delhi Congress exploited this in the recent municipal election.

I am disturbed by this kind of thing and by bringing in religion in our

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 28 October 1951. J.N. Collection.

election work. I do not like *fatwas* being issued. Of course, it is open to the *Moulvis* or others to appeal to their co-religionists to vote in a certain way. But I wish this was not done in the name of religion. Will you please enquire from the President or the Secretary of the Congress Committee about this and tell him how I feel about it. You might get a copy of this *fatwa* and then perhaps point out to the Jamiat or whoever is responsible, that while I appreciate their motive, I would much rather that *fatwas* were not issued for this kind of thing.

63. To Pratap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi

October 29, 1951

My dear Pratap Singh,

I was in a hurry this evening and could not speak to you as fully as I wanted to. Still I gave you some idea of what I had in mind.

The preparation for lists of candidates is important, no doubt, and proper persons should be chosen for proper constituencies. But at the present juncture this is of secondary importance. The fact that Giani Kartar Singh has gone out of the Congress is, I think, a good thing. I am not at all sorry for it. But this will only be to our advantage if we can take firm grip of the situation and deal with it with vision and foresight. Obviously a major factor in the Punjab situation is the Sikhs. Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh and others form a strong combination. We have to meet that combination with all strength. This is more important than winning a seat here and there. In order to meet this challenge, it seems to me obvious that it is highly important to have the full cooperation and support of Sardar Udham Singh Nagoke and his group. He is, I think, a straight man, unlike Giani Kartar Singh. Therefore, both principle and tactics lead us to the conclusion that there must be close cooperation with Udham Singh Nagoke. It is not enough to have half-hearted cooperation, or to treat him as a person whom you just tolerate. There must be a close linking up so as to meet the challenge of Tara Singh and Giani.

As I told you, I think it is highly important that the elections of office-bearers to the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee² should result in Nagoke's success. This is important in itself and it will have an important effect on the

1. Misc./1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (S.G.P.C.) was an organization controlling and managing Sikh temples.

general elections. I attach more importance to this than to winning a few seats in the elections. Therefore, every effort should be made to help Nagoke in the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee's elections. You told me that some of your friends and colleagues were members of the S.G.P.C. You should see to it that they throw all their weight in favour of Nagoke and induce others to do so. For anyone to support Tara Singh there is to support not only reaction but the opponents of the Congress.

As regards the seats for the general elections also, it is important that you should satisfy, in a large measure, Nagoke. If you succeed in doing so, the position of the Punjab Congress will strengthen greatly. We cannot afford to think in terms of pleasing or displeasing some individuals when large issues are at stake. It may be possible later to send some good men to the Council of States or to the Upper Chamber in the province. Meanwhile, the major issue is that you should produce confidence in the minds of Nagoke and his group.

It would be a good thing if you went and saw Udham Singh Nagoke before he leaves Delhi, and try to produce this sense of confidence in him.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

64. To Lal Chand¹

New Delhi
October 30, 1951

Dear Chaudhri Lal Chand,

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter. It came at a time when I was exceedingly busy and it was put away with some other papers.

Of course, I want candidates of competence and integrity for the elections. But I do not understand how this is meant to mean that we should support non-Congress candidates. The Congress is a political organisation having certain definite views about domestic and international politics and economics. Those who agree with it should normally join it. Those who disagree with those policies have naturally to be opposed.

I am always willing to meet you, though I am terribly busy at present.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

65. To Yudhvīr Singh¹

New Delhi
October 30, 1951

My dear Yudhvīr Singh,²

Your letter of the 30th. I fear I cannot find time during the next few days to discuss the matters you mention. There are specific rules on the subject, but certain conventions and practices have grown up. Whatever the rules, if there is a conflict between the local Congress and the local Congress party in a municipality or legislature, there is bound to be trouble. Such matters are usually decided by mutual consultation to avoid conflicts. If there is a marked difference of opinion over a major issue, then the matter might be taken up to higher Congress authorities.

Generally speaking, the local Congress committee should not interfere with the day-to-day administration of the municipality. Only matters of important principle should be taken up by the Congress Committee and a policy laid down, which must be in conformity with the general all-India policy. It was the old practice to have a small liaison committee to which matters could be referred for advice and direction. This committee should include the leader of the party in the municipality as well as the Chairman of the Parliamentary Board. It may have two or three others also. It should not be a large committee and even this committee should not interfere in the day-to-day matters.

The leader of the party in the municipality or the legislature is normally elected by majority votes of party members. At the same time there is usually consultation with the President and some other senior members of the P.C.C. or the Parliamentary Board in this matter so that the right person might be proposed. Obviously if a person is proposed, who is not at all approved of by the Parliamentary or Election Board, then immediately difficulties arise. I suggest that this general principle should be followed. If any major difficulty arises, you can consult the Secretaries of the A.I.C.C., who happen to be available here or me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. (1897-1983); arrested during freedom struggle, 1932, 1941 and 1942; President, Municipal Committee, Delhi, 1947-51; Minister, Union Territory of Delhi, 1955-56; Member, Delhi Metropolitan Council, 1967-70.

66. To I.D. Jalan¹

New Delhi

October 31, 1951

Dear Mr Jalan,²

Dr. B.C. Roy has written to me and sent me a note prepared by you on the subject of Speakers standing for election. Together with your note, there are copies of correspondence between you and other Speakers. It has been suggested by you as well as by many of the other Speakers that a Speaker should stand as an independent candidate,³ the idea being that he should not have to contest a seat. The example of the United Kingdom is given.

We have considered this question carefully and we have come to the conclusion that this would not be a proper procedure. We think that a Speaker whom we support should stand as a Congress candidate. This does not come in the way of his impartiality as a Speaker as after election of the Speaker, he does not belong to a party.

If the principle is laid down that a Speaker should stand as an independent candidate and should not be opposed, then it means that every person who is elected as Speaker, must continue as such for the rest of his life, unless he himself chooses to leave his post. A Speaker may have functioned only for a short while and there is no reason why he should be presumed to remain a Speaker for ever. Also there is no guarantee that others will not oppose him.

We have therefore come to the conclusion, after careful thought, that a Speaker should stand like any other candidate. He may stand as a party candidate or, if he stands as an independent, he takes the risk of being opposed.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Iswar Das Jalan (1895-1979); member, Calcutta Corporation, 1927-30; member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1938-47; Speaker, 1948-52; Minister for Local Self-Government, Excise and Judicial, 1952-67.
3. A resolution was passed at the Trivandrum Conference of Presiding Officers of legislative bodies in the country that a convention should be established that the reelection of the Speaker or Chairman should not be contested. The suggestion was based on the practice in Britain.
4. See also *post*, p. 731.

1. To S.M. Abdullah¹

New Delhi
July 6, 1951

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I have met Dr Graham² four times. The first day he came with Dr Schmidt³ and General Devers⁴ and was with me for 45 minutes. Kashmir was not mentioned and we had a general conversation about Indonesia and other places. Last night I invited him and two of his colleagues to dinner. Then too there was no Kashmir talk. Yesterday afternoon Dr Graham came to see me by himself and I talked to him for about two hours mainly about the Kashmir background and how the situation arose, etc. As a result of this, he said that he was very grateful to me for having thrown light on many matters which he did not know. He was only sorry that his principal advisers were not present, as he would like them to profit by this also. So he requested me to meet him and them today at some leisure. This afternoon we met, that is Dr Graham, Dr Schmidt, General Devers, Bajpai, and I. We were together for two and a half hours. In the main I talked, though sometimes an odd question was put to me. Again I gave a full account of our past movement, of the States Peoples' Conference, of how the Kashmir movement arose and developed, of its contacts with the States Peoples' movement, of Jinnah's attempts to win you over to the Muslim League's ideology and his failure,⁵ of reforms in Kashmir⁶ and the National Conference providing a Minister, of subsequent resignation of the Minister⁷ and the attempt by the Kashmir Government to crush the National

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Frank P. Graham was appointed United Nations mediator in the Kashmir dispute on 30 April 1951.

3. P.J. Schmidt was principal secretary to Graham.

4. Jacob Loucks Devers (1887-1979); U.S. Army General; Chief Military Adviser, U.N. Mission to India and Pakistan concerning Kashmir, June-December 1951.

5. Jinnah visited Kashmir on 10 May 1944 and stayed there for over a month and conferred with all the prominent leaders. Later, delivering an address at the annual session of the Muslim Conference on 17 June 1944, he observed that a large majority of the Muslims felt that the Muslim Conference alone was the representative organisation. He later sent emissaries to Kashmir to promote the Muslim League's claim.

6. At the annual session in Sopore on 29 and 30 September 1944, the National Conference adopted unanimously the two-part "New Kashmir" manifesto outlining a scheme for constitutional and economic development.

7. In October 1944, the Maharaja of Kashmir decided to appoint two ministers commanding the confidence of the Legislative Assembly. The Muslim Conference boycotted the election but the National Conference agreed. The Legislative Assembly elected a panel of six people, from which the Maharaja appointed Mirza Afzal Beg and Ganga Ram as Ministers for Public Works and Home respectively. Beg resigned on 18 March 1946.

Conference by arresting you and many others,⁸ my own visit and detention and so on and so forth.⁹

Then I touched upon your release and our talks then, the sudden raid through Pakistan, the appeal to us for help and our decision, why we went to the Security Council on a simple issue, which was never considered or decided, Pakistan's false denials at first and subsequent admission about their army being in Kashmir, our talks with the Commission and, in our extreme desire to find a way out, our agreeing to certain propositions, but always making it clear what we meant by them in our letters which were agreed to by the Commission, the ceasefire which we suggested, although the military position was favourable to us, removal of part of our forces from Kashmir and reduction of our army, Pakistan's building up meanwhile, Pakistan's propaganda for war and *jihad* being persistently carried on, its effects on India and our responsibility to be prepared for all contingencies. The recent result of these has been some scare in East Bengal and large numbers of people are coming away from East Bengal to West Bengal, creating a new problem for us.¹⁰

I referred briefly to the last resolution of the Security Council and how it went contrary to its previous approaches and was an attempt to impose something upon us with which we could never agree.¹¹

I referred to our whole background of Gandhiji and the background of hate and violence of the Muslim League which Pakistan had inherited.

Graham was rather concerned with the fear of Pakistan that India wanted to put an end to the partition and Pakistan. I told him that this was complete nonsense and on no account were we prepared to have that, as it would mean tremendous problems for us. It was true that some communal-minded people

8. The "Quit Kashmir" movement was suppressed and Abdullah was arrested on 21 May 1946.
9. To help in finding a solution to the problems of Kashmir and to arrange for Abdullah's defence in the trial, Nehru went to Kashmir on 19 June with lawyers but was detained as he defied the order prohibiting his entry into Kashmir. On the Working Committee's advice, he returned to Delhi on 22 June. He went again on 24 July for four days. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 15, pp. 378-419.
10. Over the whole period from 11 July to 5 August 1951, there had been a net additional flow of 25,938 Hindus into West Bengal against the claim of the Government of East Bengal that 22,359 more Hindus entered Pakistan than those going out.
11. The Anglo-U.S. resolution of 30 March 1951 brought out new elements in the U.N. approach. In the first place, the possibility of not treating the State as a single entity for allocation of areas to the two parties was envisaged for the first time. Again, it was only in this resolution that a U.N. force was contemplated. Thirdly, arbitration was specifically recommended by the Security Council only at this time. Thus the U.N. now envisaged an expanded role for itself in Kashmir. Speaking in the Security Council, B.N. Rau stated that under the guise of arbitration, agreements already arrived at were sought to be disturbed.

in India talked about it, but that was a political manoeuvre,¹² which had no force. Just as Pakistan was afraid that India might do something against it, so also some people in north India were afraid of Pakistan's aggressive designs. The raid on Kashmir was considered as a step towards subsequent aggression on East Punjab and possibly even Delhi.

I told him quite frankly that Zafrullah Khan was a slick politician, whose reputation for integrity or truth was very low. Even before partition, I had a very low opinion of him. His talking about the accession of Kashmir being brought about by fraud and violence was amazing impertinence and falsehood.¹³ In any event, if that charge was made, let it be investigated. Either it was true or false. We cannot come to any decisions without determining what the truth was at the beginning.

I talked also of the intimate connection of the Kashmir problem to India as well as Pakistan. This question was not of Kashmir, but of acceptance of some kind of communal or two-nation theory which we would never accept, as it would involve tremendous upsets in India and Pakistan, apart from imperilling our objectives and our whole idea of the State. I talked of a wrong decision in Kashmir leading to migrations on a big scale, which again would bring big troubles in their train.

Then I referred to some other problems like canal waters, evacuee property, etc.; also about the absurdity of Pakistan talking about the Kashmir rivers being diverted away from West Punjab. Graham and his colleagues listened patiently, occasionally putting a question. I think my talk served somewhat to enlighten them.

Graham intends going to Srinagar with seven or eight colleagues on Sunday morning, 8th July. They propose to stay there for about six or seven days and then go directly to Karachi, where they will stay for four or five days and then come back to Delhi. They have no further programme, so far as I know. In Srinagar they want to meet General Nimmo¹⁴ and possibly other observers. Graham told me that he would like to meet you. I think that, in all the circumstances, it would be desirable for you and your colleagues to treat Graham and his party with courtesy and talk to them freely explaining your point of view. You need not insist on talking to him unless he suggests it. You can tell him that if he so desires, you are prepared to give him any information. For the rest, I do not think it would be desirable for you to give any party or hold any function for him. You may, if you like, have a small

12. The Hindu Mahasabha had advocated the reunion of India and Pakistan through the democratic process.
13. Zafrullah Khan in his arguments before the Security Council had accused India of using fraud, oppression and even genocide in her attempt to prevent and then undo partition.
14. Maj-Gen. Robert H. Nimmo was the chief military observer of the United Nations in Kashmir.

private dinner for him or join him at dinner at the Guest House. All this must be very small and informal. He would probably like to see the Shalimar and Nishat on Sunday. If so, you can just make arrangements for them to go there informally that afternoon.

We have sent an official protest to the United Nations about Commander Cadawaller, the U.N. observer and asked for his recall.

I might make it clear that in my talks with Graham, there was hardly any reference to the Security Council resolution or to demilitarisation or anything like that. I referred to the resolution briefly and told him that I had been much grieved at the attitude of the United Kingdom which had been consistently against us in this matter. I even suggested that but for external interference it was possible that we might have settled the matter by now.

I am going to Bangalore day after tomorrow, the 8th July. I expect to remain there till the 15th, but I am not sure of the date of my return yet. As I told you, you will be very welcome there and your presence would be desirable.¹⁵ It is for you to judge, in view of Graham's stay in Srinagar, whether you should remain there or come to Bangalore.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. In fact, Shaikh Abdullah attended the A.I.C.C. session at Bangalore and spoke, saying that Kashmir as well as India were fighting for the great principles of truth, love and justice taught by Mahatma Gandhi.

2. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
July 7, 1951

My dear Krishna,

...Talking about Kashmir, I am quite convinced that our major trouble comes from the U.K. Government, and more especially from Attlee, who has always had the conviction that Kashmir should go to Pakistan. If there is war between India and Pakistan over this issue, and that is certainly possible now, the responsibility will very largely be that of the U.K. Government and the U.K. press.² This press has lost its head completely on the Kashmir question. It

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

2. For example, *The Times* (London) editorially criticised India and underlined the need for solving the issue of Kashmir at the United Nations in the context of the overall security problem of Asia.

imagines, I suppose, that I am the chief impediment in the way. They do not realise that if I was away, there would have been much more trouble. The *Manchester Guardian* more especially has become perfectly vicious.

It might interest you to know how one of the U.N. observers in Kashmir (he is an American) derided me in a private letter he wrote. He referred to me as "Nehru, the prize bastard, whose stiff-necked attitude has given so much trouble."³ That is the kind of thing we have to deal with.

Graham has been here and I have had talks with him about the background, etc. He is going to Kashmir tomorrow for a week, will then go to Karachi and return to Delhi about the 20th. Obviously he cannot do much, although he appears to be a decent and sincere man. He has brought a crowd of advisers with him.

Meanwhile, the situation vis-a-vis Pakistan has greatly worsened. The talk of holy war there goes on, and there have been many raids into Kashmir.⁴ We have protested to the United Nations. We cannot take all this lightly, especially this talk of war, and we are taking all necessary precautions.

I am going to Bangalore tomorrow for a week.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Commander Cadawaller. See previous item.

4. Feelings had run so high in Pakistan that on a "defence day" rally held on 26 July 1951, the slogan of "*jehad* against India" was given.

3. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1951

My dear Krishna,

I wrote to you sometime ago about the virulent character of British press comments relating to India, and more especially to Kashmir. I have not seen for some time past any report from India House containing press surveys. The columnal and statistical reports that used to come previously were not very helpful and gave no positive information. Even these have apparently not come and no others have taken their place. But the Indian press is full of

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

extracts from the British press and Reuters take the trouble to send the lot here.²

Occasionally in your letters and your telegrams you tell me of the favourable reactions produced on pressmen there. But the criticism continues. There are obviously deeper causes. The fact of the matter is that there is a basic conflict in the British approach and the Indian approach in western Asia and the Middle Eastern countries. The Indian approach is of course rather inchoate. The British is definite and precise and is a continuation of old days. It was really that approach that led to the British support of the old Muslim League and later Pakistan. Pakistan has largely inherited this and so fits in with British policy in the Middle East, which wants to make Pakistan the leader of the so-called Islamic countries. The U.K. therefore not only wants to influence these western Asian countries directly but also through Pakistan. The Kashmir issue has to be viewed in this light. It is important from the point of view of old and present U.K. policy that Kashmir should go to Pakistan. Sir Olaf Caroe, whom we know well in India, and who used to be the Governor of the N.W.F.P. before partition, wrote a book recently called *Wells of Power*, in which he advocated the thesis that the defence of the Middle East must be planned from Pakistan, which of course must be under the wing of the U.K. *The Economist* writing upon this agreed with this thesis and referred to Kashmir in this connection.

The real springs of U.K. and U.S.A. action thus lie in their respective policies which have nothing to do with facts in Kashmir or India. U.K.'s Middle East policy, in spite of their tremendous propaganda and financial machine there, is coming to grief. It has failed completely in Iran and no doubt it will in Iraq and elsewhere too later. If they are wise, they would take a brave step and change this. This change means reorienting it completely. If

2. On 19 July 1951, *Daily Telegraph* commented that "Whereas Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan appears to act as a restraining influence upon the more bellicose elements in Pakistan, Mr. Nehru's vehemence in maintaining India's claims in Kashmir has certainly played a large part in keeping the question unpleasantly alive in Indian opinion." *Manchester Guardian* on 19 July 1951 wrote that, "it would be tragic if this domestic situation (approaching elections) were to tempt Mr. Nehru into fresh anti-Pakistani jingoism with results far more serious than gaining or losing of votes... India has made a deplorable impression by its troop movements against Pakistan and all the more so because of its denials." On 21 July 1951, *The Economist* wrote that while India took the Kashmir issue to the U.N., she was rejecting Security Council's jurisdiction because "the United Nations has failed to settle the dispute in India's favour". It referred to Nehru as "the prime and obstinate source of trouble."

this is done, their outlook on the Indo-Pakistan question will also have to change.

You have often said, and it is true, that in the final analysis India is far more important to the U.K. than Pakistan. In a vague way the U.K. Government probably realises it, but they have not yet grasped the full significance of it. They hope to carry on their old policy in the Middle East and lean towards Pakistan, and at the same time to try to keep India more or less on their side. This is not possible and the result is likely to be that they will fail in both their attempts. They are failing in the Middle East and they are unpopular almost all over that area. They have come up against the rising nationalism there and they can no longer play it off by support of the Islamic movement and pro-Arab combine. In India they get more and more unpopular because of their Kashmir policy. They have to decide whether the Gladwyn Jebb type of person is their representative or a different type. Of course Gladwyn Jebb is duplicated in many places including the Foreign Office in London.

I suppose that the Iranian developments have made the U.K. Government think furiously. U.S.A. must also have been shaken a little. The U.S. Ambassador³ the other day spoke to me in strong language about the general folly and stupidity in the past and right upto the present of U.K. policy in the Middle East.

I have just been reading an excellent report on publicity in the Middle East by Dr. Parulekar (he is the editor of a newspaper in Poona) whom we sent some little time ago to the Middle East for an enquiry.⁴ This report is very good and is a model of its kind. We are having it printed to send it to our missions abroad.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Loy Henderson.

4. Narayan Bhikaji Parulekar (1897-1973); Editor-in-Chief and founder of *Daily Sakal* (Poona) and also *Weekly Swaraj*, *Sunday Sakal*, *Bombay Sakal*; President of the Press Trust of India and the Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society for some time.

4. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I am in receipt of your telegram No. 2729, dated July 20th.² I regret deeply that my message of July 17th which I tried to make as frank and straightforward as possible should have evoked an answer which I can only describe as propagandist.

Your references to Junagadh and Hyderabad are wrong and irrelevant.³ I do not propose to discuss these issues because our position in respect of both has been repeatedly explained. Your reference to Nepal is extraordinary and wholly unjustified. The Nepal Government itself has issued a strong protest against it. At the request of Nepal Government, small Indian forces are cooperating with Nepalese forces near border jointly rounding up some terrorist gangs engaged in looting and other acts of lawlessness and violence. As regards our defence forces, the central fact is that our army was reduced in 1950-51 by over fifty-two thousand men.⁴ This is easily verifiable. Your reference to our budget figures is irrelevant and misleading as these reflect certain economic factors, such as rise in prices and change in exchange value. We frame our budget every year in the hope of reducing our army still further. If further reduction in our forces proposed for current year has not been carried out this has been due to Pakistan's war propaganda and absence of any reduction in her armed forces.⁵ You have not controverted our statement that the size of

1. New Delhi, 24 July 1951. *India's Threat to Pakistan—Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India*—15 July-11 August 1951, White Paper (Government of Pakistan), pp. 8-10.
2. In his telegram, Liaquat Ali said: "I am deeply disappointed to read your telegram... dated 17th July 1951. Instead of revoking concentration of Indian troops on Pakistan frontier which you have admitted and thus removing serious threat to security of Pakistan and international peace you have proceeded to make a series of allegations and statements unrelated to facts."
3. He wrote that Nehru had asserted that India's policy continued to be one of preserving and ensuring peace and avoiding war, but the use of military force in Junagadh, Hyderabad and more recently in Nepal were grave warnings against acceptance of those assertions at face value.
4. Liaquat Ali said that Nehru had "referred to a reduction of Indian Army last year", but Nehru's defence budget had risen from 151 in 1948 to 195 crores in 1949; the previous year the original defence budget had been 176 crores but the revised budget rose to 191 crores.
5. Liaquat Ali Khan had said that in the current year's budget an announcement was made of a small reduction in strength of Indian army counterbalanced by increases in navy and air force; but two months later it was reported that even the proposed reduction would not be made. So actual defence expenditure in the current year was likely to rise still further.

Pakistan's forces has been steadily increasing. Thus, while we have been reducing our armed forces you have been increasing yours.

I have neither ignored nor belittled what you propagate about the Indian press.⁶ Outside a small and irresponsible section, there has been no such propaganda, as you suggest, in Indian press. I am quite willing to leave the judgement on this to any impartial student of the press of the two countries.⁷ I am surprised that you should dismiss the virulent and persistent propaganda in favour of *jehad* in Pakistan press as "expressions of discontent over" our "persistent refusal to allow a peaceful solution by a free plebiscite in Kashmir."⁸ Threats of war over Kashmir in Pakistan press have occurred almost daily for many months. I would quote only a few extracts from reports of views publicly expressed by persons in Pakistan holding highest offices:

You can take it from us that the day we become desperate and lose all hope of a just solution of the problem, not only the entire Pathan population of Pakistan and tribal areas will rise up for holy *jehad* in Kashmir but our brothers from across the Afghan frontier will also throw in their lot with us for the cause. (Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Prime Minister, N.W.F.P.⁹).

So long as a single Pakistani is alive, nobody dare snatch Kashmir from Pakistan by force.... if the problem was not settled immediately, the whole of Asia would be engulfed in the flame of war which might lead to a world conflagration." (Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Governor, West Punjab¹⁰).

I say this with full responsibility that India has now over several months taken up the attitude with regard to Kashmir which deliberately blocks progress along peaceful lines. What does India desire? It has no right to complain if it gets something else." (Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan, Foreign Minister, Pakistan¹¹).

6. Liaquat Ali had written that Nehru had "either ignored or belittled continuous and blatant propaganda for war against Pakistan and indeed for the very liquidation of Pakistan" carried on by the Indian press, prominent Indian leaders and political organisations.
7. Liaquat Ali had said that propaganda against Pakistan had been continuing in spite of the Delhi Agreement of April 1950 while the Pakistan press had strenuously propagated goodwill towards India. Indian press and political leaders continued to fulminate against Pakistan and attacked the integrity of Pakistan.
8. Liaquat Ali remarked: "You have been at pains to distort the significance of expressions of discontent which have appeared in the Pakistan press over your persistent refusal to allow a peaceful solution through a free plebiscite in Kashmir. You have construed expression of natural desire for liberation of Kashmir as propaganda for war against India."
9. Published in *The Pakistan Times*, 27 December 1950.
10. Published in *The Pakistan Times*, 10 January 1951.
11. Published in *Dawn*, 14 June 1951.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan told a press conference in Karachi that the Kashmir question cannot brook any delay. He said there were only two courses open to Pakistan to settle the issue: "One was to pursue the matter in Security Council. The second I would not tell you."

The charge that India has persistently refused to allow a peaceful solution through a free plebiscite in Kashmir is as we have repeatedly pointed out wholly baseless.¹² It is the armed aggression of Pakistan against Kashmir and the continuing presence of Pakistan armies there that has come in the way of a peaceful solution. Progress towards a peaceful settlement has not been made because of non-fulfilment on the part of Pakistan of conditions under which alone a free and impartial plebiscite could be held. In these circumstances it is difficult to draw any other conclusion from the views of Pakistan's spokesmen and the virulent and frequent comments of Pakistan press than that Pakistan is preparing to seek a settlement of Kashmir dispute by resort to force. This, and this alone, is responsible for wholly precautionary and defensive measures that we have taken. After what happened in Kashmir in 1947, we should be failing in our duty if we did not take adequate steps to safeguard ourselves against a repetition of those events and the far-reaching consequences to which these would lead.

I would once more affirm in complete sincerity that military movements on our side have not been inspired by any aggressive intent or design on our part against Pakistan. India has no intention whatever of attacking Pakistan or of seeking solution of any problem by force, but if Indian territory including Kashmir is invaded by Pakistan, then India will take armed measures in self-defence. If, as you say, it is also Pakistan's policy not to attack India, I see no reason why peace between our two countries should be in any way threatened.

My proposal for a no-war declaration by both countries was a simple and straightforward one without strings attached.¹³ You did not accept this and added many conditions.

12. Liaquat Ali stated that there could be no clearer proof of Pakistan's desire for a peaceful solution of its disputes with India than the proposal that all disputes should be settled by negotiation and mediation and failing that by arbitration. But Nehru had preferred the threat or use of force in settling disputes in his own favour wherever the opportunity had offered itself.
13. Liaquat Ali said the proposal for a no-war declaration could not be carried to a conclusion only because of Nehru's refusal to agree that if disputes between India and Pakistan could not be settled by negotiation and mediation they should be referred to arbitration.

What is needed to ease the present tension is a declaration by your Government that on no account will they attack or invade Indian territory. Even now anyone can contrast the war propaganda and preparations in Pakistan with the absence of any such activities or propaganda in India. If militant propaganda against India and talk of war in Pakistan cease, I am confident that not only will present tension ease but way will be prepared for a calm discussion in a peaceful atmosphere of disputes outstanding between our two countries and for their amicable settlement.

5. To S.M. Abdullah¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1951

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I have received the enclosed letter, a copy of which appears to have been sent to you also. I am annoyed and distressed that Prem Nath Dogra² should function this way and exploit my name. I do not quite know what to do about it. I am however enclosing a note³ which you can have published or you can deal with it in any other way you like.

The situation vis-a-vis Pakistan grows critical. I do not think there will be a big conflict, but we have to be fully prepared.

Bajpai and I saw Graham today. He asked us about the old resolutions of the U.N. Commission and what our reservations etc. were. We told him about this past history. There was no further talk about any other subject. We shall probably see him again. He did not even refer to the present crisis between India and Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Prem Nath Dogra was the President of the Jammu Praja Parishad.
3. See the next item.

6. The Jammu Praja Parishad Party¹

I am informed that the Jammu Praja Parishad Party² are carrying on an agitation in opposition to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State and the National Conference. I am further informed that Shri Prem Nath Dogra has sometimes used my name in this connection and referred to his meeting me. I gave him an interview some months ago³ at his request and made it clear to him that I considered the activities of the Praja Parishad Party in Jammu as misconceived and harmful. It was their duty to support the Jammu and Kashmir Government and to cooperate with the National Conference. He promised to do so. I am surprised that instead of keeping his promise, he and his party are doing strictly contrary to it. This attitude of narrow communalism has been opposed by us throughout India and in particular in Kashmir. Any person who encourages this policy injures the interests of India and even more so of the Jammu and Kashmir State. At the present moment of crisis, any such activity is peculiarly irresponsible and utterly wrong. I wish to make it clear, therefore, that I completely disapprove of the activities of the Jammu Praja Parishad.⁴

1. Note, New Delhi, 24 July 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. The Praja Parishad, dominated by the Dogra Hindus of the Jammu Province, stood for complete integration of Kashmir with India and for the protection of the rights of the Dogras.
3. On 27 April 1951. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Part I, p. 374.
4. This note was published on 2 October 1951. See *post*, p. 301.

7. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your statements to press conference regarding Kashmir² as reported are not wholly accurate. Care should be taken to observe strict accuracy and not create impression that we are slurring over any facts. Thus there has been no reduction in our army this year. Reduction of 52,000 took place last year. We had decided to reduce army further this year by 100,000 but owing to changed circumstances and attitude of Pakistan we had to postpone this reduction which has not taken place and is not likely to take place in near future.

1. New Delhi, 1 August 1951. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. On 17 July 1951.

Again your statement—"India had some troops in Kashmir but they were not more than had been there for its defence."³ They were sent at the request of Kashmir Government to protect their women and children during an emergency. They had been continually diminishing both in size and strength during the three or four years that followed"—conveys a wrong impression of what has happened and to bring in women and children in this connection is hardly appropriate. It is true that we sent in troops originally at the request of Kashmir Government to protect people there against raiders who were partly driven back. Later we came up against Pakistan army in Kashmir territory. Since then there was open war between our forces in Kashmir and Pakistan forces. On both sides considerable reinforcements were sent as war proceeded. When ceasefire took place on 1st January 1949 it was agreed that no additional forces should be sent. We have abided by this agreement. In the course of next two years or more we withdrew considerable numbers of our forces and replaced some of them recently. Since critical situation has arisen we have sent back some troops in replacement of that previously withdrawn. But we are still well within the figure agreed upon at the time of ceasefire. It must be remembered that war in Kashmir was not a small affair protecting some women and children but full-fledged war between India and Pakistani armies in Kashmir territory. Our case has been that we cannot withdraw our army because of continuous threat of Pakistan army and we must keep enough armed forces there to meet any raid or attack on Kashmir State territory.

3. Krishna Menon said that there had been no forward movement of troops and that only defensive measures had been taken.

8. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

I have read with surprise Attlee's reply in Parliament to a question about my reference to British officers in Pakistan.² He refers to "my having lent the weight of my authority to unfounded allegations."

1. New Delhi, 3 August 1951. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. On 1 August 1951, Attlee had said in the House of Commons that he greatly regretted that Nehru had supported "unfounded allegations" that senior British ex-officers had taken part in military planning discussions in Pakistan. But Attlee declined to publish the correspondence on the ground that it was against established practice to publish communications between one Commonwealth Minister and another.

2. What I said in Bangalore on 18th July was: "I regret to have to say that the activities of British military advisers and officers and ex-officers in Pakistan have added greatly to the prevailing tension."³

This was part of a written script which I read out and so there can be no doubt as to what I said. I should like to find out from Mr Attlee what exactly is the unfounded allegation in this. I have no doubt at all that, apart from what they did or did not do, the activities of British officers created tension.

3. Subsequent to my speech, acting High Commissioner for U.K. had a talk with Dutt⁴ who drew his attention to numerous newspapers and other reports to show the effect that these activities had in India. I am wholly unable to understand how Attlee could contradict what I said or expressed his regret at it.

3. Nehru was referring to the large number of British officers serving in Pakistan and Gracey and Auchinleck who had been visiting various military centres in West and East Pakistan in the hottest weather. See also *post*, pp. 341-344.

4. S. Dutt was Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

9. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Daily Telegraph editorial² on Kashmir finished up by saying: "Unless he (Graham) or the Security Council can induce India to change her mind, the consequences are likely to be grave indeed, and should they come to pass, no amount of pious pacifism can absolve India from her primary responsibility for them."

2. This kind of writing is a direct incitement to Pakistan to war. I am sure that Pakistan will not wage war but for continuous encouragement from England and America. Liaquat Ali Khan's correspondence with me makes it clear that under cover of offer of peace he wants freedom to attack Kashmir or in the alternative our surrender to Pakistan over vital issues. We have stated our position clearly and there is nothing more to be said about it. I think it should be fully realised issue of war and peace between India and Pakistan now rests entirely on the encouragement that might be given to Pakistan from abroad. A grave responsibility therefore rests on U.K. and U.S.A.

3. Meanwhile, Pakistan is carrying on virulent and false propaganda against India all over Middle East countries.

1. New Delhi, 8 August 1951. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. On 7 August 1951.

10. To S.M. Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1951

My dear Shaikh Sahib,
I have your letter of August 7th.

I have had two good talks with Bakshi. He went away last night to Jammu and will report to you.

Dr Graham came to see me this afternoon. He was with me for half an hour and we discussed many subjects, but not Kashmir.² He takes things in a leisurely fashion. He said that he realised that I was very busy, which of course I am, and would like to meet me when I am more at leisure. I have invited him to a quiet dinner day after tomorrow night all by himself. . .

I have recently spoken on several occasions on the Kashmir issue and spoken rather frankly. My correspondence with Liaquat Ali Khan has, I hope, ended. You write to me that, according to Loy Henderson, the British are the chief trouble-makers in this respect. The British on the other hand say that they are being pushed by the Americans. I think both these statements are true. The British did take a leading part in the beginning, but later the Americans became more aggressive. In most matters they have become rather overbearing and there is much resentment in England over the American attitude towards them. Practically they order them about.

I have no doubt whatever that we should continue to be firm in regard to Kashmir. I do not know what developments will take place, but I rather doubt if Pakistan will actually indulge in war. They can do everything short of it in the hope that they might induce the U.S.A. or the U.K. to help them. My own information is that, to some extent, the U.K. and the U.S.A. have pulled them up....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. For Nehru's note on this interview, see *post*, pp. 595-597.

11. To S.M. Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1951

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

....I had hoped to go to Srinagar with Rajaji on the 1st September. But I fear that is not possible now. The internal Congress situation is developing fast and we are going to have a meeting of the A.I.C.C. on the 8th September. All this necessitates my presence in Delhi.

The latest news about Pakistan movements near the border is not reassuring. It is difficult to prophesy, but I have a feeling that some trouble is afoot. The next month, and possibly part of October, are likely to be critical and we must be fully prepared.

The Pakistan tactics appear to be to create trouble on the Kashmir border and ceasefire line and at the same time to try to have internal trouble, if they can. This, of course, is an old story. Our recent information is that a number of trained soldiers have been pushed into 'Azad Kashmir', dressed as tribal folk, the idea being that tribal people are creating trouble and that the Pakistan army as such has nothing to do with it. If such a thing happens, much will depend upon the extent of such an attempt. Petty raids can be met locally. A major attempt creates a different situation and, as you know, we have made it clear that it will be open to us then to take action anywhere against Pakistan. I suppose the Pakistan people may try to confine their attacks to Kashmir first and call them tribal attacks. Then, if we attack Pakistan elsewhere, this would be termed aggression on the part of India. Anyhow, we are alert and I am keeping in frequent touch with our Defence people.

I do not know the dates of your constituent assembly elections.² Could you kindly send me this information, as this will have some bearing on possible action by Pakistan? We should like to have as full a programme of your elections as possible so that we may know on what dates particular elections are taking place in different areas, when elections begin and when they are over.

I suppose that soon after the elections are over, you will hold a meeting of your newly-elected constituent assembly. I think that the programme of this assembly must be carefully thought out. It would be unwise for the assembly to do something right at the beginning which might bring it in conflict

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. On 20 April 1951, an order was issued for holding elections for a constituent assembly. The assembly would be elected by direct secret ballot on the basis of adult suffrage and would draw up a constitution.

with the Security Council. Therefore, it is far better that no reference be made to the question of accession to India at that stage, or for some time. The assembly might well deal with local matters as well as prepare their internal constitution. Probably you will appoint drafting committees and the like. After the assembly has functioned for a couple of months or so and fully established itself, it will be time enough to tackle the controversial problems.

Graham is here. I have met him again and he has talked vaguely and generally about world peace. Schmidt³ has seen Bajpai once or twice. Bajpai fainted in office some days ago and since then has been more or less confined to bed....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. P.J. Schmidt.

12. Plebiscite Details¹

Reading your note² on your interview with Dr Schmidt I have a growing feeling of apprehension. We tend to go the same way as previously and perhaps get entangled. I do not quite know how we can avoid this, but at any rate we should try to do so. Also, we have to remember the Kashmir Government. It is risky our saying something which we might not be able to give effect to because of the opposition of the Kashmir Government. Their attitude has become stiffer and will no doubt become even more so as time goes on and when the constituent assembly comes into existence.

Then again all this talk seems to me unreal in existing circumstances. You have already pointed this out. I wish that Dr Graham and company would appreciate this to some extent at least with a virulent propaganda going on in

1. Remarks on G.S. Bajpai's record of interview with P.J. Schmidt forwarded to Bajpai, 21 August 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. The note by Bajpai summarised the points raised by Schmidt and his answers during their meeting on 20 August 1951. It mainly dealt with the withdrawal of forces, both Indian and Pakistani, within 90 days, possibility of a Pakistan attack, the question of guarantees and the appointment of a plebiscite administrator.

Pakistan for invasion of Kashmir. Taken together with Liaquat Ali Khan's repeated refusal to give up the idea of armed intervention, the position, from our point of view, continues to be difficult and, at any moment, may develop into a crisis. It is true that if an agreement is arrived at and all the Pakistani forces withdrawn and 'Azad Kashmir' troops disbanded and disarmed that in itself is a major turn for the better. But if the same type of propaganda and war preparations go on in Pakistan, there is really no major change.

I have nothing to say about your paragraph (1). The withdrawal of our forces will be as rapid as circumstances permit, subject always to the limit necessary for ensuring the security of the State.³

Your paragraph (2) (a): I cannot think of any guarantees other than the withdrawal of Pakistani forces.⁴ I do not think that a larger number of U.N. observers will do any good. Our experience of them has been most unsatisfactory. One possible guarantee would be a clear declaration on behalf of Pakistan that, under no circumstances, would they undertake or encourage any invasion or incursion into Kashmir territory. Ultimately this will be hardly a question for long argument. As we are responsible for the security of the State, the measures we take for this purpose will be dependent upon our view of the situation.

Your paragraph (2) (b): I am glad this has been made clear.⁵ I think the number should not be fixed at present. Also this is a matter which was only casually discussed previously and it would be unwise for us to commit ourselves in any way without reference to the Kashmir Government. Conditions have changed since we talked about this. Apart from the local armed and unarmed police, the question of the civil administration is an important one and has not been touched.

3. Schmidt wished to know whether Pakistani forces, regular and irregular, had been withdrawn beforehand and 'Azad Kashmir' forces disbanded and disarmed, the reduction of Indian forces would be continued below the figures already mentioned within 90 days. Bajpai replied that it was too short a period for any realistic plans and if "demilitarisation" on the Pakistan side were continuous, the process of reduction of Indian forces to the limit necessary for ensuring the security of the State would also be continuous.
4. Schmidt wished to know the guarantees India would consider sufficient to safeguard Jammu and Kashmir State against a fresh and sudden attack from the Pakistan side. He suggested that some more U.N. observers should be maintained in Pakistan. Bajpai asked for time to consider this.
5. Schmidt had said that by "the remaining forces on the other side of the ceasefire line" he meant a police force constituted on the lines suggested by India. But he did not commit himself to the number of 4,000.

Your paragraph (3): The question put to us and our answers should not be shown to Pakistan.⁶ It would certainly be desirable for us to see the questionnaire that Schmidt intends to put to Pakistan.⁷

Your paragraph (4): It is obvious that if a plebiscite is decided upon and is likely to take place in the foreseeable future, a plebiscite administrator would have to be appointed. But I am quite clear that any declaration of the appointment of such a person on some unascertained date would not only be premature but exceedingly embarrassing. The time for that only comes when the various preliminary steps envisaged had been taken. We have had one Plebiscite Administrator, Admiral Nimitz⁸, functioning for a long period with no plebiscite in evidence.⁹

Apart from the war propaganda etc., and the constant threat of invasion, we are charged by Pakistan with fraud, conspiracy and all kinds of evil deeds. It is hardly possible for us to deal with a government which makes these charges. The proper course would be for these charges to be investigated and cleared up, just as it is important from our point of view that our charge of aggression against Pakistan should be cleared. With this background, it is hardly possible for either party to have faith in the other's *bona fides*. Dr Graham would of course say that his terms were limited and he cannot go into these matters, which is perfectly true. But this background has to be kept in view when considering all these questions.

I am sending this note to you now. I shall try to see you this evening and have a talk. I might mention that I showed your note to Rajaji and Gopalaswami Ayyangar. Both of them felt that we were getting too much entangled in this business. At the same time they did not offer any really helpful suggestion. They were rather in a hurry at the time in Parliament.

6. Graham had sent a questionnaire on 28 July 1951 covering various aspects of the Kashmir problem. A second questionnaire seeking further clarifications was received from Graham on 14 August 1951. In reply, Bajpai had submitted three memoranda giving all the required information, the last one on 19 August 1951 spelling out India's position. Schmidt had said that he had no intention of communicating this to Pakistan.
7. Schmidt wanted to present a similar questionnaire, taking into account some of the answers given by India, to the Pakistan Government. He saw no reason why this questionnaire should not be shown to Bajpai informally but for this he would have to consult his colleagues.
8. C.W. Nimitz (1885-1966); U.S. admiral; commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1941-45; chief of naval operations, 1945-47.
9. Schmidt said that the other side would wish to know whether India would be agreeable to the appointment of a plebiscite administrator, Bajpai said that he would refer the question to Nehru.

13. Graham's Draft Proposals¹

Dr Graham, Dr Schmidt and General Devers saw me this morning at 11.30 a.m. The Secretary-General was also present. They gave me a paper,² a copy of which I enclose. They said they would like to have our considered answer later.

2. Without discussing the paper in any detail, I asked him some questions, more particularly about paragraphs 5 to 13.³ In asking these questions, I indicated our provisional reactions.

3. Later, we discussed for some time other issues like canal waters and evacuee property and the Kashmir rivers.

4. Dr Graham indicated that they would like to return to Europe in about two weeks' time, though this was not a rigid date and would depend on circumstances. He suggested that I might see the Prime Minister of Pakistan round about 31st August. I told him that, while I was always willing to meet the Prime Minister of Pakistan, it seemed to me the height of improbability that any useful meeting could take place by the 31st. A meeting which led to a break would worsen the situation greatly. He agreed. I added that a meeting between the two Prime Ministers should only be thought of after all the preparatory steps have been taken which would more or less ensure the success

1. Note to Abul Kalam Azad, C. Rajagopalachari and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, New Delhi, 24 August 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Frank Graham forwarded a formula for agreement on 24 August 1951 for the consideration of the Governments of India and Pakistan. It provided for (i) reaffirmation by the two countries that they would not resort to war on the question of Kashmir; (ii) an agreement that they would see that warlike statements were not made; (iii) reaffirmation of the ceasefire line; (iv) reaffirmation that the future of Kashmir would be decided by a plebiscite under U.N. auspices; and (v) agreement that demilitarization would be a single continuous process. As for the actual course of demilitarization, the formula provided for completion in ninety days; on Pakistan's side, the tribesmen or Pakistani nationals and Pakistani troops would withdraw and there would be large-scale disbandment and disarmament of 'Azad' troops; on the Indian side, the bulk of the troops would be withdrawn and further withdrawals or reductions of the Indian and State forces would be carried out. This demilitarization would be carried out in such a way as not to threaten the ceasefire line; the programme would be drawn up by the two governments and their military advisers, meeting under U.N. auspices; the plebiscite administrator would be appointed by the Government of India not later than the final day of the demilitarization period; demilitarization would not prejudice the functions of the U.N. representative or the plebiscite administrator regarding the final disposal of forces; the differences on the plan of demilitarization would be settled by the U.N. representative, whose decision would be final.
3. These paragraphs related to the various aspects of demilitarization.

of that meeting. I thus could not see how these preparatory steps could be taken in the next few days. Apart from the steps to be taken, we had to deal with the very abnormal tension between India and Pakistan and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's daily challenges.⁴

5. I told Dr Graham also that it was essential for us to get the consent of the Kashmir Government to any step that we might take because their cooperation was essential. I casually mentioned that I was thinking of going to Srinagar on the 1st September for the university convocation there.

6. There are some obvious points in this memorandum, which Dr Graham has given me, which raise difficulties and to which we can hardly agree. In any event, I think that we should meet together and discuss this matter. I am also consulting our military advisers.

4. On 22 January 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan said at a press conference: "There were only two courses open to Pakistan to settle the issue: one was to pursue matter in the Security Council. The second I would not tell you." On 27 July, he had raised the "clenched fist" and declared it to be Pakistan's symbol.

14. Discussions on Graham's Draft Proposals¹

Opening the conversation, Prime Minister said that, although the holding of a plebiscite would present many practical difficulties, and these would have to be considered when the time for arranging a plebiscite arrived, he wished it to be clearly understood that India not only wanted a free and impartial plebiscite to be held to settle the question whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir will continue acceded to India or accede to Pakistan, but wanted it to be held as soon as possible. Among the practical difficulties were those that Sir Owen Dixon had, for example, mentioned in his report, namely large-scale migrations from certain areas in the event of the overall plebiscite going either in favour of India or Pakistan and the United Nations. If they were handling the plebiscite, they would have to take account of these factors. For the present, however he wished to make the general point, as regards the suggestions for

1. Record of a meeting of Jawaharlal Nehru, G.S. Bajpai, Graham, Schmidt and General Devers on 26 August 1951. *Documents on Kashmir*, Volume VI, Ministry of States, Government of India.

demilitarization in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the paper² that Dr Graham had supplied on the 24th of August, namely that, until Pakistan's reactions were known to such basic questions as (a) the disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces as part of the continuous process of "demilitarization" and (b) the fact that, on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line, there would be no military force but only a neutral civil police force, partly armed and partly unarmed, for the maintenance of law and order; the Government of India could not, in the light of past experience, make any commitment regarding their own position. Pakistan had so often taken advantage of India's agreement to certain matters in order to strengthen its own position to the detriment of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir that the Government of India were naturally reluctant to avoid any such risks in the future. As an example, the Prime Minister cited the ceasefire, which India initiated at the end of 1948, and the demarcation of the ceasefire line, which, owing to difficulties that Pakistan made took nearly six months.

Dr Graham then asked whether the processes envisaged in paragraphs 7 and 9 could be combined; in other words whether the decisions to be taken under paragraph 7 should be worked out by the Indian and Pakistan Commanders-in-Chief. It was pointed out to him that paragraph 7 envisaged decisions of a political character which the Governments concerned alone could take. Paragraph 9 merely envisaged the working out of details of agreements reached under earlier paragraphs—5, 6, 7 and 8. The Government of India's view was that even this detailed programme of demilitarization (para. 9) should be worked out by the representatives of the two Governments who would include not only military experts but also one or two civil officials.

Dr Graham next raised the question of the appointment of the plebiscite administrator at some stage during the period of demilitarization of 90 days or any other approximate period that might be agreed upon. He said that paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the Resolution of the 5th January 1949, had entrusted to the Commission and the plebiscite administrator the function of determining the disposal of forces on each side of the ceasefire line after the implementation of Parts I and II of the Resolution of the 13th August 1948.³ Pakistan might well ask whether, while moving up the disbanding and demilitarization of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces to the 90 days period, it would not be in conformity with the provisions of 4(a) and (b) of the Resolution of the 5th January 1949, to associate the plebiscite administrator with the process of disbanding and

2. See footnote 2 on page 248.

3. As per the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 the two Governments had agreed to have the future of Kashmir State decided by an impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices.

disarming. General Devers made the point that the appointment of the plebiscite administrator at an early stage of the programme of demilitarization would give to the people of 'Azad Kashmir' a sense of stability, arising from the conviction that the demilitarization was a prelude to the plebiscite. The Prime Minister referred Dr Graham to the earlier discussion on this subject when the Resolution of the 5th January was being considered in its draft form. Even then, the Government of India had objected to the appointment of the plebiscite administrator until Parts I and II of the Resolution of the 13th August 1948, had been implemented. What was contemplated now was one continuing process of demilitarization. The plebiscite administrator had really nothing to do with demilitarization, though, when the plebiscite came to be held, he might have something to say, according to the Resolution, regarding the disposal of Indian and State armed forces on the Indian side of the ceasefire line. Dr Graham did not press his suggestion for the appointment of a plebiscite administrator during the period of demilitarization. Dr Schmidt, however, drew attention to the fact that after completion of the programme of demilitarization, the immediate appointment of a plebiscite administrator would be necessary in order to initiate measures for the holding of the plebiscite. A plebiscite administrator would be needed although he would have to be appointed formally by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir to his office.

Dr Schmidt said that they had used the word 'forces' in paragraph 7 and 8 on the understanding that, on our side the forces would include military forces while, on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line, they would be limited to a police force of armed and unarmed men. He admitted that the word "forces" was liable to misinterpretation and asked suggestions as to how the objection might be met. It was provisionally suggested that the relevant part of paragraph 7 might read as follows:

at the end of the period of 90 days there will remain, on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line, a neutral civil police force, composed partly of armed and partly of unarmed men, for the maintenance of law and order and on the Indian side of the ceasefire line a force which will consist of....

No figure for the police force to be maintained on the Pakistan side was specified. General Devers said that it might consist of 4,000—2,400 being armed and the remainder unarmed. Consequential changes (as regards 'forces') will have to be made in paragraph 8. The strength of the Indian forces to be maintained at the end of the '90 days' proposed for demilitarization was not discussed in terms of figures. The Prime Minister merely said that if other things were satisfactorily arranged, he would be content with a relatively small military force. His real anxiety was about unauthorised persons coming into the State to make trouble and this kind of infiltration will have to be effectively

provided against. The regular military force would be needed mainly to guard certain strategic points. Pakistan's geographical proximity and easy access to Kashmir carried the risk of a sudden attack on the State, but this risk Prime Minister would be prepared to face if Pakistan carried out fully its obligations regarding withdrawals, the disbandment and disarming of the 'Azad' forces, etc., and war hysteria ceased.

As regards paragraph 11, Dr Graham indicated that this was intended merely to preserve the functions of the U.N. representative who had succeeded U.N.C.I.P. and the plebiscite administrator with regard to those matters in 4(a) and (b) which were not disposed of as part of the programme of "demilitarization".

With regard to paragraph 12, Dr Schmidt made it clear that it was intended merely to apply to details of the programme of demilitarization referred to in paragraph 9. Paragraph 13, on the other hand, covered the agreement as a whole. On the Prime Minister pointing out that this paragraph might imply that the Government of India had accepted the arbitration of the U.N. representative with regard to any major dispute that might arise over the interpretation of the draft agreement (Dr Graham's paper of the 24th August, 1951), Dr Graham promptly disowned any intention of asking for any such thing and Dr Schmidt said that paragraph 13 would be deleted.

Before Dr Graham and his two advisers took leave, the Prime Minister also made it clear, as regards paragraph 4, that the legal validity of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India was not open to question. Dr Graham said that this was well understood. Dr Schmidt drew attention to the fact that the wording used in paragraph 4 was reproduced textually from (1) of the Resolution of the 5th January 1949.

Dr Graham and his party intend leaving for Karachi as soon as can be arranged. It is expected that they will return to Delhi, after discussing informally with the Government of Pakistan the points that they have discussed with us.⁴

4. Pakistan generally agreed to the proposals with some important reservations: the status of the forces left on either side would be the same, there would be large-scale disarmament and reduction of forces on the Indian side and not more than four infantry battalions should be left on either side of the line. Pakistan also stressed the need for an early appointment of the plebiscite administrator and a provision for making the U.N. representative's decisions final on differences about interpretation of the agreement.

15. On Informal Talks with Graham¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, gentlemen, I forget when we met last. Nearly two and a half months ago I think.² Quite a lot has happened since then. I do not know how we are going to cover this rather tumultuous period. Anyhow, it has been our custom to note down some points which we can deal with.

Question: Why has nothing been done as regards the press commission?

JN: Well, my own impression was that the representatives of the press did not show any enthusiasm for it.³ It is no good imposing a commission upon them.

Q: What about the unanimous opinion of the working journalists in the matter?

JN: The working journalists, if I may say so, have in this matter been quiet. They may not be so in other matters, but in this matter they have been . . .

Q: You must have received Washington's reply on the Japanese peace treaty.⁴ Have you sent any reply to that?

JN: Yes, I have received it, I think, day before yesterday in the afternoon, and we hope to send a reply very soon.⁵

Q: Have you any comments to offer on it?

1. Remarks at press conference, New Delhi, 28 August 1951. Full version obtained from P.I.B.
2. The previous press conference was held on 11 June 1951. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Part I, pp. 67-69, 103, 153, 295, 355-356, 361-366, 443-445, 482-484 and 502-505.
3. During the debate in Parliament on the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, 1951, Nehru said that he was prepared to appoint a commission to enquire into the state of the press. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 15 Part I, pp. 247-248. The Press Commission was set up in September 1952. It submitted its report in July 1954.
4. A note was issued by the State Department on 26 August 1951 commenting on the Indian statement that the draft peace treaty contained "imperfections."
5. A reply to the U.S. note of 26 August, issued as a White Paper in New Delhi on 30 August 1951, emphasized India's "inherent and unquestionable right" not to sign a treaty with which she was not fully satisfied; declared that she did not "wish to come in the way of any nation which was satisfied with the treaty"; and added an assurance that India did not propose to conclude with Japan any peace treaty which would "in any way be controversial or which would be counter to the provisions of the draft to be signed at San Francisco." See *post*, pp. 620-623.

JN: If you asked any specific questions, I might have. How do you expect me to roam over the entire field?

Q: What about the main point that India is supposed to have gone against the Potsdam Declaration?

JN: There is no question of going against the Potsdam Declaration.⁶ India was not a party to it. The question of the Potsdam Declaration does not arise at all. So far as I know, the question of the Japanese peace treaty was not placed at any time before the Far Eastern Council where India was represented.⁷ This question in this particular form has arisen fairly recently. I do not know what it has got to do with the Potsdam Declaration at all. One thing I might make clear. In the reply of the U.S. Government it is stated that we are not applying the same standards of judgment to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin Islands as to the other Japanese islands down below. Well, if you remember, a decision was arrived at with regard to the Kurile Islands and the South Sakhalin Islands at the Yalta Conference,⁸ and that was a decision by mutual agreement between the powers concerned at that time. We have accepted it and we do not quite see how we can oppose it or criticise it, even though it might be somewhat inconsistent.

Q: Do you think that the peace terms which are going to be discussed at San Francisco are having repercussions in Korea so far as China is concerned?

JN: I have no information on the point, and I do not suppose it has any immediate effects on the Korean situation. But naturally one can presume that in China this treaty is not approved at all, and that in that sense it might add somewhat to the tension. But I doubt whether that has any particular effect on the immediate Korean situation.

Q: Don't you think we would not have lost anything by attending the conference and expressing our inability to sign it at a later stage?

6. According to the Declaration, issued at the Potsdam Conference (17 July-2 August 1945) by U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, — the chief authority in Germany was transferred to the American, Russian, British and French military commanders in their respective zones of occupation and to a four-power Allied Control Council for matters regarding the whole of Germany.
7. The Far Eastern Commission, a 11-nation body, sitting in Washington was formally charged with establishing occupation policy. It met for the first time on 26 February 1946.
8. At the Yalta Conference attended by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in February 1945, the Soviet Union was to retain the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin in return for entering the war against Japan within three months of Germany's surrender.

JN: As you will remember, this conference is to be held, not for the discussion of the peace terms, but merely to sign them as previously determined. So, the purpose of attending it is not obvious. Either I go to sign it taking all in all, or I do not sign it. If you do not want to sign it, what exactly you do by going there is not clear, unless you want us to use the platform to express our views. There is that possibility, but so far as our views are concerned, we can as easily send them by post and telegraph, and in fact we have communicated them.

Q: By having a bilateral treaty with Japan, how are you going to achieve your ideal as regards Formosa?

JN: It does not arise at all. The bilateral treaty with Japan means only the removal of the technical barrier of a state of war, and the restoration of diplomatic, trade and commercial relations with that country. It does not come in the way of any one in deciding any political issue; it means opening up of normal relations between India and Japan. It does not affect other points this way or that way.

Q: Do you think that the representatives of Japan at this conference are representatives of the Japanese people or mere puppets?

JN: I do not really know who the representatives of Japan are going to be. But certainly I would not be prepared to call them puppets. I should say, you might call them as representing one group or other. But I would not presume to say who the representatives of Japan are at the present moment.

Q: Did the Government of India know the views of the Government of Japan and, generally speaking, the prevailing trend in Japan before communicating our reply to the U.S.A.?⁹

JN: Yes. We are continually being kept informed not only by our representatives but by various other sources of information which help us in appraising the situation.

Q: There was a specific comment in Washington's reply that they have not understood your stand in the matter.

9. India's refusal to attend the San Francisco Conference, where the Japanese peace treaty was to be finalised, had been generally hailed in Tokyo.

JN: That was, if I remember rightly, a question from a letter from Premier Yoshida.¹⁰ But our own appraisal of the situation was somewhat different. I do not know if you noticed a comment in, I think the London *Times* a day or two ago. There again, the appraisal was somewhat different.¹¹

Q: Is it not a fact that previously the British had told India that they approved India's line of action in regard to the Japanese peace treaty and that they were against the American view, but now they feel disappointed at our attitude?

JN: I do not think it is quite correct. We have exchanged many communications. At the earlier stage there were differences—considerable differences—between the two draft treaties, the one from the U.K. and the other from the U.S.A. Subsequently this was narrowed down and in some points the British approach in the beginning was similar to India's approach.

Q: One of the main comments is that the attitude of India will be the main trump card for Russia at the San Francisco Conference to defy the American proposal. Did that consideration ever influence your decision?

JN: I forget now when the Soviet Union decided or announced its decisions.¹² But I might tell you that although we did not finalise our decision till a few days ago, we have discussed this matter on many occasions in the course of the last month or so, and we discussed it quite independently of what Russia would do. We did not know what Russia was likely to do, whether she will utilise any event that may happen to her advantage.

Q: How would you handle the Formosa and China problem by signing the bilateral treaty?

10. Shigoru Yoshida (1878-1961); Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan, 1946-47, and 1948-54.

11. *The Times* published a report by Dulles to a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 March 1951 on his visit to Japan. Dulles, it was said, had encouraged the Japanese to rely for protection against direct aggression "primarily upon the deterrent influence of a retaliatory power possessed by the free world and upon United States air and sea power rather than to count upon the continuing presence in Japan of large United States ground forces."

12. With the approach of the San Francisco Conference, more differences than were at one time expected on the Japanese peace treaty had emerged with the Russian decision to participate in the conference. The Soviet Government presented a note on 10 June 1951 to the U.S. Government criticising the Anglo-American draft on many grounds and reiterating that the Japanese peace treaty should be drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

JN: I have just said that we do not handle it in the bilateral treaty. It is going to be a simple treaty for opening diplomatic relations, trade and commerce, and not touching any political problem. Because it would be quite absurd for us individually to handle these problems in which half a dozen or more nations are concerned. We cannot settle them by ourselves. So we do not refer to those problems in the bilateral treaty.

Q: Have you made a provision in the treaty to place an embargo on the armament industries which have been started recently in Japan?

JN: I do not understand that. Japan is an independent nation. Japan can do what any independent nation can do. I may have my private opinion in approval or disapproval of what she might do, it is a different matter. But as a Government I cannot come in their way of doing something.

Question: One of our main objections to the peace treaty is that it does not restore full sovereignty to Japan. How are you going to remedy that situation?

JN: I do not pretend to remedy it by a bilateral treaty. I only get rid of the technical barrier of state of war between India and Japan. Here is, if I may put it to you, a multilateral treaty proposed with Japan. It is open to any country that approves of it in the balance to sign it. It is open to me, or to our country, if it does not approve of it in the balance, not to sign it. But we do not come in the way of anybody; we only do not wish to undertake the responsibility of signing it because we do not agree with certain provisions of it. At the same time we are anxious to have peace with Japan and have normal relations with that country. So apart from the political problems we have a simple bilateral treaty to enable us to go ahead with normal relations.

Q: Once the American draft is signed, would you hold that Japan continues to be not independent?

JN: Japan will be independent with limitations.

Q: Can you tell us whether at the time when the first draft was circulated, our objections to the treaty were similar to those entertained by Britain?

JN: No, I cannot say that. There were many common points. As a matter of fact, it is not a question of Britain objecting to this or that: Britain had its own draft. There were several drafts and Britain had her own. But in some matters our approach was the same as that of the United Kingdom, in some matters it was not.

Q: At what stage of the discussions did Britain change her mind?

JN: At the stage when the two drafts became one.

Q: Was the approach similar in regard to the Kurile Islands and the disposal of Formosa?

JN: I do not think it would be correct for me to say anything, or correct for me to discuss previous drafts. It is not a right or proper thing for me to do.

Q: Don't you think in the case of Asian affairs U.K. and U.S.A. have one and the same policy?

JN: I do not suppose any two countries can have identically the same policy. Sometimes they differ and sometimes they agree. It is always a balance of considerations. So, to say that they have the same policy would not be correct; to say that they differ violently would not also be correct. They may have different approaches which often combine.

Q: In view of their changed attitude, do you still think that the British have any independent opinion about Japan now?

JN: My thinking about their opinion. It is all very vague.

Q: You said that under this treaty Japan would have limited independence. Then will India support a proposal for the admission of Japan into the U.N.?

JN: That is a question which we have not considered at all. It has not come before us. But when that comes, there is no reason why we should not support such a proposal. In other words, in all probability we will.

Q: Have the Government of India's observations been confined to criticism of the American draft or have they suggested an alternative draft which will be acceptable to all?

JN: We do not suggest alternative drafts. We did suggest, if you like, alternative phraseology of the clauses—certain amendments in the existing draft. We did not circulate an entirely new draft.

Q: Do you think this treaty will help the cause of peace in this part of the world?

JN: That is a matter of coming to certain conclusions or certain facts on an appraisal of the situation. I hope that peace will not be broken any more than it has been broken in the Far East. But we felt in the balance that it would be continuing tension by making it a little more difficult to solve some of the outstanding problems of the Far East.

Q: Do the Government of India indicate any plans for the defence of Japan at the time of the coming into force of this treaty and till Japan had time to reconstruct its army?

JN: You will remember that under this very treaty Japan has got the right to make any treaty of mutual defence, apart from doing anything within her own borders with other countries etc. It is for Japan, with the other countries concerned, to consider these matters. I do not myself see any danger, any sudden danger, arising if any such steps are taken; it is for Japan to take such steps. Apart from the desirability of any particular mutual defence pact—that will depend on its provisions—it seemed to us obviously better that an independent Japan should deal with that matter rather than it should be incorporated in the treaty which confirms or gives back independence to Japan.

Q: Do you think that the Japanese, who are an enterprising people, are interested in third power bloc?

JN: Personally I think not in terms of blocs and powers, as I am not interested in the third power bloc and so on. What Japan might or might not do I can't say, but it is one thing to cooperate in the preservation of peace. If you talk about blocs and powers, that I should not like to encourage. . .

Should we now proceed to another subject? Do you want to know something about Kashmir?

Q: Yes, about Dr Graham.

JN: But that is a subject which is not supposed to be discussed. The talks have been much on the informal level, and you can hardly reveal informal talks.

Q: Do you treat Dr Graham as a visitor to this country or as a U.N. representative?

JN: We treat him as both—as a distinguished visitor and he is obviously a U.N. representative. Your question presumably is that since we did not accept

the last Resolution¹³ of the Security Council, what is the effect of that. Well, the first thing that we told Dr Graham was our reaction to that Resolution. We did not accept it. But Dr Graham not only as a distinguished person but as a representative of the U.N. naturally was always welcome here and we discuss anything with him.

Q: Has he informally submitted any proposal?

JN: I am telling you we have had only informal talks so far. I don't think there have been any differences on that except that Dr Graham being a very distinguished person, strongly attached to peace, has always a soothing influence.

Q: Has Dr Graham conveyed to you at any stage that the work of the constituent assembly for Kashmir should be postponed to a period of about six months or so?

JN: No, he has never said anything of the kind.

Q: In the informal discussions, has he at any stage proposed demilitarization?

JN: You can't catch me like that. We discussed past histories, past resolutions at the U.N. etc. This includes many other problems that come up today.

Q: Have you seen any evidence on the part of Dr Graham to reach a settlement before the constituent assembly elections take place?

JN: I may tell you that the elections, if I am right, have not been mentioned at any stage but it is obvious that it is Dr Graham's earnest desire that a settlement should be reached and he should be able to help in the solution of the problem to the best of his ability, and we are entirely at one with him in that regard.

Q: Has he taken note of the correspondence between the Prime Ministers?

JN: He might have taken note of it because he has been supplied with all the copies of letters so exchanged.

13. Though the Anglo-U.S. resolution of 30 March 1951 was rejected by India, the Security Council adopted it. The resolution appointed Frank Graham as its representative to bring about an agreement between India and Pakistan on the procedure for demilitarization and a plebiscite.

Q: When the constituent assembly passes its resolution on accession, don't you agree that your complaint to the U.N.O. will be closed?¹⁴

JN: I think you are all premature. I do not exactly know, but no date has been fixed for the constituent assembly to meet. The elections are likely to be over about the second week of October—from the middle of September to the second week of October. It is possible it might meet by the end of October or the beginning of November. But I should rather doubt if the constituent assembly will immediately deal with any such question as you have referred to.

Q: Does the attitude of India on demilitarization continue to be as firm as before?

JN: Well, I have said that the attitude continues to be the same as before. However, I will explain the point again. I will have to go back in history. The first Resolution of the U.N. Commission was passed on the 13th August 1948. That Resolution was passed when the Commission was here and had been in constant touch with us, and attached to that Resolution were certain statements and two *aides memoire*. When the Draft Resolution was placed before us we wanted elucidation of it so that there might not be any misunderstanding. So we discussed it with the Commission and our discussion was put down in an *aide memoire*. In order to avoid misunderstanding that *aide memoire* was sent to the Commission. In fact, they discussed the first *aide memoire* with us and agreed that that was the correct presentation of what took place. Having got that from them, we expressed our agreement, our acceptance of that Resolution of 13th August 1948. Subsequently, a few days later, the Pakistan Government did not accept that Resolution or rather made a number of provisions to that Resolution which the Commission did not accept. Therefore, in the final analysis, the Resolution of the 13th August was accepted by India and not accepted by Pakistan. That was the first Resolution dealing with all the processes preceding an actual plebiscite; all these processes of troops being withdrawn etc. We accepted them.

In the Resolution of 5th January 1949, it was repeated and confirmed but there was a further clause, an important part of which was about the withdrawal of forces. That Resolution started by saying that because a new situation had arisen since the matter was referred to the Security Council, a new situation in that Pakistan troops had entered Kashmir, therefore they had to consider again.

14. It was in fact in February 1954 that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, while adhering in principle to the special position of the State, confirmed the legality of its accession to India.

And they resolved that all Pakistan troops, regular and irregular, must withdraw from every part of the State of Kashmir. Secondly, this included tribesmen and all kinds of people from there. This being done or largely done, the Indian troops in Kashmir should be reduced but always keeping in view the security of Kashmir. The phrase was that the bulk of the Indian forces should be withdrawn. But the provision was that the security of Kashmir should be kept in view. That is the main approach to it. Soon after, another question arose which had not arisen on the previous occasion. This was about the 'Azad Kashmir' troops and we brought it to the notice of the Commission even earlier and they said, yes. They had rather ignored this matter and they dealt with it. Our contention was that the 'Azad Kashmir' troops should be completely disbanded and disarmed because our object was that on that side of the ceasefire line there should be no hostile troops left, Pakistan or pro-Pakistan. That was accepted.

When you talk about what is called demilitarization, this phrase was never used. This phrase came into use when General McNaughton was considering this matter in the United Nations, and later by Sir Owen Dixon. The whole question depended first of all on the complete withdrawal of Pakistan troops, regular and irregular, from the whole territory occupied by them. The other matter became the matter for dispute—on the different interpretations about the 'Azad Kashmir' troops. We said—and we were supported by the *aides memoire*—that was a part of the disbandment and disarmament and a part of the withdrawal. Pakistan said no to that and that this could be considered later after all other withdrawals had taken place. That was the major matter which prevented agreement after the ceasefire.

Q: Will it not be better if Asian countries like Indonesia and Burma take up mediation?

JN: Any kind of friendly help or mediation can never be objected to. That is always welcome. But I do not myself see how fresh people coming in now and then for settling a complicated problem can be particularly helpful. The issue is in a sense complicated and in another sense rather simple. I may tell you quite frankly that we are anxious and eager to put an end to this business by a proper plebiscite. We do not want a running sore going on between India and Pakistan and affecting Kashmir's prosperity. But we are not prepared to accept any conditions which not only we consider improper but which go against the very resolutions of the United Nations Commission which we accepted. Our objection to the last Resolution of the Security Council is that it goes counter to the previous decisions of the United Nations which we had accepted.

Q: Is there any connection between the change of the attitude of the Security Council on Kashmir and your attitude on Korea?

JN: I do not think so.

Q: One of the assurances given to you by the Commission was that a plebiscite could be held only on a political and economic basis and not on a religious basis.

JN: It is largely correct. At that time we pointed out to them that when there is a plebiscite, it should be conducted in the main on political and economic and like issues and not on the plane of religious bigotry. They entirely agreed with us. Just conducting an election on rather fanatical slogans was very likely to prevent the plebiscite being held at all, that is to say, troubles and conflicts arise so much that the plebiscite would not come off.

Q: Do you think there is blind sympathy on the part of Britain and America in favour of Pakistan over this Kashmir issue?

JN: I have no such poor opinion of these great countries as you seem to imagine.

Q: Do you expect a worsening of the attitude of the U.K. and the U.S.A. on the Kashmir issue in view of your attitude towards the Japanese peace treaty?

JN: I do not see what connection there is between the two.

Q: While the Government of India has been saying that the decision of the constituent assembly will in no way interfere with the decision of the Security Council, Shaikh Abdullah has been saying that any decision that the constituent assembly takes with regard to accession will be final.

JN: I do not think Shaikh Abdullah has stated that at any time. And may I in this connection also say that I saw some press report in, I think, the British press, of the Deputy Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, where I think he said something about freeing the areas of Kashmir State which are under Pakistan control—which is a perfectly legitimate sentiment for any Kashmiri. But that does not mean that they have decided in advance. They feel very strongly that these areas are under—call it what you like—foreign domination, under oppressive military rule, or whatever it is. There is no question, internationally speaking, of the constituent assembly of Kashmir

deciding this issue which is before the Security Council. I will tell you quite frankly, and I am quite sure that Pakistan knows that; but what probably worries Pakistan is, if I may say so, the progressive consolidation, in advance, of Kashmir in a variety of ways, political, economic, governmental, administrative, and the rest. This worries them, because there is no doubt about it, that Kashmir State has made great progress; in spite of all these difficulties during the last two or three years. It has not only a well-run organisation, but a progressive one; it has passed laws which many of the States in India envy—the land laws, etc. We too enacted certain legislations, but for various reasons they got stopped. In spite of its meagre resources, the Kashmir State has made progress in development schemes and the like. The supplies problem is being solved—supplies come in regularly, and they have been rather fortunate with their agricultural production which has become more and more stabilised and normal. And the coming of the constituent assembly helps in that process, in that sense—not legally or constitutionally; legally or constitutionally it makes no change, but just strengthens it.

Q: There is a popular belief among a section of the public that Pakistan is determined to attack Kashmir on the eve of the constituent assembly. Do you think there is any basis for that?

JN: I do not subscribe to that. Nor, if I may say so with all humility, do I subscribe to any fear. If you ask me whether there is any basis for it, well, the answer is, you cannot rule out possibilities at any time when war cries are being raised; but I think it is unlikely.

Q: If raiders once again start attacking Kashmir will that be regarded as a purely local affair, or will it have other repercussions?

JN: It depends on the number and quality.

Q: Could you tell us what are the exact relations between India and Kashmir?

JN: It is a good question. Kashmir, in the last week of October 1947, definitely and precisely, acceded to India.¹⁵ That accession was complete, legally speaking. There is no doubt about it. It is not my view alone, and, if I may say so, that was the clearly expressed view of the United Nations Commission that came here, and of their lawyers. So, the position of Kashmir is that she

15. Kashmir was treated as an integral part of the Indian Union as defined in Article 1 of the Constitution of India.

fully acceded to India in regard to three subjects—Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. For the rest, she is autonomous. We might confer and give friendly advice and the rest. Now having said that, the other aspect is this, that right from the beginning we have laid stress—that is as between us and the people of Kashmir—that we want them to decide, that we want to give them an opportunity of revising their decision by referendum, plebiscite and the like. I might mention in this connection that the word plebiscite has become rather common. But we have been thinking in terms of the people of Kashmir deciding it long before all this controversy arose, long before accession. People's memories are short, but we said long before this trouble arose that that is the best way in which the people of Kashmir could decide their future. We said that before the partition of India, and soon after also. So, naturally when this question of accession came and we were hurried by the invasion of Kashmir, we repeated that; we repeated our own statement. Nevertheless, the accession was complete legally. But owing to the statement that we have made, that complete accession can, after a decision of the people of Kashmir, be reopened. That does not make the previous accession incomplete. But we certainly are committed at any time to the people of Kashmir deciding this.

Q: The accession of Kashmir to India having been complete, and their constituent assembly being convened, how can you now decide the issue between India and Pakistan?

JN: So far as we are concerned, it is not an issue between India and Pakistan. In a sense it is, and we are dealing with it. But the issue is between us and the people of Kashmir, to whom we gave this undertaking, and later to the United Nations to which we gave that undertaking. So far as we are concerned, we are bound by our undertakings to them. Take another matter. When we talked to the United Nations about withdrawal of forces, we have also made it perfectly clear, and in the resolution and in the *aide memoire* you can see, that Pakistan has nothing to do with our withdrawal of forces. That is a matter between us and the United Nations, because we do not recognise the right of Pakistan to deal with this matter of Kashmir. It is true that practically speaking when we have a ceasefire, when we have our army on one side and Pakistan has its army on the other side, we cannot ignore the fact that there is the Pakistan army, and the commanding officers of the two sides meet and decide the ceasefire. But we do not recognise the right of Pakistan to determine how or when we would withdraw our army. That is a matter between us and the United Nations.

Q: Are you going to treat the raiders as something foreign to Pakistan, or will you, as soon as the raiders invade Kashmir, attack the Pakistan border?

JN: Well, I do not think much of an answer is necessary for that. Because all these will depend on circumstances. On the one hand it is our extreme desire not to take any step which might lead to big consequences or conflicts; and on the other hand not to allow the other party to take any step which might lead to those consequences. We might have to balance all these factors with the knowledge of past experience.

Q: You said Kashmir has acceded to India on three matters. . . . In view of this, is Shaikh Abdullah justified to observe that so far as Kashmir is concerned, it is not bound by the Constitution of India?

JN: Yes, it is not. Apart from those three matters, it is not. You will notice that in every law that we pass—and there are many of them—the second clause in the law would be that this will not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, because if we did not say so it will normally apply.

Q: I just want to know whether Shaikh Abdullah is justified in observing in that way.

JN: Yes, certainly. In the Constitution itself it is laid down.

Q: Have the Government of India given any financial help for the progress of Kashmir State and if so to what extent?

JN: I could not say offhand. I should imagine it is about two to two and a half crores we have given on loan, usually on very good security which they passed on to us.

Q: Does not the fact that you met the Pakistan Prime Minister on several occasions and discussed with him this dispute about Kashmir indicate that you recognise Pakistan as a party to the case?

JN: As I said, one cannot ignore certain facts. But when we discuss the exact disposal of troops, Pakistan has nothing to do with such issues. May I again repeat what has been brought out adequately in my correspondence with Liaquat Ali Khan. We have always been laying stress on our trying to rule out the application of force in the solution of the Kashmir problem, and I am quite convinced that if that was clearly understood by every party there would be a tremendous lessening of tension, all possible fears of a big conflict will vanish and the atmosphere will be infinitely better for considering this problem. Because you cannot consider it normally when there is always this threat of possible conflict.

Q: Have you seen an article by David Lilienthal in *The Hindu* of Madras¹⁶ in which he is reported to have been told by Liaquat Ali Khan that he would prefer to fight in Kashmir rather than in West Punjab?

JN: I prefer not to fight at all.

Q: Is it not a fact that the Kashmir problem as such has never been discussed between you and Liaquat Ali Khan?

JN: Not in the last two years: but two years ago we discussed this issue.

Q: What is your reaction to D.P. Mishra's suggestion that you aspire to become a dictator of this country?¹⁷

JN: If I may say in all modesty, I am not of the stuff that dictators are made.

Q: It is said that Congress politics are a repetition of U.P. politics which have now been brought to New Delhi.

JN: All that is completely wrong. That is taking a very narrow view of a very big question that faces the Congress and the country. It may be that provincial politics naturally reflect themselves in the all-India sphere but the question before the Congress and the country has nothing to do with it. I have stated previously that the All India Congress Committee and if necessary, a full session of the Congress should give a very clear lead as to what the Congress stands for. We have passed many resolutions in the past and they have been well drafted and often unanimously passed. But somehow there has been a lack of reality about passing them. It has not affected the people very much and the time has come when we should give some reality to our decisions. And I think that my resignation from the Working Committee, whatever its other consequences might be, has brought reality into people's minds and forced them to think, and I think therefore it has done a great deal of good in that respect. I should like the A.I.C.C. to consider it from that point of view. It is no good at all trying to cover up or slur over various approaches, various objectives, methods, etc. The Congress and the Congressmen should know

16. David Lilienthal, who was Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority and had been chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, in his article in *The Hindu* on 26 August 1951. quoted Liaquat Ali Khan as follows: "Kashmir, as you will see from this map, is like a cap on the head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap on her head, then I am always at the mercy of India."

17. D.P. Mishra, who resigned as Home Minister of Madhya Pradesh on 22 August 1951, had in a statement referred to Nehru as being "a man of dictatorial bent of mind."

exactly where they are, which way they are looking and which way they are to go. That is what I would like them to do, and naturally I would like them to decide what I consider the right way. It is better even to decide in some other way and be clear about it than wallowing in the fog of confusion.

Q: What is the right way?

JN: Presumably, my way!

Q: There are certain gaps in public information. We know roughly what you want. You just said your way was the right way. What is it?

JN: Well, another thing I might make clear. There is a good deal of discussion in the press and elsewhere as to some kind of conflict between the Prime Minister and the Congress President; individuals apart, how far the Congress executive should control the Prime Minister, etc. That is an interesting question. It has not really affected me as Prime Minister at all. It is not a live question that way. It is a theoretical question which will gradually by convention solve itself. Obviously, the position of the Congress executive and the Congress President cannot be the same after independence as it was before. Things have happened. Next year we shall have a Parliament which is being elected by millions and millions of people and it is rather difficult to think that it can be controlled by a party executive. The party executive lays down for its own party broad policy and the party should follow it. If it is a democratic party that party itself will be responsible for those decisions. Now in regard to this matter, my own view is if I belong to a party, obviously I must follow the broad policies which that party holds. If the Congress executive gave me a mandate "do this or that", that is an important matter of policy. Either I accept it or if I feel I can't do so, I will have to tell them "I can't do so and these are the reasons for my not doing so" and if they say "you must do so", then I must get out and somebody else comes in. But that has nothing to do with Parliament. It has only something to do with my being a member of the party. I must carry out the major policies laid down by the party. If the Congress executive tells me, "resign from your Prime Ministership", I resign immediately.

But I do not think the Congress executive should interfere in my work, apart from those big policies that are laid down by it, in any of my parliamentary, administrative or other work, as to who should be in my Cabinet or not. In that I do not think the executive of the party should interfere. Of course, in a friendly way we can always take counsel. But these matters of a Prime Minister and the Congress President really do not arise at present except in theory. Whatever I have done—suppose I have resigned from the

Congress Working Committee—it has nothing to do with my Prime Minister-ship. Therefore to put it briefly, the question before the Congress is whether such policies as I stand for are to be Congress policies or some other policies.

Q: Do you think that the only way to solve the present deadlock in the Congress lies in the amalgamation of the two offices of the Prime Ministership of India and the Congress Presidentship?

JN: No. I don't think it is so. Speaking as a kind of a permanent proposition I don't think that has any meaning. It can only mean the suppression of one function. Practically speaking, if the Prime Minister is also Congress President, either of the positions will become dominant over the other. So, as a practical proposition I don't think that is feasible. That may occur during a crisis for a temporary period but it should be avoided as far as possible unless circumstances are such that for the moment one does something which is normally not desirable. If you consider these matters in this logical way there are many aspects. A friend here asks me what do I stand for—Well I can't possibly answer you in this offhand way. You cannot define a person like that—first part—middle part—further middle part—centre—right or left. I should say we are all rather mixed persons with mixed backgrounds. I could not define exactly what the Congress President stands for. I could say in some matters we are in agreement and in some matters we are not. But our approaches are the same. Every party, except perhaps the Communist Party, is normally some kind of a broad platform on a certain basis of people with relatively varying ideas but having a common will.

Q: We find that all the resolutions adopted either by the A.I.C.C. or the Congress meeting at Nasik¹⁸ have been drafted by you and adopted unanimously and still we find serious differences cropping up.

JN: I should think that you are drawing this inference that we are rather unrealistic in passing resolutions or we do not attach too much importance to the wording or the phraseology of the resolutions because you can see that in the interpretation of them or in the speeches delivered afterwards the stress is laid on one aspect or another and sometimes almost contrary things are said.

But, so far as the Congress is concerned, the resolutions are not implemented by law. You can only judge by the speeches and activities of the

18. At the 56th Session of the Indian National Congress which met at Nasik on 20 September 1950 under the presidentship of Purushottamdas Tandon, resolutions were adopted on natural disasters, foreign policy, communalism, India and Pakistan, foreign possessions in India, India's Constitution, the economic programme and khadi. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 15 Part I, pp. 119-120, 127-128 and 134-135.

leading Congressmen, and the atmosphere that is created by their activities. If I begin to feel that the whole atmosphere that is being created by speeches, activities etc. of many Congressmen as being in the wrong direction, I feel uncomfortable; I feel out of tune.

Q: What were your demands for withdrawing your resignation from the Working Committee?

JN: I have not made any demands and I have felt particularly happy since I sent in my resignation.

Q: With the reconstitution of the central Working Committee, would all provincial set-ups also undergo similar changes?¹⁹

JN: These are symbols. Reconstitution is a symbol of a change in outlook. I feel that the Congress, in spite of the many good steps it has taken, is drifting and has been drifting in a wrong direction. Therefore, if a reconstitution takes place, but without that sensation of a change, it has failed. I have one virtue, among others of course and that is, I have a sense of the public mind. I have dealt with masses so long, I believe, not merely to reach out to them and not to understand how they react. I am always thinking in terms of the effect on masses of people of the policies we may advance of creating an atmosphere. I am anxious to produce an atmosphere in the country of a certain united and concerted effort towards prescribed aims, of certain efforts, of a certain whole-hearted appreciation, of what we call the secular State, non-communalism etc., because I think if that is not done, the disruptive forces in India come into strength and weaken us and prevent progress; reaction comes sometimes under the cloak of nationalism. I want to avoid that, and in order to do that, I want to bring in vast masses of people to feel that way. And I have confidence of doing it. I can do it. I want the Congress organisation to function in that way, and with the best of men in it without producing that sensation, the Congress will not be able to achieve much. Second-rate men having produced that change have the tendency to become bigger men.

Q: Do you fear that the group that holds the upper hand in the present Congress executive does not see eye to eye with you in your ideal of a secular State?

19. The Congress Working Committee was reconstituted with the resignations of A.P. Jain and Kidwai on 17 July 1951, the resignation of Nehru from the Congress Working Committee and the Central Election Committee on 10 August 1951 and of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, on 11 August.

JN: That is not a fact. I think I can't say absolutely of all individuals but I have no doubt at all that intellectually and otherwise they accept that ideal; they work for it. But I am not so sure of the general atmosphere in the Congress in the lower ranks.

Q: The Congress is an organisation of old men, why not have young men?

JN: You lead me into very interesting by-lanes of thought. A remarkable thing that has been happening not only here but all over the world, and not now but in the last generation, specially in the period between the two Wars, is the younger generation has lost, or the older generation has lost complete touch with each other. They have lost the mental touch with each other. It is a remarkable phenomenon. In other countries, with the rapid shocks of events, and changes, this and that, the new generation speaks a different language from the old; and in a way that applies to India too, although we are a much more static people—in thought I mean, more difficult to get out of our grooves of thought. Unfortunately the younger generation has rather lost touch. And that is a big problem, nothing to do with the Congress. That is a major social problem. Any organisation, and specially the Congress organisation, if it cannot speak the language which the younger generation understands, then gradually it will fade out.

Q: Does the idea of the reconstitution of the Working Committee include the taking back of certain eminent Congressmen like Acharya Kripalani or Mr. Kidwai who have left it?

JN: Since you put me such a direct question, I have to give you direct answer more or less. Frankly it depends on many circumstances, but for the moment it seems to be rather odd that people, who have definitely and precisely left the Congress and have formed other parties against the Congress—unless some major change occurs—it is not likely that their challenge will be met that way. I would like the Congress to act in terms of the Bangalore resolution. That resolution, you will remember, was that the Congress opened its doors even to those who had left it. I would like the Congress to repeat that—not only formally by resolutions, but warmly by invitation. It is not because of individuals, but rather that is the approach I want the Congress to make in the country. As regards those who come back, it depends on circumstances, and one has to see what should be done at that time.

Q: In your statement to the Congress Parliamentary Party last week you said that you were becoming ineffective, and you wanted to be effective,

and you thought that that could be achieved only if you brought about a sensation of change in the party and the country.²⁰ If your action fails in the A.I.C.C. to achieve that sensation or change, what follows?

JN: A full session of the Congress.

Q: Do you consider the present crisis grave enough to warrant your assuming the Congress Presidentship yourself?

JN: I tried to answer this question just now. I definitely think that it is a wrong thing, practically a wrong thing, and even otherwise a wrong thing for the Prime Minister to be Congress President. But this being the general rule, I cannot say that under special circumstances, when a hiatus is created, necessity might compel one to do.

Q: When you resigned from the Working Committee, did you decide that you will cease to campaign in the elections for the Congress?

JN: Elections are so far ahead, I could not think of them. But our friend asked the question about my feeling ineffective. What I meant was that I felt myself ineffective in the Congress organisation, not in the country—I have had no such feeling at all. I think I still can be effective in the country as a whole and for that matter in the Congress also. But I felt in that organisation I had become ineffective, and I do not think it was good for my effectiveness to fade out, because it had some value from the country's point of view—apart from whatever individual effect it might have. And I felt that a clear decision by the Congress this way or that would enable me to function in a more effective way, in some capacity, whatever the capacity may be, either individual capacity or group capacity.

I was asked about elections. It is patent that, constituted as I am, I do not get excited about elections. The only thing that excites me is a movement in the country, something that rouses millions of people. That excites me. I see something of that kind in the country. But if it is a question of getting some odd person elected here and another odd person elected there, well I sit at home.

20. At the Congress Parliamentary Party meeting on 21 August 1951, Nehru stated that for some time past he had been trying to put forward before the Congress certain ideals and approaches, and though he had met with a measure of success, the feeling grew upon him that he was failing in his endeavour and that the time had come to give a jolt to the Congress to force all sections in it to consider the national situation seriously. See *ante*, pp. 161-171.

Q: Don't you think you will be much more effective in rousing the millions in the country if you come out of the Congress and then try to rouse them?

JN: Yes, rouse them—but for what? Normally, people function through organisations. You can rouse them for a riot without an organisation. That is possible. But I have no intention of doing that. So, one has to rouse them for organised, concerted effort. And concerted effort comes from an organisation. Now, if you must have an organisation, then, you can either have the Congress, or some other organisation. I see no other organisation which can—practically speaking, I am leaving out its policies for the moment—perform that function. Whether Congress can perform or not depends upon the attitude of the Congress whether it looks to the people as a whole or is rather lost in its own groups and sects. Therefore, I am inevitably led to the conclusion that the proper organ for concerted effort is the Congress, in spite of its failings or weaknesses, whatever they may be, and that I should try to utilise that organ.

Q: You just now said that you could only work well among the masses and could not function in groups. Does it mean you do not want people to question, but only to follow you without question?

JN: My complaint is that they have ceased to question. I want them to question right and left, all the time. There is no questioning left, or very little of it. And may I say that I appreciate very greatly Mr Dwarka Prasad Mishra's statement?

Q: Some minutes ago you said that in a time of crisis the two posts of Congress President and Prime Minister could be combined together. Don't you think that crisis has come?

JN: I never said that they could be combined. What I said was that it was an undesirable thing. But I cannot say what a particular crisis which creates a hiatus may demand for the moment and temporarily.

Q: Would you not follow the Pakistan model and combine the two posts?

JN: That is a very strong reason for not doing it here.

Q: Are you aware that an important section in the Congress says that this crisis in the Congress is mainly due to the policies and programmes of the Government, and that the real disease lies with the Government and not with the Congress organisation. Do you refute that statement?

JN: No, I think it is largely true.

Q: What is the role you have in mind for the Congress organisation in the present circumstances?

JN: The role of the Congress should be an active, progressive role in political, non-communal and economic matters.

Q: There is a complaint that while you want to create a sensation in the Congress, in the country, you are not saying anything definite for people to grasp or for them to achieve.

JN: Their idea of definiteness is concentration on individuals; mine is not. That is the difficulty.

Q: Don't you think the Congress is going the wrong way?

JN: No. Some people are being shifted, that is all. Maybe, there are plenty of people in the Congress with whom many of you do not come in contact. They are not outstanding people, leading people, and all that, but they are the real backbone of the Congress still. They do not count normally in these group politics and the rest. And it is those people that I should like very much to play an important role.

Q: You mean constructive workers?

JN: No, not they alone; others also.

Q: Is it a fact that most of the members of the Working Committee cannot face a public meeting of hundred people?

JN: Certainly not.

Q: The Bengal Premier is one.

JN: He is not a member of the Working Committee, anyway.

Q: The moral of the White Paper showing war propaganda in Pakistan was that preparations were being made in that country to attack us. Would you say that danger has now diminished or vanished or increased?

JN: Well, it is rather difficult to generalise, but I should say that it is somewhat less than it was. At any rate outward signs indicate that it is less than before.

Q: You recently said that the fear of invasion does not exist in your mind. What about the fact of invasion?

JN: If you mean the fact of a possible war, I do not think there is any likelihood of any large-scale invasion because we are strong enough to resist.

Q: Even as a precautionary measure you are against any kind of civil defence or other measures being taken here.²¹

JN: I do not know what you mean by other measures. But civil defence measures—A.R.P. and like that—they are completely infructuous.

Q: Will it not help to keep up the morale of the people?

JN: I do not think so. I think it has the reverse effect. People going about digging trenches, it does not help at all.

Q: What are your minimum conditions for the withdrawal of our troops from the border?

JN: Now, do not get mixed up between the Kashmir issue as such and our troops having been sent near the border there. There are no minimum or maximum conditions. The conditions are that when we feel secure we withdraw them. Now, throughout the British period the major part of the Indian army was concentrated near the frontier. Normally an army is kept where it is likely to be of use. There is no particular point in our keeping an army in Travancore or some such place.

Q: In view of the mounting tension in the world in general, and Asia and the Far East in particular, and in pursuance of your repeated desire to go to the ends of the earth for the maintenance of world peace, do you think it is time for convening a conference of Asian countries for the solution of Asian problems?

JN: No. I do not think so.

Q: About the Planning Commission, Sir, when will you start implementing the plan?

21. Nehru had given strict instructions that nothing by way of civil defence or other measures intended to prepare for war should be undertaken.

JN: The first thing to remember is that the Planning Commission has only begun its function. Some people are under a mistaken impression that having presented the Report it has largely done its work. That is completely wrong. They have to produce their final Report in the course of a couple of months or so. That Report would be the final Report subject to subsequent variation and that plan will have to be worked out by the Central and State Governments as well as, I hope, by non-official agencies and a large number of our people. As a matter of fact we have already started implementing parts of this plan. Not dramatically, but the Central Government and the State Governments have been asked to function on the lines of the Planning Commission's schemes. Of course, the plan itself was made so as to fit in with the present work which is being done, so that there is no hiatus. There may be minor variations here and there. So we have started implementing the plan already.

Q: Do you intend vesting this Commission with executive authority at a later stage?

JN: It is rather difficult to say exactly what form it might take in the future, but I think it has to be given some authority. It cannot obviously take the place of the Cabinet. When the reorganisation of the Commission takes place it may be more intimately allied to the Cabinet. There may be a Minister for Planning, who may be responsible for the Planning Commission, also in the Cabinet.

Q: How does this fit in with the Colombo Plan?

JN: The Colombo Plan, as a matter of fact, so far as it affects India, was drawn up completely by the Planning Commission. It was part of their plan. Actually it is our plan which has been incorporated in the Colombo Plan.

Q: What is the position about the Press Commission?

JN: I gave up thinking about it when I got the impression that the press was not at all keen about it.

Q: Who gave you that impression?

JN: Well, if I may say so, your bosses.

Q: When the Constitution was being amended we had thought that before this Press Laws Bill you would appoint the Press Commission.

JN: But that would delay matters a great deal. Obviously if a commission is appointed it will take at least six months, if not more. All this will delay

matters and then there is the election. We thought we ought to keep our pledge and produce something which will repeal a number of out-of-date laws, etc. We have to do that and we are doing it.

Q: Are you going to proceed with the Hindu Code Bill this Session, Sir?

JN: Certainly.

Q: Will it be passed?

JN: We will make every effort.

Q: Since the working journalists have demanded the appointment of this commission, will you again think of it?

JN: Certainly, I shall think of it.

Now, before I finish, I just remembered one thing and I might as well mention it to you. Day before yesterday I received a protest from the Pakistan Government—of course, there are many protests coming to India from Pakistan—and that protest was in regard to some press statement by Mrs Pandit, I believe, on the eve of her departure from U.S.A. You will find that the Pakistan papers have given big headlines stating that Mrs Pandit was advocating the re-union of India and Pakistan thus putting an end to partition. We think it is really fantastic and even in the actual report which appeared in the Pakistan papers it is completely different to what she had said, and she will correct me if I misrepresent her. She had said that we accepted partition much as we disliked it because we wanted independence and this came in the way and we accepted partition also in the hope that having accepted partition, the two countries would forget their past troubles and come together again, meaning thereby developing good relations between the two countries. This was because we wanted to put an end to our conflicts in order that the two countries may function in a cooperative way.²²

It is completely wrong to demand reunion of India and Pakistan because it is not only not feasible and not desirable but it is something which gives rise to fears and suspicions in the two countries and hinders our cooperation in many fields of activity as independent nations.

Q: Would you also clarify your position that Pakistan has made a protest that you are interfering in Pakistan by referring to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in your speeches?

22. Vijayalakshmi Pandit who was present at the press conference interjected: "It was not an interview. It was a feature story in the *New York Herald Tribune* which was written two months or more ago but published only perhaps a day before I left. I actually did not see it. I only heard about it."

JN: We sent a reply which is clear enough. Well, I have finished. Thank you.

16. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi

August 31, 1951

My dear Krishna,

... The comments in the British press on the Kashmir Deputy Prime Minister's speech are absurd and totally off the mark. What Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the Deputy Prime Minister, said was that they had still to free 'Azad Kashmir'.² There was no question of military operations or any other way of forcibly conquering that territory. It was a plain statement that this was a part of Kashmir, which was being exploited and crushed by Pakistan. Nobody here for an instant thought that anything more was said or intended. It is only the *Manchester Guardian*³ and the *New Statesman and Nation* that drew particular conclusions from it. I have clearly stated on more occasions than one that on no account will we resume military operations anywhere, in Kashmir or elsewhere, against Pakistan unless we are first attacked.

You will remember my sending a letter to Attlee about my speech on British officers in Pakistan. I have now received a reply from him.⁴ I enclose a copy of this....

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.
2. Addressing an Independence Day gathering in Jammu on 15 August, Bakshi said: "We are committed to liberate that part of our territory which is occupied by Pakistani forces. Their forces would be driven back from our territory as they had been forced back from other territories which Pakistan had originally occupied in Kashmir."
3. Referring to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's speech as a sign of approaching storm, the *Manchester Guardian* wrote on 22 August 1951: "Coming from a man holding such an office, this is a very grave statement indeed. What does the Indian Government say about it and into whose White Paper does it fit? This is the most coat-trailing statement yet made in the controversy."
4. Attlee replied on 21 August 1951 to Nehru's letter of 3 August (See *post*, pp. 341-344) that he had felt disturbed when he saw the reports of what Nehru had said on 16 July. Nehru should have conveyed his misgivings to him before expressing them in public because, however guarded Nehru might have felt his reference was, the results had been unfortunate. He clarified that Field Marshal Auchinleck and General Gracey, who had recently visited Pakistan, were not engaged in any kind of improper activity.

... I am going to Kashmir for the weekend. Graham continues to have vague and rather informal talks with us. He has at last produced some kind of informal proposals for demilitarization. As they have been put to us, there are some parts of it which we cannot accept. I have told Graham, and I mean it, that we are not only willing but eager to have a plebiscite, as we feel that this question should be settled once for all. But, this can only take place under proper conditions which we have indicated.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

17. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
August 31, 1951

My dear Dickie,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th August, which I have just received.²

We have been rather surprised to read the comments in the British press about the Deputy Prime Minister's speech.³ Nobody took exception to it here because nobody attached any special significance to it or any meaning such as the British press attached to it. All that the Deputy Prime Minister said was that 'Azad Kashmir' has to be freed from the tyranny under which it was suffering. There was and is no question of military operations or reconquest. So far as we are concerned, we have declared quite unequivocally and repeatedly that on no account will we undertake military operations anywhere in Kashmir or anywhere else against Pakistan unless we are first attacked.

I might inform you that conditions in Poonch etc., have been highly unsatisfactory from Pakistan's point of view. The contrast between these 'Azad Kashmir' areas and the rest of Kashmir is very striking. The latter has made great progress in many ways, while 'Azad Kashmir' is even worse than it used to be and is full of internal quarrels. Quite a number of people there are attracted towards Abdullah's Kashmir. Indeed Pakistan has had to use its troops,

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

2. Mountbatten admired the strong line Nehru had taken on developments in the Congress.

3. Mountbatten wrote that "all friends of India" had been rather disturbed about the report in the *Manchester Guardian*.

sometimes with firing, to keep down the people there. Anyhow, there is no question of embarking on a war to force Poonch etc., back into Kashmir.⁴ But it becomes more and more doubtful whether Poonch is very happy as it is. . .

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Mountbatten wrote: "No one here would seriously imagine that you would embark on a war to force a most unwilling Poonch back into Kashmir, for this would obviously be against everything you have ever stood for."

18. Graham's Revised Proposals¹

As you know, I am going away to Srinagar tomorrow. I shall consult Shaikh Sahib and his colleagues there about Dr Graham's suggestions.² Meanwhile, you can see General Devers or any other member of the Graham delegation and discuss the matter with them.

2. I have been thinking about this matter a good deal and I have also talked to Rajaji about this. I am quite clear that it is not possible for us to agree to the general approach as well as to the detailed provisions of 7(b) and 13. Very probably the Kashmir Government will have other objections too. But it is quite certain that they will never agree to the two matters mentioned above.

3. 7(b) proceeds on an assumption which we have repudiated all along. It is clear that an attempt is made here to treat India and Pakistan on a level of parity. On the previous occasion when we met Dr Graham and others they accepted, partly at least, our point of view. But, owing to Pakistan's objections, they have retained the old wording and, indeed, made it worse. This is clearly a change, and a vital change, in the resolutions of the Commission to which reference is made in paragraph 5. In effect, it gets over, from the Pakistan point of view, the old difficulty about 'Azad Kashmir' forces. The fact that 'Azad Kashmir' forces have been included in 7(a) is nullified largely by 7(b).

1. Note to Secretary-General, M.E.A., Government of India, New Delhi, 31 August 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Graham submitted revised draft proposals on 30 August 1951.

We get back, therefore, not only to the old position of deadlock, but something worse. It is not a question of numbers as General Devers repeatedly said or Dr Graham hinted at. Numbers are important and will have to be considered from the basic point of view of our security. But, before we consider numbers, it must be made perfectly clear that we cannot accept this approach of parity in treatment. We must adhere strictly to the resolutions of the Commission of 13th August 1948 and 5th January 1949. These involve the complete evacuation from the occupied areas of Kashmir of Pakistan forces, nationals, etc. etc., and the disarmament and disbandment of 'Azad Kashmir' forces. We on our part agree not to send armed forces there, but the sovereignty of that area continues with the Kashmir Government. The question of civil administration has not been discussed at all, except that this administration will be under the surveillance of the U.N. representative. The point is that Pakistan ceases to exercise any authority, military or civil, there. Anything done that gives Pakistan even a semblance of authority does not fit in with the resolutions of the U.N. Commission and certainly cannot be accepted by us.

4. The whole conception behind paragraph 7 is opposed to this and, therefore, cannot be accepted. Again, we have repeatedly pointed out that a description saying that there will be a certain force on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line (whatever that may be) and a certain force on the Indian side of the ceasefire line, is not acceptable to us as it proceeds on a wrong premise. Our argument was accepted on the previous occasion by Dr Graham, but, on Pakistan's insistence, the previous wording has been retained. We cannot agree to this, even though the description of the force may be somewhat different than it is.

5. Unless this matter is cleared up, the question of numbers does not arise. As for numbers, we are more or less committed to a certain number in the event of all Pakistan forces, nationals, etc. withdrawing, but 'Azad' forces continuing. If, as is envisaged, the 'Azad' forces are disbanded and disarmed, we should certainly agree to a further reduction of our forces. That will have to be judged from the point of view of security and we cannot give up our right of saying what is necessary for this purpose. Any further reduction still would depend on various conditions, political and other, and an improvement of the situation generally.

6. 7(b)(2) has no place at all and should be left out completely.

7. As regards 13, it seems to me that this is a clear reversion to arbitration which we have rejected. The wording is somewhat milder, but in effect the interpretation of this agreement will include the interpretation of the U.N.C.I.P. resolutions of 13th August 1948 and 5th January 1949. This is exactly what we have objected to in the past. The whole deadlock arose on that point. We cannot give this up and leave it to the U.N. representative to decide. If the position we have held in regard to those two resolutions, as embodied in the

aide memoire, is clearly accepted, and full clarification and details are given of the other parts of this document, then no necessity arises for any subsequent interpretation. If, on the other hand, this is not done, then the interpretation will cover a wide field and will amount to arbitration on important matters. We cannot agree to this. In fact, as you will remember, Dr Graham and Dr Schmidt accepted our viewpoint on the previous occasion. It is only by the insistence of Pakistan that they have included this again. We cannot agree to this inclusion.

8. After writing the above, I have received your note of today's date about your conversations with Dr Schmidt and Mr Blickenstaff.³ You can certainly see General Devers tomorrow, though the points that I have mentioned above are much more political than military and General Devers can hardly discuss them.⁴ The question of the actual number of forces only arises after a decision on the political and like issues. Also 7(b)(2) does not arise at all so far as we are concerned, except later and in the event of a great improvement in the situation. The only point that might possibly be discussed from a military point of view is what further reduction could be made from the figure of 30 battalions in the event of 'Azad' forces being completely disbanded and disarmed. We can accept the general principle of that, but as for figures, we have to consult our military advisers. But, as I have said above, the really important points involve other considerations.

9. General Devers' idea of four battalions is, on the face of it unacceptable. It does not require a military genius to say that.

10. I do not remember what was said in the resolution appointing Sir Owen Dixon as U.N. mediator. But whatever that might be, paragraph 13 in this context goes contrary to what we have been saying all along. We cannot accept arbitration.

3. Bajpai met Schmidt and David Blickenstaff, the political officers on Graham's staff, on 31 August. Most of their discussion related to paragraph 7 and its parts in the Graham proposals of 30 August 1951.

4. Schmidt had said that he would like Gen. Devers to discuss with Bajpai the question of minimum forces to be maintained on the Indian ceasefire line.

19. Demilitarization¹

Paragraph 7²

The Prime Minister made the following points:

(1) The provision in para 7. B. (ii) was entirely unnecessary;

(2) It envisaged a balance between the police force to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line and Indian and State forces to be maintained on the Indian side of that line. The correct balance would be between the Indian forces on the Indian side of the ceasefire line and Pakistan regular forces, after they had withdrawn from the 'Azad Kashmir' area into Pakistan, since these forces were within a short distance of the State and their better communications gave them easy access to it;

(3) After what happened in 1947, the people of Jammu and Kashmir could not be expected to trust the word of Pakistan. Confidence that Pakistan would not attack Jammu and Kashmir could return only slowly and in response to what would have to be a transformation in the attitude of Pakistan's leaders. Even if the Central Government of Pakistan were sincere in its desire not to break any pledges that it might make, not to attack Jammu and Kashmir, we would have to reckon with provincial Governments such as that of N.W.F.P. which, in 1947, had encouraged, aided and abetted the raiders;

(4) Apart from the threat of a possible attack by Pakistan regular forces, the State had to be protected against infiltration through numerous passes over a long border. Though 'Azad Kashmir' forces might be disarmed and disbanded, many of them would still possess arms which it was so easy to hide. These people could and probably would attempt infiltration into the area under the control of the lawful Government of Jammu and Kashmir and, without effective counter-measures, it would not be possible to stop them. If, by infiltration, even a couple of thousands of these people could come into the Valley they could do great damage;

1. Bajpai's record of a meeting between Jawaharlal Nehru, himself, Graham, Schmidt and General Devers. New Delhi, 4 September 1951. *Documents on Kashmir*, Volume VI, Ministry of States, Government of India. These discussions were confined to paragraphs 7, 10 and 13 of Graham's draft of 30 August 1951.
2. Paragraph 7 outlined a programme of continuous demilitarisation. It read: (i) "On the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;" (ii) "On the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State"; (iii) "large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces will have taken place." India disagreed on the provisions under this paragraph relating to the withdrawal of her troops and the quantum of forces to be left.

(5) 7.B (ii) must, therefore, be eliminated. It was an entirely novel conception and objectionable for the reasons indicated;

(6) All that could be said at this stage was what forces India would keep in the State under para 7.B(i) if the operation proposed for tribesmen, Pakistan nationals and Pakistan regular forces as well as the disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces in para 7.A were carried out. A certain figure had been mentioned of forces that India would like to keep on its side of the ceasefire line if the 'Azad Kashmir' forces were not disbanded and disarmed. If they were disbanded and disarmed, some reduction below this figure could be considered.

General Devers said that he was satisfied that Pakistan would not attempt aggression again against Jammu and Kashmir. If that was India's fear, it could be suggested to Pakistan that it should withdraw its forces back to Rawalpindi and Peshawar. If India was afraid of renewed aggression by Pakistan, one had also to consider the fear of Indian troops moving into the areas vacated by Pakistan troops. The Prime Minister said that it was this attempt to put India and Pakistan on the same basis in the Kashmir dispute that had proved an obstacle all this time to some kind of an agreement. India could never accept any claim to equality by Pakistan. Had India intended to seize the territory of Jammu and Kashmir now occupied by Pakistan troops by force, she could have done so and not agreed to a ceasefire. The fact that she had agreed to a ceasefire was sufficient proof of her desire to settle the dispute peacefully. General Devers then observed that, speaking purely militarily, the retention of a large number of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir by India would be dangerous. When asked by the Prime Minister to explain what he meant, General Devers said that one bomb dropped on the main tunnel through which supplies pass from India into the Valley would cut off the Indian troops there. The Prime Minister replied that India had already anticipated such a possibility and there were sufficient supplies in the Valley to enable Indian troops to hold out for six or nine months. He was confident that Kashmir could be and would be held by Indian troops against any attack that Pakistan might launch.

(7) Both Dr Graham and Dr Schmidt asked whether any indication could be given of the forces that India would retain in Jammu and Kashmir under para 7.B(i) if Pakistan carried out the operation described in 7.A. The Prime Minister said that he would have to consult his military advisers but could repeat what he had said already, namely that some reduction below the figure of 30 battalions plus supporting armour already given might be made. General Devers then asked whether only infantry battalions could be retained on the Indian side and the armour withdrawn. The Prime Minister said that he was a layman but General Devers, as a military man, would appreciate that, if there were an attack by Pakistan, infantry battalions equipped with rifles alone could not do much against the Pakistani attack.

Both Dr Graham and Dr Schmidt attempted to get an idea of what further reduction India would make in the strength of Indian forces, after the reduction contemplated under para 7.B(i), as the situation improved. The Prime Minister said that, as he had already explained, the period covered by the proposed draft (para 7) was not a period in which this further reduction could be considered. India had said that, subject to the paramount need to maintain sufficient forces to safeguard the security of the State, Indian forces would be reduced to the minimum necessary for purposes of security. India stood by this undertaking, but the question of this reduction lay outside the purview of Dr Graham's draft which dealt mainly with the stage of "demilitarization".

Dr Graham then asked whether the Government of India would indicate how they would like this idea to be expressed. The Prime Minister promised to consider the matter and make an informal communication thereon to Dr Graham later.

Paragraph 10³

The question of appointing a plebiscite administrator was again raised. General Devers said that since the disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces had been moved forward from the plebiscite stage to the single stage of demilitarization, it would be helpful psychologically in Pakistan to "move up" the date of appointment of a plebiscite administrator. The Prime Minister said that provision for the appointment of the plebiscite administrator on a fixed date was likely to have the very opposite effect on the people of the State now living in the territories under the control of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Dr Graham asked what objection there was to stating that the plebiscite administrator would be appointed at the end of the period of "demilitarization" whatever that period might be. The Prime Minister said that, if there was to be a plebiscite, there must be a plebiscite administrator. The matter had been dealt with when the relevant provisions of the Resolution of the 5th January, 1949, were being discussed with Dr Lozano. The primary function of the plebiscite administrator was to arrange for the plebiscite. Until the conditions were ripe for preparations for the holding of a plebiscite to commence, it would be premature to appoint the plebiscite administrator. Dr Graham's draft dealt really with the withdrawal of Pakistani forces etc. from the territory of Jammu and Kashmir and with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces if the necessary withdrawal on the Pakistani side were completed and the 'Azad Kashmir' forces were disbanded and disarmed. The inclusion in the draft of provision for the appointment of a plebiscite

3. Paragraph 10 read that India and Pakistan "Agree that the Government of India shall cause the plebiscite administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period."

administrator would therefore, not be logical, apart from the fact that it was open to the practical objection of providing Pakistan with a point for controversy—agitation would start immediately for the appointment of a plebiscite administrator irrespective of what happened about bringing into being conditions really favourable to the holding of a plebiscite—and the unsettlement of opinion and feeling that would follow on the Indian side of the ceasefire line.

Paragraph 13

1. The Prime Minister again pointed out that when the final draft of Dr Graham was discussed, Dr Graham had agreed that anything that might bring in arbitration should be excluded from the draft and that since paragraph 13 was liable to this interpretation it should be omitted. Both Dr Graham and Dr Schmidt said that this still was their intention. They had been thinking in terms of substituting for paragraph 13, a provision in the resolution of Security Council, appointing Sir Owen Dixon as U.N. Mediator which authorised him to decide differences of interpretation that might arise out of an agreement over demilitarization. Prime Minister drew attention to the language of paragraph 5 of the draft and said that paragraph 13 could and probably would be interpreted as investing the U.N. representative with authority to decide on questions and interpretation of the provisions of Resolution of 13th August, 1948 and Resolution of 5th January 1949. Dr Graham said that they had no intention of asking India to accept anything that savoured of arbitration because they respected the stand that India had repeatedly taken against arbitration. Dr Schmidt added that if paragraph 13, or something on the lines of the resolution appointing Sir Owen Dixon from which he quoted, was likely to be interpreted as involving arbitration, it would be best not to include such a provision. The Prime Minister said that if agreement were reached on "demilitarization" and worked out in sufficient detail, there might not be any objection to leaving the U.N. representative authority to decide differences over such details. As regard the interpretation of the agreement as a whole, however, his objection stood.

2. Apart from the specific paragraphs mentioned, the question came up, more than once, of how best the fear of aggression could be removed and the tension between India and Pakistan eased. Dr Graham said that he and his associates had prepared a paper which was intended to replace the first two paragraphs of the draft that he had given to the Prime Minister on the 30th August. This draft he handed over to the Prime Minister and invited his comments. As regards paragraph 2 of the draft, the Prime Minister said that it was not quite clear as to what action was to be taken by the nation that was attacked by raiders, etc. General Devers said that what the draft tried to do was to throw on each Government the responsibility for itself fighting raiders

that might come into its territory for purposes of aggression against the other State. The other State would, of course, be free to resist such aggression itself. There was no further discussion of this additional draft.

3. When the subject of the proposed civil armed force to be raised on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line was being discussed, the Prime Minister emphasised that not only was this force, to the extent of half its strength, to be recruited from among persons, belonging to the area, other than those who sided with 'Azad Kashmir' and Pakistan but that such recruitment would be made by "our" officers.

20. Reaction of Kashmir Leaders to Graham's Proposals¹

I had a talk with Shaikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Baig tonight.

2. Shaikh Abdullah's first point was that the document presented to us by Dr Graham was obviously in pursuance of his authority derived from the Security Council resolution which we have rejected. By our answering it, in effect we cooperate in carrying out that resolution.

3. I pointed out that, while there was truth in this comment, it was also true that Dr Graham hardly ever mentioned the Security Council resolution to us, and in fact argued on the lines of the two resolutions of the U.N.C.I.P. of August 1948 and January 1949, which we had accepted. We could have refused to see him, but, having met him, we could not very well refuse to talk to him about these previous resolutions or our general attitude.

4. The only thing we could do now was to repeat that we did not accept the last Security Council resolution, but that being eager to find the way to a peaceful settlement, we had gladly met and discussed various aspects of the Kashmir question with Dr Graham. Without prejudice, therefore, to the stand we have taken up, we were replying to his communication. Shaikh Abdullah more or less agreed to this line of approach.

5. Regarding paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12, Shaikh Abdullah did not have much to say. He commented chiefly on paragraphs 7 and 10.

6. About 7(a)(iii), he drew attention to "large-scale disbandment and disarmament" and said that this meant that part of the Pakistan troops would not be disbanded or disarmed. I pointed out that this phrase had been taken from the previous resolution, but that we had pointed out in some of our

1. Note to Secretary-General, M.E.A., New Delhi, 9 September 1951. J.N. Collection.

notes that what we meant was a complete elimination of Pakistan civil and military authority from that area. The "large-scale disbandment and disarmament" presumably meant full disbandment and an attempt at full disarmament which was not likely to succeed wholly, because arms could be hidden or kept away. At the end of (b), the reference to civil armed forces on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line precluded any other armed forces on that side. If any armed 'Azad' forces remained, they would be part of those civil armed forces, which had been defined by us in another place.

7. Shaikh Abdullah, of course, objected to 7(b)(ii), as it is.

8. He referred to the fact that no mention was made in this document of civil authorities in 'Azad' area after the withdrawal of Pakistan. I said that this certainly was a serious omission and indeed there were many omissions about the future. But it might be explained by saying that the question did not arise during the period mentioned. Nevertheless, it had to be settled some time or other, or else there would be misunderstanding and confusion at a later stage.

9. As regards 10, Shaikh Abdullah repeated, what he had told us previously, that the appointment of the plebiscite administrator at this stage was unnecessary and undesirable. The question was in what manner we should object to this. He made some suggestions. The best thing would be not to mention him. In the alternative, to say that after the demilitarization had been completed, as laid down, or at any rate after 7(a) had been completed, the plebiscite administrator might be appointed.

10. Dr Graham's document is strictly limited to a certain period for demilitarization. All the major questions that arise in preparation for the plebiscite and during it have not been touched at all; e.g. question of stopping undesirable elements from coming in from Pakistan or elsewhere, the checking of *bona fide* residents and the like.

11. I asked Shaikh Abdullah whether he would be agreeable to the U.N. carrying out a plebiscite in the part of Jammu and Kashmir territory under his Government's control, i.e. excluding 'Azad Kashmir'. This has no relation to Dr Graham's letter; but can we at a suitable stage make this offer saying that, while there were many difficulties in the way of an overall plebiscite and these would take some time to be overcome, we were quite prepared to have a plebiscite in our own area under U.N. supervision? This could be easily done, as our electoral rolls were ready. The U.N. authorities could check these rolls and then have the plebiscite in that area. We would be prepared to remove our troops to the ceasefire line to prevent incursions, etc. and leave the entire area free for the plebiscite. We could give every assistance to the U.N. authorities. This one condition would be that Pakistanis or people from 'Azad Kashmir' should not be allowed to come in to create trouble.

12. If, however, it was said on the part of Pakistan or 'Azad Kashmir' that they should be allowed to explain their case to the Kashmiris, Shaikh

Sahib said he would be willing to permit a few well-known persons to come over to do so, provided they did not indulge in communal propaganda. Of course, this facility should be given to him when the plebiscite was held on the 'Azad Kashmir' side.

13. As I have said above, this question does not arise at this stage, but a time may come when we could make this offer. It is quite possible that out of a population of 30 lakhs in the part of the State territory under Shaikh Abdullah's Government, well over 20 lakhs would vote for his Government or for accession with India. If so, this would be an absolute majority in the whole State.

14. The idea is worth remembering and pursuing later.

21. To Frank P. Graham¹

New Delhi

11 September 1951

Excellency,

I have the honour to reply to Your Excellency's letter of the 7th September, 1951, which you handed to me personally that day.²

2. As Your Excellency is aware, we were glad to meet you and your associates as we are eager to find a way to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question. We made it clear, however, to Your Excellency, at the very outset of our discussions, which were informal, that, for the reasons explained by our Permanent Representative, Shri B.N. Rau, to the Security Council, we have found ourselves unable to accept the Council's resolution dated the 30th March 1951, and that our discussions were without prejudice to this stand of the Government of India. The views that my Government are submitting now on your proposals are similarly without prejudice to that stand.

3. We are in complete agreement with paragraph 1 of your proposals;³ it represents a policy that we ourselves have been urging upon the Government of Pakistan for a long time. We would also add that India has not committed aggression against Pakistan or made war on that country and has no intention of doing so.

1. File No. 52/94/NGO/Vol. I, p.54A/corr., M.E.A.

2. Frank Graham made twelve proposals on 7 September 1951 for India and Pakistan on the Kashmir problem.

3. Paragraph I read that the Governments of India and Pakistan "reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir."

4. As regards paragraph 4,⁴ the Government of India not only reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the continuing accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations but are anxious that the conditions necessary for such a plebiscite should be created as quickly as possible; it is with this object, and this object alone in view that they have examined your proposals.

5. It is clear to the Government of India that the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir from invasion or large-scale infiltration of hostile elements will not be effectively ensured until the spirit and temper of war that now prevail on the other side of the ceasefire line and in Pakistan have been demonstrably replaced by a firm will to settle the Kashmir question peacefully. Nor will it be possible to make any headway with arrangements for holding a plebiscite until this condition is satisfied. The Government of India greatly doubt whether this will be practicable within the period of 90 days mentioned in paragraph 6 of the proposals⁵ or such other period as may be agreed upon in terms of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9⁶. The Government of India are willing to carry out the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces in the State by the end of this period provided that the operations described in 7.A(i) (ii) and (iii) of the proposals are progressively completed by the end of that period.

6. In the opinion of the Government of India, para 7.B (ii)⁷ should be omitted. They feel that further withdrawals or reductions are to be made, and their phasing and withdrawals or reductions referred to in this part of the proposals cannot be related to the period to be fixed in terms of paragraphs 6 and 9; these can be realised only progressively thereafter as the fear of incursions into the State or renewal of aggression diminishes and completed when the fear completely disappears. Both the period during which these further withdrawals or reductions are to be made, and their phasing and quantum cannot be determined realistically at present. I would point out that

4. Paragraph 4 read that both the Governments "Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations."
5. Paragraph 6 stated that both "Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of 90 days, unless another period is decided upon by the representatives of the India and Pakistan Governments. . ."
6. Paragraph 9 read that both "Agree that representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments, assisted by their military advisers, will meet, under the auspices of the United Nations, and draw up a programme of demilitarization in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above."
7. It read: "On the Indian side of the ceasefire line further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B(i) will have been carried out."

the withdrawal of their forces which the Government of India are prepared to make under paragraph 7.A, B(i) of the proposals, and which is specified in paragraph 8⁸ of this letter, will be considerably in excess of "the bulk of the India forces". It would leave in the State the very minimum forces necessary to prevent infiltration. Any further reduction could only take place at some risk. The Government of India will be glad, however, to consider this problem with the U.N. Representative from time to time and to give effect to the measures that may be agreed upon between them to make further withdrawals or reductions. They wish me to give you the assurance that it is their policy to reduce their forces in the State to the minimum necessary to safeguard its security; the greater the measure of security that the State enjoys from threats of incursion or aggression, the smaller will be this minimum.

7. As regards the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000 organised, equipped and composed as recommended by the U.N.C.I.P. in C of the memorandum transmitted to Dr Lozano under cover of letter No. 248-PASG/49 dated 13 April 1949,⁹ by their Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs.

8. In pursuance of what has been stated in paragraph 5 of this letter, the Government of India will retain on their side of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir, one Line of Communication Area Headquarters and one Infantry Division (normal) but of four brigades of four battalions each, at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraphs 6 and 9 of the proposals, provided that the operations described in paragraph 7.A(i), (ii) and (iii) of the proposals have been completed by the end of that period. Thus much more than the "bulk of Indian forces in the State" will have been withdrawn and I wish to emphasize that the forces left behind will be wholly inadequate to resist any large-scale aggression. Effective measures to prevent such aggression will, it is presumed, be taken by Pakistan.

9. About paragraph 10 of the proposals, the Government of India agree that the plebiscite administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the State, on both sides of the ceasefire line, permit of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out the plebiscite. To appoint the plebiscite administrator before he can function effectively would be premature. The

8. It read: "On the Indian side of the ceasefire line the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn."

9. During March and April 1949, Lozano, Chairman of the U.N. Commission, met in Delhi, Karachi and Rawalpindi representatives of India and Pakistan with a view to the implementation of the truce agreement decided upon after a joint meeting on 12 March 1949 between Indian and Pakistani representatives, the Commission's Military Adviser, and its truce sub-committee.

Government of India would therefore prefer such a proposal to be omitted from the present document; it would be more appropriately included in proposals that deal specifically and in detail with the holding of the plebiscite and connected matters.

10. The Government of India have no other comments or suggestions to make on the proposals.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Jawaharlal Nehru

22. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi

September 12, 1951

My dear Bakshi,

I enclose a press cutting containing a report of an address you gave in Jammu two days ago. I confess that I am worried about this. There are two matters in it especially which may give us needless trouble. One is your declaration about liberating the 'Azad' areas by any and every means, including war. The other is that the constituent assembly would decide the issue of accession.

I think both these statements are unwise and will be taken advantage of by our critics. Why say anything which might lead us to trouble. You will remember that when I was in Srinagar I laid particular stress on the fact that the constituent assembly should avoid any reference to accession for some time at least. We must await developments and then decide. Reference to accession in this context goes against our own declarations and can do us no good.

You might also know that a previous speech of yours about liberating the 'Azad' areas created quite a furore in England and the United States. To some extent they misunderstood it. Anyhow, it did not help us. I wish you would be more careful in what you say.

Graham has gone. On the whole, I do not think that anything that he might report will be unfavourable.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.



AT A PUBLIC MEETING TO CONDOLE THE DEATH OF LIAQUAT ALI KHAN, NEW DELHI,
17 OCTOBER 1951

I think you should draw the particular attention
of the Home Ministry to effect of war predictions in
some newspapers. Also to astrologers' forecasts
of a coming war. Is it not possible to do
something to stop this kind of thing? The
least that can be done is to tell them
~~or~~ forcibly that this must not be done.
The astrologers should be warned that any
publicity about war predictions will
get them into trouble.

J. Nehru
- 5/9/57

23. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi

September 12, 1951

My dear Krishna,

... Dr Graham and party have now returned to Geneva. During the many conversations I had with him here there was no mention on his part of either the last Security Council resolution on Kashmir or the constituent assembly of Kashmir. It was evident that he scrupulously avoided these topics. I mention this because the London *Times* has stated that Graham asked me to postpone the constituent assembly till March next and that I refused. No such request was made. It is true that if he had made that request, I would have expressed my inability to accede to it.

The large number of unopposed returns² to the constituent assembly in Kashmir have led to caustic comment in the foreign press.³ That comment is justified to only a very small extent. As a matter of fact, it is perfectly true that the present Kashmir Government and the National Conference are both strong and popular. The unopposed returns definitely indicate this popularity as well as a feeling of weakness on the part of their opponents. There may be an element of fear on the part of confirmed Pakistanis, because recently many conspiracies and plots have been unearthed and action taken against these people. Nevertheless, there was no difficulty placed in the way of opposition candidates. In Jammu there will be tough fights in some constituencies. But the fight there will be against Hindu communal elements. Anyhow, the constituent assembly will come into being within the next three or four weeks. It will probably have a short session in Srinagar about the end of October, appoint committees, etc., and then adjourn to Jammu, the winter seat of the State Government. I do not think that the constituent assembly will rush in to make any decision about accession to India. I have advised them strongly against it, as that would only confuse the issue.

Dr Graham spent most of his time with us in discussing the past resolutions of the U.N. Commission on Kashmir and the attitude we had taken up then. All these talks were wholly informal. At a late stage he produced a

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.
2. Seventy three out of seventy five candidates were returned unopposed.
3. For example, *The Times* (London) wrote: "The lack of any opposition, while introducing a farcical note, also proves the strength of Shaikh Abdullah's party machine. This uneventful culmination of the elections had prevented the authorities from assessing reactions to the exercise of the right to vote for the first time in Kashmir history." On 7 September *The Times* again commented that "there could be no more convincing proof of the impossibility of holding a fair plebiscite in Kashmir until the country is effectively rid of troops."

paper, which also was said to be informal. This dealt strictly with what is wrongly called demilitarization (wrongly because the demilitarization is only on the Pakistan side and not on ours). The whole argument was based on the agreements arrived at previously when the Commission was here. We indicated our reactions to it. Graham then went to Pakistan and presumably discussed the same subject there. On his return here, he presented a somewhat revised paper, also informally, and I had a long talk with him expressing our disagreement with some of the clauses in it and our reasons for this. Finally he gave us the formal document, a copy of which I am sending you. In this document he had tried to meet some of our objections. The copy of our reply will indicate to you what our views were.

After this he went to Pakistan and got their reply to this last document.

Without giving up any of our basic points, we have gone pretty far in meeting his proposals. We have expressed our readiness to reduce our army in the State very greatly, provided of course that all the Pakistan forces etc., are withdrawn and the 'Azad Kashmir' forces are disbanded and disarmed.

On the whole, I am inclined to think that Graham is not unfavourably disposed to us. Probably he will make a report to the Security Council just indicating the differences between us and Pakistan and without committing himself. We have gathered from the U.K. High Commissioner here that his Government are not at all anxious that this matter should be brought up before the Security Council and that a break should occur. They want to play for time.

The Indo-Pakistan situation has not undergone any marked change, although things are generally quieter. There is still a vague fear or expectation of war. But, on the whole, this is less than it was. As I have written to you previously, October is likely to be a difficult month from this point of view. Personally I do not expect big scale conflict. But we are perfectly prepared for it.

Please keep the Graham papers secret.

There is another matter to which I would like to draw your attention. I do not want you to do anything special about it, but you should know of it.

For a long time past the Burma Government have had to face a difficult situation on their border with China. Some 2,000 Kuomintang troops, pushed out from China, entered Burma and there they have been since. The Burmese Government did not like this at all and protested vigorously. But they are not strong enough to take any effective action against them. They were afraid of the Chinese Government's troops entering Burma in pursuit of the Kuomintang forces. At the request of the Burma Government we spoke to the U.S. Ambassador here last May and suggested to him that these Kuomintang troops should be removed from that place.

Nothing has happened since then and in fact these Kuomintang forces have given a lot of trouble to the Burma Government. There is some evidence

to show that they have been re-armed recently. If so, this could only have been done through Siam and possibly by the Americans there. I suppose plenty of arms are flowing into Siam anyhow.

The Burmese Government are greatly worried about this and have almost decided to appeal to the United Nations giving all the facts. We have asked them to stay their hands for a while. Today we gave a full account of all this to the U.S. Ambassador and the U.K. High Commissioner. Both recognised the gravity and delicacy of the situation and said that they would communicate with their Government immediately. I think Morrison⁴ is being informed in the U.S.

I need hardly tell you that I have got to face more work and problems today than any normal human being ought to have to deal with. Somehow I cannot escape them.

Love

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Herbert Stanley Morrison (1888-1965); British Labour politician, at this time Foreign Secretary.

24. To K.M. Munshi¹

New Delhi
September 18, 1951

My dear Munshi,

Your letter. I am glad you are going to Kashmir. I have no record of my speeches in Kashmir with me and it is difficult to prepare a comprehensive note on the subject. I do not know for what particular purpose you are going there. Is it some function?

The present is rather a difficult and delicate moment to say much about Kashmir. Indeed the less said, the better. Graham has just gone and we should await his report before saying much more than we have already done. Our basic position is that the Kashmir people themselves have to decide about the future of Kashmir. We are always prepared for a plebiscite, provided it is under proper conditions.

1. J.N. Collection.

As for the constituent assembly, we are entirely in its favour as giving a constitutional background to the Government there and drawing up the constitution. Nothing should be said about the constituent assembly finally deciding about the accession of Kashmir. This is rather a delicate matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

25. Status of Kashmir Constituent Assembly¹

Shaikh Abdullah's statement, as reported, certainly goes too far.² No such assurance has been given by the Government of India or on its behalf. What I have stated from time to time is that the constituent assembly will be considered by us as representing the people of the State and their wishes must naturally carry the greatest weight. Further that the ultimate fate of the Kashmir State will have to be decided by the people of the State.

2. A distinction has to be made between the internal authority of the constituent assembly and Kashmir's external relations. The assembly would no doubt be sovereign in regard to all matters concerning the State, excepting its relations with the Government of India, which obviously can only be settled by mutual consent. Further, and as a part of this, the constituent assembly cannot decide finally about the accession of the State, though it may express its opinion upon that or any other subject.

3. I have repeatedly emphasised to Shaikh Abdullah and other Ministers in Kashmir that it would be a wrong approach for the constituent assembly even to discuss such subjects as accession in its early stages. They appeared to agree with my views. It is unfortunate that speeches or statements are made which confuse the issues and can be used against us in the Security Council or elsewhere.

1. Note to G.S. Bajpai, Secretary-General, M.E.A., New Delhi, 18 September 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Abdullah said in Srinagar on 13 September 1951, that the Government of India had already agreed that "the consembly shall be a sovereign body and under these circumstances India shall have to recognise its decisions. The Government of India have given us certain pledges in this respect which they have to honour."

4. I agree with you that we should inform Shri B.N. Rau that we stand by the statement he made before the Security Council on the 21st March, 1951.³ Our Ambassador in Washington should also be informed of this. I do not think that Shaikh Abdullah should have any reasonable grounds of objection to this procedure.

3. B.N. Rau stated that Kashmir was an autonomous State in a federation and had every right to have its own constitution. The constituent assembly it had proposed to set up could express an opinion on the issue of accession, but this would not prejudice the issues before the Security Council.

26. To Ghanshyam Das Birla¹

New Delhi

September 19, 1951

My dear Ghanshyam Dasji²,

Thank you for your letter. I am sorry I missed you when you were in Delhi.

About Kashmir, I can hardly give you any new information. Dr Graham is likely to present his report to the Security Council within a few days and much depends on what that report contains. I imagine that the report will be rather non-committal and will only point out the different approaches of India and Pakistan in regard to what is called demilitarization.

We told Dr Graham that we are anxious and eager to have a plebiscite to put an end to this dispute. But this plebiscite must be held under proper conditions.

So far as the constituent assembly of Kashmir is concerned, it will come into being very soon. We have made it clear that this assembly will not decide the question of accession of Kashmir so far as we are concerned. But it will certainly be the sovereign body within Kashmir, subject to the existing relationship with India.

Although there has been some toning down of the war scare in Pakistan, it cannot be said that danger has passed. The next two months will be delicate and difficult. So far as we are concerned, it is worthwhile looking at our present-day activities which are as far removed from war as possible and are in great contrast with that of Pakistan. There are preparations for the general elections, and in Parliament we are engrossed in the Hindu Code Bill. No country thinking of war could function in this way. We have made it clear

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A leading industrialist.

that we are not going to start a war whatever happens. But if we are attacked anywhere by Pakistan, then we shall certainly resist with all our strength and this will mean an all-out war with Pakistan. I do not think there will be war, but there can be no certainty. It depends on Pakistan.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

27. To S.M. Abdullah¹

New Delhi
September 26, 1951

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I have just received your letter of September 24th about the forthcoming meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in Paris.²

As you know, the General Assembly splits up into a number of committees dealing with specific problems and in choosing our delegates we have to provide a member for each specialised committee. The agenda is a very big and complicated one dealing not only with political, but also with economic, social and financial matters. There are five delegates and five alternates. It is always rather difficult to get people for each specialised type of work. We have more or less finalised our delegation from this point of view.

It is rather doubtful if the Kashmir question will be brought up before the Assembly. It might come up before the Security Council. Our own information is that the U.S. and the U.K. will try to soft-pedal it and postpone it, if possible. Nevertheless, it may come up. If so, it might come up even before the General Assembly meeting. Till Graham's report is out, we do not know what the future course would be. I think it may be necessary for a representative of the Kashmir Government to go there when this matter is considered. That will depend on developments.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The fifth session of the General Assembly, which opened on 19 September 1950 in New York, was formally brought to a close on 5 November 1951 in Paris. The sixth session was held in Paris from 6 November 1951 to 5 February 1952.

The other factors, which no doubt you have in mind, are the general propaganda value of people discussing the Kashmir issue there with other delegates, etc. There is something to be said for this. But I think we had better wait for developments. The U.N. Assembly this year will be so tied up with major political issues of war and peace in the world that it is quite unlikely that Kashmir will be very much in the background.

Among our alternate delegates we are including Zaidi.³ Subhan⁴ is going as an adviser for publicity work. R.K. Nehru⁵ will be Secretary-General of the delegation and we are asking him to keep fully acquainted with Kashmir papers.

The delegation is likely to go early in November.

I do not yet know when Graham's report will come out, but probably this will be presented to the Security Council by the end of this month. Immediately after, we shall have some indication as to the future course likely to be adopted in regard to it. We shall be in a better position to judge then.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Syed Bashir Husain Zaidi (b. 1898); Minister, erstwhile Rampur state, 1930-36 and its Chief Minister, 1937-49; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1956-62; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1947-49, Provisional Parliament, 1949-51, Lok Sabha, 1952-57 and Rajya Sabha, 1963-1970.
4. Mohammad Subhan, a senior correspondent of *The Times of India*.
5. He was Special Secretary for U.N. Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs at this time.

28. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Your telegram No. 327.² As I have already told you, it is impossible to define our own line in dealing with Graham's report until it becomes available. If, as reported in press today, report is not presented before 6th October, debate in

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1951. File No. 52/94/NGO/Vol. I, p. 59-A/corr., M.E.A. Also available in J.N. Collection.
2. Rau cabled on 26 September 1951 that Zafrullah Khan had said at a press conference that he would remain in New York until the issue of Graham's report. Rau, therefore, wanted to clarify certain points which he thought might be raised by Zafrullah Khan. These points were in respect of India's interpretation of U.N.C.I.P's resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 as well as the elections to the constituent assembly.

Council on 8th could be purely preliminary. Both parties must have time to consider it before they can make any useful contribution to Council's deliberations. As soon as main contents of report become known we should like you to telegraph these immediately. On receipt of report, we shall send you full instructions. We are also considering whether we should send anybody from here to assist you when report is being debated (Abdullah has been pressing that someone from Kashmir should be sent for this purpose) and shall decide matter when substance of report is known to us. Meanwhile, following brief answers to questions asked in Para 3 of your telegram might be of some use:

(1) India has never accepted position that disbandment and disarming of 'Azad Kashmir' forces should come after withdrawal of bulk of Indian forces referred to in B.1 of Part II of Resolution of 13 August, 1948. It was Commission which took view that such disbandment and disarming should take place under 4 (b) of Resolution of 5 January 1949, presumably because, in September 1948, it had given assurance to Pakistan that it did not contemplate disbandment and disarming of 'Azad Kashmir' forces as part of operation envisaged in A. 1 and 2 of part II of August, 1948 Resolution. Our stand has been explained in detail in paras 1 and 2 of memorandum (No. II) given by Bajpai to Dr Schmidt vide 6 of papers relating to Dr Graham's mission forwarded with Bajpai's letter No. 356-SG/51 dated 8th September to you through Mrs Pandit. Bajpai's letter of 18 February 1949 did not involve admission that disarming of these forces was to take place after withdrawal of bulk of Indian forces envisaged in B.1 of Part II of 1948 Resolution. Pakistan had contended that disbandment and disarming should take place after implementation by India of B.1 of this Resolution. We contended that this would jeopardise security of State, which we had always regarded as paramount and that, therefore, disbandment and disarming of 'Azad' forces should be treated as part of process envisaged in A. 1 and 2 of Part II of that Resolution. This has been our position throughout all discussions. See also Bajpai's letter of 21st August 1949 to Chyle³ (pages 117-118 of Vol. 111 of *Documents regarding Kashmir*).

(2) India has always interpreted "final disposal" to mean territorial disposition of forces, both under 4(a) and 4(b). This is fully consistent with position regarding disbandment and disarming of 'Azad Kashmir' forces explained in (1). India never envisaged this phrase in 4(a) to mean disbandment and disarming either of India or of State armed forces.

(3) Our position has been fully explained in para 6 of our reply dated 11th September to Graham's proposals forwarded with Bajpai's letter 361-SG/51 dated 12th September.⁴

3. Oldrich Chyle, Czech member and chairman of the U.N.C.I.P. in 1949.

4. See *ante*, pp. 290-291.

(4) We are asking for detailed information from Kashmir Government and further telegram will follow. According to our information, arrests and detentions were not made to influence result of elections to constituent assembly but because of infiltration into the State of persons of evil intent from Pakistan side of the ceasefire line who, in conspiracy with similar elements in Kashmir, wished to assassinate Ministers of Kashmir.

29. Agitation by Jammu Praja Parishad¹

The activities of the Praja Parishad in Kashmir are misconceived and harmful.

This attitude of narrow communalism has been opposed by us throughout India and in particular in Kashmir. Any person who encourages this policy injures the interests of India and even more so of the Jammu and Kashmir State. At the present moment any such activity is irresponsible and utterly wrong.

I am informed that the Jammu Praja Parishad Party is carrying on an agitation in opposition to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State and the National Conference.

I am further informed that Mr Prem Nath Dogra has sometimes used my name in this connection and referred to his meeting me. I gave him an interview some time ago at his request and made it clear to him that I considered the activities of the Praja Parishad Party in Jammu as misconceived and harmful. It was their duty to support the Jammu and Kashmir Government and cooperate with the National Conference. He promised to do so. I am surprised that instead of keeping his promise, he and his party are going contrary to it.

1. Statement issued from New Delhi on 2 October 1951. *National Herald*, 4 October 1951.

30. United Nations Observers¹

Britter's² despatch to *The Times*³ is highly objectionable.⁴ We have no intention whatever of modifying our stand whether as regards demilitarization or the extension of the scope of active United Nations observers.⁵ In view however of the fact that Graham's report is likely to be published soon⁶ it appeared to me premature and undesirable to make any pronouncement at this stage. As soon as the Graham report is published we shall make our views known.

1. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon, New Delhi, 3 October 1951. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Eric Britter (1906-1977); foreign correspondent for *The Times* (London) in several Asian countries, and for fourteen years its New York correspondent covering the United Nations.
3. Britter wrote on 2 October 1951 that it seemed imperative that the United Nations should act boldly as soon as Graham's report was presented, even if the action was unpopular with one of both parties, and demilitarization of Kashmir should be brought about through firm action by the Security Council.
4. Krishna Menon had drawn Nehru's attention on 2 October to this report.
5. The despatch suggested that the system of U.N. observers should be extended to the Indo-Pakistan border and both countries should be induced to withdraw their troops to a safe distance.
6. Graham submitted his report to the Security Council on 16 October 1951. He recommended that the Council should call upon India and Pakistan to avoid any increase of their military potential in the Kashmir State. He also recommended that the Council should consider a fresh effort to obtain agreement on demilitarization. The Council at its meeting in Paris on 10 November allowed Graham to continue his efforts.

31. To K.M. Cariappa¹

New Delhi
October 5, 1951

My dear Cariappa,
Your letter of the 5th October.

I am afraid I am terribly busy and can find no time for seeing films or even for a long talk. I should, however, like to see you for a few minutes before you go.

1. J.N. Collection.

During your visit to England, I suggest that you should avoid any discussions with U.K. officers or others.² More particularly, you should avoid discussing anything about Kashmir or the recent deployment of our forces on our frontier. Indeed I would go so far as to say that if anybody starts such discussion, you should tell him that these are political matters which are discussed by Government and not by officers.

I might inform you that I wrote to Mr. Attlee sometime ago taking strong exception to U.K. officers, in the course of their talks with our officers, passing slighting remarks about our policy in Kashmir and vis-a-vis Pakistan.³ I told him that I considered this very objectionable and had advised our own officers not to enter into any arguments.

The Kashmir issue, in particular, is highly intricate and I do not know what possible developments might take place after Dr Graham's report has come out. We shall have to decide on our policy then.

In regard to the recent deployment of our forces on our frontier, the simple position is that Pakistan has been shouting about war and *jehad* for months past and actually taking every precaution for it. In self-defence, we have taken some measures and we propose to continue them so long as there is the slightest danger. On our part, we shall, on no account, start any conflict with Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Krishna Menon had cabled on 4 October 1951 that there were rumours in War Office circles about Cariappa's visit.
3. See *post*, pp. 341-344.

32. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 10904 dated 11th October.²

About Kashmir we have nothing further to say. We have made our position

1. New Delhi, 12 October 1951. File No. 52/94/NGO/Vol. I, p. 72 A/corr. M.E.A.
2. V.K. Krishna Menon had written that he would meet Herbert Morrison the next day for the last time before the general election and though he expected the conversation to be informal, and despite a commonsense understanding of the issues of Kashmir, Iran, Egypt and the West Asia, he would feel assured of Nehru's mind and approach and appreciate any general guidance that he might desire to give him in regard to Egypt and Iran.

clear and we await Graham's report. Recent statements in London *Times* and *Manchester Guardian* have suggested that Security Council should compel us to adopt certain course of action.³ This is foolish and dangerous suggestion which, if adopted, will lead to much more trouble.

Middle East situation is difficult and delicate and we would have preferred not to be entangled in it. But we shall have to take up some definite attitude in Security Council. Generally speaking, we feel that British policy there has been very inept and has not taken into consideration new forces and passionate nationalism. Continuous reference to legal formulae and International Court of Justice does not help at all and in fact irritates Iranians. Any exercise of force obviously inadvisable and impracticable. Therefore, more conciliatory attitude desirable. We realise that Iranian Government has made peaceful solution more difficult. We also appreciate that U.K. Government has been put in false and embarrassing position and we have a certain measure of sympathy for it in troubles that envelop it. We think that all-out effort should be made for real conciliation and peaceful settlement having regard to existing facts. Our exact attitude in Security Council will depend upon developments there which we are following carefully.

Our general attitude, therefore, is one of some sympathy with U.K. but, at the same time, we feel that their past policy has been unfortunate. Any attempt to pursue that policy will not yield results.⁴

This is for your personal guidance. No commitments of course can be made at this stage.

3. See *ante*, pp. 232 and 234.

4. After meeting Morrison, Krishna Menon cabled on 14 October that Morrison felt "the U.K. cannot and do not intend to withdraw the case from Security Council", and if they did so they would fall between two stools and lose the apparent strength of their position. He hoped that India would not oppose their resolution at the Security Council and help the U.K. reach a settlement. He would welcome any suggestion from Nehru.

33. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Your telegram No. 372 of 17th October.² As Council must be aware, we have given Dr Graham all possible cooperation consistent with the stand that we

1. New Delhi, 18 October 1951. File No. 52/305/NGO-54., M.E.A.

2. Rau informed Nehru on 17 October 1951 that the Security Council was meeting on 18 October 1951 to receive Graham's report and that Gross had asked him whether India would agree at the meeting to the adoption of a resolution granting Graham authority to continue his negotiations.

took on Council's Resolution of 30th March, 1951. We gladly agree to Graham being given authority to continue negotiations as recommended by him in his report but without prejudice to our stand on Resolution of 30th March.

For your own guidance: It is most important that no indication be given either formally or informally, that there is any possibility of modification of position taken up by us in our reply of 11th September to Graham's proposals. We have had no time to consider line to be taken by us in proposed negotiations and there must be no commitment on that at this stage.

34. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

We have given preliminary thought to possible resumption of negotiations as recommended by Graham in his report to Security Council. Since demilitarization still presents main problem, we have provisionally selected General Thimayya and Brigadier Manekshaw² to assist in further discussion of this problem. Thimayya, as Divisional Commander in Kashmir for over two years, is familiar not only with history of military operations but every inch of terrain. He can speak with authority on problem of security of State and defend our stand on 7.B(1)³ as well as (ii)⁴ of Graham's proposals. Manekshaw, Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters, has participated in all past discussions with U.N.C.I.P. etc. and should be of great help in explaining Indian position from broader military standpoint. Since military problem cannot be divorced from political, which is of paramount importance, someone representing Government of Kashmir will also probably

1. New Delhi, 24 October 1951. File No. 52/305/NGO-54, M.E.A.

2. S.M.F.J. Manekshaw (b.1914); commissioned in February 1934; G.O.C.-in-C, Western Command, 1963-64, Eastern Command, 1964-69; Chief of the Army Staff, 1969-73; Field Marshal, 1972.

3. The proposal 7.B (1) said that regarding "the Indian side of the ceasefire line the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn."

4. 7.B (ii) read: "further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B(i) above will have been carried out, so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the ceasefire line a force of—(to be filled in by Pakistan) civil armed forces, and on the Indian side of the ceasefire line a force of—(to be filled in by India)."

go to Paris.⁵ We cannot, however, finalise composition of team to be sent from here until we have clear idea of procedure that Graham intends adopting for purpose of projected negotiations. If you see no objection, we should like you to sound him informally on this point as soon as convenient. As stated, however in telegram Primin 21721 of 18th October, no indication should be given in any talks that you have with Graham now, that there is any possibility of modification of position taken up by us in our reply of 11th September to Graham's proposals.⁶

5. The Security Council meeting in Paris on 10 November 1951, adopted a joint Anglo-American resolution instructing Graham "to continue his efforts to obtain the agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of Kashmir," and to report to the Council within six weeks; those voting for the resolution were Great Britain, Brazil, Nationalist China, Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the U.S.A., and Yugoslavia, while the Soviet delegate abstained.
6. See *ante*, pp. 289-292.

35. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Your telegram No. 11070 dated 24th October.² Last Sunday, we discussed with Abdullah and Bakshi question of constituent assembly's handling of accession issue.³ They view that assembly should, in opening stages of session, adopt resolution affirming accession was pressed, Abdullah's own view was that he should, in his inaugural address, trace history of Kashmir dispute, affirm his own preference for accession to India with reasons there for and then ask constituent assembly, which will break up into committees, to consider matter. This view prevailed and will be acted upon. Since, after first session of ten days, assembly will adjourn till March, there is no likelihood of its passing any resolution on question of accession until then. There is little doubt, however, that if Council again raises issue of competence of assembly regarding

1. New Delhi, 25 October 1951. File No. 52/94/NGO/Vol-I, p. 86A/corr, M.E.A.
2. B.N. Rau wrote that the convening of the constituent assembly on 31 October was viewed by U.K. and U.S.A. as a disturbing element in Indo-Pak relations particularly because of Shaikh Abdullah's statements that the constituent assembly would decide the question of continued accession. Rau, therefore, requested Nehru to prevail upon the constituent assembly to refrain from dealing with the question of accession altogether or at least until after conclusion of further negotiations recommended by Graham.
3. On 21 October 1951.

accession and if critical or hostile views are expressed, result will be very opposite of what Council may desire. Since para 4 of Graham's proposals⁴ reaffirms our agreement to decision of question of continuing accession by plebiscite and in para 4 of our reply, we have clearly stated that we want plebiscite to be held as soon as necessary conditions are created, there is no justification for Council reopening issue, especially after full explanation of our attitude given by you during debates on resolution of 30th March.⁵ You can make this clear to Graham and to members of Council. I wish to emphasise, as strongly as possible, that any reopening of issue of competence of constituent assembly during Council debates will hinder and not help negotiations that Graham has recommended and peaceful settlement that we presume Council still has in view.

4. Para 4 of Graham's proposals read as follows: "Reaffirmation of their (India's and Pakistan's) acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State would be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations."
5. Rau had informed the Security Council on 29 March 1951 that the Indian Government could not accept the revised resolution which he regarded as a violation of the U.N.C.I.P. resolution of 13 August 1948.

36. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

Your telegram No. 132 dated 29th October.²

1. We have no objection to paragraph 12 of Graham's proposals dated 7th September as its scope is limited to programme of demilitarization, for if such programme is agreed upon, differences could arise on relatively unimportant matters of detail. We object, however, to the suggestion in paragraph

1. New Delhi, 30 October 1951. File No. 52/305/NGO-54, M.E.A. Also available in J.N. Collection.
2. Rau had asked for clarification in regard to paragraph 12 of Graham's proposals of 7 September which said that differences upon demilitarization programme be referred in last resort to U.N. representative for final decision. It was accepted by Pakistan but India's reply of 11 September was silent on this point.

6 of Pakistan's reply to these proposals dated 12th September³ that any differences regarding the interpretation of the agreement (assuming that one is reached) on these proposals should be referred to the U.N. representative whose decision should be final. Graham's original draft proposals included such a provision but he agreed to omit it from his final draft because of our strong objection. In view of the references in the proposals to the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5th January 1949 (paragraph 5⁴) such a provision would be specially dangerous as Pakistan is certain to argue that it gives U.N. representative final authority to interpret portions of those two resolutions dealing with demilitarization, a view to which we have been consistently opposed.

2. In our telegram Primin 21721,⁵ we authorised you to agree to Graham being given authority to continue negotiations as recommended by him in his report but without prejudice to our stand on the Council's Resolution of 30th March. This covers both venue and time-limit of six weeks proposed for negotiations. We also accept Graham's recommendations 1⁶ and 2.⁷

3. The Pakistan Minister for Kashmir Affairs, M.A. Gurmani, said that Pakistan's reply to "Graham proposals" was submitted on 12 September 1951 but he declined to disclose the nature of Pakistan's reply to those proposals.
4. Paragraph 5 said that the Governments of India and Pakistan "agree that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 11, the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the U.N.C.I.P. resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single, continuous process."
5. See *ante*, pp. 304-305.
6. The first proposal laid down reaffirmation of the two Governments' determination not to resort to force with regard to the question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
7. The second proposal recommended agreement to take measures to avoid warlike statements regarding that question.

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

1. The Danger of War

1. Pakistan's Military Confrontation with India¹

... This morning's paper contained a statement by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, in which he accused India of thinking in terms of aggression on Pakistan and of amassing her troops on Pakistan's borders and of doing many other things which he did not appear to like.² Obviously, as soon as I read this, my mind focused in that direction because Mr Liaquat Ali Khan had accused us before the world and approached other countries and made various statements and the like which appear to me to be completely wrong.

I wanted to speak to you about many subjects. Nevertheless, this fact stared me in the face, for Mr Liaquat Ali Khan has raised a major issue. Therefore, I should say something about it to you and through you to others to whom my voice might reach, because it is an important matter that has been raised and we should understand it. So, I propose to speak for a little while on the issue of what Mr Liaquat Ali Khan has said but not to give away too much on that subject or something which may not be perhaps quite correct. I have, for that reason, taken care to bring some notes, if you will permit me to refer to them while I am speaking.

The first thing is that this statement of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, if I may say so, is critical of India. The facts stated by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan were not correct. It was true, however, that there have been movements of the Indian army units in areas in order to give full security to our frontier areas.³ We cannot afford to let our frontiers go undefended or to permit ourselves to lapse from the vigilance that every independent nation is compelled by necessity to exercise.

It is a gross falsehood for anyone to suggest that India has any intention to attack Pakistan or any other country. There is no country and no government in the world which does not abhor the idea of war as much as India. As evidence of this we had demobilized a considerable section of our army last

1. Speech at a public meeting, Bangalore, 16 July 1951. A.I.R. tapes. Extracts.
2. On 15 July 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan told a press conference at Karachi that 90 per cent of the Indian army had been concentrated within striking distance of the borders of West and East Pakistan, constituting a grave threat to Pakistan's security, the interests of neighbourly relations between the two countries and to international peace. He said that he had asked Nehru to remove this threat and had also informed the Security Council of this development.
3. In June 1951, Pakistan dispatched a brigade to 'Azad Kashmir'. India saw it as a sign of Pakistan's preparations for an offensive and responded with troop concentrations along the West Pakistan border.

year,⁴ and we had hoped that this would have some effect on Pakistan. Instead of this Pakistan has been adding to her defence forces feverishly and, what is much worse, there has been a continuous, intensive and vicious propaganda for war in Pakistan during the last six months and more.⁵ Hardly a day goes by when the Pakistan newspapers do not demand war against India. Responsible leaders of Pakistan, including Ministers in Government demand war. I do not know of any other State where such propaganda is being carried on for war anywhere else at any time. We have repeatedly drawn attention to this of the Pakistan Government and at the United Nations. Yet this has continued. Either the Pakistan Government are responsible for it and encouraging it or are incapable of checking it.

During the last month a large number of aggressive raids have taken place on Indian Union territory in Kashmir State from Pakistan. We have drawn the attention of the United Nations to this also.⁶ We know also that organised preparations for raids and sabotage in the Indian Union territory have taken place from Pakistan. My Government would have been failing in their duty if they did not take adequate measures to meet this grave situation. We are taking all such measures. On no account will India attack Pakistan but if Pakistan indulges in any aggression against India in any part of her territory this will be met adequately. We want to make this perfectly clear.

It is intolerable for continuous propaganda for *jehad* to be carried out in Pakistan, month after month without check or hindrance, and then for the Prime Minister of Pakistan to tell us that India is at fault and that he wants good neighbourly relations with India. We want good neighbourly relations but not at the price of aggression, insult and calumny and continuous threat of

4. India had reduced the army by 52,000 in 1950.
5. Preparations for organised raids and sabotage in Indian Union territory had been made in Pakistan and armed forces in both West and East Pakistan, massed near the Indian frontiers had been augmented greatly. The Pakistan Government had asked factories in Pakistan to stock coal for six months' consumption. It had also enjoined on its fighting personnel not to ask for leave.
6. On 5 July 1951, the Government of India drew the attention of the Security Council to three incidents which took place on Indian territory between 23 and 26 June 1951. Two Indian soldiers were killed in Jammu Province, 800 yards inside the ceasefire line. One Indian soldier had been killed and three wounded when patrols were fired on shortly after in the same area. Three more Indians were killed when patrols were fired on in the Tithwal area. In addition, Pakistan forces also opened fire on two occasions on the Indian patrols in the Uri area.

war. Mr Liaquat Ali Khan refers to a "no-war declaration."⁷ It was we who suggested it repeatedly and pressed for it and yet this was rejected by Pakistan on flimsy grounds repeatedly.⁸ As I have said, we reduced our army last year. I should like to know whether the defence forces of Pakistan were reduced or increased during the past year. I should like to know whether these forces have not been added to greatly in both western and eastern Pakistan and if they are not amassed near the borders of Indian territory.

We are engaged today in preparation for the most colossal democratic election in history. Only a day or two ago the Congress Party finalised the manifesto for these elections after open discussions in which we reemphasised the need for peace and friendly relations with all our neighbours including Pakistan.⁹ We agree that the maintenance of a peaceful atmosphere is desirable. We have done our utmost for this.

The answer from Pakistan has been the cry of *jehad* and threat of war. It ill becomes the Prime Minister of Pakistan to talk of good neighbourly relations or of peace when his Government, his ministers and his newspapers, and many of his people are continually talking of war and preparing for it. I regret to have to say that the activities of British military advisers and officers and ex-officers in Pakistan have added greatly to the prevailing tension.

Mr Liaquat Ali Khan has referred to Kashmir. He seems to forget that Pakistan's aggression still continues in Kashmir and that a part of Kashmir State territory, which is Indian Union territory, is still occupied by his troops. I have yet to learn under what law or equity this can be justified.

Meanwhile, the present game of raiding Indian territory from Pakistan continues. If this is Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's idea of promoting a friendly atmosphere with a neighbour country it is not ours. I repeat that we shall commit no aggression on Pakistan on any account, but if Pakistan attacks any part of the Indian Union territory we shall repel this attack with all our strength.

Our people have also suffered from isolation, isolation from the world both physical as well as mental. That is a very dangerous thing to happen and inevitably it leads to decay and collapse as it did in the case of India. The country suffered. When a people lose a dynamic culture which made them progress, which made their minds go ahead, invent and discover, and apply

7. Liaquat Ali Khan had recently suggested a five-point peace package: the withdrawal of troops to normal peace-line stations; a reaffirmation that the Kashmir issue would be decided by plebiscite and that all differences in this regard should be settled by the Security Council; the renunciation of the use of force for settlement of disputes; a reaffirmation that propaganda against the other country would not be permitted; and a no-war declaration.
8. India had first proposed through diplomatic channels in December 1949, a joint 'No-War Declaration' by India and Pakistan.
9. See *ante*, pp. 3-13.

new ideas, then it fell into a rut whether it is a custom or fashion or anything. Then that race decays....

It is most dangerous for a nation and for a people to isolate themselves in minds and in other ways from the progress of the world. The most dangerous thing is to become self-complacent, thinking that we are very great because our great great grandfathers were great, and living in the shadows of the past greatness. Therefore, the question today is, after the achievement of independence, which way shall we look, how can we get rid of this weakness which has secluded us in the past? Our social structure had got many virtues in the past but the moment it became a rigid social structure with caste evils that rigidity led to separatism and the country got isolated.

You cannot suggest that this great variety of India should be done away with. You cannot, because it is in the very texture of this country's history, her geographical position, and climate and all such things which lend a certain distinctiveness to India. And I would not like to see India regimented to one pattern. I like the richness of this variety. It helps in India's progress and growth.

So do not imagine that I am against variety, but I think one condition of survival for India, it is not a question of my liking it or disliking it, is to get rid of our factional and separatist spirit. If we do not succeed in that then we shall go down.

We talk about a secular State. A secular State, of course, does not mean that people should give up their religion. That is absurd. A secular State means a State in which the Government protects all religions, and does not favour one religion at the expense of others. It leaves religion to the individual and to the group; it does not for itself have any State religion.

We use the word secular State often enough. As a matter of fact, every State in the world is a secular State in effect, even though it might have its old forms attached to it. No modern civilized State can be other than a secular State. It is a sign of going back, to some hundreds of years back, to the Middle Ages of Europe, if you can think of anything but a secular State. Apart from that, when I think of a secular State, I mean that it is the only civilized way to solve the State's problems. It is the only practical and possible way for us because any other method means the encouragement of weaknesses and separatist forces.

Yet communal organisations, communal parties and the like talk in terms of communalism. They say something which probably is more dangerous for the future of India than any armed attack from any foreign country. We know exactly that any foreign country which is attacking us is an enemy. There is no doubt in our own minds. But the other effect is a vicious attack which gradually creeps into our minds, without our understanding its full significance or its danger.

We, of course, have suffered enough from communalism. It began in a big way from the time of the Muslim League, and the result of it was separation; the idea behind it resulted in the partition of India. Now it amazes me that the people in India talk about the Muslim League type of communalism, which is now more or less outside India. Some odd foolish individuals may indulge in it, but that does not count in India today, nothing can happen from that source.

Today, by some reverse process, that idea has entered some people's minds and we have Hindu and Sikh communal organisations, as communal as the Muslim League was. Of course, they talk of themselves as nationalists. Naturally, they can describe themselves so because they are the citizens of this country. But, if you examine that gospel of communalism, even under the cloak of nationalism, it is the most dangerous trend from which India had suffered before. It has caused separation because it brought barriers and could break up that essential and fundamental unity of India without which we cannot progress. It does not matter where you see it. Whether it is a Brahmin-non-Brahmin controversy, whether it is this caste or that caste, whether it is any other, it does not matter. This is a fatal weakness of ours, and we have to be wary of it. I know you will forgive me for stressing this, because it is an obvious factor that I lay stress on it. It is of the highest importance.

I spoke to you a little while ago about Mr Liaquat Ali Khan's statement. Pakistan has been built on a communal theory. They sometimes call it a two-nation theory. If this two-nation theory is right, then there is no reason why you should not have a ten-nation theory or a twenty-nation theory. There is absolutely no reason why you should not have a hundred-nation theory. Anyhow, Pakistan is built upon that communal basis. It is a very bad thing for Pakistan. In the long run Pakistan is bound to suffer, as every country must suffer that follows that kind of policy. That is to say, the country suffers not because of the inability, it suffers because of the internal forces that it creates in its own land, and which perhaps have already begun to create their impact there. Because it is an out-of-date, and fantastically wrong basis for a nation to progress, a country that adopts that cannot go ahead.

But then, what Pakistan does or does not do is none of my concern, provided it does not come in my way or my country's way. It is not for me to impose my wishes on Pakistan. I am only sorry that a part of the country which had been an intimate part of our own territory should go wrong. You do not realise it but we, who live in northern India, are concerned intimately with those areas that constitute Pakistan now. I have spent a good part of my childhood in what is Pakistan now, in Lahore. My mother came from there and so many others, and even now there are so many friends still in Pakistan—Muslims, Hindus—there are not many Hindus in western Pakistan—but once we get over these political difficulties immediately we go back to old friendly ties. We cannot totally break up traditional links in this way.

However, as I was telling you, Pakistan may have adopted that theory, I cannot help it. But the most amazing thing is that some young men and women should be misled by these communal cries and communal slogans. That is amazing indeed. Sometimes people tell me that one of my weaknesses is that I see the other man's point of view too much. Perhaps that is so. I do try to understand the other man's point of view. I think it is good to understand, but I just cannot understand how any person with any intelligence can encourage the communal way of thinking or acting. I just cannot understand it. Therefore, I was deeply put out when I found sometimes young men and even young women being misled by cries and slogans and sometimes by the old-fashioned, narrow and bigoted outlook. That way lies folly which is dangerous for India. That way lies our becoming a static people, always looking backwards.

I do not think any country can go ahead by merely becoming a copyist or an imitator of any other country. A country must have its roots in its own soil, history and culture, and if you uproot the people from there they become rootless and superficial. At the same time a country cannot be all roots, it has to come out of the roots, out of the soil and go up to the skies and have branches and flowers and leaves and fruits.

There is a tendency in this land always to look backwards, to think of the roots only—which are very important—but you cannot exist on roots only. The other growth, which comes from them, from a practical view, is essential and important. We should put ourselves in the van of progress, whether it is scientific, whether it is cultural, whatever it is, not losing our roots but taking advantage of whatever is worthwhile in the rest of the world.

The modern world may very well commit suicide in its own way by an atomic war. All this may happen, but the fact remains that the modern world would be much the safer if wars are outlawed, outlawed with a belief in non-violence, and special conventions that do not put us in a strait-jacket. If you do that then I have no doubt that the material in India, the human material, is magnificent, whether intellectually speaking or in spiritual terms. You can see that. If we get rid of that feeling which promotes separation and faction we go ahead fast.

I should like you to think of this, and of this tremendous country of ours as a whole, both in historical perspective and geographical perspective, and see what a magnificent opportunity we have got, all of us who live in India, something which challenges the best in us, and we cannot progress by merely waiting for things to happen, expecting them to happen. We have to work hard in our respective fields. It is a test of the country, and if we do not come up to the test then the world may not be with us. As I said it is a cruel world, but if we have strength enough then we can find our way despite the world, even if the world wants us to keep burdened.

And one thing more and that is this. There are many things worthwhile in life. We have great values. We talk of politics and indulge in conflicts as if there is nothing else. We have lost our attraction for many of the things for which we were noted in the past. Our culture has suffered an erosion i.e., the finer aspects of our culture are no longer cherished. How many of you, I should like to know are familiar with the names of these very fine trees in Bangalore? I have fallen in love with the trees in Bangalore. They are lovely trees, some of them. Do you know their names? Do you make friends with them? Do you know the names of the flowers, the wild flowers as well as the tame ones? Do you recognise the numerous kinds of birds that come? How many of you can tell me the names of the stars above us?

These are little things, perhaps, but they are the things which enrich a person's life. Children, in other countries, know about these things, which our grown-ups do not know. So, try to get out of your narrowness of ways, try to appreciate the richness of life so that when you go elsewhere from here then you see much more because your eyes are open, your mind is receptive. You will be able to see much more of the world, the beauty of the world than the average narrow-minded person sees. And if you were to go to other countries, you will see still greater things and make your minds all the richer with these contacts.

Ultimately, I do not know, it is difficult to say, what the purpose of life is, a question which great men have contemplated upon and tried to answer, I suppose, to their satisfaction, or have also failed to find an answer. But surely one way to find the purpose of life is to have a big purpose in life, a big idea and to hitch your wagon to something big, a star or something, and to work for it. I can tell you that in the ultimate analysis there is nothing more satisfying in life than to work for big things, and it just does not matter what the result is. *Jai Hind*.

2. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I am in receipt of your telegram No. 2650 July 15th.² Your apprehension that there is any threat to the security of Pakistan and to international peace on the

1. New Delhi, 17 July 1951. *Indo-Pakistan Relations. Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan* (From July 15, 1951 to August 9, 1951). White Paper, M.E.A., Government of India.
2. Liaquat Ali had cabled that he had been receiving reports of "large-scale concentrations of Indian armed forces" with all its armour against the Pakistan borders which "constitutes a great threat to security of Pakistan and to international peace."

part of India is completely unjustified. India's policy continues to be to preserve and ensure peace and to avoid war. We have demonstrated this by our reduction of the Indian army last year in the hope that this might have some effect on Pakistan. But according to my information continued and intensive efforts have been made to increase the armed forces of Pakistan which have been largely massed on the Indian frontiers. In addition to this, an intensive and astonishing campaign for *jehad* and war against India has been carried on not only by newspapers but by responsible authorities in Pakistan. We have repeatedly drawn attention of your Government to this. During last five weeks raids into Kashmir State territory across ceasefire line and elsewhere have also been intensified. As you know we have drawn attention of the United Nations to these serious developments. My Government cannot ignore this continuous talk and preparation for war in Pakistan, and we would be failing in our duty if we did not take effective defence measures. The facts you have mentioned in your telegram are not correct but it is true that certain troop movements have been ordered by us for defensive purposes. As I have repeatedly said before I assure you that there is no intention whatever for any aggressive action on our part but any aggression on Indian territory will be resisted.

You have referred to neighbourly relations between our two countries. We are exceedingly anxious to have such relations, but the attitude and propaganda in Pakistan is the major impediment in the development to these relations.³

As regards Kashmir and other disputes between India and Pakistan it has been our consistent policy to strive for a peaceful settlement and we have made numerous proposals to you on this behalf. Our anxiety to avoid conflict with Pakistan is evidenced by our proposal to have a no-war declaration. I would earnestly urge you to stop the propaganda for *jehad* and war against India in Pakistan. This will help more than anything else in improving the relations between our two countries.

3. Liaquat Ali Khan had alleged that the reason for existing tension between India and Pakistan was "persistent refusal" by the Indian Government to settle disputes by peaceful means whereas Pakistan had "made every effort for just and peaceful settlement of these disputes" and had "demonstrated time and again its desire to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with India." He asserted that Pakistan had no aggressive designs against anyone.

3. Cable to R.G. Menzies¹

Thank you for the message which your High Commissioner has transmitted to me.² As I have repeatedly made clear India has no aggressive intentions towards Pakistan. We had to take certain precautionary measures to defend our frontiers. Our reasons for doing so have been clearly stated in a telegram which I sent to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan on July 17.³ The text of my telegram has already appeared in the press. But I am asking our High Commissioner to hand over a copy to you. I appreciate your offer of good offices. In view, however, of our peaceful intention, you will, I hope, agree that there is nothing really that need be done so far as India is concerned.

1. New Delhi, 19 July 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Nehru was replying to an offer made two days earlier by the Australian Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, of his good offices in the relations between India and Pakistan. He saw the danger in rousing religious feelings and was distressed by the behaviour of the Karachi press.
3. See the preceding item.

4. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
July 19, 1951

My dear Jairamdas,²

... I have your two letters dated July 13th and 14th, and I have noted what you have said. We must, of course, take all possible precautions. At the same time, there is no necessity for overdoing this business and spending our time and energy as well as money over relatively unimportant matters. I think that the chances of actual war with Pakistan in the near future have rather receded because of so much shouting about it as well as because it is now perfectly known that India is ready to meet any attack....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extract.
2. Jairamdas Doulatram was Governor of Assam at this time.

5. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
July 19, 1951

My dear Dickie,

You must have been distressed by all this talk of warlike preparations between Pakistan and India. As a matter of fact, we have been greatly worried for the last six months and more by the feverish preparations going on in Pakistan for war. This has taken place both in West Pakistan and East Pakistan. In addition to this, the Pakistan press has been full of insistent demands for *jehad* or war against India. There have been many other indications which point the same way. Meanwhile, we had reduced our army last year by over 52,000 and our intention was to reduce it by another 100,000 this year. We had hoped that this would have a favourable reaction in Pakistan. Nothing of the kind happened.

Reports reach us that as soon as this Graham mission is over, Pakistan would probably attack Kashmir. We have made repeatedly clear to all concerned that any further attack on Kashmir would result in an all-out war between India and Pakistan. I am almost sure that this announcement of ours has thus far prevented any attack on Kashmir.

We had thus to face this serious situation and as an indication of what might come in the future, serious raids across the ceasefire line in Kashmir became rather frequent.² After much thought, we came to the conclusion that we must take effective defensive measures so as to be prepared for an attack. Nothing much was done in Kashmir except to be on the alert and more specially to watch some passes and valleys to prevent infiltration. In East Punjab, however, we moved some troops and armour. It takes some time to do this because rivers have to be crossed. If such movements did not take place at the right time, then our most effective weapons are rendered almost useless at a critical stage. We could not take this risk when on the other side of the border troops and armour have been concentrated.

These moves, of course, could not be kept secret, and Liaquat Ali Khan suddenly started protesting in his most innocent voice. On the whole, I think all this shouting has had a good effect. It is realised by Pakistan that we are quite ready for any emergency. At the same time, the attention of the world

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. On 26 June 1951, at Tithwal, a Pakistan military picket opened fire on Indian Home Guards patrolling the border. On 9 July 1951, Pakistan troops in the Mendhar sector, crossed the ceasefire line, and penetrated into Indian territory for several hours; and on 12 July, a small number of Indian troops on patrol duty, near Karotana village, were fired at by Pakistani intruders.

has been drawn to this and there is less likelihood of any sudden move on the part of Pakistan. So far as we are concerned, we shall certainly not do anything in the way of aggression. I imagine, therefore, that this scare will pass off within a few weeks. Of course, that does not mean that all the tension will go.

According to our information, Gracey has been playing an important part in military matters in Pakistan. He goes there repeatedly and visits all the important military stations and confers with the officers there. Auchinleck has been doing the same both in western Pakistan and in East Bengal. Whether he does anything wrong or not I cannot say, but it is a fact that he has visited most of the military stations, staff colleges, etc. all over the place, and nobody can suggest that he has come here in the middle of the hot weather for his health. The result of all this is a good deal of feeling in India on this subject. There are still quite a considerable number of British officers in the Pakistan army.

During the last six months a study of the Pakistan papers is an education in the propagation of hatred, violence and war fever. All this is very distressing, but I hope that we have reached the pitch and that things will tone down soon. So far as we are concerned, we are terribly busy with preparations for our general elections which are going to be on a colossal scale. Nobody can think of war and at the same time be fully occupied with these election arrangements.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

6. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 9897 of 19 July.² We are stationing our troops and armour on various points near the borders of Pakistan. They are not kept in cities like Amritsar but round about Amritsar, Jullundur and Ferozepore. In order to be able to use our troops and armour we have to put them across two main rivers. If they remain on this side of the river then they cannot get into position in an emergency for many weeks as crossing of rivers takes a long time. If

1. New Delhi, 20 July 1951. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Krishna Menon sought information whether Indian troops were concentrated or moved into Amritsar.

bridges over rivers were destroyed then possibilities of crossing become very difficult indeed.

2. Pakistan has for sometime past concentrated troops, etc. on their side of border from Kashmir to Punjab. They were thus in a position to attack suddenly and we had to take effective precautions.

3. Pakistan continues to raise new divisions in calling up reserves and cancelling leaves and making all kinds of warlike preparations. So far as we are concerned we have taken no other steps except to place our troops on the border.

7. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi

July 22, 1951

My dear Krishna,

I have to answer several letters from you. I have been battling with very heavy work, quite apart from other difficulties. I hope in the course of two or three days to answer your other letters. Meanwhile, I shall deal with your long telegram which came today. In this telegram you refer to your meeting Gordon Walker²....

4. I was surprised to receive your telegram asking me if our troops were in Amritsar. I also read a report of your speech in which you said that we had not moved our troops forward. Perhaps you were not correctly reported. Of course we have moved our troops forward and gone near the frontier. There are always some troops near the border. What we have done in the present instance is to move our Armoured Division from Meerut to the Punjab. This is not sitting in any city, but is spread out over a considerable area within a few miles of the border.

5. For some months past we had been worried not only at the feverish preparations in Pakistan for war but also at the hysterical demands for *jehad* there. Some five weeks ago we considered the situation. There were many factors which indicated that Pakistan might take aggressive action, probably

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. In his cable of 21 July, Krishna Menon mentioned that Gordon Walker, who was Parliamentary Under Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, gave him the impression that the British Government attached no importance to Liaquat Ali's statement of 15 July and regarded it as non-factual. Gordon Walker also told Menon that they had several times asked Pakistan to stop the "holy war" campaign and not to talk of war.

beginning with Kashmir, as soon as Graham went back. As you know, I had made it quite clear on many occasions during the past year that any further attack in Kashmir would necessarily mean an all-out war between India and Pakistan. It would be impossible to limit it to Kashmir as previously. This declaration of mine has, I am sure, prevented Pakistan from attacking.

6. Meanwhile, the progress made in the Kashmir State, that is our part of it, has been very marked. The government machinery is running fairly well, supplies are good, transport, which is very important, is well organised. Generally, there is an appearance of normality and tourists have poured in. In contrast, the Pakistan areas of Kashmir are in a bad way and there are many squabbles and internal conflicts. Because the internal position in our part of Kashmir was improving rapidly, Pakistan became afraid of our consolidating our position too much. Then came the announcement of the constituent assembly. To Pakistan this appeared as the final nail in the coffin as far as Kashmir was concerned. Immediately there was a hullabaloo³ and they went to the Security Council and the U.K. and U.S.A. representatives made very offensive anti-Indian speeches. However, we stood firm on that issue⁴. Pakistan's fear is that if the constituent assembly is held, her chances fade away. So she has tried her utmost to prevent this being held. Our information was that if she cannot stop this by foreign pressure, she would take offensive action and try to create trouble, sabotage, etc., in Kashmir also. Indeed we have caught people who had been sent from Pakistan for this purpose.

7. All this was disconcerting enough. Then came a number of raids across the ceasefire line, which appeared to be parts of an organised plan. They were far more important than the petty raids which had occurred previously.

8. We came to the conclusion that it was exceedingly dangerous for us not to take full precautions to meet any possible attack by Pakistan. Conditions in Pakistan were such that even if the Government there was somewhat reluctant, events might force their hands. We decided therefore to be fully prepared and took steps accordingly.

3. In repeated communications to the U.N., Pakistan asked the Security Council to take note of the threat to peace created by this decision of India and to "retrieve the situation by taking effective measures to stop the Government of India and the authorities concerned in Jammu and Kashmir State from convening the proposed constituent assembly." To back up this demand, Pakistan's Minister for Kashmir Affairs declared that Pakistan might withdraw her delegation from the U.N. if there was any delay in considering the subject.
4. On 1 March 1951, B.N. Rau told the Security Council that the Anglo-American resolution was wholly unacceptable to India, "because in many respects it runs counter to decisions previously taken by the United Nations Commission with the agreement of the parties." India could never accept any entry of foreign troops in Kashmir or any supersession of the lawful Government of the State.

9. Last year we had reduced our army by 52,000 and it was our programme to reduce it by an additional 100,000 this year. But owing to these developments, we hesitated to make any further reduction. We had decided to transfer our Armoured Division from Meerut to Jhansi, which is much further away, but which has better quarters and training grounds. We stopped this transfer.

10. A little later, we decided to send this Armoured Division to the Punjab. In order to go there it has to cross two major rivers. That is a long process and it takes several weeks. If by any chance the bridges are destroyed, then it is hardly possible to send it across. Pakistan's plan appeared to be to attack us suddenly in Kashmir to begin with, to achieve some results quickly, and then perhaps to stop if the U.N. jumped in and called for a ceasefire. This plan was largely based on our unpreparedness to meet a sudden assault on a big scale in Kashmir and our inability to do anything in the Punjab at least for some time. We had thus to be prepared for any such sudden action. The only way we could do so was to send our Armoured Division across the two major rivers of the Punjab and make some other troop dispositions. We ordered this and the Armoured Division is on its way. It has not fully got there yet. Probably it will take another two weeks or more to be in position.

11. In Kashmir, our undertaking to the U.N. is not to add to the number of troops which existed at the time of the ceasefire. After the ceasefire we withdrew a considerable number. Recently we decided to send some additional troops to Kashmir. This was well within the old limit and therefore we were entitled to do it in terms of the ceasefire arrangement. I think that the U.N. observers in Kashmir were informed of it.

12. We have also made some arrangements on the borders of eastern Pakistan. Eastern Pakistan has been during the last many months prepared for war purposes. Troops have been sent from the west and many other steps have been taken.

13. One must remember that the normal disposition of troops in Pakistan is more or less along the Indian borders. They had added to this and it was very easy for them to push across into India if they so chose. It is no longer easy for them to do this because we are there or will be there soon.

14. This is what has happened and I am quite sure that we would have been completely wrong in not taking these steps to protect ourselves in case of an attack. In fact, these steps have probably put an end to the fear of war because Pakistan cannot take us by surprise anywhere now. If unhappily war still comes, we shall be more or less ready for it in so far as one can be ready.

15. As a matter of fact, Pakistan has taken many other steps too, which we have not, such as calling up their reserves, cancelling leave, A.R.P. precautions, and recruiting new divisions. In spite of our army's persistent demand for additional recruitment, we have not agreed. Nor are we taking any other unusual steps. Any person who goes to Lahore and Delhi can notice



CELEBRATING DUSSEHRA, NEW DELHI, 10 OCTOBER 1951



ON UNITED NATIONS DAY, NEW DELHI, 24 OCTOBER 1951

the difference. In Lahore there is talk and preparation for war. In Delhi no change has occurred. It is true that this recent crisis has been referred to in the newspapers here, but this is nothing compared to what the newspapers in Pakistan are saying.

16. Some things may be taken for certain:

(1) We are going to have the constituent assembly in Kashmir, whatever other people may say or do. No amount of pressure or threats from Pakistan or the U.K., or the U.S.A., or the U.N., will stop us from having constituent assembly elections in Kashmir, probably in September.

(2) We are not going to remove our troops from the Pakistan border till we are satisfied that there is no further danger of attack or invasion.

(3) If Pakistan attacks or invades our territory anywhere, including Kashmir, this will inevitably result in an all-out war.

(4) We are on no account going to attack Pakistan or take any aggressive action. We shall only take action if and when we are attacked. Therefore there will be no war, unless Pakistan starts it.

17. These facts must be fully understood. I do not think there is adequate realisation of them in the U.K. or U.S.A. and perhaps they still imagine that by some kind of pressure tactics they can force us to give in. That is impossible. You mention that Gordon Walker said that the Americans were putting considerable pressure on the British to be tough with India and that they are using Kashmir for this purpose. Some Americans have told me that it is the British who take the lead in this matter and that this is definitely Attlee's policy. Whatever Attlee's good intentions might be in regard to India as a whole, and I believe he has good intentions, about Kashmir his mind is completely closed and he thinks he has seen the light once and that is enough.⁵ I am sorry for this because he is hopelessly mistaken as are the Americans. They have got used to dealing with soft countries who are afraid of losing their goodwill or their money. Kashmir is a question on which we will not give in, whatever the consequences, and this should be made perfectly clear to everybody. I am quite convinced that it is the policy of the U.K. and the U.S.A., which has made the Kashmir situation as bad as it is. If war occurs therefore, the responsibility will be theirs. For their own reasons, they have chosen to back Pakistan in this and other matters. I cannot help that. But I am sure that sometime or other they will realise their grievous mistake. Personally I consider (I am sorry to say it) the leaders of Pakistan to be completely crooked in their ways.

5. Attlee thought that on the Kashmir question "facts were too strong" for religion to be disregarded.

18. I made a reference in my speech at Bangalore to British officers and ex-officers in Pakistan adding to the tension.⁶ I was referring then to the large number of Britishers serving in Pakistan. I was also referring to Gracey and Auchinleck, who have been visiting various military centres in West and East Pakistan in the hottest weather. Nobody comes here in search of health during this time of the year. You have yourself reminded Gordon Walker of Gracey's advice to the Pakistan Government to send the Pakistan army to Kashmir. He is bitterly anti-Indian, as is almost every Englishman in Pakistan. Many of these Britishers in Pakistan employ used to be in the Indian service and were pushed out by us. They have no love for us and they find that anti-Indian atmosphere in Pakistan completely congenial. Indeed they play a leading role in it.

19. The military conspiracy in Pakistan⁷ was chiefly due to resentment by Pakistan officers at the role of the British both in the Pakistan Army and in civil activities. That conspiracy was basically anti-British. The story that all kinds of concessions and bases were being given to the U.K. and U.S.A., had gone round and excited these military folks.

20. In Karachi, the British High Commissioner⁸ is also very anti-Indian. The U.N. observers in Kashmir are completely anti-Indian and say so in private. One of them, an American, whom I have not seen, described me in a private letter as "Nehru, that prize bastard, who is always coming in the way of a settlement". I might mention that these U.N. observers have said in private that a war is coming in Kashmir this autumn or at the latest in the spring. Presumably they got this from the Pakistan army people.

21. Graham is due here soon from Karachi. He has behaved very circumspectly and chiefly listened. On the whole, he seems to be somewhat of an improvement on Dixon. Dixon was the pure lawyer. Graham has not mentioned to us anything about the Security Council Resolution. He has talked about the general background, etc. I do not know what he is going to do. But he is hardly likely to stay here very long.

22. I might inform you that Nye was told about Gracey's and Auchinleck's tours in Pakistan. Nye said that he could not believe that about Auchinleck, but about Gracey he could not say.

6. See *ante*, p. 313.

7. The Rawalpindi conspiracy, in which a group of army officers and some members of the Communist Party were alleged to have planned for creating commotion in the country and for subverting the loyalty of defence forces, was unearthed on 9 March 1951. Among those who were said to be involved was Major-General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan army, who had commanded the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir as General Tariq.

8. Gilbert Laithwaite.

23. In connection with this war scare, it is a major point that we are preparing hard for our general elections which are going to be on a stupendous scale. Is it likely that we would do this and think of war?

24. One other factor might be kept in mind. During the last few weeks there has again been a big exodus of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. A surplus of 40,000 has come over and they continue to come. This may be due to many causes, because the condition of Hindus continues to be bad in East Bengal. But I think that principally it is due to the war scare.

25. We talk about Kashmir as being the root of all troubles between India and Pakistan. I do not think this is true. The root lies deeper and Kashmir is only a major symptom.

26. You refer in your telegram to our taking a different line about Kashmir both officially and otherwise. It is not quite clear what this different line is. Certainly we should be a little more positive and aggressive about it. I see no reason to be apologetic. I think we have been perfectly right in the various major steps we have taken. Above all, it should be made clear that we are firm about what we say and that we are not going to budge from it.

27. We are greatly criticised in our own country and outside. And yet we have some considerable achievements to our credit. I need not write all this. But it is as well to remember what we have done. In Pakistan, there has been practically nothing constructive done during these four years. They have not even started properly with their constitution-making and they carry on with the relics of the old British Constitution. Provincial autonomy there is nominal. All that they have done is to concentrate on the growth of their defence forces and to instil hatred and the spirit of violence into their people. They hope to hold together because of this anti-Indian feeling and the appeal to Islam. How long this will carry them, I do not know. A war scare of course helps the Government very much to consolidate its position in Pakistan.

28. The situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border continues to be very troubled and the relations of the two countries are definitely bad. Pakistan has decided to send back its troops to some of the border areas, from which they had withdrawn them previously.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

8. To H.S. Malik¹

New Delhi
July 23, 1951

My dear Malik,²

I have just received your letter of July 16th. From your account of what you said at the Anglo-American Press Association, I think that you made a good speech. You have every right to say, and indeed we have often said it, that Pakistan helped the aggressor, was in fact the aggressor....

I would not say that India was partitioned on the basis of religion. At any rate we did not agree to any such partition. To some extent this may have been the objective of others, both the Muslim League and the British Government. But so far as we were concerned, even then we did not agree to that approach. We agreed to a territorial partition among various provinces or parts of provinces to decide which way they wanted to go. It is true that in this process a large number of Muslims went to Pakistan. The point is that if we had agreed on the basis of religion, then other consequences would follow from it which we were not prepared to accept. It would have meant the acceptance of Jinnah's two-nation theory, which we have always rejected and which we reject now in Kashmir. It is of course perfectly true that India is a secular State and Pakistan is a communal one.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. (1894-1985); entered I.C.S. 1922; Prime Minister, Patiala, 1944-47; High Commissioner, Canada, 1947-49; Ambassador to France, 1949-56.

9. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
July 23, 1951

My dear Jairamdas,

Your letter of July 20. We should, of course, take all necessary precautionary measures in the event of a possible war with Pakistan. I do not myself think that there is any great chance of war for the simple reason that Pakistan knows that we are fully prepared. If unfortunately a war does take place, its

1. J.N. Collection.

fate will depend on the major theatres. This does not mean that we should ignore, in any way, the other theatres. East Bengal may create trouble. But, as a matter of fact, it is weak and is terribly afraid of our forces entering it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. Cable to Sayyid Abol Qasem Kashani¹

I am in receipt of your message of the 26th July² and of the message that you were good enough to send me through my colleague and friend, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. In reply, I hasten to assure you that, true to the teachings of the Father of our Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, India has no intention of resorting to force against her neighbour, Pakistan, with whom, indeed, we wish to cultivate and to live on fraternal terms. The movement of Indian troops to which you refer is purely precautionary and defensive and has been forced upon us by intense propaganda, extending over several months, for a *jehad* against India in order to settle the Kashmir dispute. As I have assured Mr Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly, India has no aggressive designs on Pakistan and will never resort to force against Pakistan to settle any dispute. Only if she is attacked she will, as she must, defend herself. I sincerely hope that the advice that you have given to the Pakistan authorities and press will be acted upon.

1. New Delhi, 27 July 1951. J.N. Collection.
(1881-1962); religious leader of Iran who worked closely with Mohammed Mossaddeq, the Prime Minister, for the nationalisation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951; President of the Majlis, 1952-53.
2. Kashani wrote that the news of the concentration of Indian troops on the Pakistan border had come as a shock to all the people of Asia, particularly because Nehru was the chief disciple of Mahatma Gandhi. At the juncture when the people of the West Asia had risen in revolt against imperialist forces, the existence of differences between India and Pakistan was nothing short of definite disaster for the nations of Asia. He had urged the Pakistani authorities as well to maintain peace towards India.

11. Cable to M.A. Rauf¹

Your telegram 123 of July 27. I have also received Thakin Nu's message about Indo-Pakistan dispute. Please inform Thakin Nu that I appreciate his message and his anxiety to help in maintenance of peace. We are indeed even more anxious to preserve peace and stability and have tried and will continue to strive to the utmost of our ability.

Present crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations none of our making. For months past continuous propaganda and statements in Pakistan calling for *jehad* against India. Almost entire Pakistan army normally situated all along Indian border from Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Jhelum, Lahore and beyond. Further movements nearer our border taking place. Our information was that attack is contemplated firstly in Kashmir and later possibly elsewhere. In view of these circumstances, no responsible government could avoid taking precautionary measures. We therefore decided to move some of our troops nearer to borders. Even now these troops are farther away from border than Pakistan troops. This was purely precautionary measure about which we made no fuss. Pakistan, however, is deliberately whipping up war fever partly for internal consumption and partly to influence some foreign countries. I have made it perfectly clear that on no account will any aggressive step be taken by us unless we are attacked by Pakistan. I have invited Pakistan Prime Minister to make similar declaration which would immediately remove any fear of war. I can assure him that we shall be patient to the end. There is no question of our taking any action at all unless we are attacked. For our part we are not going to have a war. It is therefore for the Pakistan Government to stop their hysterical war propaganda. In India there is no such feeling. I would of course be happy to meet Thakin Nu at any time, but the real threat to peace comes from Pakistan.

1. New Delhi, 28 July 1951. J.N. Collection.

12. To F. R. Roy Bucher¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1951

My dear Roy,²

... We are having a very difficult time and we never seem to get out of crises.

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Roy Bucher was Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in 1948-49.

Just at present, Liaquat Ali Khan is becoming exceedingly pugnacious and he has announced that Pakistan's emblem is the clenched fist. Tactful, in the present circumstances, is it not? There is a great deal of shouting and excitement in Pakistan and blackouts and civil defence and what not. In spite of all this, there is not a trace of excitement in Delhi or even in East Punjab and life goes on evenly. So far as we are concerned, we are determined to avoid war and I think we shall succeed. But what is one to do, with this continuous talk of *jehad* in Pakistan? Their papers for months past were full of it. Ultimately, we thought it was risky business to leave our frontier not properly guarded and so we sent some of our armed forces there. The result was much more shouting from Liaquat Ali Khan. Personally I think that our sending these troops there has largely ended the fear of war....

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to your telegram 2869 dated 26th July.² A repetition of allegations which have been refuted frequently on previous occasions does not give greater substance to those allegations but only confuses the immediate issue. If we both aim at an easing of tension between our two countries, that purpose will not be achieved by a continual exchange of argument and counter argument. I am exceedingly anxious that this situation should be so handled as to remove the fears and apprehensions that darken the relationship between our two countries. I am convinced, as I have always been, that it is inevitable that India and Pakistan should work closer together and cooperate in common tasks to their mutual advantage.

2. Our whole past outlook and our long struggle for freedom, our Constitution, and the policy we have pursued, have the one aim of building

1. New Delhi, 29 July 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Liaquat Ali Khan alleged that India's enhanced defence budget, the strength of her army which was greater than that of Pakistan, massing of Indian troops against Pakistan frontiers and India's refusal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir under U.N. auspices as well as "provocative" speeches by Nehru himself and his ministers and party, revealed where the potentiality of aggression lay. He added that parties like the Hindu Mahasabha were carrying on propaganda against Pakistan through the press.

up a State which, within its own borders, treats everyone alike and without difference of religion and seeks friendly cooperation with other countries. As you know, we have a very large Muslim population, over 40 millions, as well as large Christian, Sikh and other religious groups and we have endeavoured to give them an equal place in the life of the community and in governmental and other activities. In practice, people make mistakes and foolish persons make irresponsible statements, but our fixed and determined policy has the backing of vast numbers of our countrymen.

3. In consonance with the past history of our struggle for independence and the policies that we pursue today, we seek the friendship of all our neighbour countries; more especially, we desire friendly relations with the people of Pakistan, who though politically separated from us, yet have and must continue to have so much in common. Unfortunately, the leaders of Pakistan were associated with movements which encouraged feelings of separateness and hatred between different religious communities. We had hoped that after the partition, these feelings and passions would die away and we would develop the closest cooperation between two neighbouring, independent and intimately connected countries. To our great sorrow this has not taken place. The old policy of promoting communal hatred continues to guide the authorities in Pakistan.

4. After the tragic major upheaval consequent on the partition, we had again hoped that the worst was over and gradually we would develop normal relations. But in the months and years that followed, non-Muslims were driven out of Pakistan till ultimately we have arrived at a stage when all but a handful of the large non-Muslim population of western Pakistan have come away and become refugees in India. That same process started later in eastern Pakistan, but was fortunately checked by the Agreement arrived at between us in April 1950. Conditions however, from this point of view, deteriorated later and recently another exodus of non-Muslims from eastern Pakistan has begun.

5. I draw your attention to these matters in no spirit of controversy but to point out the basic difficulty that we have had to contend against during these last four years. We have endeavoured to follow a policy of peace internally and externally and of curbing the spirit of narrow-minded communalism which must do grave injury to any country that adopts it. We have had our difficulties and we have faced them without flinching and have not deviated from our policy.

6. The question of Kashmir would have been decided peacefully long ago, in accordance with the wishes of the people there, as we desired right from the beginning, but for the major fact that Pakistan first encouraged and then actively took part in violent aggression against the State and its people. This is not just an odd fact but the dominant consideration. Pakistan tried to take possession of Kashmir by violent means. You are aware also that during

the past 20 years a movement for freedom from autocratic rule developed in Kashmir State. For long years the struggle for freedom continued and a powerful mass movement came into existence aiming at political and social progress. It is out of that mass movement that the present Government of Jammu and Kashmir took shape as a genuine people's Government, progressive, autonomous, and seeking to build up a state on the basis of harmony and cooperation between different communities. It has made great progress in administrative, social, educational and economic matters. Land laws have been changed to the great benefit of the vast majority of the population. All this could only be done with the active cooperation and support of the mass of the people. On the other side in the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' areas, conditions are entirely different.

7. It is not for India or Pakistan, whatever our wishes, to decide the future of Kashmir. Kashmir and the people of Kashmir are not commodities for barter or for bargain. It is their inherent right to determine their own future. It is this right that we openly acknowledged long before Pakistan came into this picture. We stand by that declaration and, even in our relations with the Kashmir State, we have shown that, in spite of the abnormal conditions that have prevailed, that State has had the fullest autonomy to develop according to the genius of her people.

8. We are convinced that only the people of Kashmir could finally decide their future and we stand by every assurance we have given to the United Nations in this behalf. But we have laid stress on one fact that proper conditions must be created first before they can decide fairly and according to their wishes. It is on this subject of pre-conditions that India and Pakistan have differed thus far.

9. You have invited me to visit Karachi, but you have made this visit conditional on India withdrawing her forces from near the border. I am led to think that your invitation could not have been seriously meant because the condition that you attach to it was obviously such that, in present circumstances, could not be accepted by us. The condition in effect was that we should accept your main argument, which we challenge and consider wholly wrong. It was only after very serious and earnest thought that we, as a Government responsible for peace being maintained and realising the conditions requisite for the fulfilment of that responsibility, decided to move certain troops towards the frontier. Whatever the reasons we had previously for the step we took, surely the open war preparations in Pakistan and the general hysteria that prevails there, are compelling reasons for us to continue our precautions. With a clenched fist raised against us, do you seriously expect us to leave our frontiers unguarded and open to possible aggression? We have said before, and I repeat with all emphasis and earnestness, that not the slightest step of an aggressive character will be taken on our part so long as no aggression

takes place on Indian territory on the part of Pakistan. I wish to make it clear that this includes Kashmir. Either we are going to settle the various issues between us, including Kashmir, by peaceful methods or by war. I want to rule out war and I invite you to do the same. If you agree on this basic fact, then other consequences easily follow.

10. You have invited me to meet you conditionally and the condition attached, as I have stated above, is such that the invitation has no meaning. I am perfectly prepared to meet and discuss every matter of concern to us without any conditions attached. I would welcome you, therefore, to come to Delhi to any time convenient to you to discuss these matters without any pre-conditions.

11. You say that the present crisis has been caused by the massing of Indian forces against Pakistan borders. May I remind you that even the normal disposition of Pakistan forces, all the way from Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Jhelum, Lahore and beyond has been right near the Indian border. This applies to some parts of eastern Pakistan also. These forces are always in a position to commit aggression without any further preparations or delay and, with the calls for *jehad* in Pakistan and the statements of men in responsible position, no country could afford not to take precautionary measures against the possibility of such an attack which was being urged all the time. Even now our forces are much farther away from the border than yours. The whole difficulty has arisen because your Government is continually saying or hinting that you will resort to force to settle the dispute. We have to take precautions against this threat. If your declaration that Pakistan has no intention to attack India explicitly includes Kashmir and the temper of war so manifest in Pakistan is cooled, then the danger of war between the two countries will cease. I pointed out to you in my last telegram the contrast between the widespread preparations for war and the deliberate attempt that is aimed to excite the people of Pakistan by blackouts, civil defence measures, and generally creating an expectation of war on the one hand and, on the other, conditions in India where we have resorted to no such measures and life goes on evenly. There is a complete absence of war psychosis in India because we neither want war nor prepare for it.

12. Our activities have been largely concentrated on great plans for development. We have just been giving thought to a great five-year plan for the building up of the economic and other resources of India. We are busy also with arrangement for general elections which are going to be the most colossal in the history of democracy. These activities, apart from others, absorb our attention. How can they be fitted in with war, which will upset all the great schemes which we have in hand?

13. I must firmly deny your charge that India refuses to honour its international agreements for a free and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir under

U.N. auspices. It was we who first offered to let the people of Kashmir decide their future and we stand by that pledge. The delay that has occurred in implementing the U.N.C.I.P. Resolution has been due to non-fulfilment of assurances on which the two resolutions were accepted by us. The very first condition laid down by these resolutions was the withdrawal of the Pakistan army from the Jammu and Kashmir State territory.

14. As regards what you call your peace plan, I have already dealt with:

(i) the withdrawal of our forces which have recently been moved towards the Pakistan border and

(ii) the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

(iii) we are ready to affirm again that the Government of India renounce the use of force as a method of settling all disputes. We have not rejected either arbitration or judicial determination as a method of settling disputes which are not resolved by negotiation or mediation. All that we have contended is that the question of arbitration or judicial or some other method of determination should be decided with due regard to the merits of each case. You will remember that we made proposals for the judicial determination of two of our major disputes, namely canal waters and evacuee property. But you did not accept these proposals.

(iv) We accept again the obligation undertaken by the two Governments about propaganda against the territorial integrity of both countries. In taking action we have to act within our own Constitution and in accordance with judicial pronouncements about freedom of expression, which limit our action. Our Government's policy however is clear and has been repeatedly affirmed. In this connection, may I draw your attention to the type of propaganda which has been and is taking place in Pakistan, propaganda which often calls not only for war but the conquest of India by Pakistan. We are not troubled by these fantastic outbursts, but inevitably they produce some reaction here. You refer to the Hindu Mahasabha and some like organisations. You will permit me not to agree with you about their strength or influence in this country. May I draw your attention to the Hindustan Hamara Party³ in Pakistan which demands the incorporation of India into Pakistan?

(v) I entirely agree with you that we should make a declaration that neither Government will on any account attack or invade the territory of the other. I must ask, however, that this declaration should cover the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the future of which must be decided by peaceful means.

3. A new party, Hindustan Hamara Party, had been formed in Karachi with the object of liberating the minorities in India "through the Islamic tolerance".

14. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1951

My dear Dickie,

I have today received your letter of the 25th July.² Two or three days ago I received your previous note.

As you are naturally very interested in the rather critical situation that has arisen between India and Pakistan, I am giving you my appraisal of the latest situation. Personally, I do not think that there is any real chance of war. For one thing, there can be no sudden move and any attempt to do so will mean a big-scale war. That itself is a restraining factor. Secondly, there has been so much shouting about it and so much attention has been drawn to it that it is more difficult now to start shooting.

The contrast between Pakistan and India today is striking. In Pakistan they are having blackouts, A.R.P., all kinds of volunteers enrolled, defence days, people writing their names with blood to affirm their determination, and so on and so forth. At public gatherings cries are raised: "On to India. Let us conquer India". The whole thing is so infantile, and yet there are elements of tragedy in it. In India there is not the slightest difference in our normal lives and practically no excitement whatever. There is no talk of blackouts or A.R.P. or any other defence measures, civil or military. Except for the fact that we sent our Armoured Division across the two rivers of the Punjab and made some other minor dispositions, we have done nothing else. We did not shout about this. Why did we send this Armoured Division across the rivers? As I have told you, there has been a continuous call for *jehad* in Pakistan and the press has been full of it for many months past. We had definitely decided to reduce our army by 100,000 this year. We had decided also to send away our Armoured Division from Meerut to Jhansi, where there are better quarters. Jhansi is of course much further away from the frontier and we were told it would take an extra month for it to move up to the frontier from there. Then we became slightly anxious. There was the daily propaganda in Pakistan, there were statements by Ministers there, there were rather serious raids into Kashmir, and there was information received by us that there was an organised plan for a big-scale and sudden attack in Kashmir in order to achieve some quick and substantial result. We also got evidence of attempts being made by people from Pakistan to commit sabotage on a big-scale in the valley. We had actually

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mountbatten wrote that he had been worried about the warlike preparations between India and Pakistan. He had in a hand-written note to Attlee, told him that Gracey and Auchinleck were the two officers whom Nehru had in mind.

reduced our forces in Kashmir very considerably. We had left many important points very thinly protected. Our army people told us that they were not in a position to ensure safety. The story was that immediately Graham went away, there would be this attack. This was supported by all kinds of odd bits of information that we got from Pakistan.

What were we to do? We were told that if we wanted to send our Armoured Division to the Punjab border, it would take some six weeks to do it properly. There are two rivers to cross in the Punjab with narrow bridges. This business of crossing the rivers took time. If, by any chance, those bridges were destroyed, then it would become exceedingly difficult to cross the rivers at all. This was too grave a risk to run and so we decided, very reluctantly, to cancel our orders for the transfer of the Armoured Division to Jhansi and send it instead to East Punjab across those rivers. I do not see how any Government could have acted otherwise. Indeed I felt sure that our lack of proper defence on our frontiers would itself be an invitation for an attack. So we sent these troops there and there they will remain till we are assured that there is no danger.

As a matter of fact, normally the main concentrations of Pakistan troops are always near the Indian border from Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Jhelum to Lahore. We have not shouted about this. They can attack us suddenly and without notice, as they can attack parts of Kashmir, because they are right near. Indeed the question arises whether normally we can leave our frontier inadequately guarded. In the old days, as you know, most of the Indian army was concentrated in or near the North West Frontier. But in any event, it seems to us fantastic that we should be asked to withdraw our troops from the border when this raging tearing campaign for war is going on in Pakistan.

We have reacted very calmly to this and I must say that our people, both in the Punjab and in Delhi, have also shown no excitement. The only thing that is rather alarming is the new exodus of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. Between one and two thousand come daily. These belong to the real agricultural classes who had stuck there till now in spite of provocation. They are leaving their lands either because of fear or because conditions have become intolerable or because of both.

Western Pakistan was practically cleared of non-Muslims from 1947 onwards. Out of millions there, only a few thousand remain, mostly the scheduled classes. I am not referring to the major migrations from August or October 1947, but to the subsequent squeezing out of Hindus from Sind which took place later. This process took place more slowly in East Bengal. It became very rapid last year when I had the Agreement with Liaquat Ali Khan. This Agreement had a good effect and many people went back. Now for the last six weeks, this has started again and it is increasing in volume. There is no counter-movement on any big scale. Many people think that ultimately, all or

nearly all the Hindus of East Pakistan will be driven out. This means 11 or 12 millions of people. Even if this number is reduced to half, it is terrific. What are we to do with them, and imagine the reactions of this process.

I am a little tired of receiving from and sending long messages to Liaquat Ali Khan. I am afraid I have come to the conclusion that most of the leaders of Pakistan are crooked in their dealings. Yet, of course, I shall continue because there is no other way.

Yesterday I addressed a meeting here in Delhi. It was an open air meeting and it was continually raining, and yet it is estimated that nearly 2,00,000 people had gathered there and listened to me in the rain for over an hour. I am sending you a cutting from *The Statesman* about this meeting.

Kingsley Martin³ is of course a good friend, but he has an extraordinary capacity for getting muddled. His thinking about India recently has been far from straight, probably because his correspondents here are not particularly intelligent. I do not know who they are. I regret I do not agree with him about Kashmir. I think this business would have been long over more or less to the satisfaction of the parties concerned, if there had not been a continuous instigation of Pakistan by the authorities and the press in England and of course the U.S.A. I have been amazed to read much that has been written in the British press about Kashmir. There has been so much venom and anger in it. It is evident that the U.K. Government as well as the U.S.A. Government and their press had long ago decided that Kashmir should go to Pakistan and they are greatly disappointed that we do not fall in with their wishes. In this matter, as in some others, no arguments are needed or are helpful when one starts with the wrong premises and the wrong convictions. I have not a shadow of doubt that the people of Kashmir proper are overwhelmingly with Shaikh Abdullah. Apart from everything else, his land reforms have made a great change. The difference between the valley of Kashmir etc., and the 'Azad Kashmir' areas is tremendous. On the one hand, there is a progressive, autonomous and well-running Government, which has shown quite substantial results in many ways; on the other hand, there are backward and rather primitive conditions. Apart from anything else, this is a clear case of conflict between progress and reaction.

The Pakistan army has been rather shaken up by the conspiracy trials. Some of their own best officers are under trial. I think the case against them is greatly exaggerated. There was no question of their murdering anybody, but they were greatly worked up about what they considered the reactionary policies of their Government. In fact one of their cries was that Pakistan was becoming a kind of joint colony of the U.K. and U.S.A.

3. (1897-1969); editor, *New Statesman and Nation*, 1930-60.

You refer to Auchinleck and Gracey. Some days ago at Bangalore, I said that "the activities of British military advisers and officers and ex-officers in Pakistan have added greatly to the prevailing tension." Attlee has been answering questions about this in the House of Commons and has repudiated the insinuation. As a matter of fact, I used moderate language. I did not accuse anyone of positive action. What I said was that there was the reaction to these activities, which added to the tension. There is not a shadow of doubt about this. Regardless of the motives of anybody, the fact is that all our army officers are talking about it and feeling angry and the general public is referring to it.

When I said this, I had Auchinleck and Gracey in mind certainly, but I had much else in mind also. Pakistan and Karachi are full of British officers, military and civil. It is our misfortune that every one of them is bitterly anti-India. We receive constant reports of what they say in private and sometimes in semi-public. They attend Indo-Pakistan conferences over some particular issue. Almost invariably the British officer is more difficult than the Pakistani representatives at the conference. Our evacuee property problem might have been much nearer solution but for the fact that Moss⁴ used to represent Pakistan at our conferences. Moss was the person who once sentenced me to four years for a speech. Many of those officers who had, according to us, a very bad record in India, were later absorbed by Pakistan and they have been more against us than any Pakistani can be.

I remember an Inter-Dominion Conference in Lahore when Mudie was there. Liaquat Ali practically agreed to our propositions, when Mudie openly asked him not to give in. There was a luncheon interval and afterwards Liaquat Ali changed his attitude completely and the conference was a failure. Gracey, you will remember, was the person who advised the Pakistan Government early in 1948 to send their army inside Kashmir. Is it surprising that all this should create a powerful impression on the Indian mind? Many of our officers meet Pakistani officers on various occasions and they get on well together. But they tell us that when the British officers of Pakistan are there, then relations become stiff immediately.

The U.N. observers, many of whom are drawn from the U.S., are notoriously and sometimes openly against us. Part of the reason at least is that we are not supporting U.S. policies elsewhere in the world. One of them referred to me in a private letter as "that prize bastard, Nehru, who comes in the way of a settlement." This is not conducive to our faith in the U.N. observers.

4. Eric Moss (1896-1981); joined I.C.S., 1923; district magistrate and collector of Gorakhpur, 1940-42. He sentenced Nehru at Gorakhpur in 1940. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 11, pp. 485-491.

I wish people in England would realise that this Kashmir question is not a matter of territory or profit, at least so far as we are concerned. It is a matter of the most vital principle. If we accept the Pakistani thesis, which is supported by the U.K. Government, that Kashmir being Muslim must be presumed to go to Pakistan, then we give up every principle that we have stood for and make the position of 40 million Muslims of India very difficult. That does not mean that we should impose our will on Kashmir. But that does mean that the decision about Kashmir will have to be political and economic and not on the basis of religion. What Pakistan wants is to have an opportunity of bringing in all its religious bigotry and hatred into Kashmir, and thus having a kind of civil war all over the place which, it thinks, will bring it advantage. We are not going to permit that.

We are a little tired of the advice being given to us from time to time in minatory language from the U.S. and the U.K. They seem to forget that we are not some little Central American Republic or some Balkan country which can be cowed down or won over by money. Even if we were a small country, that has not been our past.

There is a great deal of talk about the Indian army's presence in Kashmir and very little talk of the fact that the Pakistan army sits in Kashmir territory. The very first thing decided by the U.N. Commission was that the Pakistan army and auxiliaries should withdraw. Other steps followed. Well, they have not withdrawn and they have added to their strength and entrenched themselves. Whatever right there may or may not be in favour of the Indian army being there, there is not a shadow of justification for the Pakistan army to be in Kashmir territory.

I am afraid that the U.K. Government is often ill-served by its officers abroad. They represent some out-of-date mentality and are totally unreceptive to what is happening about them. Falconer⁵ in Nepal, after having served many years there, knew only a few Ranas and misled the British Government. It was by sheer chance that the U.K. did not commit a grievous error there. It was our strong attitude that prevented it. In Iran now, the old lot of officials and the Anglo-Iranian Company's people still think in old terms and have treated the Iranians with contempt. They do not realise that something new has come about. Some powerful urges which move masses of people, who are prepared to suffer anything, even destruction, but not give in in regard to something that they consider right. The Iranians have acted foolishly in many ways. But the fundamental fact is that there is this widespread and powerful movement affecting the people there and no minister dare go against it. I wish the U.K. Government had some new kind of test made of its officers

5. G.A. Falconer was British Ambassador in Nepal at this time.

abroad. Jebb in the Security Council should be one of the first persons to be examined.

I am sorry I have written to you at such length and possibly with a little warmth. But I wanted you to realise how we feel about these matters here.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

15. To C.R. Attlee¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1951

My dear Prime Minister,

The Acting High Commissioner for the U.K. at Delhi² came to see our Secretary-General yesterday and handed to him the text of a question and the reply you gave to it in the House of Commons on the 1st of August 1951. This question related to "allegations made against British officers in the service of Pakistan." In your reply, it is stated that "strong representations" were made "about the views which Mr. Nehru expressed in the course of his speech on the 16th July. I greatly regret that Mr. Nehru should have lent the weight of his authority to such unfounded allegations."

You have referred in your answer to a speech I delivered on July 16th at Bangalore. What I said then was read out from a script so that the words I used were not open to doubt or dispute. All I said about this subject was as follows:

"I regret to have to say that the activities of British military advisers and officers and ex-officers in Pakistan have added greatly to the prevailing tension."

It is not clear to me which part of this sentence you consider to be an unfounded allegation and in regard to what strong representations were made. I have not the least doubt that the tension between India and Pakistan has been increased by the activities of some British officers, both civil and military, in Pakistan. I realise fully that the U.K. Government is not responsible in any way. It may be also that the officers concerned acted in accordance with their

1. J.N. Collection.

2. F.K. Roberts.

own feelings. The brief statement I made at Bangalore was carefully worded and I should be glad to know wherein it was wrong. Your Acting High Commissioner came to see our Foreign Secretary and later our Secretary-General. They pointed out to him certain obvious facts in regard to reactions in India. Subsequently I saw him also for a short while and told him exactly what I had said at Bangalore.

I am likely to be asked questions in our Parliament here about this and, therefore, I wish to remove any misapprehension in your mind as to what I said or meant, or what I might have to say to our Parliament.

Apart from my statement in Bangalore, I should like you to appreciate how we have felt about this matter for a considerable time past.

There is absolutely no doubt about the widespread public feeling on this subject in India. We have British officers, civil and military, in India, and they have served us loyally and we respect them. The British officers in Pakistan, no doubt, have served that Government loyally and we can have no objection to that. To my knowledge, no British officer in India has said a word publicly or privately against Pakistan. We appreciate that attitude. In Pakistan, however, to our certain knowledge, many British officials in civil employ as well as British officers in the defence forces openly and aggressively run down India. Many of our people, including our officers, have been to Pakistan frequently. They reported invariably that the British officers there talk openly and with bitterness about India.

We have had many conferences between India and Pakistan on various issues. On some occasions, British officials have been among the representatives of Pakistan. Almost invariably, these British officials have taken up a much more irreconcilable attitude than the Pakistani officials. I have personal knowledge of one high level conference where this occurred. This has specially happened in regard to conferences on evacuee property and rehabilitation.

Quite a number of British officials employed by Pakistan served in India previous to partition. They were well-known for their extreme anti-India bias and their hatred of Indian nationalism. These people still carry their old hatred and it is reflected in their work. If it would interest you, I could mention names and particulars of occasions.

You will remember my bringing to your notice early in 1948 a memorandum addressed by General Gracey to the Pakistan Government, in which he advised them to send their armies to Kashmir. I shall not go into the question as to whether he was justified in doing this, but you can appreciate what the Indian reaction to this was. We also had a British Commander-in-Chief³ then, but he kept quite apart from developments in Kashmir. General

3. Gen. Rob Lockhart was Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army during August-December 1947.

Gracey's advice was made the basis of an invasion of Kashmir by the Pakistan army. As a matter of fact, General Gracey is notorious for his exceedingly active anti-India bias. I think you can find this out from your own officers.

General Sir Rob Lockhart was invited in April 1949 to Pakistan to attend some function. When we heard that he was going there, he was invited to come to India also and he agreed. He did not, however, come to India. Later we found that when he expressed his intention to come to India from Pakistan, stronger objection was taken by the British officers in Pakistan than by the Pakistani officers. I think that General Gracey was one of many British officers who objected; some of them are still in the service of Pakistan.

As a matter of fact, both General Gracey and Major General Loftus Tottenham⁴, either while in the service of Pakistan or since retirement, have given open expression to violent anti-India sentiments. General Gracey has often been described as more than a hundred per cent Pakistani.

I understand that General Gracey came to Pakistan in May and June to assist the Government of Pakistan in the army conspiracy case. Both he and Field Marshal Auchinleck were in Pakistan at a critical moment in Indo-Pakistan relations. The purpose of the Field Marshal's visit may have been to promote a carpet factory, but he visited many military establishments, even in East Pakistan, accompanied by the Adjutant General of Pakistan, Major General Sher Ali Khan. This tour of important military establishments in West and East Pakistan may have been a private visit to these places, but is it surprising that people in India should draw certain inferences from it, more especially when the relations between India and Pakistan are so strained? It is not clear to me why a business mission should have led to a long tour of military establishments during the hottest period of the year in West and East Pakistan.

We have often had to consider what directions to give to Indian officers who are stationed in and who visit the U.K. Our general instructions to them have been that they must not get entangled in arguments or mix themselves up in any controversy. Indeed we have not even encouraged them to make any factual statements on any controversial topics. Yet, when they come back, they tell us that they have to face, often enough, false and mischievous propaganda there on behalf of the Pakistan Government and that many British officers support this and make provocative statements. Are they not to reply, they ask us? We have, so far, adhered to our old direction and advised them to keep out of such controversies.

4. Francis Loftus Tottenham (1880-1967).

It is our misfortune to have the ill-will of many eminent British officers who go out of their way to run us down. Perhaps this flows from the past when many of us were in conflict with them in India and they do not like the fact that the old order has changed and that we happen to be in control of India today. Circumstances have changed greatly, but these people have not changed with those changing circumstances. In Pakistan they have not that past history of conflict behind them. Most of the leaders of Pakistan did not associate themselves with the struggle for freedom, and sometimes were even opposed to it.

I have not connected the attitude of British officers in Pakistan with that of the U.K. Government. Indeed I have often felt the difference between the official policy of the U.K. Government and the behaviour of old-time officials abroad.

May I add that we have no grievance at all against the British officers serving us in India either in a civil or military capacity. They are giving us loyal service without in any way becoming partisans for or against Pakistan and we are happy to have them with us.

I would not have troubled you with this letter but for the reason that the facts which I have mentioned have created a most unfortunate impression in India which affects Indo-British relations. Our army officers talk about it, because they themselves have experienced these outbursts from British officers in Pakistan, as well as sometimes in England. Not only army officers but other people in India have been affected by this. This distresses me because one of the things that has influenced me greatly, and I have referred to it in public many times, has been the development of friendly relations between India and the U.K., ever since we gained independence. That was due greatly to the wise action of the U.K. Government under you and, if I may say so, to some extent, to what we did. Even when we have differed in matters of policy with the U.K. Government, we have worked for the maintenance of close relations. There are people and parties in India who object to our being in the Commonwealth. We have opposed them and resisted them successfully. Only the other day, in a public report I made, I referred to our connection with the Commonwealth and insisted on its continuance. To our misfortune, we seem to be getting more and more unpopular in England.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

16. To Udham Singh Nagoke¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1951

My dear Nagoke Ji,²

I have your letter of August 1st, together with the report of the meeting of the convention that you convened to consider the problem of 'gurdwaras' in Pakistan.

I think you are unjust to the Government when you say that Government has not attached adequate importance to this important matter affecting the Sikh community. We realise the importance of this and we have addressed the Pakistan Government on numerous occasions in regard to it. We propose to continue to keep this matter before us and to take such steps as are open to us. But you will, no doubt, realise that in view of the very delicate and strained situation between India and Pakistan, we cannot go very far towards settling any issue between the two countries at present.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. President, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee.

17. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

Thank you for your letter of August 2nd.

I am glad that you have pointed out how newspapers give undue importance to small incidents and thereby excite people's imagination. Big headlines appeared of Pakistan's invasion while, as you have pointed out, this was a small matter regarding some areas in dispute and had nothing to do with the present Indo-Pakistan tension.

While it is right that we should be vigilant and prepared for any emergency, I think that we should not do anything which adds to that emergency or to a feeling of panic in the people. I have therefore been entirely opposed to any

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to K.M. Munshi.

A.R.P. schemes and civil defence and the like. You may have paper schemes, but they must not be talked about and nothing should be done. Actually, A.R.P. and civil defence have proved to be of rather little consequence in the past. So far as an Indo-Pakistan conflict is concerned, they will be of even less consequence. Pakistan is poor in its aircraft, even poorer than India. It might occasionally create a diversion, but we need attach no importance to that. These A.R.P. schemes were meant for big warfare with thousands of planes in the west. In any event, we must avoid copying Pakistan's example and making people feel that war is coming.

The recruitment of some additional armed police, however, is a wise measure. In dealing with suspected persons, one should be a little careful in not overdoing it. There is probably more danger from Hindu communal elements out for mischief than from any minority group. In fact special attempts have to be made to protect the minorities.

I am exceedingly sorry to learn of the heavy damage done by floods, etc.² You have, at any rate, some money to fall back upon for relief work—money of the Earthquake Relief Fund which can be used for this purpose.

As regards the food situation, I realise that it has suffered greatly from recent happenings in Assam. I feel, however, that your Government is not relying on its own resources as much as it ought to. We have become rather slack because we think that foreign food has come or is coming. This is a very dangerous attitude of mind. It is quite essential for us to do our utmost to procure food in the State concerned. After all Assam had a big surplus a year ago. There is no reason why it should become so terribly deficit as is made out, in spite of floods, etc.

You refer to some areas where food is scarce and purchasing power has gone down. In such areas assistance must certainly be given by public works and even by distribution of free food. This will come out of the Earthquake Relief Fund.

As you know, our Food Minister will be visiting your State soon and will give every help he can. But he has to bear in mind the all-India situation which continues to be difficult.

I am afraid it is not possible for the Government of India to add to the subsidy they are giving for food. We have gone to the utmost limit already....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Floods in the Brahmaputra and Lohit rivers caused heavy damage to crops and livestock resulting in acute food shortage.

18. To S.M. Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1951

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I have sent you one or two brief letters recently and forwarded copies of telegrams sent to Liaquat Ali Khan or received from him. Of course, you will see these telegrams anyhow in the press.

Otherwise, I have not written to you, although there is a great deal to write about. The Indo-Pakistan situation has developed rather rapidly and is at a fairly high pitch. It can hardly continue to remain at that pitch for long. It has to burst up or come down. I am inclined to think that it will not burst up and therefore, inevitably, it will come down. But that is just an appraisal on a balance of probabilities. It is certainly possible that Pakistan may be foolish enough to jump into the fire. They have raised popular passion to such an extent there that even Liaquat Ali Khan might not be able to restrain it.

On the whole, I think that the feeling is spreading among intelligent persons in Pakistan that they have gone too far. In the long correspondence I have had with Liaquat Ali Khan, at last some issues have been clarified. My last telegram does that. The burden is now almost completely on Pakistan. It has to choose whether it will attack Kashmir and thereby precipitate a big war or not. So far as we are concerned, we are prepared in a military way. But, apart from this, we have resolutely refused to take any other measures and there is complete calm in various parts of India.

I think there is little doubt that the Pakistan authorities had definitely intended to attack Kashmir suddenly and with force. When we sent our troops to reinforce our garrisons near the border in the Punjab, this came as a shock and a surprise to Liaquat Ali Khan. For the first time they realised that there was no more bluff and that we were deadly serious. This realisation led them to hysterical outburst and they tried to fasten the blame on us. They hoped to get full support from the U.K. and U.S.A. They did get some support, especially from the newspapers there, but on the whole the U.K. and U.S.A. became a little cautious. Both of them have, I believe, brought some pressure to bear on Pakistan to go slow and not to precipitate matters. The U.K. has said nothing to us, partly because they know that we are angry with them. The U.S.A. sent us an oral message which did not amount to much.

The result is that Liaquat Ali Khan and the other Pakistan authorities suddenly feel that they cannot fully rely on the U.K. and U.S.A. and this rather darkens the picture for them.

1. J.N. Collection.

Anyhow, the next two months are critical. By about the middle of October, I think, this crisis will pass, unless something happens before. I do not know when Graham proposes to return to America. So long as he is here, I think it is very unlikely that Pakistan will take any aggressive step, apart from shouting. Probably Graham will be here till the end of this month at least or till some time in September. If he is wise, he will extend his stay because his presence may well be a preventive for war.

Whatever the motives of the Pakistan authorities might be, there is a good deal of nervousness in the Pakistan High Commission here, and I believe some of their people have slowly gone back to Pakistan. We have refused to allow any of our officers or others serving in Pakistan to return to India in spite of the hysteria there.

From a military point of view, the rainy season is rather an obstruction. That means that major military activities are not easy till the rains are over, i.e., till the second half of September at least.

I presume the elections to your constituent assembly will be over by the end of September.

It is rather foolish of me to give you good advice in so far as your person is concerned. Nevertheless, I think you should take special care of yourself during the next two or three months, and not only you, but your colleagues in your Government. It is quite conceivable that some people might be encouraged in Pakistan to go and have a shot at you. Generally speaking, Pakistan is suffering from a peculiar mixture of hysterical excitement, frustration and fear.

I am expecting Indu back tomorrow. Day after tomorrow Parliament begins. This is going to be a very heavy last session of Parliament. Apart from the work, very difficult problems face us. There is the Indo-Pakistan situation. In addition to this, our internal Congress problems have become in some ways rather serious. Rafi Ahmed's going away had become inevitable. Nevertheless, it is sad and I fear it will lead to many repercussions.

If you and Bakshi have any specific information about the conduct of Britishers or of U.N. observers in Kashmir, please let me have it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

19. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I am in receipt of your telegram No.3006 of the 1 August.² What stands out conspicuously in this telegram is that you reserve the right to yourself to use your armed forces against Kashmir.³ The statement of Mr Khaliquzzaman published in the morning's papers express the same thought.⁴ Our will in regard to method of settling Kashmir dispute is thus diametrically opposed to yours. You have continually envisaged possibility of using your armed forces to attack Kashmir. For us such an attack is an attack on Indian territory which will have to be met fully if it takes place. It is because of your constant threat of *jehad* and war to achieve your purpose in Kashmir that we were compelled to take precautionary measures and making certain troop disposition. So long as that threat remains no Government in India can avoid taking all necessary defensive steps.

The issue is simple. We do not agree about the merits of Kashmir question. Do we agree or not that there must be no further resort to warfare for settlement of the dispute? We have offered to do so and you have refused to accept that position or to give the necessary assurance.

We have adhered in the past and shall continue to adhere to all assurances that we have given to the U.N. We shall keep to our undertaking to implement U.N.C.I.P.'s resolutions provided the assurances given to us by that Commission are also implemented. This is not a question of our interpretation but of the formal assurances given to us by U.N.C.I.P. on the basis of which we accepted its two resolutions. In any event we stand by our pledge to the people of Jammu and Kashmir that they should decide their own future.

1. New Delhi, 4 August 1951. *Indo-Pakistan Relations—Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan* (From July 15, 1951 to August 9, 1951) White Paper, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
2. In his cable Liaquat Ali denied all the charges in Nehru's telegram of 29 July 1951.
3. Liaquat Ali had said that "the occupation of Kashmir by your armed forces was an act of aggression against the people of Kashmir and against Pakistan and was immediately denounced by us."
4. It was reported on 3 August 1951 that Khaliquzzaman, former President of the Pakistan Muslim League, stated in Karachi on 1 August that military action if ever taken by Pakistan "to frustrate the evil design of India to grab Kashmir by show of force" would not amount to aggression, but would be in the nature of military help to the U.N. organisation whose "honour and prestige is at stake in Kashmir."

I have raised no objection to the stationing of Pakistani troops at the various places you have mentioned.⁵ I have only pointed out that they are right near our border and that in view of your aggressive attitude of threatening war we have to take defensive measures. You mention Jhelum and Rawalpindi are far away but both are very near to the Kashmir border which you are constantly threatening to attack.

You refer to two opposing forces standing face to face across border and to danger of a trivial incident leading to a conflagration. I do not know where you have stationed your troops. But under our revised disposition no new unit of our force is less than at least 20 miles away from the border. There is no question, therefore, of these forces creating any incident that may lead to a widespread conflict.

You say that our armed forces stand poised for attack and would utilise any "incident" as a pretext for launching their invasion. Our forces are not conscripted for attack and will not, as I have repeatedly told you, take any action unless they are attacked. The new dispositions of our forces were not begun till we had evidence that Pakistan was prepared for aggressive action. In this connection, I might point out to you that on the 28th June, we learned that Pakistan was moving a brigade from Peshawar to Rawalkote which is 15 miles from Poonch. The move directly threatened Poonch and could have no other purpose. We drew the attention of the U.N. observer to this on 3rd July. The move was physically completed on the 7th July. Till then we had not taken any steps to move our troops. Indeed, these movements began only on the 10th July. This is further proof of the pure defensive character of the new disposition of our forces.

Your reference to our proposal for the decision of the canal waters dispute is far removed from the facts of the case.⁶ Our proposal was clear and provided for any possible deadlock. This could have been made precise, if you had not

5. Liaquat Ali wrote: "you have suddenly discovered that the presence of Pakistani troops in their normal peace-time stations is also a danger to India. Lahore, Sialkot, Jhelum and Rawalpindi. . . were all cantonments in pre-partition days, and our troops have been stationed in them for the last four years without exciting any apprehension in your mind. Jhelum is over a hundred miles and Rawalpindi one hundred and eighty miles away from your frontiers."
6. Liaquat Ali wrote "that you made proposals for judicial determination of the canal waters dispute. . . Nevertheless, you are not prepared to refer it to the International Court of Justice. . . . Instead you proposed the creation of a new tribunal consisting of two Indian and two Pakistan judges, but when it was pointed out to you that a tribunal so composed would inevitably be deadlocked you were not prepared to agree to the addition of a neutral judge. In short, you . . . wanted more delay so that, taking forcible advantage of your position as upstream riparian, you could continue the construction of new irrigation projects designed to misappropriate water at the expense of Pakistan."

rejected the proposal out of hand. We are still prepared for a proper judicial determination of these canal water disputes as well as of the evacuees property problem.

May I, in conclusion, suggest to you that peace is not offered with clenched fists⁷ nor with threatened aggression and resounding cries of *jehad*.

7. Liaquat Ali demonstrated a clenched fist and announced its adoption as the national symbol at a mammoth meeting held on 27 July 1951.

20. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 5, 1951

My dear Krishna,

I sent you a letter for Attlee yesterday dealing with the activities of British officers in Pakistan.² I had mentioned in that letter and in my telegram to you that there is a possibility of questions being asked in Parliament on this subject. The Indian newspapers have been full of it. It is possible that we can induce people not to ask questions, which can only lead to embarrassing answers. Our Parliament is meeting tomorrow. I met most of the members today at a Party meeting. I spoke to them at some length about the Indo-Pakistan situation. I did not say anything about the British officers. But I appealed to them generally to restrain themselves in this critical situation and not to ask inconvenient questions or deliver aggressive speeches. My words had some effect. It is possible, therefore, that they might not ask me those questions. But there are others, not in our Party, who might do so. If so, I shall give them a suitable answer and inform you of it.

There is naturally a strong undercurrent of feeling in India, especially in the North,³ but it is surprising how little manifestation there is of the crisis.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See *ante*, pp. 341-344.

3. The general council of the All-India Hind Mazdoor Sabha, at its meeting in Kanpur on 30 July 1951, urged upon the workers of the two countries to bring pressure to bear upon their respective Governments to seek the solution of differences by peaceful means. Syama Prasad Mookerjee said in Calcutta on 29 July that the only solution for the tense Indo-Pakistan relations was the abandonment of the policy of appeasement and pursuit of a uniform policy both in economic and political spheres towards Pakistan.

The contrast with Pakistan is remarkable.⁴ This does not mean that our people are much better than Pakistanis. It means that the Pakistanis have been worked up to a state of semi-frenzy and are both very angry with India and afraid of India. Our people, on the whole, do not expect war to come and, I suppose, have a feeling that we are strong enough to meet the situation.

In Pakistan, more especially in Lahore, there has been a large exodus to the interior.⁵ It almost appears that this was encouraged by the Government there. Here there are no such signs, even in our forward areas like Amritsar. The *Dawn* reported the other day an exodus from Calcutta and blackouts and all that there. This was completely false. The Pakistani press has worked itself up to a state of hysterical frenzy. The Urdu papers are full of blood and thunder.⁶

Yesterday I sent my latest reply to Liaquat Ali Khan.⁷ This was communicated to you. This reply is relatively brief. I think our correspondence, in spite of its amorphous character, has cleared up one or two points. One is of course that Pakistan refuses to give any assurance of not attacking Kashmir. All it is prepared to say is that it will not attack the rest of India. As an attack on Kashmir means for us an attack on India and all-out war, this distinction does not mean anything. We are certainly not going to put up with an attack on Kashmir and limit military operations to that territory.

In my telegram I have also given some revealing dates which show definitely that Pakistan took the first move in sending a brigade from Peshawar to Rawalkote, which is right near Poonch. We actually protested against this to the U.N. observers on the 3rd July. Our movements of troops began on the 10th July when we felt that an attack on Kashmir might take place at any time.

4. Akhtar Ali Khan, editor of the Lahore paper, *Zamindar*, asked the Muslims of Pakistan to be prepared to die for their country. In eastern Pakistan, newspapers were concentrating on the bugle as a method of rousing Pakistanis to war. M.A. Gurmani, Pakistan Minister for Kashmir Affairs, declared on 3 August 1951 that Pakistan would prove an iron wall against India's "expansionist designs" and "Brahmin imperialism."
5. During the period from 22 June to 7 July 1951, according to a Pakistan Government press note, 85,738 Hindus left East Bengal while only 72,985 Hindus entered East Bengal. The corresponding traffic of Muslims for the same period showed a net influx of 6,230 Muslims into the province.
6. For example, on 16 June, Zafar Ali Khan wrote a poem in *Zamindar* stating that "to keep alive our traditions in this age is a sign of victory and triumph. I swear by the strength of Allah that there is glory under the shade of swords. We will some day sit on the throne—Delhi has been our seat of Government for centuries."
7. See the preceding item.

I might inform you that the U.N. observers' reply to our protest was that, strictly speaking, Pakistan could move their troops behind the ceasefire line, so long as they did not exceed the number at the time of the ceasefire.⁸ Pakistan had withdrawn some troops probably from that area. As a matter of fact, after the ceasefire, we had withdrawn quite one third of our army from Kashmir. Then recently we sent back some part of it (only a small part of the number we had withdrawn previously). We could do so without infringement of the ceasefire on the ground mentioned by the U.N. observers, that is, that we were well within the number at the time of the ceasefire.

Pakistan's movement of troops to Rawalkote might thus be considered as not a breach of the ceasefire agreement. But there was no doubt that it was a dangerously aggressive move, so far as we were concerned. The only possible reason for it was that an attack on Poonch city was contemplated. This was relatively easy from the high ground where the troops were. This fact and many other facts induced us to take rapid action to improve our defensive dispositions. This action itself has largely averted the Pakistani attack and war. Whether it will finally do so, I do not know.

Thus we are perfectly justified in saying that there is danger of a Pakistani attack on Kashmir. In fact it is more or less admitted by Liaquat Ali Khan. If so, what are we supposed to do? To stay out and wait for the attack? Or to look on from the rest of India while the attack takes place in Kashmir? Obviously the only thing we could do is to be perfectly prepared all along the line. This we did and, as soon as news of this reached Liaquat Ali, he grew angry and the frustration of his plans upset him completely. If we had not taken that action, it is dead certain now at least, if not before, that an attack on Kashmir would have taken place followed by war. To talk therefore that our troop movements had endangered the situation is to say something which is wrong.

There is a great deal of frustration in Pakistan now. Partly this is due to a realisation that we are deadly serious and prepared; partly to the fact that they are not getting quite as much support as they wanted and expected from the U.K. and the U.S.A. These are restraining factors, and yet the hysteria is so great in Pakistan that one does not quite know what might happen.

I hope the U.K. Government and the U.S.A. have realised, as Pakistan has done, that we are deadly serious and no amount of pressure tactics is going to make us surrender to Pakistan on this issue. We shall not attack and we shall avoid war to the utmost of our capacity. But we will not withdraw our troops from their new positions, till everything has settled down, and we

8. On 9 July 1951, Pakistan troops in the Mendhar sector crossed the ceasefire line, and penetrated into Indian territory for several hours; and on 12 July, a small number of Indian troops on patrol duty, near Karotana village, were fired at by Pakistani intruders.

shall have the constituent assembly elections in Kashmir next month. Threats and pressure on us will only help to embitter feelings. They will produce no other result. Indeed any encouragement of Pakistan at this juncture means encouragement of war.

Parliament is beginning again tomorrow. We have a very heavy session ahead. Apart from external difficulties, there are serious difficulties internally in the Congress, and many developments might take place in the near future which might surprise some people.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

21. Cable to Sayyid Abol Qasem Kashani¹

Our Charge'd'Affaires, Mr. Kapur, has informed me of the interview that he had with you, in the course of which he explained our position.² I am asking him, when he delivers this message to you, to hand over to you the text of my latest message to Prime Minister of Pakistan. I would specially invite your attention to two facts:

(1) Pakistan does not agree that there must be no further resort to warfare for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, although we have offered to settle it by peaceful means only;

(2) The new dispositions of our forces were not begun till we had evidence that Pakistan was preparing for aggressive action. In fact they had actually moved troops so as directly to threaten Poonch, a town in Jammu and Kashmir State, which lies in the area under the control of the lawful Government of Jammu and Kashmir. We had to make fresh military dispositions in order to defend ourselves against fresh aggression.

1. New Delhi, 7 August 1951. J.N. Collection. This cable was sent through B.K. Kapur, India's Charge'd'Affaires in Teheran.
2. On 4 August 1951, Kashani had assured that he would ensure that Liaquat Ali Khan called off his campaign of *jehad*, although, Kapur added, Kashani was labouring under the impression, created by Pakistan propaganda, that "the big bad Indian wolf" was "going to swallow up the Pakistan lamb."

The present Government of Jammu and Kashmir State is an autonomous popular Government whose legal and constitutional position is undoubted. A considerable area of the State was invaded by Pakistan forces, committing aggression against it, and is still in the possession of these forces. The Kashmir Government and we would be justified in taking action against this aggression. But in our desire to settle the Kashmir question peacefully, we have stated clearly that we will not take any military action there or elsewhere and strive for peaceful settlement. If Pakistan agrees to this proposal, all fear of war would immediately end. But they refuse to agree in regard to Kashmir. Even so, we have unilaterally declared that on no account will we take any military action unless we are attacked. When continuous threats of war are held out over us by Pakistan, no government can avoid taking preventive measures in their own territories. Even so, apart from certain new dispositions of troops far from the border, we have taken no other measures and there is no propaganda or talk of war in India, while in Pakistan the air is full of war preparations and slogans of attacking and conquering India.

We wish to live on the friendliest terms with Pakistan, which is not only our neighbour, but with which we have more in common than with any other country. I would wish you to appreciate that it is not our fault that we have been unable thus far to realise this aspiration. Pakistan has nothing to fear from us, and I earnestly hope that the present talk of war in Pakistan will be given up, thus reducing the tension between India and Pakistan and leading towards more peaceful relations. I can give you and all others full assurance that on no account will there be any aggression on part of India.³

3. Kapur was instructed to point out in course of conversation that Indo-Pakistan relations would have been much better but for continuous interference of some western powers who influenced Pakistan policy greatly and also the presence of large numbers of foreign, chiefly British, civil and military officers in Pakistan.

22. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 3109, dated August 6th. This correspondence has already grown so voluminous and repetitious that it is with the utmost reluctance that

1. New Delhi, 10 August 1951. *India's Threat to Pakistan—Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India—15 July-11 August 1951*, White Paper, Government of Pakistan, pp. 35-36.

I permit myself some brief comments on some of the points raised in your telegram.

(1) You have disputed the correctness of my statement that we had taken no steps to move our troops until movement of your brigade in June towards Poonch. For this you rely on what you described as reinforcement of our armed forces in Kashmir by four battalions. There were no such reinforcements. There were in some cases reliefs. Our total force in Kashmir was reduced after the ceasefire by nearly 40 per cent. After that, for every battalion that went in, one came out. With our forces in the State reduced to 3/5th of their original strength, no one could regard the mere relief of four battalions, in that reduced force, as evidence of any offensive intention against Pakistan. *Per contra*, the recent movement of your brigade to within immediate striking distance of Poonch could be capable of no other interpretation than an intention to attack Poonch.

(2) You continue to accuse us of threatening Pakistan with our armed might and describe what you call "the occupation of Kashmir" as wrongful and as an act of aggression against Pakistan.² I regret that I cannot go on arguing endlessly against a persistent distortion of facts and allegations which are the very reverse of truth. Everyone knows that not a single Indian soldier went to Kashmir till it was invaded from Pakistan and a part of Kashmir State had been subjected for days to loot, rapine, and massacre. It was only then that Indian soldiers went at the request of lawful government and people of Kashmir to defend them against brutal aggression. In spite of your invasion of Kashmir and military operations that followed, not a single soldier has set foot on Pakistan territory. May I remind you that the U.N. mediator, Sir Owen Dixon, has held that Pakistan's action in Kashmir was contrary to international law.

(3) You say that the peace plan proposed by you rules out war and aggression. But in effect, you reserve freedom to yourself to attack Kashmir, on the ground of our alleged aggression against the people of the State and against Pakistan unless we accept a settlement of the dispute on your terms. Considering that it is Pakistan that is the real aggressor in Kashmir, that Pakistan denied that aggression until it became too obvious to be denied, that Pakistan is constantly proclaiming *jihad* as the only effective means of solving the problem and making feverish preparations for it, no other conclusion is possible than that the real alternatives you offer us are surrender to your wishes or resort by you to force. This is not a genuine attempt to settle the Kashmir dispute peacefully. So long as this remains your attitude, no Government of India can relax its precautions which are purely defensive.

2. Liaquat Ali Khan wrote that "India is in wrongful occupation of Kashmir and is trying to perpetuate this occupation by means of force."

(4) You also charge us with defiance of the United Nations. This is as baseless as your other charges. It is not defiance to ask that the U.N. honour their assurances to us.

(5) Your newspapers continue not only to preach war but some of them demand the conquest of India.

2. In spite of the provocation to which we are being deliberately subjected by distortion of facts, by baseless charges, and by warlike propaganda, I assure you that we shall adhere to the unequivocal assurance that I have repeatedly given, namely, that we wish to live in peace and friendship with Pakistan and that we are resolved not to attack it. With that assurance, honestly and firmly reaffirmed, I am content to leave our conduct and our intentions to the judgment of history.

23. Cable to B.K. Kapur¹

I have received another long telegram from Abol Qasem Kashani in reply to my message which you gave him.² Will you please draw Mr Kashani's attention to the reply that I sent to Liaquat Ali Khan last Sunday as also to my recent speech.³ Please inform him that the present acute tension is entirely due to statements and activities of Pakistan Government. We cannot possibly withdraw our forces when daily threats of war and invasion of India are hurled at us. No responsible Government can take that risk. I have stated clearly that on our part there will be no aggressive action on any account and I have invited Liaquat Ali Khan to say likewise.

2. As regards Kashmir dispute, we have always been of opinion that the people of Kashmir must decide. This would have been done long ago but for invasion of Kashmir territory by Pakistan troops who are still there. At present, Kashmir has an autonomous Government which is predominantly Muslim and has at its back the only great popular and national organisation of Kashmir. We do not and cannot interfere with its working. A plebiscite has been delayed because Pakistan has not agreed to the necessary conditions for a fair plebiscite which include withdrawal of their troops from Kashmir State territory.

3. So long as there is no real evidence that Pakistan has given up all idea of aggression against India, including Kashmir, India has to take necessary precautions.

1. New Delhi, 11 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 354-355.

3. See *ante*, pp. 311-317, 349-351.

24. On S.P. Mookerjee's Speeches¹

We are constantly receiving protests from Pakistan about Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's speeches. These speeches are undoubtedly provocative and objectionable. I do not quite know what to do about it. I suggest the following answer:

To: Foreign, Karachi

Your telegram No. 3573 dated August 30. We agree with you that Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee's speeches have been objectionable,² though he stated in Parliament that he did not suggest any military measures. But it is true that he has often made statements which are directly contrary to Government's policy.³ Our Prime Minister has given him an effective reply in Parliament⁴ and outside and no doubt will deal with this matter again. I might inform you that Dr Mookerjee is not the leader of any major or opposition party in the Indian Parliament.

We have pointed out to you that in terms of our Constitution and judicial decisions, freedom of expression, even though highly distasteful to Government, is permitted. Because of the coming general elections in India, Government have given a further assurance about freedom of speech. It is largely because of these general elections that speeches attacking Government's policy are being made by some individuals and groups. The Government, however, has taken a strong stand in regard to this matter and has no doubt that this stand is upheld in the country. The principal national organisation, the National Congress, has fully supported that stand. Government consider that the most effective method of dealing with objectionable speeches is to counter them in public instead of taking any repressive action, which is not only doubtful under the Constitution and laws but might give greater publicity and prestige to those who deliver such speeches.

1. Note to Secretary, Commonwealth Relations, New Delhi, 31 August 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Mookerjee, on 26 August 1951, speaking at Nagpur, sought to repudiate partition and called upon the Prime Minister to give an ultimatum to Pakistan and march troops into it.
3. On 28 March 1951, Mookerjee urged in Parliament that the "Kashmir case should be withdrawn from the Security Council."
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 (Part I), pp.515-521.

25. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
September 3, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

Your letter of the 30th August about the defence of Assam. I shall convey its contents to our Defence authorities. You will appreciate however that the military situation has to be viewed as a whole and not in bits. Also that it is a very unsafe policy to spread out one's defence forces and make them relatively weak at strategic points. In order to be strong at the right places, we have to take the risk of being weak in other places. It is the definite opinion of our Defence authorities that, taking it all in all, we can easily deal with the East Bengal situation in case of necessity.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

26. Predictions of War¹

I think you should draw the particular attention of the Home Ministry to effect of war predictions in some newspapers.² Also to astrologers' forecasts of a coming war. Is it not possible to do something to stop this kind of thing? The least that can be done is to tell them forcibly that this must not be done. The astrologers should be warned that any publicity about war predictions will get them into trouble.³

1. Note to Secretary, Commonwealth Relations, 5 September 1951. File No. 2-4/51-Pak. I, M.E.A.
2. A news item in the *Tej* of Delhi on 18 August 1951 mentioned that Pakistan would attack Kashmir, while another article in the *Blitz* of Bombay on 11 August 1951, entitled "Pak plan of a 3-week war", furnished certain details of Pakistan plans, which included a three-pronged attack on India. A news item printed in the *Milap* of Delhi on 25 August 1951 mentioned that war with Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute was inevitable.
3. See also *ante*, pp. 69-77.

27. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi

September 15, 1951

My dear Bidhan,

I have had some reports about the border areas of Nadia district. It is stated that large numbers of Muslims living on our side of the border are being uprooted and taken elsewhere. Presumably, the policy is to clear those areas, upto a certain depth, of Muslims because it is thought that they might be unreliable elements in case of trouble.

I feel that any such policy would be definitely wrong and harmful even from the narrowest point of view of expediency. It would, of course, be against any general principle that we follow. It would give a big handle to Pakistan and to our opponents in the rest of the world. It would react very badly on the Hindus in Pakistan. These considerations are important enough for us not to do something which is not in keeping with our principles and proclaimed practice and which will naturally have serious consequences both in India and elsewhere.

From the narrow point of view of military expediency, this policy, if such there is, is not only unnecessary, but rather harmful. In the event of trouble and war with Pakistan, our borders will naturally be occupied by our troops. There will be no chance for any people residing there to give trouble. The area will become a military area and probably that area will be safer from the trouble point of view than any other area. If you take away the Muslims from there and put them elsewhere you give no greater assurance to that area, but would put discontented and disaffected people elsewhere.

I have no doubt whatever that, in case of war our troops will function on the other side of our border. No one can guarantee a raid here and there, but, generally speaking, any conflict would take place within Pakistan. If that is so, these Muslim inhabitants of our border regions cannot possibly do anything harmful to us.

If, on the other hand, Pakistan forces enter our territory in some places, then it makes little difference whether Hindus live there or Muslims. In either event, therefore, there is no point whatever in removing Muslims from the border, more especially those who have been permanently living there. Any such attempt will do us injury in many ways.

1. Saroj Chakrabarty, *With Dr. B.C. Roy and Other Chief Ministers* (Calcutta, 1974), pp.192-193.

I do not know, of course, if there is such a policy or if any such steps have been taken, although my information is that some such thing has been done. I should like you to look into this matter and take steps to rectify any such action which might have been taken. I am sure that this is the right policy. Any other policy will create grave problems for us.

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

28. To C.C. Biswas¹

New Delhi
October 6, 1951

My dear Biswas,²

Dutt has shown me your letter of October 1, with its enclosures.

It does appear that there has been a marked change since Dr Malik went away and Azizuddin Ahmad took his place.³ This may be due partly to the existing tension in India and Pakistan and partly to Azizuddin Ahmad's personality. Obviously, continuous talk of war preparations etc. hardly fits in with the joint tours and the like.

While I agree with you in your analysis, I am quite sure that we must not allow this to come in the way of our own approach to the problem and that we should continue functioning, in so far as we can, as we have done. That means that your organisation in Calcutta continues. Any suspicion that we are going to wind it up or even lessen its activities, is bound to have far-reaching consequences. It will depress greatly the morale of the minority in East Bengal and might add to their exodus.

We are passing through a difficult time with Pakistan. Within a few days Dr Graham's report will be out and there will again be a good deal of shouting. My own impression is that, on the whole, the situation is somewhat better now than it was a month or two ago. Pakistan by its continuous cursing and shouting has overshot the mark and is experiencing the consequences of this. No one can live at a high pitch of excitement all the time. Either this blows up into conflict or it tones down. The chances of conflict are much less now, though they cannot be ruled out. The result is inevitably a toning down and a

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Biswas was India's Minister of State for Minorities.

3. Ahmad succeeded A.M.Malik as Pakistan's Minister of State for Minorities.

certain feeling of demoralisation on the other side. It is this feeling that leads to wild outbursts from time to time.

If, as I expect, the Graham report and what follows from it will not come up to Pakistan's expectations, there will be still more depression and demoralisation.

We must, therefore, hold on and carry on quietly and firmly without exhibiting too much excitement and you, particularly, should carry on the good work you have been doing.

I am suggesting to Dutt to write to the Pakistan Government pointing out that your work is not progressing at all because of the attitude taken up by Azizuddin Ahmad, your opposite number. If your enquiries are not properly attended to and joint tours and meetings become fewer and fewer, then obviously the work of the Central Ministers is strictly limited.

I suggest that you might write to Azizuddin Ahmad on these lines. I do not suppose this will bring about any change in the situation, but, nevertheless we should do the right thing and cast the burden of not doing this on the other party.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

29. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
October 8, 1951

My dear Pantji,

Thank you for your letter of October 7th.

I wonder if you noticed an article in the *Medina* of Bijnor. My attention was drawn to this because it was largely reproduced in the Pakistan papers with big headlines. Subsequently I saw the article as well as an English translation of it. It was a kind of a lament of the Muslim in India. It was powerfully written with deep feeling. It was no doubt greatly exaggerated, but there can also be no doubt that it represented the suppressed feelings of the man who wrote it, which had suddenly found expression. It made painful reading. I think it did represent the state of frustration of the Muslims in India. Their future seems dark to them....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. G.B. Pant Papers, N.A.I. Extracts.

30. Liaquat Ali Khan's Assassination¹

All of us should now approach this larger question of Indo-Pakistan relations in a new way and try to hush the voice of controversy and disputes and blaming of each other as far as we can and try also to find some way or path, consistent with our self-respect and honour, to establish real peace between India and Pakistan.

¶ I am exceedingly grieved to learn this shocking news² not only for personal reasons but for larger reasons too. We have complained frequently of speeches made on the Pakistan side by various people, including Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, and of other activities, but, I think, the fact remains that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan was a great steadying influence in Pakistan.

That applied not only to Mr Liaquat Ali Khan but to so many other leaders also in Pakistan.

We shouted at each other and were angry several times but whenever we met, we met as friends. The fact remains that we have lived together most of our lives, we have grown up together, we know each other's strong and weak points. I do not know what the future will bring but I hope that that feeling of oneness and that feeling of knowing each other and understanding each other will not disappear and when political troubles, disputes and conflicts fade away that will be the basis of our future relationship.

But that is the personal aspect. The wider aspect is that Mr Liaquat Ali Khan was, undoubtedly, ever since the death of Quaid-e-Azam, the dominating figure in Pakistan. His influence was undoubtedly exercised in restraining people's passions and feelings and steadying Pakistan. It is a tragedy both from the personal as well as the larger point of view that he is dead and more so is the manner of his death.

1. Speech before the adoption of a resolution of condolence moved at the Congress Parliamentary Party meeting, New Delhi, 16 October 1951. *National Herald*, 17 October 1951.
2. Liaquat Ali Khan was addressing a public meeting at Rawalpindi on 16 October when he was shot at close range. He was taken immediately to hospital and given a blood transfusion but he died after a short while. The assassin whose name was given as Said Akbar from Hazara was killed by the crowd on the spot.

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

2. Canal Waters Issue

1. To B.K. Nehru¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1951

My dear Birju,²

Yesterday I received a letter from E.R. Black,³ the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. I enclose a copy of this letter. In the course of the next few days I shall probably send a reply to him direct. A copy of this reply will be sent to you.

A.N. Khosla⁴ is leaving tomorrow for London and New York and is likely to spend about three weeks in the United States. I think it might be worthwhile for him to see Black and discuss the canal waters problem as well as the proposal made by Black with him. Khosla knows all about this subject and has been in charge of it right from the beginning. Of course, he cannot discuss legal and such like matters, but he can give the fullest information about the technical and engineering aspects and also about the course of negotiations between India and Pakistan during the last three or four years.

You had better have a full talk with Khosla so that you might be posted up and then Khosla can meet Black.

Lilienthal's article in *Collier's* magazine is full of mistakes and factual errors. However, there is something in the proposal he has made.⁵ In fact that proposal is in line with what we have been suggesting all along to the Pakistan Government. We have wanted a joint technical survey of the whole Indus region so that the best use can be made of the waters of the Indus and other rivers. Pakistan has refused to agree. We are convinced that there is more than enough water for all and we have no desire at all to starve Pakistan of water.

1. File No. DW(38)(1)-CWD/51, Ministry of Irrigation.
2. Nehru was posted in the Indian Embassy in Washington.
3. Eugene Black (1898-1992), then President of the World Bank, wrote to Nehru to solve the canal waters dispute on the basis of a financial plan, independent of political issues and without relation to past negotiations and claims.
4. Khosla was Chairman, Central Water and Power Commission.
5. David Lilienthal emphasised that the canal waters problem was neither a religious nor a political one but a feasible engineering and business problem. He proposed that if India and Pakistan would make full use of the waters of their lands, a solution could result. But he felt that an engineering solution of the problem required financial help for certain schemes and that the World Bank could easily give this. He himself suggested one such scheme: "The Development of the Indus Basin by a Joint Indo-Pakistan Authority."

I do not know if you have seen the Inter-Dominion Agreement dated the 4th May 1948 in regard to the canal waters dispute.⁶ This is an important document and it indicates the then approach to the problem which was reasonable. I might add that after accepting this agreement for more than two years, Pakistan had tried to denounce it on the ground that they agreed to it under pressure and coercion. This is fantastic nonsense. I myself was one of the signatories to this and so was Ghulam Mohammad and the whole thing was done in an exceedingly friendly and cooperative atmosphere. I enclose a copy of this agreement.

One fact should be borne in mind. The canal waters dispute has nothing to do with the Kashmir issue. It is entirely independent of it and, as a matter of fact, at no time in our discussions about Kashmir has the question of Kashmir rivers been seriously discussed with Pakistan. They never raised this issue in those discussions. But in press statements and the like, reference has been made to the Kashmir waters by the Pakistan leaders.

Secondly, any engineer or intelligent layman can see that we just cannot stop the Kashmir waters running into Pakistan. If there is the slightest doubt about it, there can be a guarantee which may be affirmed by the U.N.

Thus the canal waters issue should be considered apart from the Kashmir issue.

Leaving out Lilienthal's wrong statements, we come to his proposal. This is essentially that the whole Indus system must be developed as a unit. We agree that this whole system should be examined as a single unit and plans for its development should be settled cooperatively. In fact that has been largely our proposal when we asked for a joint technical survey. We would not mind the association of an outside expert agency or the International Bank in such a technical survey.

But, to say that this Indus unit should be operated by an Indo-Pakistan agency is to say something that is not feasible at any time, and more so now, with so much distrust of each other. This would mean that this joint agency would function all over western Punjab and the Sind on the one side and East Punjab, etc., on the other. What should happen is that after a joint scheme has been evolved, it should be worked separately by each Government in its own area. In addition, we would be prepared to have a joint Indo-Pakistan commission, something on the lines of the U.S.-Canada Commission, in regard

6. Water was allowed into Pakistan canals through canals and works in India early in May 1948 in accordance with the Inter-Dominion Agreement of 4 May 1948. In July 1948, at the Inter-Dominion Conference held at Lahore, Pakistan was allowed seven years to develop alternative sources of water supply. But in June 1949, Pakistan suggested that India should refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. Pakistan proposed, if India refused, to place the dispute before the Security Council.

to joint waters. This commission could iron out any differences that might arise and generally help in cooperative working.

I want to make it clear that it is not our purpose to deprive Pakistan of the waters it gets, provided they tap their other resources so that we can also use more of the water available. This was the basis of the Inter-Dominion Agreement of May 4th, 1948 and, on the whole, this is what Lilienthal says.

I might mention that we have been advised by competent lawyers that the legal position in regard to canal waters is very much in our favour. Lilienthal is wrong in thinking otherwise. But we do not wish to stick to the legal position as was indicated in the Inter-Dominion Agreement.

You might remember that we proposed to Pakistan a joint tribunal consisting of two judges from India and two judges from Pakistan to decide finally this canal waters issue.⁷ They refused to agree and said that this would lead to a deadlock. We said that anyhow it would reduce the points of differences very much and if there was a deadlock again, we can refer the remaining points to some other impartial agency to decide. We did not suggest this agency but, between ourselves, we are prepared to refer such matters to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague (not the International Court of Justice).

These are some odd points hastily jotted down. As I have said above, I shall send you copy of my letter to Black later.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

7. In his letter to Liaquat Ali Khan on 12 September 1950, Nehru expressed India's willingness to have a tribunal to which the canal waters dispute might be referred, as its reference to The Hague Court was manifestly most inconvenient as well as costly. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol 15 (Pt. I), pp. 322-326.

2. To Eugene R. Black¹

New Delhi
23rd September 1951

My dear Mr Black,

Thank you for your letter of September 6th which has been forwarded to me by our Charge' d' Affaires in Washington. I was glad to receive this letter. I

1. File No. DW(1)-CWD/51. Vol. I, Ministry of Irrigation.

had previously read Mr Lilienthal's article in *Collier's* magazine. That article was very interesting and contained a proposal which struck me as important and worthy of consideration. There are a number of factual errors in Mr Lilienthal's article, but this is not surprising, as his visit to India was a short one and he did not have time to go into details. What we are concerned with is the proposal he has made.

2. This proposal is, to a large extent, in line with what we have ourselves suggested in the past. I think, therefore, that with some variations this proposal can be adopted and will yield fruitful results both for India and Pakistan. I am indicating below what variations we consider necessary.

3. We entirely agree that the development and use of water resources should be treated on a functional and not political plane, even though, in existing circumstances, it may be a little difficult to divorce it from political issues. This is an engineering matter and should be treated as such. We are convinced that there is more than enough water in the Indus Basin to satisfy the needs of both India and Pakistan, provided it is properly exploited. In the early days of this controversy, we suggested to Pakistan that there should be a technical survey of the entire Indus Basin jointly undertaken by Indian and Pakistani engineers. This was to form the basis of agreed plans of development. It was difficult to consider the question properly without having this information at our disposal. Such information as we had led us to the conclusion that it was not difficult to make arrangements for further supply of water both to India and to Pakistan. We had and have no desire to reduce the water supply to Pakistan. At the same time, we were naturally anxious to increase our own supply of water for lands which had been neglected in the past.

4. Unfortunately, Pakistan did not agree to our suggestion for this joint technical survey and, in spite of several conferences, we have made little progress. Various proposals for the solution of this problem have been made from time to time. Among these was a proposal made by us that this matter should be referred to a joint tribunal, consisting of two judges nominated by India and two nominated by Pakistan. We suggested that this tribunal should be given final authority to decide the matter. Pakistan raised the objection that such a tribunal would probably not come to an agreement. We said in our reply that it would be easy to make provision for a reference of the remaining matters of difference to another authority, which may be an international authority. However, nothing came out of this proposal.

5. I might make one point clear. The canal waters dispute between India and Pakistan has nothing to do with the Kashmir issue. The dispute started and has been confined to East and West Punjab. So far as the rivers flowing into Pakistan from Kashmir are concerned, no question arises of any diversion or anything else being done which is likely to reduce the quantity of water which they carry into Pakistan.

6. The dispute between East and West Punjab Governments regarding these canal waters arose early in 1948. An Inter-Dominion Conference was held in 1948 and an agreement was arrived at on the 4th May. As this agreement is important, I am enclosing a copy of it for your information. The agreement was signed by Ministers of the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan as well as Ministers of the East and West Punjab Governments. I would particularly invite your attention to paragraphs 3 and 4 of this agreement which run as follows:

(3) The East and West Punjab Governments are anxious that this question should be settled in a spirit of goodwill and friendship without prejudice to its legal rights in the matter. The East Punjab Government has assured the West Punjab Government that it has no intention suddenly to withhold water from West Punjab without giving it time to tap alternative sources. The West Punjab Government on its part recognises the natural anxiety of the East Punjab Government to discharge the obligation to develop areas where water is scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab.

(4) Apart, therefore, from the question of law involved, the Governments are anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit on the basis of the East Punjab Government progressively diminishing its supply to these canals in order to give reasonable time to enable the West Punjab Government to tap alternative sources.

7. You will observe that the approach in this agreement was a practical and cooperative one. It was recognised that the East Punjab Government must have more water for its underdeveloped areas. It was also recognised that this must be done progressively and after giving reasonable time to the West Punjab Government to tap alternative sources. A technical survey of water resources was suggested and it was proposed that the two Governments should have further meetings with a view to consider the report of the technical survey and other matters.

8. Ever since then, there has been a continuous supply of water to the canals of the West Punjab and no difficulty has arisen. There have been arguments about payment for the water. More than two years after this agreement, the Pakistan Government denounced it. But we have maintained that it could not be set aside unilaterally. There has, however, been no change in the supply of water throughout this period and this continues still. Even though the agreement gave us the right to diminish the supply progressively, we have not actually exercised this right during these three years and more.

9. I have given you this background information so that it might help us in considering the problem. Mr Lilienthal's proposal, of course, can be considered quite apart from past history. We agree to that proposal in so far

as the whole Indus system should be considered and examined as a single unit, and plans for its development should be settled cooperatively. This would involve a joint technical survey of this entire region and an attempt to draw up plans for uniform development so as to benefit both India and Pakistan. We would welcome the association of the International Bank or any outside expert agency in such technical survey.

10. Such a survey should lead to proposals for development both in India and Pakistan. Although these proposals should be considered as parts of a single scheme of development of the entire region, it would not be practicable for a joint agency to operate them. Such a joint agency operating in large areas of Pakistan and India would lead to many difficulties and complications. While the survey and planning should be joint, the actual operation will have to be separate. But even in the operation a large measure of cooperation can be brought about by having some kind of a joint commission which could keep in view the entire Indus system as a whole and advise both countries whenever necessity arises. It could iron out any differences. I have in mind for the joint commission something like the commission which Canada and the United States have in regard to their common waters.²

11. It seems to me that this would include the essence of Mr Lilienthal's proposal and what you have yourself suggested in your letter. In any event, the first step has to be a joint survey of this entire Indus region. India and Pakistan could easily undertake it with such assistance that the International Bank could give. Once this initial first step is taken, other steps would inevitably follow, and the progress will be towards more and more cooperation.

12. There is one matter to which I would like to refer. We have at present under construction a big river valley scheme in East Punjab. Mr Lilienthal visited this. This scheme was planned long before partition in order to supply water to certain underdeveloped areas of what is now East Punjab. We have continued this and made good progress with it. This project will of course have to continue. I mention this because the Pakistan Government have sometimes suggested that work on this project should be stopped. To stop this work on a huge project on which we have worked hard for years and on which the future of East Punjab depends, would be a calamity. Apart from this, there is absolutely no necessity for doing so from any point of view.

13. I welcome therefore your proposal on the lines which I have indicated above.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. An International Joint Commission was set up with a view to provide supervision of the boundary waters between Canada and the U.S.A.

3. Cable to B.K. Nehru¹

Your telegram No.632, dated 26th September. My reply to Black, together with two copies for your and Khosla's use already despatched to you on 26th September. After full consideration of point made in paragraph 2 of your telegram, we had already come to conclusion that it would be best now not to hold out hopes that operation by joint Indo-Pakistan agency would be feasible. Any dubiety on this point is almost certain to be exploited against us later by Pakistan and might be regarded even by Black as equivocation. It is best to be completely frank in this matter from the outset.

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1951. J.N. Collection.

THE HINDU CODE BILL

1. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
August 2, 1951

My dear Mr. President,

... Regarding the reference to the Hindu Code Bill, I put that in because of an explicit direction by the Cabinet.² All the Bills mentioned in the Address were specially selected for mention in the Address. In regard to the Hindu Code Bill, there was even some discussion and stress was laid upon it. It is difficult for me to override the Cabinet decision in this matter. The Bill is anyhow going to be taken up and time has been allotted for it.³ Whether it is passed or not and, if passed, what the final form would be, I do not know. There is a great deal of feeling in this matter and a considerable majority in our Party has repeatedly insisted that this should be taken up. Several deputations have come to me about it. I know that there is opposition to it too. Apart from the merits of the Bill, it is something over which the House has spent a long time and merely to allow it to fade away after several years' labour, would lead to strong criticism. It was because of this and after discussion of the time factor that the Cabinet decided to include it in the important Bills mentioned in the President's Address.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 5(5)/51, President's Secretariat. Extracts.
2. Rajendra Prasad had suggested that reference "to the passing of the Hindu Code Bill in this Session" should be omitted from the President's draft Address to Parliament.
3. Parliament on 17 September 1951 resumed consideration of Part II of the Hindu Code Bill relating to divorce and monogamy. The debate was concluded on 22 September 1951.

2. To B.R. Ambedkar¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1951

My dear Ambedkar,

At the Party meeting yesterday, the Hindu Code Bill was discussed for some little time.² To my surprise and satisfaction, some of the opponents of the Bill said that they quite realised that it was highly desirable for the Bill to be passed during this session, because otherwise all kinds of exaggerated ideas might be spread. They added, of course, that they hoped that what they considered objectionable in it would be deleted. Ultimately, the Party agreed that the Bill should be taken up and passed during this session. I think this is helpful.

As for the date, I informed them that the Cabinet had decided that it should be taken up about the beginning of September. The rest of August will be spent in other important measures. By the beginning of September we should be a little freer and then we can concentrate on the Hindu Code Bill. I told them that we want to pass it within a fortnight but shall have to add to the time, if necessary.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Congress Parliamentary Party met on 8 August to discuss the President's Address to Parliament. It also decided to support the passage of the Hindu Code Bill during the coming session of Parliament.

3. To B.R. Ambedkar¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1951

My dear Ambedkar,

I wrote to you yesterday about the Hindu Code Bill. Today I got your letter of the 10th.²

I am sorry that your health is causing anxiety. I suggest that you take things a little easy.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Ambedkar had written that he needed immediate long-term treatment to avoid complications in his health. As he attached the greatest importance to the Hindu Code Bill, he wanted to take it up on 16 August and complete it by 1 September. Ambedkar had heard that in the last Party meeting Nehru had said that the Bill might be taken up in the first week of September.

About the Hindu Code Bill, you know that we have a good deal of opposition not only inside the House but outside. With the best will in the world, we cannot brush aside this opposition and get things done quickly. They have it in their power to delay a great deal. We must therefore proceed with some tact and with a view to achieve results. I am anxious that the Bill should be passed in this session.

The Cabinet decision was, and I think it was recorded in the minutes, that the Bill should be taken up at the beginning of September. I mentioned that at the Party meeting and they agreed. For us to try to hasten it and bring it earlier would needlessly give a handle to our opponents and create trouble. Also it would be far more advantageous to have it early in September, after we have finished with some of the important Bills—the ordinances, the Part C State Bill, the Industry Bill. If we try to have the Hindu Code Bill before any of these, again that will create a furore and give a handle to others. I think that, taking everything into consideration, it is far better to stick to the dates we have announced and then go ahead with it. We shall be able to do so then with greater vigour and somewhat less opposition. Parliament is going to sit till at least the 1st week of October. So there is plenty of time.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1951

My dear Prakasa,

Your letter of August 9th. About the Gorwala report.² It can hardly be said that the Planning Commission rushed to the press hastily and unceremoniously.³ The report was received by the Planning Commission about two months ago or more; at any rate I saw it two months ago or more. It was discussed at

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A.D. Gorwala had on 30 April 1951 submitted to the Planning Commission his report on the administration of public enterprises. It recommended organisational flexibility and a large degree of real autonomy together with effective control by the Government and of Parliament. It also dealt in detail with the machinery for administration of State enterprises, in both policy matters and internal management. The report emphasised that public undertakings must be judged solely by their efficiency.

3. This report was published on 29 July 1951.

length in the Planning Commission. Later various Secretaries were invited to participate on a further discussion of the report. At this stage the report was circulated to Cabinet Ministers here and to Chief Ministers in various Provinces. It was then decided that it should be published some little time later, about the time or a little after the Planning Commission report came out.

This procedure has been followed. As Deshmukh and I were parties to these discussions as well as to the decisions taken about the publication, I can hardly complain to the Planning Commission. It was quite obvious that Gorwala's report had to be published. Merely holding it up for an extra two or three weeks makes very little difference. A report of this kind cannot and should not be suppressed. The public get to know of it and suppression has worst of reactions on them. We decided therefore that it should be published in the normal course.

About the Hindu Code Bill, this matter was considered at a Cabinet meeting. You were not here then. It was then decided that it must be given priority during this session. Later at the Party meeting, this was again discussed and it was the viewpoint even of some of the opponents of the Bill that the Bill should be taken up and passed during this session. Of course they added that the controversial clauses should be left out. But they felt that a pending Bill with many clauses to which they objected would probably be a greater handle to their opponents in the elections.

It is true that there are people who are opposed to it.⁴ It is equally true that there are people who are passionately in its favour. The matter has been voted upon at Party meetings after long and heated discussions. Every time a considerable majority has insisted on its being passed.

I think therefore that the Bill should be proceeded with, even though the President, the Speaker, and the Deputy Speaker are against it.⁵ In fact it was mentioned in the President's Address. It is possible of course to vary some of its provisions.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Syama Prasad Mookerji said: "The Hindu Code Bill would shatter the magnificent structure of Hindu culture and stultify a dynamic and catholic way of life that had wonderfully adapted itself to changes for centuries." He proposed that the Hindu Code should be made optional. Bhupendra Singh Mann and Hukam Singh reiterated that Sikhs should not be governed by the Hindu Code. It was also argued that the concept of divorce was alien to the Hindus.
5. While Rajendra Prasad urged Nehru to withdraw the Bill warning of bitter feelings in the country, the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, it was said, had allowed the abuse of rules of procedure by some members to prolong unduly the debate so that the Bill could not be passed in the current session.

5. To B.R. Ambedkar¹

New Delhi
August 15, 1951

My dear Ambedkar,

Your letter of the 15th about the Hindu Code Bill. I shall certainly speak on this Bill. But I am not sure what the proper time for this will be. What is much more important is that we should consider it at the Party meeting and I shall speak then also. The only way to get it through Parliament with some speed is to give full consideration to it at the Party meeting.

As for the date, I had already mentioned to you that we have provisionally suggested the beginning of September. The 5th of September is a good date. We cannot absolutely fix it on that date because some other important business may be unfinished, but we may keep that date in our mind at present. The whole point is that we should begin its consideration in the Party. I think we might do so as soon as we have disposed of two or three important measures like the C States Bill which is urgent from the point of view of elections etc., and the Industries Bill and possibly the Press Bill. The Press Bill might be taken up even later.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

6. To B.R. Ambedkar¹

New Delhi
August 30, 1951

My dear Ambedkar,

Progress in Parliament has been very slow and we have got rather stuck up. There are quite a number of important Bills which we must pass. I had hoped, as you know, to take up the Hindu Code Bill on the 5th of September, but, I fear, this will be difficult for a variety of reasons. One of these is that we have not got enough time before that to consider it fully in the Party, which is important to save time. Otherwise, we shall get bogged up. Another reason is that during some days of next week the Afghan Prime Minister is going to

1. File No. 32 (195)/49-PMS.

take a lot of time.² The third reason is that owing to the proximity of the A.I.C.C. meeting it will be difficult to carry on anything, both in the Party and Parliament, with ease. Members' minds will be elsewhere.

I am suggesting, therefore, that Monday, September 10, be fixed for the Hindu Code Bill and that we should proceed with it day to day after that. Next week, that is from the 4th to the 9th September, we should have at least two Party meetings to consider the Hindu Code Bill. This ought to enable us to be quite ready for discussion in Parliament.

I enclose a copy of a note I am sending to Satya Narayan Sinha.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Shah Mahmoud Khan Ghazi, Prime Minister of Afghanistan since 1946, was in Delhi from 4 to 10 September 1951.
3. See the next item.

7. Current Legislation in Parliament¹

... I have read your note about the Hindu Code Bill. I appreciate the reasons you have advanced. I think, however, that it will be improper for us to postpone it too long. That would probably delay other work also, because some people will think that if they delay other work, the Hindu Code Bill may not be taken up. The result will be that very little work will be done anyhow. If it is made clear that the Hindu Code Bill is going to be taken up by a certain date, other work will proceed faster. We have given repeated assurances to Parliament about this Bill and any suspicion that we are delaying it and possibly bypassing it will be to break our assurances and give rise to a great deal of justifiable criticism.

4. As you know, it was our intention to take up the Hindu Code Bill on September 5th. I think it will be rather difficult to do that chiefly because we are really not ready to get on with it, in the sense that we have not considered it in the Party. I think it is essential that we should give full consideration to

1. Note to Satya Narayan Sinha, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, 30 August 1951. File No. 32 (195)/49-PMS. Extracts.

it at meetings of the Party. This will lessen the time taken in Parliament and facilitate its passage. During the next week in Parliament there will be a good deal of what might be called outside excitement because of the coming meeting of the A.I.C.C. This will make it difficult to concentrate on this Bill and at the same time to have frequent meetings of the Party.

5. I think that we should definitely fix Monday, the 10th September, for the Hindu Code Bill to be taken up first thing and for us to proceed with it from day to day, except for minor breaks. In the course of the next week we should have at least two or possibly three meetings of the Party to consider this Bill so that we might be ready with it on the subsequent Monday....

8. The Progress of the Hindu Code Bill¹

It has been decided at a Party meeting that we should, for the present, take up only Part 2 of the Hindu Code Bill.² The progress made in this at the Party meeting today was substantial. It is quite possible that this whole Part may be concluded in the Party meeting fairly soon. After that, in Parliament this should not take long. This would be treated, of course, as a separate Bill by itself. It is difficult to fix a time table for this Bill or any other. But I think it is quite possible that it should be concluded within a week at the most. It will be taken up tomorrow, the 15th September. It should certainly end by the 22nd September. We thus will have the rest of the time i.e., from 24th September to 6th October, for the remaining work. I think we can compress a lot of work within that period and perhaps dispose of many of the Bills that you have mentioned.

2. There is thus no question of taking up the Hindu Code Bill formally on the 15th as we have already agreed to a good part of Part 2, which is going to be taken up.³ We should proceed with it. We might after the second

1. Note to Satya Narayan Sinha, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, 14 September 1951. File No. 32(195)/49-PMS. Extracts.
2. The Congress Parliamentary Party considered the clauses of the Hindu Code Bill relating to definition, different forms of marriage, monogamy, restitution of conjugal rights and judicial separation.
3. On 17 September 1951, Ambedkar presented in Parliament Part 2 of the complete legislation on the Hindu Code, dealing with marriage and divorce and covered by 47 clauses of the total 139 clauses of the Hindu Code as a separate Bill leaving the remainder for a future occasion.

reading of this Part 2 (which will be a bill by itself) has ended give a short interval of a day or so to take up the two University Bills and then finish the Hindu Code Bill....

4. We shall be in a better position to judge of progress by the middle of next week.

9. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
September 15, 1951

My dear Mr. President,

I have received today your letter of the 15th September, and with it your note on the Hindu Code Bill. I have read this note with care.² As desired by you, I shall place it before the Cabinet.³ The legal and constitutional questions you raise are important. In the last paragraph of your note you have mentioned that it may be necessary for you to inform Parliament of your viewpoint. You also refer to your right to examine the Bill on its merits when it is passed by Parliament before giving your assent to it.⁴

These are serious matters of great constitutional importance. They might involve a conflict between the President on the one side and the Government and Parliament on the other. They would inevitably raise the question of the President's authority and powers to challenge the decision of Government and of Parliament. The consequences would obviously be serious.

I do not wish to say much on this subject except that, in our view, the President has no power or authority to go against the will of Parliament in

1. File No. 48(4)(a)/48-PMS.

2. On 15 September 1951, Rajendra Prasad sent a note to Nehru expressing a desire to act solely on his own judgment, independently of the Council of Ministers, when giving assent to Bills to Parliament for reconsideration. He maintained that the Provisional Parliament did not have the authority to enact such major legislation as the Hindu Code Bill because it was indirectly elected and its members lacked the public 'mandate' of a general election. He desired to use the power of his office either to force the Provisional Parliament to shelve the measure or, failing that, to veto it even against the advice of his Cabinet.

3. Prasad had written: "I feel I owe it to you and to the Cabinet to put you in possession of my view so that you and the Cabinet may not be taken by surprise."

4. Rajendra Prasad had also written: "But if I find that any action of mine at a later stage is likely to cause embarrassment to the Government, I may take such appropriate action as I may feel called upon to avoid such embarrassment consistent with the dictates of my own conscience."

regard to a Bill that has been well considered by it and passed. The whole conception of constitutional government is against any exercise by the President of any such authority.

You have been good enough to mention to me, on several occasions, your disapproval of the Hindu Code Bill. I pointed out on each occasion that the Government had given the most earnest consideration to the principles underlying this Bill and were fully committed to them. This Bill is not a new measure and it has been before the country for a number of years. There has been a very great deal of discussion and argument about it outside and within Parliament. It is after the fullest consideration of all the factors that Government came to the conclusion to press this Bill forward in Parliament. It has already been discussed, in the earlier stages, at great length. There have been many informal committees, and noted public men, representing various viewpoints, have been consulted. As a result of such consultations, major changes have been made in the Bill. The object aimed at was to reduce controversy to a large extent and to gain as large a measure of approval of the Bill as possible.

The question of the competence of the present Parliament to enact such a measure was raised in Parliament itself, and after much discussion, the Speaker gave a ruling on the subject. The various grounds mentioned in paragraph 1 of your note⁵ were considered by Parliament and a decision taken thereon. It is hardly open to anyone, even the President, to challenge that decision. Otherwise, the question would arise as to whether Parliament is the supreme legislative authority in this country or not.

You refer to the revolutionary changes contemplated by the Bill. The Bill is now, in the opinion of many, a very moderate measure of social reform with very little, if any, of revolution about it. Indeed, it is very largely a codification of the existing law. In this codification even custom has often been accepted as a guiding factor. It was felt strongly by large numbers of people, of varying opinions, that some such codification was necessary to bring some certainty and uniformity in the law.

Certain changes have been introduced, but they can hardly be called far-reaching. Indeed, many of those persons who stood strongly in favour of this Bill are severely disappointed at it because of its very moderate character. The changes suggested are generally recognised by thinking people the world over as desirable and as being in consonance with modern conditions and the spirit of the times. Indeed, as you have pointed out yourself,⁶ some of these

5. He found it inconceivable for any Government or Parliament to undertake legislation of such a fundamental character without obtaining an express mandate from the electorate at a general election where the question was specially raised.
6. Rajendra Prasad wrote: "It has been said that in some States polygamy has been prohibited by law while in others it still continues and it is considered necessary to enact the law to remove this anomaly."

changes have already been introduced in various States.⁷ No one, to my knowledge, has called them revolutionary changes there, nor has there been any marked reactions against them.

It is true that when any social or economic changes are proposed in an existing structure of society, there are always some elements which are strongly in favour of them and some opposed to them very strongly. No reform can take place if this opposition is considered to be an adequate bar to change. The mere fact of long established static conditions can hardly be considered an argument for no change, even though facts otherwise warrant it.

I hardly think that it is correct to say that public opinion is overwhelmingly against the proposed measure. Parliament is supposed to represent public opinion in this and other matters, and even apart from this there has been a very widespread expression of opinion in the country in favour of the Bill.

As I informed you, in view of the heavy business before the House and the short time at our disposal before the session ends, we have decided to concentrate on passing as a separate measure Part II of the Bill, viz., that dealing with marriage and divorce. I doubt if we will go any further in this during this session. We hope, however, to enact this part of the Bill as a separate Act before the session concludes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Monogamy had become a part of the law, in States like Madras, Bombay and Saurashtra and divorce was practised by a large number of people governed by the customary law, and it was statutorily recognised in Baroda.

10. To Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1951

My dear Alladi,

Our President is creating difficulties for us in regard to the Hindu Code Bill. Indeed he has hinted at refusing his assent to the Bill, when passed. He intends sending a message to Parliament on the subject and all that. Whether he will

1. File No. 48(4)(a)/48-PMS. A similar letter was sent to M.C. Setalvad, the Attorney General of India.

do this or not ultimately, I do not know. But we have had some indication that his mind is working in that direction.²

I should be grateful to you if you could look up books and memoirs relating to the British constitutional system in regard to the King's assent to Bills. I would be grateful if you could send me a note on this subject.³

I might add, for your information, that for lack of time and the prospect of the whole Hindu Code Bill being only partly considered by Parliament during this session and then being postponed *sine die*, we had decided to deal only with Parts 1 and 2—Part 2 relating to marriage and divorce. That is to say, we want to pass a separate measure dealing with marriage and divorce in this session so that we can show some achievement at least. If we have time, we might take up something else also, but that is very doubtful.

Discussion on the Hindu Code Bill was resumed today in Parliament. We are trying our best to get through Part 2 by the end of this week.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Rajagopalachari on 16 September, had suggested to Nehru that he should ask "Alladi and Setalvad to look up the books and memoirs relating to the British constitutional system, and draw up a note on the King's assent to Bills" without creating any impression that a crisis was round the corner.
3. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar replied to Nehru's queries in two notes. In his first note he wrote, citing several authorities, that it was perfectly clear "that the President's position was analogous to that of a constitutional monarch in England. . . and there is no sphere of his functions in respect of which he can act without reference to the advice of his ministers." See also *post*, p. 390.

11. To B.R. Ambedkar¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1951

My dear Ambedkar,

I enclose copy of a letter received from Munshi. I think that what he has written deserves careful attention.² Anything upsetting all kinds of customs

1. J.N. Collection.
2. K.M. Munshi had expressed fears about monogamy and divorce laws. He said that villagers and tribals, following their lax customary laws, would now have to go to a court, perhaps 100 miles away, engage a lawyer and produce evidence. Instead they would "poison their wives or cut their throats." He also feared that courts would collapse under the weight of divorce litigation.

making divorce rather easy among vast numbers of people might well have a disastrous effect.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Munshi had argued in favour of a "tolerably easy procedure" to avoid hardship and discontent and to retain stability and morality of these groups.

12. To M.C. Setalvad¹

New Delhi
September 20, 1951

My dear Setalvad,

Thank you for your note. I have now received a reply from the President. I enclose a copy of this; also a draft of a letter I propose to send to the President.² But before I send it I should like your advice about it. Please, therefore, let me know if you consider the draft suitable for the occasion.

I had asked you previously to look into English precedents. That would be useful. But the President has taken up a somewhat different position and argues that British precedents will not apply to our Constitution. This means that we would have to look into our own Constitution and not merely to refer back to English conventions.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 48(4)(a)/48-PMS.

2. See the next item.

3. In his reply of 24 September 1951, Setalvad, clarified that the functions of the President could not be "exercised by him without the concurrence of his Ministers" and that in exercising them he was bound "to act in accordance with the advice tendered by his Ministers.... The supremacy of the legislature as representing the people" was the basic principle of the Constitution.

13. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

21 September 1951

My dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th September.² I am glad of your assurance that the fullest consideration will be given to all aspects of the question before any decision is taken.

There is no doubt that the Constitution gives a right to the President to address and send messages to Parliament, also to assent to a Bill passed by the House or not to do so. But I am not aware that at any time it has been suggested that the President functions in this respect in his individual capacity. During the discussions in the Constituent Assembly and subsequently, I have been under the impression that it was taken for granted that the President functions in such matters on behalf of the Government. That is to say, that the British procedure is followed and not the American. Any other interpretation would give the President powers which do not fit in with the whole conception of the Constitution. I do not wish to enter into any argument about this at this stage, but I feel that I should make it perfectly clear how my colleagues and I view this matter.

Sometime ago, in another context, this question was considered by some of us, and we were advised that our interpretation of the Constitution was correct.

You will remember that in your Address at the opening of this session of Parliament,³ a reference to the Hindu Code Bill was included, and it was hoped that this would be passed in the course of this session. It was clear that you were speaking on behalf of the Government and it was entirely proper for you to include this in your Address.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 48(4)(a)/48-PMS.

2. Rajendra Prasad contending that he possessed the powers he desired, cited the absence from the Constitution of any mention of conventional limitations.

3. On 6 August 1951.

14. To Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar¹

New Delhi
September 21, 1951

My dear Alladi,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th September, sending me the promised note.²

As I have already written to you, the President does not challenge the position of the Ministry in the U.K. He admits the limitations of the constitutional monarchy in England but he seems to think that our Constitution has given the President far greater powers. This is a point we may have to meet. You have referred to Article 74 of our Constitution.³ I think that is clear enough. Evidently the President does not think so. If this matter could be elaborated a bit more it would help.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 48(4) (a)/48-PMS.

2. See *ante*, footnote No. 3, p. 387.

3. In his note Alladi had written: "Article 74 provides that a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head must aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions". The phrase aid and advise being "a constitutional requirement that in the exercise of all his functions the President shall be aided and advised by the ministers. Article 75 makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the House of the People."

15. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1951

My dear Gopalaswami,

Thank you for your long letter about the Hindu Code Bill.²

So far as the President's threatened step is concerned, I am quite sure that he is in the wrong. If he persists in it, a crisis will certainly come and the Government should resign. I regret to say that the President attaches more

1. File No. 48(4)(a)/48-PMS.

2. On 21 September 1951, Gopalaswami Ayyangar had written that the President had on 12 September discussed with him the Hindu Code Bill. Ayyangar thought that there was no legal compulsion on the President to respect the advice of the Cabinet. If the President was unwilling to accept, the alternative for the Government was to resign.

importance to his astrologers than to the advice of his Cabinet in some matters. I have no intention of submitting to the astrologers.

The position as regards the Hindu Code Bill is that it is highly unlikely that we will finally pass even Part II during this session. We may get through a large part of it during the second reading, but something is likely to be left over. I think that we would be justified to finish that small part which is left over during the February session. It is difficult to decide now, because much would depend upon various developments. It would be improper to take up something important and new during the February session.

I think that we ought to be prepared to take a strong line in regard to any reform that we may consider important. It is always open to the electorate to dismiss us. We ought to be prepared to take that chance. Democracy is all right, but it has to be given a forcible lead and not allowed to work passively in the ruts. Personally, I am convinced that a great majority of the electorate would approve of this Bill, though perhaps a majority of 10 per cent of the Hindus of the upper classes might not do so. After all, what are we trying to do in this Part II? It is nothing very new and some States have already done so.

I think we should consider the position in Cabinet.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Gopalaswami Ayyangar in his reply of 23 September agreed with Rajendra Prasad that the Bill was discriminatory as it applied only to the Hindus. He pointed out that it was not proper to use the Provisional Parliament, which was elected on the Cabinet Mission Plan, and which included many members who might not be returned in the next elections, to pass even a portion of the Bill. "There is nothing to be lost and everything to be gained by deferring it to sometime after the elections."

16. On the Powers of the President¹

As members of the Cabinet are aware, the question of the President's powers in relation to the Government and Parliament has been raised. I do not think this question is likely to become important in the near future, but I thought it desirable to consult the Attorney-General and Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar on the subject. Both of them have sent me notes containing their views on this subject. Both are clearly of opinion that the President must act with the aid and advice of the Council of his Ministers and cannot act independently

1. Note to Cabinet Ministers, New Delhi, 25 September 1951. File No. 48(4)(a)/48-PMS.

of that advice. In fact, it is stated that the position of the President is weaker as compared to that of the British monarch. The President under our Constitution has no prerogative, personal or other, which the British King has. In practice, the British King also can only exercise his personal prerogative solely on the advice of his Ministers.

The fact that the President, unlike the King, is elected to his office for a term makes no difference to this position. The election is merely intended for the choice of the constitutional and executive head. Once he is chosen his functions are as limited and prescribed by the Constitution.

The fact that the King of England is strictly a constitutional monarch and cannot act independently of his Government is established in law and practice. The only question that arises is whether our President, because of his election, or because of anything else in our Constitution, has any greater powers than the King of England. The advice we have received indicates that he has no such powers.

In the event of the President acting in opposition to the advice of his Ministers in any way, such as by refusing his assent to legislation sponsored by Government and passed by Parliament, such action must inevitably lead to the resignation of the Council of Ministers who have the confidence of Parliament. On such resignation the President could be faced with a deadlock.

The answer given to me by our legal advisers to the question I had asked them is, therefore, that the functions of the President cannot be exercised by him without the concurrence of his Ministers and that in exercising them he is bound to act in accordance with the advice tendered by his Ministers.

I am sending this to you for your information. This particular issue is not likely to come up for decision in the near future.

17. To B.R. Ambedkar¹

New Delhi

September 27, 1951

My dear Ambedkar,

I have your letter of the 27th September. Two days ago news of your resignation appeared in the press and I was rather mystified.² At the beginning of the

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Ambedkar had been thinking of resigning from the Cabinet for a long time. Only the hope of passing the Hindu Code Bill during the life of the current Parliament was holding him back. Breaking up the Bill to restrict it to marriage and divorce so that "at least this much of our labour may bear fruit" had not helped and "even this part of the Bill had been killed. I see no purpose in my continuing to be a member of your Cabinet".

session you spoke to me about your ill-health and I know of course that you have not been keeping well.

In view of your ill-health and your desire to resign from the Cabinet, I cannot press you to stay on. I should like to express, however, my appreciation of our comradeship during these years since when we have worked together in the Cabinet. We have differed sometimes, but that has not affected my appreciation of the good work that you had done. I am sorry indeed that you will be going away.

I can quite understand your great disappointment³ at the fact that the Hindu Code Bill could not be passed in this session and that even the marriage and divorce part of it had ultimately to be postponed. I know very well how hard you have laboured at it and how keenly you have felt about it. Although I have not been intimately connected with this Bill, I have been long convinced of its necessity and I was anxious that it should be passed. I tried my utmost, but the fates and the rules of Parliament were against us. It seemed clear to me that nothing that we could do could get it through during this session. Personally, I shall not give up this fight because I think it is intimately connected with any progress on any front that we desire to make.

You say that you would like your resignation to take effect immediately. But you are good enough to suggest that you stay on till some of the Bills and Motions standing in your name are dealt with. I shall look into this matter. In any event this session is going to last only till the 6th of October, that is a little more than a week from today. There is not much room left for priorities during a few days. We shall try to push in your Bills and Motions as soon as possible. I hope therefore that you will stay on till the end of the session.⁴

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. When even the marriage and divorce part of the Hindu Code Bill could not be passed, Ambedkar felt that the Bill "was killed and buried, unwept and unsung. . ."
4. Ambedkar wanted his resignation to take effect immediately but would put the Bills and Motions standing in his name through if Nehru wished so. "For I do not wish to deny the civility I owe to you and the Cabinet. In that event I would request that the Bills and Motions standing in my name should be given priority over others."

18. On B.R. Ambedkar's Resignation¹

May I say a few words in this connection. It is a matter of regret to me, if for no other reason, for the fact that an old colleague should part company in the way that he has done today.² I do not wish to go into the various matters that have arisen to which you have referred. I got a copy of that statement³ at 9.30 A.M. as I was sitting in my place here, about 45 minutes before he actually rose to make it. I read it with some surprise, because it was not the kind of statement that I had expected from a Minister resigning. However, there it was and it was my intention when he made this statement to say a few words, because it was not desirable nor permissible under the rules to have a debate on such a matter. I should just like, with your permission, to read out the letter of resignation sent to me and a few other letters exchanged before and after.

The first letter which I received from him....⁴

I wish to read out to the House his letter of resignation, because normally a statement by a Minister is related to his letter of resignation....⁵

As you know, Sir, so far as I am concerned I was expecting him to make his statement and if I may say so with all respect, I did not know that the

1. 11 October 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, Vol. XVI, Part II, 24th September-16th October 1951, columns 4730-4737.
2. Ambedkar had obtained the consent of Nehru to make a statement in Parliament on 11 October, after the business standing in his name was finished. When Parliament resumed on 11 October the Delimitation Orders Bill was taken first. After that work the Deputy Speaker called on Harekrushna Mahtab to move the Industries Development Regulation Bill. Ambedkar raised a point of order that he must be heard first. The Deputy Speaker ruled that Ambedkar would have been allowed to speak if he had earlier submitted a copy of his statement to the Chair. He added that at 6 p.m. he could, however, read his statement even if he had still chosen not to submit a copy of it for scrutiny. Ambedkar walked out of the House in protest.
3. In his statement Ambedkar charged that the Hindu Code Bill, on which Nehru, in spite of his sincerity, did not show enough determination, had been dropped. He was dissatisfied with the treatment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and disapproved of the Government's foreign policy. He complained that, apart from assisting in the constitution-making and piloting it in the Constituent Assembly and carrying out essentially Congress decisions, he had not been given any important portfolio in spite of Nehru's assurance. The policies of the Government were framed in committees, like the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee, from which he had always been excluded, and which worked "behind an iron curtain." Under this system a Minister, who had to take joint responsibility, had no opportunity to shape the policies.
4. C.D. Deshmukh intervened to say that it would be better to wait for Ambedkar who was absent from the House.
5. Deshmukh intervened again but the Deputy Speaker allowed Nehru to proceed.

statement would not be made then or that you would fix another time for it. I did not expect the developments, as they occurred. But since this has happened and the statement has been published in the press or is going to be, I think the House would be interested greatly in the letters exchanged. I am not referring to the statement in the least, but I am referring to the letters exchanged between Dr. Ambedkar and myself.

The first letter he wrote to me does not refer to his resignation and is dated the 10th August, 1951....⁶

6. Nehru read out the correspondence between him and Ambedkar.

19. To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja¹

New Delhi
October 25, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

Your letter of the 24th October about the Hindu Code Bill. I agree with you generally in what you say. But I am afraid the coming elections make it very difficult for us to appoint proper committees for this purpose. I entirely agree that it will be better to divide the Bill in parts and pass each part separately. I am afraid a fuller consideration of this Bill will have to remain over till the elections are over. I would personally favour the appointment of some committee soon after the elections and even before the new legislature meets.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

I. General

1. Report on the Union¹

I am submitting this report to the A.I.C.C. because I think it is necessary for the A.I.C.C. to consider from time to time the broad policies pursued by the Government. The Government has not been and is not, at present, a fully Congress Government in the sense that every member of it has been drawn from the Congress. Nevertheless, it is predominantly a Congress Government and it relies upon the Congress organisation for its support. It is essential, therefore, that there must be a close understanding and cooperation between the Government and the Congress and the broad policies of the Government should have the approval of the Congress.

2. I think it would have been desirable to have an annual survey and stock-taking by the Congress of the work of Government so that there might be that coordination between governmental activity and public opinion which is so essential. A Prime Minister drawing his mandate from the Congress should present a report, preferably to the annual session of the Congress for the consideration of the delegates. I regret that this has not been done in the past.

3. It is difficult for me, in the compass of a brief report, to present a picture of governmental activity during the last three or four years. The subject is too vast and complicated and involves writing some kind of a history of these few years since we attained independence. Such a report, if at all adequate, would involve consideration of all manner of political, social, economic and other problems. Apart from the length and complexity of such a report, I fear I am not competent to produce one at this stage. Nevertheless, I am presenting these few rather sketchy and disjointed remarks in order to enable the A.I.C.C. and, if possible, the full session of the Congress itself, to survey this scene and to have an opportunity of expressing its opinion upon its broad features.

4. It will be remembered that in August 1946 I was asked by Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, in my capacity as Congress President, to form a Government at the Centre. The Working Committee considered this offer carefully and took Gandhiji's advice upon it. It was decided that I should accept the offer. In spite of the constitutional limitations then prevailing, it was to be made clear to the Viceroy that we should function not as the old Viceroy's Executive Council, but, to the largest possible extent, as a free government.

1. Report to the All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 6 July 1951. It was published in the newspapers on 7 July 1951.

5. Early in September 1946 my colleagues and I took office. My colleagues, some of whom were non-Congressmen,² were selected in consultation with the then Working Committee of the Congress.

6. Some weeks later, some representatives of the Muslim League came into the Government.³ This broke up the integrity of the Cabinet and led to continuing internal conflict. An agreement was arrived at with the British Government which led to the partition of India and from the 15th August 1947 onwards India became independent; so also Pakistan.

7. This past period, full of conflict, has raised many controversies, but they are of little relevance today. I have merely given it as the background out of which arose independent India.

8. One of the immediate results of independence and partition was a communal upheaval of unprecedented magnitude in West Pakistan and East Punjab, Delhi and the surrounding areas. This led to vast migrations from one country to another and problems of colossal magnitude had to be faced by the newly independent India. Powerful disruptive forces were at work and the first objective of the Government was to meet this menace, which might have put an end to our unity and freedom and an ordered government. The Government also had to face the tremendous problem of looking after millions of dispossessed persons, most of whom had lost everything and were reduced to destitution. At the same time, the Government had to help in building up the structure of independent India, which had been badly shaken up in a variety of ways by the partition.

9. Two and a half months after the partition, a sudden raid from Pakistan into Kashmir took place bringing destruction and misery in its train. An appeal for help came to the Government of India from both the Government and the people of Kashmir and, after serious thought, it was decided to respond to this appeal. This raid developed into a full-scale war in Kashmir State territory and Pakistan forces, first secretly and furtively and then openly, committed aggression on the State territory, which had become Indian Union territory because of the accession of the State to India.

10. Gandhiji's assassination,⁴ a little over three months after the raid on Kashmir began, was evidence of the powerful communal and anti-social forces at work in India.

2. Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, Sarat Chandra Bose, Jagjivan Ram and Asaf Ali were the Congressmen and Baldev Singh, Shafaat Ahmed Khan, Syed Ali Zaheer, John Matthai and C.H. Bhabha were the non-Congressmen, in the Interim Government.

3. The Muslim League nominees, Liaquat Ali Khan, I.I. Chundrigar, Abdur Rab Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Jogendra Nath Mandal joined the Interim Government on 25 October 1946.

4. On 30 January 1948.

11. These were the problems facing independent India in its early months. In addition we had to face the new problems which arose after the World War. This War had put an end to the old world and a world, different in many ways, was taking shape and posing entirely new problems to minds which still moved in the old ruts everywhere. As a result, as we have seen, there was a good deal of confusion everywhere and people groped in different directions. In every country there was a certain lack of uniformity and policy. India, in common with other countries, suffered from this hiatus of thinking in old terms in a new world. Our economy had been powerfully affected during the War and in post-War years and by the partition. The pressure of a growing population was continuous. Just at a time when advance was most necessary, our economy became static and even stagnant. Production did not increase adequately and even in some cases went down and prices shot up.

12. It would have been the Government's first task to deal with these economic problems which affected the lives of the great masses of our people. Indeed, the desire to bring about rapid progress led the Governments of the Union and the States to start many schemes of economic development and social amelioration, in accordance with the general aims of the Congress. We attempted too much because of this urge and the pressure of circumstances and the demands made upon us. This led to enormous strains on our economy with its depleted personnel and multiplying activities.

The overriding necessity of the moment, however, continued to be to preserve the integrity and freedom of the country. The administrative machinery was run down and greatly affected by partition. Its quality had suffered in war-time and the quick changes that followed independence affected that quality still further. The transport system was in a broken-down condition.

Meanwhile, entirely new and highly complex problems grew up and the activities of the Government covered fresh fields. Three entirely new Ministries developed rapidly. These were the States Ministry, the Relief and Rehabilitation Ministry and the Ministry of External Affairs. Some other Ministries also had to deal with novel problems and grew in size. Thus the machinery of the Government of India became more and more an unwieldy structure trying to grapple with entirely novel and highly complex political, social and economic problems. The State intervened more and more in the economic sphere and in business and industry. All this was done with a continuing sense of crisis or impending crisis. Often these activities were uncoordinated and unplanned and did not take into consideration the limited resources of the country.

13. Controls, introduced during war-time, continued but there was always pressure for their removal chiefly because of the corruption they led to. The Government's policy in regard to them was not uniform and at the end of 1947 a measure of decontrol was adopted, resulting in a shooting up of prices. There is little doubt that this resulted in great harm to our economy and was

one of the dominant causes of our later fiscal and economic difficulties. Some months later controls were again re-introduced to hold and reduce prices which was the first objective of the Government. This was generally followed with some success, but even here there were minor variations, due to the pressure of the food and textile problems, which led to some rise in prices. It has become clear that it is of vital importance to keep prices down and any lapse on our part in this matter leads to serious consequences.

14. During the larger part of this period a great deal of attention was paid to the drawing up of the Constitution of India. It was, I think, a remarkable feat that in spite of the tremendous pressure of our problems and of some kind of crisis succeeding crisis, the Constituent Assembly proceeded with this arduous task and completed it, ushering in the Republic of India on the 26th January 1950.

15. There is no doubt that the pressure of economic developments has borne heavily on many classes of the community, more especially perhaps the lower middle class, and there has naturally been a good deal of dissatisfaction because of this. It is possible to attribute many causes for this and blame external events or anti-social elements. But the Government must shoulder the responsibility for what has happened and must try to seek remedies. One of the significant and depressing features of the situation has been the lack of coordination and cooperation between governmental activity and the public. Indeed, public apathy has grown.

16. Looking back at these years, I think I can say with justice that the record of constructive activity of both the Central Government and the State Governments has been very considerable. I do not think we need be ashamed of that record at all and I am sure that, in some matters at least, we have laid the foundations for future progress. Everyone knows about the success of the States integration policy for which credit must go to Sardar Patel. A fact not generally recognised is the remarkable growth in scientific research in India during the last few years. We consider this as something basic for future progress in a world dominated by science and its applications. The progress made has not been merely in the setting up of very fine central laboratories and institutes all over India, but in the quality of work that is being done there and the fine body of men and women scientists who are working there. In spite of financial stringency we have continued and made good progress in our major river valley schemes—the Damodar Valley, the Bhakra-Nangal, and the Hirakud. That again is something fundamental for our future progress. These river valley schemes, which are using up so much of our resources, require, however, careful attention and constant vigilance. An exhibition held in Delhi early this year⁵ was evidence of the remarkable progress being made

5. The India Engineering Exhibition was held from 10 January to 18 March 1951.

in India in the river valley and other engineering schemes. Our transport system has improved greatly and had been progressively nationalised in many States.

17. Many of our great State undertakings like the Sindri Fertiliser Factory, in spite of initial difficulties and delays, are making very good progress. Our communications system has improved considerably.

18. The results obtained in our rehabilitation work for displaced persons are, I think, remarkable. It is true that much remains to be done and there is still much suffering. But the rehabilitation of millions of persons during the past three years is a great achievement. Model and cooperative townships have grown up,⁶ with enthusiastic people engaged in productive activities.

19. I do not wish to give a list of what has been done, but I am quite sure that the achievements of our various Governments have been quite considerable. From a social point of view, the biggest achievement has been the legislation in many States for the abolition of the zamindari system.⁷ Unfortunately, this was held up by an interpretation of the Constitution in the courts and it became necessary to amend the Constitution to get over these difficulties.⁸ I trust that progress in this respect will now be rapid and there will be no further impediments. Many State Governments have, in addition, many other achievements to their credit, of which any country can be proud.

20. Yet, while we have this record of achievement, in spite of great difficulties and in spite of the colossal problem of rehabilitation of many millions of people, the fact remains that the basic economic situation in the country has not been successfully grappled with. At the most it has been, to some extent, held up. This has troubled me greatly during these years and I came to the conclusion that the only way to deal with it, with any measure of real success, and to direct the available resources of the nation into proper channels, was to have a Planning Commission. Without an overall picture of the situation and continuous attempts at keeping the major objectives in view and defining priorities and having targets, it seemed to me that our efforts, however well meaning and however much they were backed up by hard work, would be uncoordinated and partly wasted. A Planning Commission was,

6. New townships were built up at twelve places. See footnote No. 12, on *ante* page 11.

7. The Bihar Abolition of Zamindaris Bill 1948 received the assent of the Governor-General in 1949. It was replaced by the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The Madras Government's Bill for the abolition of zamindaris was passed on 27 October 1948 and received the Governor General's assent in April 1949.

8. The Constitution Amendment Bill sought to legalise the Zamindari Abolition Acts and educational policies of the Madras Government.

therefore, established a year ago⁹ and ever since then this body of eminent and earnest men have wrestled with this enormous variety of problems in their entirety. They hope to issue very soon their first preliminary and provisional survey in which they propose to make recommendations for a five-year plan.¹⁰ I feel that the wisest thing that our Government has done during these three or four years has been the appointment of this Planning Commission. I am quite sure that without some such approach, it is not possible to deal with the situation that faces us with any measure of success.

21. The Congress has defined from time to time its objectives and laid down broad lines of policy, more especially in regard to agrarian matters, which count for so much in this country. Those directions are helpful. But in order to translate them into an actual programme, much more detailed investigation of each problem and its relation to other problems is necessary. We cannot go beyond our resources and, therefore, we must know exactly what our resources are and how best to apply them. A government may be and should be idealistic in its approach, but its idealism will fail if it is not based on realities.

22. It is essential that we make progress, or else we go down and for this purpose we must have the wherewithal for progress and a complete picture of what we are aiming at in the near future. It seems to me that both for the Government and the Congress, and indeed for all other parties and the people generally, the only right approach is through a consideration of the Planning Commission's report. This report is something more than the report of a few eminent men. It has been evolved after the fullest consultation with various departments of Government, both Central and State, and with eminent men and women representing different interests and viewpoints all over the country. It thus represents a very large measure of cooperative effort. The Government is not committed to it yet, because it has had no opportunity of fully examining it. Nor can the Congress be committed to it. But any consideration of our various problems should, I think, take place in future on the basis of this report. It is not helpful for the Congress or for any other organisation merely to pass general resolutions which indicate the direction in which we have to go. These are important in their place, but are not enough when we are dealing with practical problems. I do not propose, therefore, to refer here to these various problems except to draw attention to some aspects of some of them.

23. I should like to say that I have been very deeply conscious of the lack of success in many matters, and more especially in these basic economic matters. I feel that, as Prime Minister, I must shoulder the responsibility for all that has happened, both the successes and the failures of Government, and

9. In March 1950.

10. On 9 July 1951, the Planning Commission presented an outline report on the first five-year plan.

I should like to be judged by that standard. My colleagues in the Government have worked hard for a number of years and given the best that was in them to the service of the country. All of them are responsible men and women, but the final responsibility must inevitably rest with me. I became Prime Minister because the Congress willed it so and the country accepted it. I have shouldered this very heavy responsibility for a long time now and I would welcome younger shoulders to carry it in future. It is possible that fresh and earnest minds may throw more light on our complex problems than those who have perhaps got into a rut of thinking and action. Indeed, in any event, we have to use our best resources in the country and not rely on just a few persons to carry the burden.

24. Although nearly four years have elapsed since independence came to us, neither we nor the world have gone back to any degree of normality. We live in a precarious and dangerous age and this requires constant vigilance. The distance between freedom and the lack of it is not great and it is a possibility not to be forgotten that wrong policies might lead to a breakdown of some of the essentials of freedom. We have faced the spectre of famine and we hope that we have prevented it from materialising. Yet the situation requires constant and unremitting care. Disruptive and anti-social forces are at work in the country and the law and order situation also requires vigilance. We have not yet developed sufficiently a sense of loyalty to the nation, overshadowing the overriding regional and sectional loyalties. Or perhaps most of our people feel that freedom having been attained, any danger to the nation is past and, therefore, they can indulge in these narrow and sectional activities.

25. In spite of apparent differences and strong condemnation of each other, I believe that there is a very large measure of unanimity in the country about our basic objectives. If we are to succeed, presumably there should be also an equal measure of agreement in working for those objectives. I see no harm in differences in methods of approach or emphasis, provided there is a wide measure of agreement. Any national plan must necessarily have that large measure of agreement. There must also be adequate power to give effect to it and an administrative set-up suitable for it. It is necessary to have a strong Central Government which can work out this national plan throughout the country in cooperation with the State Governments. There has been sometimes a lack of this cooperation between the Centre and the States. Nothing would be more injurious to the nation's progress at this stage in history than to have weak and unstable governments which cannot adopt any firm policy or give effect to it.

26. There are risks and dangers in adopting any plan of democratic progress, but the greatest risk of all today is in remaining static. At the same time we must necessarily minimise risks and not indulge in adventurist policies, which may well lead to reaction, as they have done in some other countries.

Broadly speaking, we aim at democracy with the essential features of socialism. Thus we would realise the purpose embodied in our Constitution and the objective of a cooperative commonwealth that the Congress has laid down.¹¹ To move slowly is dangerous, because events might overwhelm us. To move too fast might well lead to bitter conflicts and weaken the country and involve a heavier price in the end. Whether it is possible to find the middle path, I do not know. But we have to try our utmost to find that way, for any other path is likely to prove harmful. We have to function within the limits of the Constitution which has been drawn up with exceeding care. But that does not mean that, if urgent necessity arises, or experience points that way, we cannot amend or vary it.

27. Political and economic theories and doctrines are important as they are presumably based on knowledge and experience. But if they are to be worthwhile, they have to satisfy basic human needs. It is patent that these basic human needs are not satisfied in India and in many other countries for a vast number of people today. The existing economic structure has failed to that extent and to seek to maintain it unchanged is, therefore, to ignore reality and invite defeat. We must find some way out. Communism's appeal to the many has been based on its promise to satisfy certain essential human needs and to provide security. But we have seen that it brings in its train conflict and violence and authoritarianism and the suppression of the individual. Can we provide economic security and progress without sacrificing democratic liberties? There is no reason why this should not be possible though the path may be difficult. This will involve social vision and a social purpose in all our activities. This will mean our deliberately aiming at a new type of society whose chief purpose is the welfare of the people, not only in material living standards, but also in the things of the spirit. That is the Welfare State, which may be far from us now, but which we can progressively realise if we set our minds and hearts to this great task. If we have to avoid authoritarianism, as we must, we have also to avoid unregulated private enterprise. We have to try to replace the acquisitive instinct with the spirit of cooperative effort in a common cause.

28. The world is full today of the spirit of conflict, and behind that lie fear and hatred. The destructive forces are at work and armaments pile up. Every man knows that even victory in a vast world conflict means nothing to humanity, which will have to face a wilderness of destruction, and the growth of centuries of civilised effort will be shattered. Yet vast elemental forces push humanity to the brink and blind men's eyes. Violence and conflict cannot

11. The Congress manifesto advocated the modernisation of industry and agriculture, and social control of all sources of wealth, methods of production and distribution so that India may grow into a cooperative commonwealth. See *ante*, pp. 4-5.

always be avoided, internationally or nationally, but their outcome seldom leads to human progress. At any rate we have arrived at a stage when the very survival of man and of all human values is threatened by unrestrained violence. From this world scene we can learn some lessons for our national problems. Those national problems, which are essentially human, have to be solved or else there is progressive degradation and perhaps disaster. If we try to solve them by large-scale conflict, we not only fail but possibly bring untold human suffering and go back for a generation or more. For us also it is a question of survival. The middle way is the democratic way, provided that such democracy is a vital force, with something of the revolutionary ardour about it.

29. India is a secular State. That is the very basis of our Constitution and we must understand it with all its implications. That, of course, is the only modern and civilised approach. That approach is in keeping with the whole growth of our national movement. It is not only in consonance with our ideology but also with practical considerations. Any other approach is fraught with disaster and would be a negation of all that we have stood for. I am laying stress on this because there has been some flabbiness in this matter even in Congress circles. I feel that on this subject there can be no compromise of any kind. Unfortunately there are some communal groups in the country which challenge this secular aspect of the State and which nourish narrow and reactionary ideals. It is necessary for us, therefore, to be perfectly clear on this issue and to be prepared to stand or fall by it. As a consequence we have to give special care to all our minorities, such as Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and others. This fact has always to be remembered and in the forthcoming elections this should, more especially, be borne in mind.

30. Our objective in ensuring justice, social, economic and political to all may take some time before we realise it fully. But it involves special attention being paid to the backward and unprivileged classes, including those living in the tribal areas, so that they might raise themselves educationally and economically.

31. I would certainly not call our women backward. In our national struggle for freedom they have played a splendid part and they have distinguished themselves in many fields. But it is true that they labour under great social disabilities and even in the political field they have not yet been given the position that they deserve. I think that a nation's progress depends far more, than many men think, on its women and on the care that is bestowed upon them. For some years past a legislative measure which sought to remove certain disabilities on Hindu women has been before the legislature.¹² I hope that it may be possible to pass the Hindu Code Bill before long.

12. On 17 September 1951, Parliament resumed consideration of the Hindu Code Bill. See *ante*, pp. 377-395.

32. We have been criticised for our economic policy and some of the criticisms are, as I have mentioned above, justified. But I feel that the criticisms would have had more weight if they had been based more on facts. Inevitably, our policy has been that of what is called a mixed economy with a public and a private sector. A policy of pure *laissez-faire* is not feasible and must therefore be rejected. The only alternative to a mixed economy is something in which the private sector hardly plays any important part. But this cannot be brought about merely by legislation unless we have the resources and the training for it. We have felt that there is still an honourable place for private enterprise. But, if we have any national plan, as we must, then the private sector must accept the objectives of that plan and fit into it. Indeed, both the public and private sectors must function, more or less as a single whole, in the interests of that plan and serve the same social ends. The only test of any system that we apply is that it gives the desired results. It is the objective that counts and not the method. To what extent there should be a public sector or a private sector must therefore be judged by the results achieved. Any plan will involve certain controls, certain priorities, and the adjustment of conflicting claims. It involves also a balance between present benefits and future progress. If we are to go towards the achievement of the purposes we aim at, then we must lay the foundations for more rapid economic growth in the future. We have to enlarge our resources and to some extent, sacrifice present good. Inevitably, this involves a certain degree of austerity, not as a virtue, but as a political and social necessity so as to secure the essentials of life for those who lack them and to ensure future progress. I am sure that this would be accepted by a great majority of our people, provided that the entire picture is before them, and provided that they realise that the burden is evenly borne.

33. It was with this purpose in view that we gave first priority to the great river valley schemes which promise more irrigation and power. It was also with this objective in view that we developed scientific talent and resources in the country. Top priority has to be given to agriculture and rural economy and to certain basic industries, such as steel, on which so much else depends. Stress has frequently been laid on an increase in production. Without this, the most we can do is to distribute our poverty and to bid good-bye to any real advance. Another essential condition is to check inflation. If prices continue to go up, then all our plans are shattered. It must therefore be kept always in mind that it is of the highest importance to keep down prices and every step taken should be judged from this point of view.

34. As agriculture is the principal occupation of the great majority of our people, it must be the first concern of the State. The abolition of the zamindari system has been the first reform and this must be expedited. But it must be remembered that this by itself is no solution of the problem. Even before this abolition a very large proportion of land was self-cultivated. An addition to it,

without any further reforms, will not help much. The small subsistence farm makes progress difficult. We have to think, therefore, and think soon, of other and further steps. There should be a diversion of a part of the agricultural population to other occupations. There should be a development of cottage and small-scale industries. But essentially the problem of agriculture needs cooperative cultivation and the application of modern techniques. This does not mean necessarily mechanising agriculture all over India, though some degree of mechanisation is taking place and is desirable. But there is no escape from some form of cooperative cultivation, if we are to make agriculture progressive.

35. In this connection we have to think also of the tremendous growth of population and the necessity for what is called family planning. From being a fad of some individuals in India, this has become one of the important issues before the country and it seems clear that the State must encourage this family planning or birth control.

36. In dealing with agriculture, the cooperation of the farmer is essential. Our Government departments have an abundance of good plans. But they seldom reach down to the farmer. If any large-scale improvement in our agriculture is to be brought about, it can only be by the understanding and cooperation of the cultivator. Where this understanding has been aimed at and achieved, quite substantial results have followed.

37. The food problem is necessarily of topmost priority. During the last two or three years this has overshadowed other matters and we have barely escaped a large-scale famine. Grow-More-Food campaigns have been severely criticised and it has been said that they have been a wasted effort. This criticism is not justified, although mistakes have been made. The campaign has yielded substantial results as statistics show.¹³ It is likely to yield even more results. But, because this additional production did not come in the net of procurement, the results were not so obvious and the necessity for imports continued. I should like to express my gratitude to various countries, who came to our help at our time of need, more especially to the United States of America for their recent food legislation which will enable us to get two million tons of foodgrains from them.¹⁴ The position, nevertheless, continues to be serious requiring our utmost effort.

13. The Government had launched a Grow-More-Food campaign in 1949, calculated to produce an additional 4.8 million tons of food crops during 1950-51. As a result of this drive the country obtained between 1950 and 1951 3.44 million tons of foodgrains more than in 1947-48.

14. Legislation authorizing a loan of 190 million dollars to India for the purchase of 2 million tons of American grain was signed on 15 June 1951 by President Truman, who appealed to voluntary agencies in the U.S.A. to aid India by supplementing the relief made available by Congress.

38. In this connection there has been a good deal of controversy about controls.¹⁵ Nobody likes controls as such and some of the criticism has great weight. But the removal of controls of foodgrains is likely to lead to a substantial rise in food prices. This is too grave a risk to run and it will upset not only our price policy but our entire plan. An attempt at decontrol in 1947-48 had disastrous consequences.¹⁶ Because of our present difficulties and dissatisfaction with the working of some controls, we must not lose sight of the fact that removal of control on essential articles in short supply may not only have serious consequences on the well-being of the people generally, but affect our entire structure of planning.

39. In regard to industry, the question of industrial relations is obviously of importance. No real progress can be made and no plan can function if there is industrial discord or if there is a sense of frustration and lack of effort in the worker. As with the cultivator, so also with the industrial worker, his cooperation has to be sought and obtained. The Industries (Development and Control) Bill of 1949 for the regulation of industry has unfortunately been pending for some time.¹⁷ I should like it to be passed as soon as possible.

40. I have mentioned cottage and small-scale industries. These are important even in highly industrialised countries. But they are of very special importance in India. If we lack capital, we do not lack manpower and, like China, we must use this manpower both to add to the wealth of the country and to reduce unemployment. It is important, however, for both cottage and small-scale industries to use the latest techniques and to be coordinated with large-scale industry.

41. There is always a difficulty in planning for the urgent needs of a country. A large part of our national revenue is spent upon the Defence Services. They are not productive in the normal sense of the word and all that is spent upon them ultimately reduces our capacity for other and more productive expenditure, and yet the basic need of national security demands the Defence Services. Apart from reasons of security, they are useful in toning up our country in regard to disciplined service. It is our endeavour to use them more and more for social purposes also. They can be used not only to help in food production, but also for social education, sanitation, and some kinds of public works.

15. It was argued that while controls were useful in times of emergency like war, they also often led to corruption.

16. Decontrol of production, pricing and distribution of cotton yarn and cloth on 19 January 1948, and further relaxation on 21 April about stamping the price on manufactured cloth, and abolition of the system of quotas, led to black-marketing and rise, ranging between 40 to 100 per cent, in prices of different varieties of yarn and mill-made cloth. Control on cotton yarn and cloth was reimposed on 21 July 1948.

17. See *post*, footnote No. 7, p. 721.

42. Because of our urgent need for economic development, which will add to our resources, many of our important plans for education and health have unfortunately suffered. Ultimately progress in these will depend upon our resources and these resources can only come from higher production and greater national wealth. Apart from formal education, I should like to lay stress on other forms of cultural progress which brighten the lives of our people and raise their standards of appreciation of beauty. I think the State should encourage art, drama and literature, music and song and dance.

43. There has been a great deal of criticism of the administrative machinery of the Government. We have carried on with the old machinery and added to it. That has its advantages and disadvantages. I have no doubt that the advantages were greater than the disadvantages and that progressively the disadvantages will grow less. As a machine, it was as efficient as any in the world, but it is true that it was nurtured under a different tradition and it was not easy to change that tradition or the habits that grew out of it. There is no doubt that in the large number of persons that constitute the administrative machine, there are all kinds of persons, good, bad and indifferent. There are persons whose integrity is not beyond dispute and there are persons who are communal-minded. But I think that the strong criticism made is, by and large, not justified. We have had able and devoted service from a large number of the old civil servants and I am sure that none of them ever worked quite so hard as they have done in recent years. I think, however, that this whole question of the administrative machinery has to be considered afresh from the point of view of the general plan that the country may adopt. The administration must serve the purposes of that plan. The present rules governing Government servants make it difficult to distinguish much between the efficient and the inefficient, the good worker and the bad, the man of integrity and the man whose integrity is in doubt. It is difficult to measure efficiency in terms of Government rules; it is still more difficult to get proof of lack of integrity. These rules must be changed so that even the reputation for a lack of integrity should be enough to prevent an officer from holding any position of responsibility or influence. At the same time it is due to our officers to protect them from unfair attacks. In a democratic regime, the services are not usually criticised. It is the Minister who is held responsible. We must endeavour to maintain moral standards in our public work and do so in a manner that the public understands and appreciates. Public confidence is essential. Where a charge of misconduct is made by a responsible person or there is a *prima facie* case for it, there should be an inquiry, however highly placed the person concerned might be.

44. Unhappily during the War and afterwards various types of corruption have grown. Controls have added to them and general standards have fallen, both in Government servants and in the public. Black-marketing in India is

not merely an individual offence, but a social evil. There can be no two opinions that adequate measures should be taken to check and end this degradation of our public life.

45. There is one aspect of our public life to which I should like to draw special attention. Religious and sentimental reasons have to be respected, but if problems are to be considered on these grounds alone, then there will not only be no solution, but conditions might conceivably worsen. Thus proper cattle preservation and improvement of breeds and increase in milk supply are of high importance to the country. But the sentimental approach to them is not by itself likely to yield any results. Many of our social habits are separatist and do not encourage the community outlook. The objective of the Congress of a cooperative commonwealth cannot be achieved if we continue to nurse these habits and customs. Old customs and social habits and conventions cannot be changed by legislation, though legislation can help in the process. It is by personal example and a constant friendly attempt to convince others that results can be achieved.

46. A development took place in the Punjab recently which must be regretted. This was the suspension of normal constitutional government, and the Governor, functioning for the President, exercising the authority of Government.¹⁸ In view of the resignation of the Ministry, and no alternative Ministry being formed at the moment, the Governor had no alternative but to report as he did to the President. The responsibility for this development was not that of the Governor or the President, but rather of the Central Parliamentary Board which called upon the Chief Minister to resign. The story of the Punjab during recent months has been a long, complicated and rather depressing one. The State is one of our most important and contains fine human material. Its importance has become even greater by the fact of its being the frontier province of India. Unfortunately, it has been the scene of factional and communal strife for a considerable time and the situation was rapidly deteriorating in many ways. In particular, there was continuing conflict between the Ministry and the Congress organisation in the province. The Parliamentary Board decided that, in the circumstances, the functioning of a Congress Ministry was not desirable. They did so in the hope that this unusual step might tend to put an end to this factional strife.

47. There has been a good deal of feeling in Congress circles, more especially in the States which are called Part B and C States, in regard to their present status. There can be and should be no discrimination between different parts of India. This particular classification arose out of certain

18. A prolonged political crisis from April to June 1951 and eventually the suspension of parliamentary Government and imposition of Governor's rule in East Punjab led to dissensions within the East Punjab Congress Party.

historical and administrative necessities of the moment and cannot be permanent. It has, however, to be realised that certain parts of India are different or have developed differently during past years. The tribal folk, who are a fine liberty-loving people, require special treatment. So also certain border areas which have assumed a new importance because of recent events. In regard to Part B and C States, the chief difficulty has been the lack of a legislature in most of them.¹⁹ As soon as these came into existence the differences between them and the Part A States will largely disappear. Where such legislatures and ministries exist, there is no reason for any differentiation to continue, except for the fact that there are certain covenants which have to be honoured. A certain amount of guidance for the improvement of standards of administration may be provided where necessary. The general policy should be to speed up the removal of differential treatment as rapidly as possible.

48. I should like to say something here about our foreign policy. This has been, I believe, very largely approved by the country and no apology is needed for it. This policy has been the natural outcome of our past outlook on foreign affairs and on independence. We have followed no ambitious course and have tried to develop friendly relations with all countries. I am glad to say that in spite of the conflicts that continually threaten the world, our relations with every country, except one, are friendly. We have endeavoured in our own small way to throw our weight on the side of peace and to keep ourselves out of military and like commitments. Naturally, such a policy is often criticised. There has been, however, all over the world, a basic appreciation of our sincerity in this matter as also of the soundness of our policy, even though it may not fall in line with the wishes of many others.

49. With the nations of the East, and more especially our neighbour countries, except again unfortunately one, our relations are exceedingly friendly and cooperative. Inevitably, with the coming of independence, the centre of gravity of our political interest has shifted to our neighbour countries and to Asia. Our Foreign Service has grown up rapidly and rather spasmodically during these years. We have endeavoured to limit its growth, but the mere fact of India's importance in the modern world and the desire of other countries to have diplomatic relations with India, compelled us to grow. In the circumstances, it was natural that this growth should not be uniform and the necessary experience and traditions should take time to grow up. We have had difficulties and troubles in some of our missions. But, on the whole, our Foreign Service has done good work and is highly thought of in foreign

19. The Government had decided to readjust the provisions of the Part B and C States to secure autonomy and responsible government.

countries. In particular, during this critical period, our representatives in the principal capitals have performed their functions with ability and brought credit to our country.

50. The Congress has repeatedly approved of our foreign policy. It is necessary, however, that there should be no doubt in the public mind in this country or other countries that this policy represents the wishes of the great majority of our people, in spite of some criticism here and there. In its foreign policy, the nation should speak with a firm and, as far as possible, with a united voice, if it has to carry weight.

51. Even after the establishment of the Republic, it was decided to continue, in a somewhat more attenuated form in keeping with our republican status, our association with the Commonwealth. For sentimental reasons, derived from the past, some of our countrymen have objected to this. I am convinced, however, that this was a right step. It is perfectly clear, and events have shown this, that this does not lessen our complete independence in any way or to the slightest extent. It has been of help to us in the past and it has made India's influence felt in the wider circles of the world. I think, therefore, that this association should continue.

52. Unfortunately, the passions and manoeuvres that led to the partition did not die away and subsequent events rather added to them. It is said that Kashmir is the basic difficulty which comes in the way of cooperative relations between India and Pakistan. It would be more correct to say that the problem of Kashmir is the resultant of that basic inner conflict between the two countries. India stands for a secular State and for freedom of its component parts to live their autonomous lives. Pakistan continues to be a communal State which by the very nature of its objectives and ideology, is aggressive in its outlook. Such an ideology appears strange in the world today and it is difficult to conceive of a modern State which makes a large number of its citizens feel that they are inferior citizens and cannot be treated as equals.

53. In India there are some people who in their unwisdom and lack of vision represent the communal policy of Pakistan in reverse. In doing so, they support that policy and weaken the basic conception of the Indian State. They have even stated that they want to put an end to the partition. This is the height of folly. Fortunately such people are few and have little influence, and our State policy, as well as the wishes of the great majority of our people, are quite clear on this subject. We desire no ending of the partition for that can only bring infinite trouble to all concerned. This has been repeatedly stated and must be clearly affirmed again, so that there remains no shadow of doubt about it.

54. In Pakistan it is the State policy that represents the old two-nation theory and the same narrow communalism which the old Muslim League did. While we have no desire to interfere with the inner working of Pakistan, we

cannot ignore the effect of this on millions of people in Pakistan and indirectly in India. It is a disruptive and subversive policy.

55. In East Pakistan and West Bengal a very grave situation arose early in 1950.²⁰ Fortunately an agreement arrived at with the Prime Minister of Pakistan was of great help in resolving that immediate crisis. That, of course, was no solution of the basic problem. But it brought relief to millions of people and vast numbers of migrants returned to their original homes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the position of the minority community in eastern Pakistan (in western Pakistan it hardly exists) is one of peculiar difficulty. The middle class elements, which were the backbone of education and trade and the professions, have practically been driven out, and the others remain full of fear and apprehension about their future. Recently, the flow of non-Muslim migrants from eastern Pakistan to West Bengal has increased substantially and created a grave problem.

56. Kashmir has been wrongly looked upon as a prize for India or Pakistan. People seem to forget that Kashmir is not a commodity for sale or to be bartered. It has an individual existence and its people must be the final arbiters of their future. It is here today that a struggle is being fought, not in the battlefield, but in the minds of men. That struggle started many years before partition. As the communal movement grew in India under the leadership of the Muslim League, and the two-nation theory was propounded, attempts were made to capture this beautiful valley of Kashmir by the proponents of that theory. They failed then and Kashmir developed a strong nationalist movement with a certain ideology which was socially advanced. The National Conference of Kashmir led this movement and it found common ground in many matters with the National Congress and the Indian States People's movement. So, in the thirties and in the forties, the link of common ideals and the bond of comradeship in a common cause bound us together, whether we were Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs or others. It was natural, therefore, for the people of Kashmir to resist later the narrow communalism of Pakistan which sought to thrust itself by violence and force upon them. It was natural and inevitable for the people of India to stand by them in their agony.

57. Thus this question of Kashmir is of deep significance to India as it is to Pakistan. But its significance is felt most of all by the people of Kashmir who wish to live their lives according to the ideology and nationalist feeling that they have themselves developed. During the past three and a half years

20. Reports of alleged ill-treatment of Hindus in certain districts of East Pakistan led to communal disorders in a number of districts in West Bengal from January 1950. Then followed riots in Calcutta and Dhaka. The situation was finally controlled by the signing of the Delhi Agreement between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan on 8 April 1950.

of conflict and continuous tension, it is surprising to note the progress that the State of Jammu and Kashmir has made. In some matters, such as agrarian legislation,²¹ it has gone ahead of India, and brought about a change in the economy of the great majority of people, which is truly revolutionary. How can the people of this State, with their socially advanced ideology, look forward except with dismay towards the communal, reactionary and authoritarian regime of Pakistan. India's position in regard to Kashmir has been repeatedly and firmly stated and we stand by it.

58. In this connection our minds naturally go to one of the finest men that India has produced, a great leader in our struggle for freedom and a man whose whole life was dedicated to this struggle and to the service of the common man. This man is Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He and his brave comrades continue their lives in prison in Pakistan year after year, even though it is said that freedom has come to their country. This is not only significant but also symbolic of the type of freedom which awaits brave and freedom-loving spirits in Pakistan.

59. It is not Kashmir, therefore, but rather a much deeper conflict that comes in the way of friendly relations between India and Pakistan and the situation is a grave one. We cannot give up the basic ideals which we have held so long and on which the whole conception of our State is founded. We cannot encourage anything which breaks up the national unity of India. We cannot submit to a continuation of the old policy of disintegration and aggression. This must be clearly understood. We realise the necessity of friendly relations with Pakistan and we shall continue to strive for them, but that friendship can only come if the spirit of aggression is given up by Pakistan.

60. The A.I.C.C. is meeting at a critical moment and has to come to vital decisions in regard to national policies and the future of the Congress. The coming elections are important, but it is far more important to know exactly what we stand for and how we want to function in the future. It is better to keep our soul and to lose an election than to win that election in the wrong way and with wrong methods. There has been a deep searching of hearts among Congressmen after some of our old colleagues had left us. It matters little to argue as to whose fault this has been. There is something lacking in us if any old comrade and colleague finds that the Congress is no longer a place for him. We have to find out the reason why.

21. On 13 July 1950, the Kashmir Government enacted the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act, 1950, which made individual holdings of more than 182 *kanals* (about 23 acres) illegal, the rest being transferred to peasant-tillers who would be turned into peasant-proprietors, paying their revenue directly to the Government. The Distressed Debtors' Relief Act was passed in 1950 and Debt Conciliation Boards were established to relieve the debtors of their indebtedness in case the principal, and 50 per cent interest, had already been paid.

61. Some people criticise us for desiring what is called a single-party rule and point out the necessity of an effective opposition. I do not understand this criticism, and I entirely agree that a democratic legislature should have an effective opposition. But it is equally true that in times of crisis a large measure of unity and national purpose is essential. When disruptive and disintegrating forces are at work, it becomes every man's duty to combat these forces. It would be a tragedy if a large number of good people with excellent ideals indirectly help these disruptive and anti-social forces.

62. It is natural for a large country like India to have numerous groups and parties with various objectives and ways of thinking. Let us analyse some of these. On the one side there are the Communists and the communalists, very different from each other, and yet both essentially disruptive. The Communists, whatever their ideology, have followed a path of violence and open warfare against the State. No State can tolerate that. Their object appears to have been to create chaos and disruption out of which perhaps something might come. To some extent they have varied their policies and tactics recently, but basically their approach continues to be the same as before.

63. The communalists are essentially reactionary. They have no social theory and seek inspiration from a certain form of revivalism and a narrow and bigoted nationalism which excludes large parts of the nation. And yet they talk glibly even of socialism and nationalisation, although they represent forces which are entirely opposed to these. We cannot be taken in by these phrases and we must remember that communalism has already done great injury to India and will, no doubt, do greater injury if it is given a chance. We cannot, therefore, have anything in common with them.

64. There are other groups which are definitely anti-social and represent certain deep-rooted vested interests in the country, especially in the land. As a rule they look to the communal organisations. With them also we have nothing in common.

65. We now come to the Socialist Party and the newly formed Praja Party,²² consisting of many of our old colleagues. It is not clear wherein, in policy or programme, the Praja Party differs from the Congress. Where there is no clear difference in ideology, personal conflicts arise. This is most unfortunate and cannot but lower our standards. We should try to avoid this at all cost and invite our old colleagues of the Praja Party to do likewise. The Socialist Party perhaps does not differ very greatly in regard to final objectives

22. The Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party was formed at a conference of former members of the Congress at Patna from 14 to 17 June 1951 under the chairmanship of J.B. Kripalani. Its objective was defined as "the establishment of a free, democratic, casteless and classless society by peaceful means."

from the Congress. But it certainly does differ in so far as immediate objectives and methods are concerned. We have no quarrel with them, though we differ, and there should be the possibility of a large measure of agreement in regard to certain common programmes.

66. Thus in regard to the Socialist Party or the Praja Party or any like organisation, we should endeavour to have as much of cooperation in working common programmes as possible. The Congress must stand on its programmes and methods and must keep its doors open to all who agree with it. Even those who disagree with it and follow a different course should be invited to cooperate in some of the larger issues on which we think alike.

67. The Congress has been in the past something much more than a narrow party. It functioned as a national forum. The coming of independence has naturally made a difference and we cannot quite function as of old. But there is still plenty of room for the Congress to be a platform to achieve many common purposes. It should, therefore, keep its doors open and welcome back those of its old members who have, in a spirit of distrust or frustration, left it. The situation in the country and the world demands this larger outlook and wider vision. The Congress must also seek to remedy the weaknesses and evils that have crept into the organisation, and more particularly discourage any particular group from considering this great organisation, or any of its numerous branches, as its private preserve. Any charges of irregularity or worse in its working should be investigated.

68. All this is necessary, but at best it is a negative approach. What is required is an active faith in its mission and the cause and the capacity to work for it. What is also required is service of our people and throwing our lot with them. We are not a sect apart but are of the people and we should function as such. If we ourselves have faith, we can convince others.

69. The coming elections are a test for us not merely in the winning of seats but in something which is of far greater importance. Are we to function as the ordinary run of politicians, whose sole aim is somehow to win an election, or as votaries of a cause for whom our principles and objectives are more important than seats in a legislative assembly or Parliament? I hope that in the choosing of candidates great care will be exercised in selecting men and women of integrity who, by their past record, have shown that they believe in and act up to the principles we proclaim. It will be more honourable for us, and will be of greater service to the cause we serve, if we do this and even lose an election than to win with the help of dubious candidates. Our choice should not be restricted to a narrow circle or group but should extend to any who fulfil the qualifications laid down. In particular, we have to take special care that an adequate number of candidates of minority communities, as well as from women, are chosen.

2. Faith in a Secular State¹

I am grateful to the house for the general welcome given to my report.² Mr Algurai Shastri has not approved of the paragraph relating to a secular State.³ It is my misfortune to disagree with him on the subject and on the consequences that flow from a secular State. Let us be clear about it. There should not be a shadow of doubt in any Congressman's mind.

On matters of this kind we cannot speak with two voices or with a wavering voice or a hesitant voice or with any voice that produces any impression other than this, that we stand till death for a secular State and nothing else but a secular State.

There has been enough of silly and misleading talk about it. Let us put an end to the hypocrisy of saying one thing and acting in a different way.

Let us not say: "It is not our fault but somebody else's fault that we act in this way." It is nobody's fault except ours if we do not stick to our principles. Our principles are our principles and not somebody else's principles.

It may be somebody else's business to distort, to upset us and push us down. And that certainly is no excuse for us to fall from our principles. That would mean that our principles depend on what somebody else does. That is not the usual description of a principle to which either an individual or a party is wedded to.

I have stated in my report that special attention should be given to the minorities such as the Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and others.

A question was put to me: on what basis are the minorities named? Is that in consonance with our idea of a secular State?

I confess to a feeling of surprise at this question. A minority does not disappear, nor does it become a majority in a secular State, nor does a person give up his religion, his customs or his culture in a properly-run secular State. No State can be civilized except a secular State.

There is no country in the wide world where there are so many barriers, as in India, between one group and another in the social structure. We want them to disappear, but we cannot shut our eyes to them. We still function in narrow communal ways. We talk about Brahmins and non-Brahmins. It is communalism. We hope to get rid of it. We have given up separate electorates, but we have to see that what we have done is justified by results.

1. Reply to the debate on Nehru's report at the opening session of the All India Congress Committee, Bangalore, 13 July 1951. From *National Herald*, 14 July 1951. Extracts.
2. See previous item.
3. Algurai Shastri had asked: "On what basis are the minorities named? Is that in consonance with our ideal of a secular State?"

Ultimately, there should be no majority or minority. We are all just human beings. But today, during this transitional period we have to see that the minorities do not suffer. The responsibility inevitably rests on the majority whatever the majority may be and wherever it may be....

3. For a Concerted Effort to End Poverty¹

Four years are not a very long period in the life of a nation. Yet it is true that the last four years seem to be an age so far as India is concerned. Vital experiences the Indian people have passed through have apparently lengthened the span of these years considerably.

I sometimes wonder what would have happened had the people of India not passed through the trials and tribulations which had fallen to their lot during the past four years.

Even today, when times are hard, many people are prone to be careless, ease-loving and selfish, much to the detriment of the nation. Naturally, I fear to imagine that if the times were not so difficult, perhaps the whole nation might have fallen a prey to carelessness and selfishness. Nothing can be more dangerous and deplorable than that a nation should become careless and forget its ideals.

What was that power which inspired us in our fight for freedom? That power was the strength of our minds, of the hearts of millions of ordinary men whom Mahatma Gandhi had taught not to be afraid even of the mightiest imperialist power. If that strength of heart and mind was lacking, then no other power could save the country.

It is, therefore, proper that on this anniversary day of nation's freedom, the people should look back and ponder over what had increased their strength and had helped them in winning freedom. At the same time, they should pledge to avoid all those pitfalls which had weakened India in the past and made her the slave of others.

Unfortunately, many people believe that after independence their work has been completed. This attitude is utterly wrong because, for the maintenance of independence, eternal vigilance is necessary and whosoever is not vigilant is bound to go under in the harsh merciless world of today.

1. Speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort, New Delhi, on Independence Day, 15 August. From *National Herald*, 17 August 1951.

I am proud of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force which are manned by brave young men who can be depended upon to protect the country. But, a country can ultimately be defended only by its people and not by armies alone. The security of the country depends on whether the people are brave or not, and whether they entangle themselves in minor conflicts or care for big things.

There is great need for hard work. A country whose people shirk work is bound to be weakened. Along with hard work, united action is necessary. People must remember that we are all sailing in the same boat. We have, therefore, to sink or swim together. If the country goes ahead, all are bound to be benefited. But if, unfortunately, it goes under, nobody will be able to escape his doom.

Some foolish people may try to disturb national unity either out of sheer stupidity or because of their calculated move to weaken the country. I have heard that some persons tried to create some trouble in the city of Delhi this morning or last night. It is the bounden duty of the people to frustrate each and every move of such foolish people.

People are facing the problems of rising prices, black marketing and other such difficulties. These problems are created by two factors, first, those which are out of our control, like the Korean war, and secondly, those which can be controlled by us. The black market is of the latter category and any government should try to curb it with an iron hand. Perhaps, in the past that vice had not been combated as effectively as it ought to have been. But then it was not merely the responsibility of the Government to do that. People also had to cooperate with the Government and both had to find a way out of the mess.

The success of the five-year plan depends upon the measure of people's support. Many people have suggested that we should get foreign aid in order to push through national projects. Foreign aid is welcome if no strings are attached to it. But the people must realise that we cannot go on looking towards outsiders for help.

Moreover, silver and gold alone, howsoever important they are, do not constitute by themselves the wealth of a nation. In fact, the real wealth of a nation is the hard work of its people. Government help may be there, but the work has to be done by the people. For instance, China is making rapid progress because its people are working hard. Each village there is competing in a friendly manner with every other village to construct and produce more and more, and naturally great results are being produced. The United States of America is another example worth following. This country is the richest in the world because its people work hard to produce wealth. In India also some people in villages have built roads and public buildings without depending on Government machinery which is inevitably slow.

I appeal to you not to look down upon manual work and to keep up the dignity of labour. It is not proper for everyone to seek office jobs. You must produce with your own hands.

A world war will completely destroy civilization as it exists today and will take the world back to savagery. Korea ought to be a lesson to those who talk glibly of war. That unfortunate country has been almost completely devastated by a war between two great powers. People claim that they have gone to Korea to liberate it. I am afraid that soon there might not be left any Korean to need liberation.

That is why India has consistently followed a policy for world peace and particularly for peace with its neighbour, Pakistan. It has to be understood that partition has been brought about by mutual agreement and has to be accepted. Therefore, all talk of its annulment is wrong, and does no good to anybody.

War drums are being beaten in Pakistan and there is a cry for *jihad*. India has naturally taken precautionary measures, for the defence of the country is our primary responsibility. At the same time we have made it clear that we want no war with anybody, much less with Pakistan.

I am grateful to the people of India who have remained perfectly calm despite sabre-rattling on the other side of the border. Even in our border areas people are carrying on their normal vocations unruffled. This is a sign of our strength and our peaceful intentions.

I want to tell the people of Pakistan and the whole world that there is no reason why the bonds which had tied the people of India and Pakistan so long should now be broken. Why should the two countries waste their strength in mutual conflict?

I urge the people of India not to bear any ill-will towards the people of Pakistan. There are good people and bad people on both sides. If some people in Pakistan do something wrong, it does not mean that we should consider the whole nation as our enemy.

4. The Programme of Planned Economy¹

This Congress approves of the Election Manifesto adopted by the All-India Congress Committee at its Bangalore meeting in July 1951.

1. Nehru's speech while moving the resolution drafted by him at the Subjects Committee meeting at New Delhi, 16 October 1951. The resolution was adopted by the A.I.C.C. on 18 October 1951. File No. G-16(B)/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

The Congress believes that the establishment of a planned economy is essential for the most effective utilisation of the country's resources, for increasing national wealth and distributing it equitably, and for harnessing the energies of the people in the tasks of national reconstruction. The Congress, therefore, welcomes the draft five-year plan formulated by the Planning Commission and calls upon the nation and, in particular, upon all Congressmen to offer the fullest cooperation in the execution of the national plan.

The largest possible increase in production in every sphere of economic activity by all available means must figure in the forefront of our immediate economic programme. The production of food must be the first concern so as to put an end to dependence on foreign aid in this respect. It is also essential to make sure of an adequate supply of raw materials to keep the people employed and industries running to full capacity.

The underlying defects in the economic and social organisation of the country, which have led to economic stagnation, have to be removed so as to lead to higher standards of production and welfare.

Future progress depends on capital formation and the amount saved by the community every year for this purpose. In order to enlarge the savings of the community, consumption will have to be restricted. Traditional sources of investment should give place to corporate and collective savings as well as the small savings of a very large number of persons. Tax evasion and black marketing, which have grown during the war and post-war period, have become social evils which are a serious impediment to economic progress, which may interfere with any effective planning. It is essential that the Government should take effective steps and the whole community should cooperate in order to destroy this menace to our social stability and welfare.

The administrative machinery of the State, both general and economic, has to be attuned to present-day needs in India and to the effective working of the national plan. This necessitates the building up of an industrial and commercial cadre to plan for the country's economic life and reorganise the existing economic structure in terms of the plan and in accordance with the needs of social justice.

The building up of basic industries has to be given high priority. The Congress stands for the progressive extension of the public sector according to the resources and personnel available. For the present, however, the bulk of the resources available to the State have to be invested, as a matter of priority, in agriculture, irrigation and power, transport and cottage and small-scale industries. The private sector should function in close accord with the public sector in the fulfilment of common national objectives. Labour should be able to participate in the day-to-day management of industrial undertakings and in the handling of the general problems of each industry.

Land is the base of India's economy. The agrarian system should be so organised that the fruits of labour are enjoyed by those who toil, and land is tilled as a source of wealth for the community. Some measure of land reform, notably the abolition of the zamindari system, protection of tenant cultivators, regulation of rents, the imposition of a ceiling on future acquisition of land and the fixation of minimum wages for agricultural workers have already been given effect to in many States. These should be extended and completed, as speedily as possible, so that their full benefit reaches the masses.

The first step in the reorganisation of rural economy is to strengthen the village as a social and economic entity as against the separate interests of individuals, and for the purpose of effective administration for development. Village production councils should be charged with the responsibility of developing and increasing production and should serve as the link between the people and the agencies of the State. They should mobilise voluntary labour for community works. Management of all land, not cultivated by farmers, should vest in village production councils. Uneconomic and inefficient units of cultivation stand in the way of economic as well as social progress. Large cooperative farms are therefore necessary and the agricultural and agrarian economy should be reorganised on the lines of cooperative village management.

Until cooperative village management is fully developed and organised, substantial individual farms should, as an interim measure, be brought under State direction and control. They should be required to conform to standards of cultivation and management laid down by the Government. The incidents of inequality should be reduced through measures, such as enforcement of minimum wages, levy of betterment fees in kind, agricultural income-tax, and control of land values. In the event of failure, their management should be taken over by the Government.

Incentives should be provided for the organisation of small uneconomic holdings into cooperative farms, and a large-scale programme should be undertaken for the organisation of multi-purpose cooperatives.

The greatest asset of the country is its manpower. But if this is not used to proper advantage, it becomes a drag and a burden on the country. Apart from those who are wholly unemployed, there are a vast number of able-bodied persons who are only partially employed. Many of those who are employed or partially employed exhibit a low level of skill, thus leading to economic loss. Full employment and raising the level of efficiency are thus the most important objectives of national endeavours.

The growth of basic industries, envisaged in the plan, as well as the improvement in agriculture will provide additional employment. But the only way to provide useful employment on a large-scale is by the development of cottage industries. Definite programmes of production through cottage and small-scale industries should therefore be framed and such industries should

be given facilities for organisation, research, training, finance, materials, marketing, and an adequate measure of protection. It is necessary that such cottage industries should be worked at the highest technical level of efficiency. By this method unused human working capacity will be mobilised and harnessed for constructive activity.

The whole system of production and distribution has to be reorganised with the deliberate object of achieving the ends of social justice. The existing disparities in respect of material well-being between the rural and urban areas, the backward and more advanced regions and communities, and the different economic layers of the population must be progressively narrowed down, and a ceiling should be fixed for the higher incomes. Taxation and fiscal policies should be examined from this point of view.

The aim of planning must be the progressive removal of economic and agricultural inequalities, in order to realise and establish a cooperative commonwealth based on equality of opportunity and of political and social rights, aiming at world peace and fellowship, which is the object of the Indian National Congress.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

II. The Naga Problem

1. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
July 13, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

This is a very belated acknowledgment of your letter of July 4, which came here after I had gone to Bangalore. We are very much concerned about the troubles from floods etc. that you are having.

I have been in consultation with our engineers about the work they have done since the earthquake in Assam.² I have no doubt that they helped you considerably. But I have equally little doubt that a great deal remains to be done.

I note what you say about the air service. I should very much like to have an air service there and I am enquiring into the matter. But you will realise that just at present the I.A.F. has its hands full.

About the food situation,³ I discussed this with our Assam friends in Bangalore and I am in touch with our Food Minister about it. I understand that he will be going to Assam fairly soon.⁴

I agree with you that we should not give any prominence to Phizo.⁵ I do not think we need bother very much about this plebiscite business.

I think the Nagas would make good soldiers, but to lower our standards for officers is a dangerous business. There has been some lowering already and we are regretting it.

You refer to some proposed agreement by the B.O.C. or the A.O.C. for carrying crude oil obtained on the Indian side to the refineries proposed to be set up in Pakistan. I entirely agree with you that we cannot accept this.

While no final dates have been fixed for the elections, it is almost certain that polling will begin about the 3rd January.

I have just received your letter of July 19.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. A major earthquake in Assam on 15 August 1950 resulted in the deaths of 575 people and affected about 74,000 people.

3. Earthquake, floods and drought led to the decline in the production of food in Assam. The return of one lakh Muslim emigres and influx of over 50,000 Hindu refugees from East Bengal worsened the food situation. The State Government enforced strict food laws against hoarding, profiteering and smuggling. Steps were taken to increase production.

4. K.M. Munshi went to Assam on 19 August 1951.

5. A.Z. Phizo was the President of the Naga Hill Council which demanded independence for the Naga areas.

About the payment of compensation to the Nagas etc.,⁶ I suggest that you might write to the Defence Ministry directly. I do not think there should be any difficulties in meeting your proposals.

I can very well understand your difficulties about procurement. Nevertheless, it is quite essential for more procurement to be made. The Centre's capacity is strained to the utmost, and I hope you will not rely completely on the Centre.

As I have said above, I think that we should not make it appear to Phizo that we rely upon him too much.

We must prepare for any war, but it is no good becoming panicky about it. I rather doubt if any war will take place.

We are already enquiring about the road link from West Bengal to Assam.

Thank you for your suggestion to send orchids here. But, this is perhaps not the best time to send them. However, I am enquiring into this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. The Government of India had sanctioned Rs 30 lakhs as compensation to the Nagas who suffered damage during the Second World War and Rs 10 lakhs for welfare schemes.

2. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1951

My dear Jairamdas,

I have received a report from the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes² about his visit to the tribal areas of Assam.³ In the course

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Laxmidas M. Shrikant (1897-1992); President, Bhil Seva Mandal, 1923-50; Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, 1950-61.

3. Shrikant mentioned in his report of 31 December 1951: (i) The Naga National Council, consisted mostly of Angami Nagas, who were Christian converts educated at missionary institutions, was opposing the formation of district tribal councils and demanding independence for the Naga areas; (ii) tension was growing between the Christian and non-Christian Nagas; (iii) the demand for war compensation was being put up before the Governor; (iv) the Mikir Hill district was the most backward one without roads and dispensaries and adequate number of schools; and (v) the Abhor Hill district was prone to earthquakes and floods.

of this report, he describes his journeys with you in the Naga Hill districts. I have also received some other reports on this subject. The impression I gathered from these reports is that perhaps you have been giving too much prominence to A.Z. Phizo. On one occasion, he is said to have kept you waiting for half an hour in his house. This kind of thing has increased the importance of Phizo in the eyes of the Nagas.

I have written to you repeatedly about the Nagas and I have suggested that Phizo should be dealt with gently but firmly. I think there is a danger of overdoing the gentleness and creating a wrong impression. My own reading of the situation is that we overestimated Phizo and I think the best thing would be not to pay too much attention to him.

There is another question. We have given a good deal of money to the people in the Naga Hill districts. Shrikant considers that there are other tribes who are much more deserving. For instance, the Manipur Nagas, I am told, are agitated that so much should be done for the Naga Hill districts and that they should be left out in the cold. How the Manipur Nagas can be brought in this connection, is not quite clear to me. I understand that the Defence Ministry has done something separately for them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1951

My dear Mr. President,

I have seen a copy of your note dated 25th July about the report of Shri Laxmidas Shrikant on his tour in Assam.² This note draws particular attention

1. File No. 33/51, President's Secretariat.
2. Rajendra Prasad wrote that Shrikant's report noted that the situation in Assam was serious on account of the demands of the tribes, and the policy being followed by the Governor to deal with the Nagas. Rajendra Prasad suggested that the Ministry should be kept in the picture and arrangements for elections to the district councils should be made, and the Nagas be told of the futility of their demand for an independent state; the amount of 30 lakhs to be distributed to individuals for damage suffered during the war and Rs 10 lakhs for welfare work should be spent according to the plan already worked out.

to our approach to A.Z. Phizo, one of the Naga leaders, and suggests that the approach of the Governor has not been perhaps very happy.

May I say that I entirely agree with what you have written in the note and, as a matter of fact, I have already written to the Governor on this subject. I am also sending a copy of your note to him.

My advice to the Governor previously had been that he should treat this agitation in the Naga Hills gently but firmly.³ What I meant was that repressive action should be avoided, but no encouragement whatever should be given. The Nagas are a proud and disciplined people, who do not easily submit to repressive action. But on no account should anything be done to encourage this agitation, and it should be made perfectly clear that there could not be any independent State.

A certain confusion had arisen in the Naga minds because of some assurances given by Sir Akbar Hydari, which were not, in some minor matters, in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution.⁴ In particular they were troubled about their land and were afraid of losing it. I told the Governor to assure them that their land would not be taken away except with the consent of their representatives and for a public purpose beneficial to them and to the country.

As for the distribution of Rs. 30 lakhs, this has been arranged according to the directions of the Defence Ministry.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Prasad asked Nehru to lay down the policy to be pursued in a frontier area. He also asked him to contact the Governor and decide upon the action to be taken.
4. The nine-point agreement between the Naga National Council and the Government of India, negotiated by Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of Assam, was signed in June 1947. It gave the N.N.C. powers in the matters of judiciary, executive, legislature, land resources, taxation, boundaries, arms act and Chin Hills regulations and the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulations. The Governor of Assam was to ensure the observance of this agreement for ten years and at the end of this period the Naga National Council would be asked whether an extension of it, or a new one to replace it, was required.

4. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1951

My dear Jairamdas,

Thank you for your letter of August 4th.² I am glad you have taken the trouble to explain to me what happened during your tour. As suggested by you, I am sending copies of your letter to the President and to the Home Minister.

You are quite right in saying that our approach should be one of courtesy and also firmness. It is clear to me that A.Z. Phizo's influence is not what it was. We must gradually make him and others feel that we do not attach too much importance to him. As for the Naga independence business, it should be made perfectly clear that, while we wish to consider all legitimate claims of the Nagas, the claim for independence has no meaning or relevance and we can pay no attention to it.

I have just received a letter from Phizo³ complaining against what he calls "a deliberate campaign of vilification on the part of Mr. S.J. Duncan, the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills" in regard to the distribution of the war compensation. I shall deal with this matter later and let you know what I am doing.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Jairamdas stressed the need for friendly social contact with the Nagas. He felt that they did not know the implications of the demand for independence and were apprehensive that outsiders might exploit their resources. An accelerated welfare programme for the Nagas and speedy disposal of their complaints would draw them closer. No punitive or repressive action should be contemplated against the Naga leaders unless they broke the law or incited violence.
3. See the next item.

5. To A.Z. Phizo¹

Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister has received your letter of the 30th July.²

The war compensation being given to the Nagas, on account of the losses suffered by them during the war, is distributed according to the rules laid down by the Defence Ministry in consultation with the Assam Government. The officers in charge of this distribution have to carry out the directions given to them. This has nothing to do with the part played by the I.N.A. So far as the Government of India are concerned, they have taken special steps to help, in every way possible to them, the ex-I.N.A. personnel. There is no question of condemning them or ridiculing them, and anyone who does so is acting contrary to the Government of India's policy and directions.

The Prime Minister does not know what part you played in the I.N.A. This question does not arise at all in regard to the compensation to be given to the Nagas for their war losses.

If you have any grievance in regard to the distribution of the compensation, you should address the Assam Government on this subject, who are in charge of it.

You refer to a plebiscite being taken by the Naga Hills. There can be no question of threats or lures in this or any other connection. The Government of India in any event cannot recognise any attempt by any section of the people of India to claim an independent status.³

1. 7 September 1951. This letter, signed by the Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, was drafted by Nehru. J.N. Collection.
2. Phizo had written that while distributing compensation to the Nagas, the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, S.J. Duncan, was accusing Phizo of the Japanese invasion of the Naga Hills and of suggesting that the people should go to him for compensation. Phizo also wanted a plebiscite to be held to decide on the independence of Nagaland.
3. The Naga National Council, on its own, held a plebiscite in May 1951 and declared that the Nagas preferred to remain separate from India.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

III. The Andhra Province

1. To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja¹

New Delhi

August 15, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

I have your letter of the 14th August about Swami Sitaram.² I am sorry to learn of his intention to undertake a long fast or a fast unto death in order to bring about the formation of an Andhra Province. Personally I am entirely opposed to bringing in fasting as a method of finding a solution for political problems. In this particular case this seems to me specially uncalled for.

The election manifesto of the Congress referred to the question of linguistic provinces. The Government of India is prepared to accept that in toto. The question is therefore that more or less agreed proposals should be put forward before the Government of India. I do not mean that everybody should agree on everything, but there should be a wide measure of agreement on the principal questions involved. It is quite impossible for the Government of India to impose any such decision against the wishes of any considerable number of people.

Swami Sitaram suggests that an impartial tribunal should be constituted to solve controversial issues. No tribunal of this kind can be impartial. As a matter of fact a very impartial committee was appointed by Sardar Patel two or three years ago under, I think, Mr. Pannalal's³ chairmanship and that committee presented a report.⁴ The committee was generally opposed to the formation of linguistic provinces.⁵ Nevertheless we expressed our readiness to go ahead more especially with the Andhra Province, provided an agreed scheme was put forward.⁶ You will of course appreciate that the separation of a

1. J.N. Collection.

2. G. Sitaram Sastri later known as Swami Sitaram (1885-1960); prominent Congressman of Andhra; supported the demand for a separate Andhra State.

3. Panna Lal was a member of the I.C.S. who served in the United Provinces.

4. Nehru was referring to the Linguistic Provinces Commission of which S.K. Dar was president and Panna Lal and Jagat Narayan Lal were members. The Commission was appointed on 17 June 1948 by the President of the Constituent Assembly.

The Dar Commission was of the view that re-formation of provinces should not be based upon "linguistic considerations but rather upon administrative convenience."

The J.V.P. Committee, in its report in April 1949, recommended postponement of linguistic provinces by a few years, but said that the case of Andhra could be isolated from others as there was a large measure of consent behind it. The report also laid down that the protagonists would have to abandon their claim to Madras city.

province is not a matter of simple decree. It involves a large number of complicated questions relating not only to boundaries but also to finances, administrative matters, judiciary, capital, etc. With the best will in the world and with every effort to that end, it is quite impossible to form the Andhra State before the 2nd October 1951, as suggested by the Swami. We are perfectly prepared to go ahead with this matter, even though many of us feel that this critical moment is not the proper time for taking steps to this end. But if the people concerned are willing and desire it, we do not wish to come in their way. It would be very odd indeed if we tried to impose our will or somebody else's will on some or many of the people concerned in such matters at a time when grave danger threatens the country and we are on the eve of a general election.

It is quite clear to me that Swami Sitaram's starting a fast for this purpose will not help in that at all.⁷ I am sure that if he gives thought to this matter carefully, he will appreciate the position. He wants surely to achieve the creation of the Andhra Province. We have suggested the way to proceed about this business. It is not we who are coming in the way of such a province. Swami Sitaram can proceed on the lines we have suggested and thereby expedite the formation of such a province. Otherwise his objective will not be reached or will be delayed, and needless suffering and ill-will will be created at a time, when, as I have said above, grave perils threaten the nation. The Government of India has to keep the entire picture in view and cannot take isolated action, however important it might be, if this has adverse effects on other important matters.

I suggest that you might yourself write to Swami Sitaram and convey my message to him on the lines I have given above.⁸

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Sitaram sought an assurance that before 2 October the Andhra State would be formed. As no assurance was forthcoming, he began his fast unto death on 16 August 1951.
8. This letter was read out in the State Assembly on 29 August 1951.

2. Formation of an Andhra Province¹

I should like to say a few words. First of all it is a matter of concern to the House and certainly to the Government that noted public men should indulge in a hunger-strike for a cause which they consider important and dear. I confess, Sir, that I do not think that that is a method which helps in regard to the subject matter of the hunger-strike, i.e., the formation of an Andhra Province, but so far as Government are concerned, they have always been favourably inclined towards it and expressed themselves so on numerous occasions. When a proposal for a linguistic province is made, it consists obviously of several units or States and the decision that Government have taken in the past is that we are very agreeable, subject to certain considerations, but the main consideration is that those parties or States involved should come to a general agreement, not, of course, about every single matter but broad principles. Then it is possible to go ahead with some speed. An agreement is not merely a question of parts. That of course is important; it is an agreement about finances, about services, and about so many other things, and a Government cannot take a forward step without working out all these matters carefully or else really more delay occurs and troubles and difficulties occur. After all the word "partition" is not well liked by most of us in another context, but even an inner partition creates difficulties which should be faced, of course, but one has to be careful about them. Therefore what the Government has declared as its policy is that if there is this large and broad agreement brought about by the parties, the Government would gladly take steps to finalize it, to further it, by appointment of commissions and the like. It is sometimes suggested that a commission might be straightaway appointed. The work of the commission would be to work out details of any broad agreement because if there is no broad agreement, it is quite conceivable that the commission may report that there is no agreement and instead of going further ahead, they might further be delayed. It is rather difficult to bring compulsion in this matter. In a desire to please one side, another side is displeased and the Government has to come down with a heavy hand trying to compel somebody to agree and even if that could be done that leaves traces of ill-will born out of friction and conflict. The thing, if it is to be done and successfully done, should be done with a large measure of goodwill and agreement and so far as

1. Reply in Parliament to N.G. Ranga's notice of an adjournment motion to discuss the fast unto death by fifteen persons of Andhra in protest against the inaction of the Government to form an Andhra Province, 22 August 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, Vol. XIV, Part-II (6th to 27th August 1951), columns 1101-1102.

we are concerned, we are prepared to go ahead as fast as possible; but I do submit that the basis should be with a large measure of agreement and goodwill. I believe that there is a fair amount of agreement and goodwill about this matter and it should not be difficult for the remaining part to be covered, but I do submit that a hunger-strike is hardly the way to cover that. With all respect for those gentlemen whose names are mentioned, I would say that they perhaps allowed their deep feelings on the subject to overcome a rational consideration as to how to achieve it.

3. Telegram to Andhra Leaders¹

I have your telegram about Swami Sitaram Shastri's fast.² I have been deeply grieved over this fast and have repeatedly appealed to Sitaramji to give it up on the assurances I have given on behalf of Government. We are all agreed that an Andhra Province should be carved out and, having agreed on this, I am anxious that this should be done as soon as possible. But I have stated clearly the most feasible and speedy method of bringing this about. If that method is followed, early results can be achieved.

You are no doubt aware that I feel strongly about forcing of administrative decisions through pressure exercised as a result of fasting. Whatever the merits of the case, this method of exercising undue pressure is fraught with mischief. It is unjustifiable when so many normal and constitutional channels of action are available. It is easily open to others to start a fast for a contrary purpose. What then is Government to do if this kind of pressure through fasting is exercised?

You will realise that if there is clear disagreement on major points or when important and influential leaders and groups keep alive doubtful claims on major points such as the city of Madras, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the Government of India to act. We shall only make matters worse by precipitating acrimonious disputes.

We have made our attitude perfectly clear and it remains for Andhra leaders to put forward a scheme without mental reservations and make their position acceptable to the leaders of the neighbouring areas who are equally

1. New Delhi, 6 September 1951. This telegram was sent through the Chief Minister of Madras Province to twenty six leaders of Andhra who had requested Nehru for his intervention to end Swami Sitaram's fast. J.N. Collection.

concerned in the matter. No scheme in which major matters in dispute are to be reserved for arbitration can be considered as satisfactory in terms of what the Government of India have so clearly announced as their definite policy in this matter.

At the same time it may be taken as agreed that once the above condition is satisfied, the matter is simple and there will be no delay or difficulty in our taking the necessary steps. But I repeat that this fast should be unconditionally given up, even to induce us to consider the matter calmly and without prejudice. Whatever may be the view taken of the case, I hope my friendly and earnest advice will be accepted and the fast terminated.²

2. This telegram was read out in the Madras Legislative Council on 7 September 1951.

4. Fast for Formation of a Separate Andhra State¹

It is a fact, as stated by the honourable Member,² that the three-man committee specially referred to the question of the city of Madras as one important element in this, and I believe, it is also a fact that the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee then passed some resolution.³ But, the honourable Member knows very well that ever since then a good deal of doubt has been cast upon this and what Government have been suggesting is that all these doubts should be removed by the parties. It is easy enough. If the honourable Member thinks that expedition is required, the organisations concerned can also function urgently and not wait for something to happen, and remind us of something that happened two years ago...⁴

1. Reply in Parliament on 14 September 1951 to N.G. Ranga. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, Vol. IX, Part I (7 August to 21 September 1951), columns 1305-1308. Extracts.
2. Ranga asked whether the three-man committee had suggested that the people of Andhra should give up their claim to the city of Madras and the Congress Working Committee and the Andhra Provincial Congress Working Committee had accepted that condition.
3. In fact the A.P.C.C. requested the Government of India to form the Andhra Province immediately with the undisputed twelve districts, to take steps to carve out Madras city and the bilingual villages around it into a separate city province and to make necessary arrangements in Madras city for the headquarters of both the Andhra and Madras provinces until such time as might be required to set up permanent capitals.
4. Ranga asked whether the presidents of the Kamataka Provincial Congress Committee, Tamilnad Provincial Congress Committee and the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee had assured Nehru of their willingness to accept the present jurisdiction of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee without Madras city.

That is not completely a fact though it is largely true. People have spoken to me vaguely and sometimes orally. As a Government we cannot proceed on vague statements made without precision, which, as a matter of fact, have been challenged by some other people even now. The position, as far as I can see, is quite simple and easy to deal with, provided the suggestions made by the Government are accepted and the important organisations concerned and the Government of Madras can express their agreement to certain general formulae which could be acted upon later...⁵

I do not understand the honourable Member's suggestion that Government have taken it in a leisurely way. Government have indicated precisely, definitely and most expeditiously the steps to be taken, not today but nearly ten or twelve days ago or two weeks ago. Everything could have been done in 48 hours. I understand they are proceeding about the business and they are also meeting in a day or two. But, I must confess that this proposition that because respectable people fast, the whole administrative procedure of Government should be upset is a proposition I cannot accept. May I point out to the House that in fact I have been told by some people who do not like this that they will go on fast against this business? We cannot allow people to fast against each other...⁶ I am not trying to take shelter; but I do wish to say precisely and definitely that Government will not submit to fasts; they will submit to facts and not fasts.

There it is; the honourable Member will observe the difficulties...⁷

If the various bodies concerned in this matter express their general agreement over the various issues, Government is certainly prepared to proceed irrespective of Swami Sitaram's fast...⁸

I do not suppose it will serve any useful purpose to discuss the desirability of fasts being undertaken for any particular purpose...⁹ I am not prepared to say that nobody should ever fast for any purpose. Certainly if he feels strongly about a matter of conscience he might do it. But surely such a fast, normally speaking, should not be undertaken first when there are other ways open.

5. Ranga stated that though Sitaram and his colleagues had been on fast for twenty nine days, the Government had not taken any action.

6. Ranga alleged that Nehru was taking shelter under his statement.

7. Kala Venkatarao wanted to know whether Nehru was aware that Sitaram had stated that unless the question of the city of Madras was left to arbitration he was not going to end his fast.

8. Kala Venkatarao wished to know whether, if the Provincial Congress Committees of Tamilnad, Andhra and Karnataka as well as the Government of Madras were prepared to give it in writing that they would support the report of the Madras Partition Committee of 1950, the Government of India would form the Andhra Province.

9. Ranga asked if Nehru was aware that Governments in the past had taken notice of fasts undertaken by satyagrahis.

Secondly, it should not be taken over what might be called administrative matters. They affect many parties concerned. A fast compelling the Government perhaps one can understand; but here it means compelling others concerned who do not agree with that view. So this creates great difficulties.

5. Telegram to A. Kameswara Rao¹

I have already appealed to Swami Sitaram to give up his fast.² This may be taken by you as an appeal or direction given by me as Congress President as well as in my other capacities and you may try to persuade him to give up his fast.

1. 18 September 1951, *National Herald*. A. Kameswara Rao was Member of the Madras Legislative Assembly.
2. Sitaram had entered the 33rd day of his fast.

6. Telegram to Vinoba Bhave¹

We have approached question of formation of Andhra Province with greatest measure of sympathy and with desire to facilitate its formation. Any step taken which causes resentment and bitterness in large groups would lead to obstruction and delay and trail of bitterness. We proposed therefore simple course which would have brought large measure of agreement on major issues including question of future of Madras city. As a matter of fact agreement on many issues already reached by Partition Committee² two years ago and only a little more concerted action was necessary. I have appealed to Swami Sitaram both as Congress President and Prime Minister to give up his fast. Continuation of this fast is creating fresh difficulties both in Tamilnad and Rayalaseema

1. New Delhi, 19 September 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. The Partition Committee set up by the Madras Government in 1950 went into the questions of the boundary of the new State, financial allocation and other allied matters.

and strong objections are being raised there now to any decision without their consent. I am unable to see what more I can do in present circumstances. I would request you to exercise your influence and advise Swami Sitaram to give up his fast.³

3. Sitaram terminated his fast on 20 September at the instance of Vinoba Bhave who conveyed Nehru's assurance that everything possible would be done to expedite the creation of a separate Andhra Province.

7. To Swami Sitaram¹

New Delhi
September 29, 1951

Dear Swamiji,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th September. I am very glad to learn that you and your colleagues are recovering health after your long fast.²

Thank you for sending the pamphlet by Desabhakta Konda Venkatappaiah³ on the Andhra demand. I shall certainly read this.

Whatever my views might be generally on the question of formation of linguistic provinces, it is quite clear to me that there should be an Andhra Province. It is enough reason for me that the Andhra people desire to have such a province. So far as I know, the people of Tamilnad do not wish to come in the way. Thus, it may be taken for granted that there should be an Andhra Province. If that is so, the sooner this is brought about, the better, because delay lengthens a period of uncertainty which can do no good to anybody.

The only real question that arises is that of method to bring this about. As you will appreciate more than anyone else, the means to be adopted have importance. A wrong approach might actually delay the realisation of the objective as well as leave a sense of conflict and bitterness behind. Hence it had been my desire to find a way by consent as far as possible. When I say consent, I do not mean that every person should agree. That is too much to ask for. What I mean is that there should be broad agreement about the principal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Fifteen Andhra leaders had gone on a fast following the fast undertaken by Sitaram for the formation of an Andhra province.

3. (1866-1949); Congress leader of Andhra Pradesh; founding-member of the Andhra Mahasabha.

issues. An agreement has already been arrived at by the Partition Committee in regard to many matters and that is helpful. But there are some matters still which remain undecided or unclear. To take a decision with mental reservations on either side is bound to create controversies at a later stage with resulting bitterness. Even the division of a joint family is sometimes a painful affair, much more so the division of a Province into two unless this is done with goodwill on all sides.

One of the principal issues is that relating to the city of Madras. The position, as I see it, is that the Tamilnad people would never countenance the giving up of Madras and even a reservation to this effect will create a great deal of opposition there. On the Andhra side, there appear to be varying opinions. Some people say that they are prepared to give up the city of Madras wholly: others are not prepared to do so; yet others are prepared to have an Andhra Province without the city of Madras but want to reserve consideration of this to a later stage. Unless this point is cleared up to the mutual satisfaction of the Tamilnad and Andhra peoples, the big obstacle remains.

Then there are the people of Rayalseema.⁴ I have received numerous letters and telegrams of protest and warning from many persons there. At one stage some representatives of Rayalseema had come to some kind of an agreement for the creation of an Andhra Province. But their agreement was apparently hedged in by certain conditions.

If these matters could be decided with broad agreement, Government would be prepared to make a statement. I am afraid it is physically impossible, even with agreement, to produce an Andhra Province within a few days as you suggest. It is difficult to take any executive action during the election period. But it would be possible to come to a decision about broad policy and announce it, if the barriers now remaining could be removed. I am sure that they can be removed given goodwill and a friendly approach.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The people of the districts of Rayalaseema region wanted that in an Andhra Province, every region should have equal representation in the Cabinet, the legislatures and the services. Rayalaseema should have its due share in professional and educational institutions and in the establishment of radio stations, hospitals and courts. They also demanded the inclusion of Madras city. Later they demanded a separate Rayalaseema province with Madras as its capital.

8. To Swami Sitaram¹

New Delhi
October 4, 1951

Dear Swamiji,

I have received your telegram. I am surprised at the publication of the contents of my letter to you.² As far as I remember, I sent copies of this letter to Acharya Vinoba Bhave and the Chief Minister of Madras.

In my letter to you I have stated clearly what our position is. I am not making any declaration on the subject till there is anything further to say. If and when occasion arises, I shall make a statement. It is now for other parties to advance this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. See the preceding item.

9. To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja¹

New Delhi
October 5, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

A reference in *The Hindu* says that your Government is apparently waiting for us to do something about the Andhra Province or for us to ask you about it.² I do not quite know what is meant. So far as we are concerned, I have made several statements and recently I wrote a letter to Swami Sitaram, a copy of which I think I sent you. This letter has subsequently appeared in the Madras press.

In this letter I have made our position perfectly clear. The two matters I have specially mentioned are the city of Madras and Rayalaseema. I am really anxious to settle this Andhra matter, because till this is done, it would be like

1. J.N. Collection.
2. *The Hindu* had reported that Vinoba Bhave had written to Sitaram that he had advised the Government of India to make a declaration about the immediate formation of the Andhra State. Vinoba had assured Sitaram that if it were not done, he would himself take it up in Delhi on 1 November.

a running sore. I am sure you will like it settled too. I would, therefore, like you and your Government to take such steps as you may consider necessary for a settlement by consent in regard to the principal matters. Details can be worked out later.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Vinoba Bhave¹

New Delhi
October 7, 1951

Dear Vinobaji,

...I am sending you a copy of a resolution² passed by the Working Committee of the Andhra Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party with Shri T. Prakasam presiding. This resolution will indicate to you the difficulties we are having in regard to the formation of an Andhra Province. I have tried my utmost to speed this up, but I cannot go far when people will not agree to certain basic propositions....

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. The resolution said that the J.V.P. report should not form the basis for the constitution of the Andhra Province.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
IV. The Railwaymen's Strike

1. Appeal to Railwaymen¹

For some time past there has been talk of a strike in the railways.² My Government were naturally greatly concerned and were anxious to remove all legitimate grievances to the utmost of their capacity. My colleagues, the Railway Minister³ and the Finance Minister,⁴ have conferred with the representatives of the railwaymen and discussed the situation with them at length. I have kept in close touch with them in these matters.

We realise fully the hardships suffered, more especially by the lower income groups, on account of the high and rising price level of essential commodities, and we have been continually anxious, on the one hand, to control this situation and hold the present price level and, if possible, to bring it down, and, on the other, to relieve the hardships of those who are suffering from this rise in prices.

I have not said anything in public thus far on this subject, although I have been deeply concerned with it and have constantly conferred with my colleagues. I feel I must say something now and make an appeal to the railwaymen and their leaders, as well as to others, to view this situation in all its aspects and to avoid any precipitate action which might do untold harm to the community and to them.

I understand that a strike ballot has been taken among the members of the All-India Railwaymen's Federation and its central council is to meet tomorrow at Patna to consider the results and to decide the action to be taken thereupon.

There is unrest in certain parts among dock workers and among members of one or two unions of other Government workers. A strike in any public utility concern is always a matter of serious concern to the public.⁵

1. Statement to the Press, New Delhi, 5 July 1951. *National Herald*, 6 July 1951.
2. The All-India Railwaymen's Federation had decided to go on strike from 27 August 1951. The main demands of the Federation, apart from the principle of adherence to the Pay Commission's recommendations, were an increase in dearness allowance, reopening the option in favour of grain concessions, and the reference of all disputed points to arbitrators. The Federation had also persuaded the Hind Mazdoor Sangh to call a token strike regarding dearness allowance on the same day. The All-India Bank Employees Federation was to follow the railwaymen and to strike if its demands were not met before 28 August.
3. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.
4. C.D. Deshmukh.
5. Ten days before the railwaymen were due to strike, an Essential Services (prevention of strikes) Ordinance was promulgated. The Ordinance included the prevention of sympathetic strikes in essential services such as road transport, dockyard, postal and telegraph services.

A strike on the railways or other large-scale transport concern is even more serious and I am sure that the railwaymen and their leaders will not use a weapon which, however much justified in certain circumstances, is sure to produce great injury and economic disruption at this critical juncture.

For the past year and more our national economy has had to face a critical situation. The spectre of famine has been hovering over large areas. We have tried our utmost to buy and bring food from all parts of the world. We have just succeeded in obtaining the minimum necessary to ward off starvation. In this process our railways and transport system have played a highly important and creditable part in rushing these foodgrains to the affected areas of the country. We have held the food situation and, if all goes well, we shall master it by the end of the year. But the utmost vigilance is necessary and the utmost effort, and if either of these is lacking or anything else comes in the way, that situation may well crack up to the infinite misery of large numbers of our countrymen.

Recently when I was in Bihar,⁶ I saw the Government apparatus for food distribution functioning satisfactorily. But I saw also famished and undernourished children and men and women. It is going to take some time to bring these unfortunate countrymen of ours to health. We have still a long way to go.

In order to obtain food from abroad and to check the inflationary forces that have been set in motion largely by world causes, the Government of India have been forced to exercise the utmost economy in all directions. In spite of this, we have gone as far as we could to meet the wishes of the railwaymen, and we are prepared to consider any outstanding grievances of a legitimate character by negotiation and discussion. My Government believe in all such grievances and disputes being settled in a friendly way by this process of negotiation and discussion, and we have given proof of our readiness to do so.

Millions of tons of foodgrains are arriving in the country during the next few months and have to be transported promptly to the consuming areas.⁷ If there is delay in their transport, and they do not reach the hungry mouths waiting for them, then our responsibility will be great indeed. I would suggest that no grievances or disputes, however legitimate they may appear, should be allowed to interfere with this essential task of national urgency. I am sure that

6. Nehru visited Bihar from 19 to 21 June 1951.

7. It was officially announced on 4 June that India had contracted to import 4,393,400 tons of foodgrains, valued at Rs. 1,800,000,000. A quantity of 1,650,000 tons had arrived by the end of May.

those who guide the activities of the All-India Railwaymen's Federation will fully appreciate this responsibility which they owe to the community as a whole. I would, therefore, earnestly appeal to the All-India Railwaymen's Federation and to all other organisations of transport workers, and to the railwaymen and workers themselves, that they should give up all ideas of the strike or dislocation of transport services. Let us all cooperate together in solving the economic crisis which faces us and in raising living standards through coordinated production and just distribution of essential goods and services.

I repeat that we shall gladly consider any outstanding grievances and try to settle them by the methods of negotiation and discussion.

2. To G.V. Raghavan¹

New Delhi

July 7, 1951

Dear Friend,²

Thank you for your letter of July 1. I would gladly do anything to settle this very unfortunate conflict. I do not know what I can do. Soon after my return from Kashmir³ I issued an appeal to the railwaymen⁴ but it was described as a political manoeuvre. Whatever my faults may be, I do not know much of political manoeuvring.

The General Council of the Federation has already taken a decision. That decision seems to me most unfortunate, more especially at a time when we have to face a very grave situation in regard to food and Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Raghavan was the Secretary of the B.N. Railway Indian Labour Union in Nagpur.

3. Nehru visited Kashmir from 26 June to 4 July 1951.

4. See the preceding item.

3. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
July 18, 1951

My dear Jayaprakash,²

I returned yesterday from Bangalore and had immediately to face a very serious situation vis-a-vis Pakistan. There is also an accumulation of heavy and important work. I am however hastening to reply to your letter of the 17th July which I have just received.³

2. I appreciate your writing to me. With reference to your last personal paragraph, I may have written to a friend that you were using strong language about me. I do not remember the exact word. Perhaps it might have been "abuse".⁴ I hope I have not become so thick-headed as to object to criticism, however strong it may be. What I meant was that repeatedly in your speeches, you had been referring to me rather bitterly and with anger. I do not challenge your right to do so, but it did pain me that you were bringing down a high argument to a personal level and apparently challenging my *bona fides*. I felt a little hurt, not because of your criticism or condemnation, but rather because of this inference which seemed to flow from your words. As you know, there is a very great deal of not only criticism but strong language used about me by various people and in various periodicals. I do not think I mind that very much and sometimes perhaps I profit by it. But it does hurt to know that I have fallen so low in your esteem.⁵

3. I agree with you that it would have been better for me to issue an appeal to railwaymen at an early stage. Unfortunately I was away for about ten days in Kashmir and for a number of these days I was even cut off from newspapers and other kinds of news. The very day I returned to Delhi I took

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Jayaprakash Narayan was at this time the President of the All India Railwaymen's Federation.
3. Jayaprakash wrote that he had discussed at all levels the problems faced by the railway employees. The people had waited for years for prices to decline and their hardships were real. Even private industries such as textiles gave twice as much dearness allowance as the Government. He wanted the representatives of the Federation to be called for talks.
4. Jayaprakash wrote that he had been shocked to hear that Nehru had written to a common friend that "I was going about the country abusing you.... but it is far from me to abuse anyone least of all you. If you consider criticism as abuse that is another matter. I hold that you are upholding, no doubt unwillingly, conservatism if not reaction in this country."
5. Jayaprakash replied on 25 July that he had in his recent speeches criticised Nehru strongly but not with bitterness or anger, nor on a personal level. It had become "a political duty to criticise, even to attack" Nehru, though it was painful to hurt him. He assured Nehru that his "love and regard for you are no less than before."

this matter up and issued my appeal. Of course, I could have done this before I went to Kashmir also. But the matter was being dealt with by Gopalaswami Ayyangar and other colleagues of mine and I felt that perhaps I would not help by barging in.

4. It is a little difficult for me in this letter to discuss the details of the railwaymen's demands, which you have already discussed fully with Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Deshmukh and others. You know that Gopalaswami Ayyangar has on past occasions gladly conferred with you and your colleagues of the A.I.R.F. In fact he has refused to discuss these matters with other organisations, because he thought that the A.I.R.F. was the principal railwaymen's organisation.⁶ Whether he agreed with you or not, he certainly wanted to agree and try to find a way out. It was in no unfriendly spirit that he has dealt with you in the past. In the present case, you will at least appreciate that certain vital financial considerations put a strict limit to our ambition. I think this was put to you when you met Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Deshmukh. We have to consider the whole picture and cannot upset the apple cart even when something desirable is suggested.

5. You may be right in suggesting some vital change in our social structure. But, in existing circumstances, we cannot suddenly change that structure and have to deal with the situation as it is. We cannot go beyond our resources, unless we give up something vital, such as a river valley scheme, or just take to printing currency notes without backing and thus bring about progressive inflation. Prices rise again and the condition of the worker is as bad as before or worse. All our economy and schemes for development are shattered.

6. Because of all these considerations, which no doubt were placed before you and your colleagues, we could not add much more than we did to the burden on the exchequer. The problem is a difficult one and it is possible that you may not accept the argument put before you, or you may have other solutions. But you will at least admit that the matter is not simple and is full of difficulty. A government has to consider not only that particular matter but innumerable other factors which may be influenced by any particular decision.

7. Only two or three days ago, you must have seen Liaquat Ali Khan's complaint about our massing troops.⁷ One need not attach too much importance to Pakistan's complaint, but the fact is that for sometime past things have been coming to a crisis in the relations of India and Pakistan. We had to give

6. Jayaprakash replied that the Railway Minister had never refused to deal with other organisations than the A.I.R.F. and it had been officially reported that he had done so. As rival unionism harmed both the labour and the employer, he urged the Government to settle this policy at the Cabinet level.

7. See *ante*, footnote No. 2, p. 311.

serious thought to this many weeks ago. We saw a dangerous trend developing and we came to the conclusion that there was a fair possibility of Pakistan suddenly attacking us. They had been preparing for this for a long time and they had whipped up their people by a virulent propaganda of hate. Anything could happen. We could not take any risks or at any rate avoidable risks, and so we prepared for proper defence, if attacked.

8. Take this single factor, which we had constantly in mind for sometime past. I do not suppose that you have had this in mind except during the last two days or so. Yet we had to consider other matters too in relation to this. I could mention many other things which we had to keep in mind also.

9. You refer to the Ordinance. Nobody likes an ordinance and I hope few persons like any action taken against a *bona fide* strike. But I do not understand how your Federation could expect Government to sit supinely and wait for a strike which might not only paralyse normal life all over the country but would also specially aggravate the food problem and weaken India so much at a critical time as to encourage Pakistan to invade it. I do not think any Government, including a socialist government, could take the risk of such a situation developing. If we have to take action, then surely that action should be effective. I do not myself see what alternative course we could adopt, after the strike had been resolved upon.⁸

10. I agree with you that such suppression of the strike would leave deep wounds which take a long time to heal. It is for this reason that the idea of the strike has distressed me very greatly. You accuse the Government of trying to suppress the strike. Surely the responsibility of the consequences must rest very largely with those who advise a strike in such circumstances. The alternative to Government in suppressing such a strike is for the Government to resign and hand over the government of the country to those who are responsible for the strike. Do you think that that would be in accordance with the wishes of the great majority of people in the country? Is it not true to say then that the Railwaymen's Federation, apart from the merits or demerits of its case, is bringing tremendous pressure on the community as a whole and trying to coerce it into doing something which it does not want to do or is incapable of doing?

11. You refer to the I.N.T.U.C. unions. It is true that some Congressmen are interested in them. But Government has, I believe, always tried to accept the largest union in any industry, whatever it might have been. I do not think

8. Jayaprakash replied that trade union opinion, except that of the I.N.T.U.C., was unanimous that "by denying arbitration on the one hand and banning the strike on the other you have struck a blow at the very foundations of collective bargaining and free trade unionism." He wrote that it was the accepted principle of free trade unionism that a strike could not be outlawed without offering the alternative of arbitration.

you are just or correct in describing the I.N.T.U.C. unions as merely company unions which cannot last a day without official support. I am not connected with them, but I know a number of these unions which are strong and independent. Would you call the Ahmedabad unions surviving merely because of Government support?⁹

12. I am sending your letter to Gopalaswami Ayyangar for his information. I am sure that he is always willing to discuss matters with your Federation.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. Jayaprakash replied that his views on the I.N.T.U.C. were not invalidated by the exception of the Ahmedabad Labour Association, one of the strongest labour unions in the country, which did not owe its strength to official support; but the I.N.T.U.C. could not take credit for building up this union. In spite of exceptions, he maintained that but for official support the I.N.T.U.C. unions could not last long.

4. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1951

My dear Jayaprakash,

Thank you for your long letter of the 25th July.² You will forgive me if I did not answer it in detail. This is partly because I cannot answer it in detail without a good deal of enquiry into various facts and circumstances, but chiefly because I am overwhelmed with work at present. This is not normal work but rather special work related to the Pakistan emergency and like matters.

I confess that I was mistaken when I said that the Railway Minister had refused to discuss these matters with other organisations. That was not a correct statement. But, so far as I know, he has dealt with the A.I.R.F. always as the principal railwaymen's organisation.

Sometimes we see individuals or groups without much reference to their representative capacity. I see almost anyone who wants to see me subject to time. The other day some railwaymen wanted to see me and I met them. I had absolutely no idea who they were. On meeting them I discovered that

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Jayaprakash Narayan suggested that Nehru should mediate in the dispute. "It would be a pity if such a stupendous labour unrest were merely sought to be put down by repression or just tided over by a few concessions."

they belonged to some G.I.P.R. Clerks Union, which was not associated with your A.I.R.F.

If the Railway Ministry is a party to the dispute, then the whole Government is equally a party and I am very much part of Government. Surely you make a difference between a private proprietor who stands personally to gain, and the State owning an industry.

You suggest that I should assume the role of a mediator between the Federation and the Railway Ministry. I do not see how I come in that way because the Railway Ministry has been frequently consulting me in this matter not only in Cabinet but separately. If one Department of Government separates itself from another and functions independently, then Government would go to pieces. You refer to Truman.³ I do not know if they have any major nationalised industries there. In the U.S., Truman steps in with regard to private industries.

I would gladly help in any way I can, but I cannot function as a mediator in that way as you suggest. Also it is physically impossible for me during these days to give a great deal of time and to go into the numerous details which have to be understood in this important and complicated matter. But where my presence or services can be helpful, I shall certainly try to find the time.

The situation in regard to Pakistan is very serious indeed. I cannot say definitely that there will be war soon, because I am not going to make a war. What the other party may do can only be guessed. But from what appears from Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches and other accounts from Pakistan, things are drifting very badly. Unfortunately some foreign governments and press have encouraged Pakistan so much in the past that it has become completely intransigent. My information is that one of the reasons why Pakistan has been behaving in this manner is their expectation of a general strike on the railways or, at any rate, serious labour trouble.⁴

Quite apart from other questions, I think that this grave situation necessitates that we should put aside our disputes and quarrels and make it clear that we face this grave external danger together. I should have thought that this by itself was adequate reason for the A.I.R.F. to call off completely the proposed railway strike.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Jayaprakash Narayan felt that under similar circumstances Truman would have assumed the role of a mediator.
4. Jayaprakash had written that "to be faced with the possibility of invasion and at the same time to allow such a vast labour dispute in such an important service to go unsettled" and allow its repression was "the height of unwisdom." If newspapers alone were relied upon, "a dozen wars with Pakistan should have taken place."

5. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
August 8, 1951

My dear Jayaprakash,

I have your letter of the 4th August.² I have also received a copy of a letter you have sent to Gopalaswami Ayyangar dated August 7th.

Your impression that I was anxious for a settlement was certainly correct. I would gladly do what I can to bring this about. But I cannot take the matter out of the hands of the Railway Ministry which is dealing with it and take charge of it myself. That, as I said to you before, is physically impossible for me for some time at least, because of the grave situation that has arisen in regard to Pakistan and certain other matters which absorb all my time. Apart from this, surely the best way I can help is to give my full cooperation to the Railway Ministry in any matter of principle that may be discussed. They are as much part of the Government as I am, and they are primarily responsible. But such help as I can give, I shall gladly give. I recognise entirely that Railways are of vital importance.

You ask me for a "detailed and definite" reply to various points that you have raised. These points not only involve principles but no doubt have to be considered in relation to many other matters. To consider them fully is to go deeply into the entire subject. No practical question of importance can be considered in vacuum, separated from other matters. If and when you discuss these matters with the Railway Ministry, I shall gladly try to make myself available, whenever I am needed.

You protest against my remarks about Pakistan being encouraged by the prospect of a railway strike in India.³ Those remarks have nothing to do with what your attitude or the attitude of the A.I.R.F. might be. I am sure that neither you nor the A.I.R.F. would like to encourage Pakistan in such a matter and that they would help in any national crisis. But what I said was that the Pakistan Government undoubtedly was encouraged by so much talk of a railway

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Jayaprakash asked whether in a nationalised industry all the rights and privileges should go to the State and the workers should have no share in them. "Whenever we raise an issue, we are told that the State cannot be treated on a par with private employers... Nationalisation of industry has little meaning if the status of the workers in such industry does not change."

3. Jayaprakash wrote: "If the Government of India has no faith in the loyalty and patriotism of its employees, I am sure the Pakistan Government has no illusions about them..." Reminding Nehru of A.I.R.F. policy he wrote: "You can stop the preparations for the strike by merely appealing to the men to postpone action in view of the Indo-Pakistan situation."

strike in India. Indeed I know this for a fact and I have had reports of it. That is quite natural for them. They are encouraged whenever they hear that we are in any kind of trouble, because they feel that weakens us in a conflict.

The situation vis-a-vis Pakistan is very serious. I cannot obviously say whether it is bound to lead to war, and if so, when. We shall do our utmost to avoid it. But we cannot control the other party. Unfortunately they have received a good deal of encouragement from foreign sources and this makes them even more irresponsible. In my last letter to you, I appealed to you to give up the idea of the strike because of this serious situation. In your letter to Gopalaswami Ayyangar you have clearly said that if the situation is a grave one, the railwaymen will stop the strike.⁴ I am glad you have taken up this clear attitude in this grave matter. I was sure that you would do so. Gopalaswami Ayyangar has sent you a telegram today with which I entirely agree.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The railwaymen's strike scheduled for 27 August was called off on 10 August by the All-India Railwaymen's Federation because of the food situation and the crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations.

6. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
August 30, 1951

My dear Jayaprakash,

I have just received your letter of the 30th August and your note on the railway strike which you intend to publish. This note runs into seven pages, but evidently there was another page or so to it which has been left out by mistake. However, that is a small matter.

I have no objection to your quoting in your note from my letters to you.

Yesterday I received a copy of the letter that you had sent to Gopalaswami Ayyangar. Some days ago I received your letter in which you criticised the passage in the President's Address regarding the Pay Commission's reference to dearness allowance. I did not send an answer to this as there was no particular point in arguing about it. I might, however, remove one misapprehension from your mind. That passage had nothing to do with our

1. J.N. Collection.

Railway Ministry, as you appear to have thought. That passage was incorporated at the instance of the Finance Ministry. When I received your letter, I sent it on to the Finance Minister who wrote to me at some length quoting from the Pay Commission's report and pointing out that the general interpretation put on it in the President's Address was justified.

May I say that it is quite wrong for Government to think or to say that by any action on their part they have won a victory over the railwaymen. That would be a wrong approach completely, just as I think it would be a wrong approach for the railwaymen to think or speak in terms of a victory over Government by any action of theirs. The right approach can only be for all of us to try in a cooperative way to find the way out. The railwaymen inevitably and rightly have to think of the subject as it relates to them; Government has to think of it also in terms of many other factors. Any Government must necessarily want to have the goodwill of the railwaymen. Nothing is achieved by what might be called strong action, as this always leaves behind a trail of bitterness and actually causes loss to all parties concerned. I can assure you that it was with extreme reluctance that our Government thought in terms of any such action.

The situation vis-a-vis Pakistan is still very obscure and difficult. It is anybody's guess what might happen. All one can say is that the next two months or so are rather critical. If we are successful in overcoming the crisis by November, it is possible that the tension might be eased a little. Of course, it would be far too optimistic to think that the tension or the crisis will disappear even then. All we can hope for is that it would tend to lessen.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

V. Attitude to Communists

1. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 25, 1951

My dear Rajaji,²

Some days ago I received a request from some members of the Communist Party who had come here to see me and you. My immediate reaction was to give them a date some days later, because I am always prepared to see anybody subject to time. I sent information of this to H.V.R. Iengar³ who suggested that I might wait for your return. Iengar has now written to say that you intend sending a reply which he has given.

I have little to say about this reply. I generally agree with it. But perhaps it is too categorical and beyond even the power of the Communist Party to do immediately. But the general line is clear enough and I agree with it.

Nevertheless, I feel that I should give them an interview as individuals. I do not remember having refused an interview to anybody, however bad he might be, if he has sought it and I would not like to break that rule. On seeing them, I would, more or less, take up the line that we could not deal with the Communist Party till it has dissociated itself publicly from violent action and more particularly from the crimes of violence that have been taking place under its inspiration in Telengana and other places.⁴ Further that there should be practical evidence of this.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Rajagopalachari was Minister for Home Affairs at this time.
3. Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
4. Throughout 1950 and 1951, violence continued in Telengana, Assam, Tripura and Manipur.

2. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 25, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

I have accepted your advice and had a message sent to the Communists.² A copy of this was sent to you.

I have no doubt that the Communist Party have been guilty of atrocious crimes and that we have to deal with it as such. Nevertheless, I feel that certain communal elements in India are far more dangerous to our unity and to any progress that we might hope to make, than the Communists. The Communists could never have brought about a situation which existed in Punjab or in Delhi in August-September-October 1947. We live on the verge of a repetition of that, though the situation is no doubt more in hand. Delhi is a special centre and the kind of activities that have been taking place in Delhi for sometime past are gradually working up to a very serious situation. The speeches that are delivered here by Hindu communal leaders are practically incitements to murder. Worse than this, the grossest vulgarity is indulged in and the basest passions of the mob pandered to. Yet we meet these people and their leaders in a friendly way. If war comes between India and Pakistan, Pakistan will be largely responsible. But certainly a considerable share of that responsibility will rest with the communalists in India.

We have had some evidence that communal organisations receive indirect support and sympathy from the U.K. and U.S.A. officials here. I have little doubt in my mind that this is so. To what extent, it is difficult to judge. Indeed the U.K. and U.S.A. intelligence and propaganda system in India is widespread. We keep a close watch on the Russians and the Chinese, as we should. But our innate bias makes us relax and become unwary of U.S.A. and U.K. activities here.

I think that some of the old rulers of the Indian States, whom we have provided with ample funds for mischief, are likely to play their full part, given the chance. We know a great deal of what they did in 1947 and 1948. Baroda was a fool and got caught. He was not intelligent enough for much mischief. There are others who are much cleverer.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Nehru had sent a message (not printed) on 24 July 1951 that he was not prepared to meet representatives of the Communist Party because the party had encouraged, notably in the Telengana area, the worst kind of crime. However, he was prepared to meet individuals in their personal capacity if they gave evidence of their dissociation from violent activities.

The fairly rapid growth of communal atmosphere in Delhi and elsewhere cannot be due just to a succession of incidents. The whole thing appears to me to be well-organised. It is supported by ample funds and it is tolerated largely by a positive or an unconscious element of communalism in many of us.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
August 5, 1951

My dear Gopalaswami,

A few days ago, I consented to meet a Communist (he is an M.L.A. from Bengal) and I had a talk with him. He was chiefly interested in the elections to come. But in the course of our conversation, he discussed the Hyderabad situation. He said that they were eager to stop all trouble there, but they did not quite know how to do this, as many of their men were being hunted all over the place. Sometimes they had to take action in self-defence.

I did not say much to him, but I told him that he could not expect Government to deal with the Communist Party or with the Telengana people after all that the latter had done. There could be no question of any kind of deal or agreement with them. They should lay down their arms and then it would not be necessary for our police or military to take any action. He said that they would be prepared to give up their arms provided they felt that they would not be shot down afterwards. If there was this apprehension, then they would naturally keep their arms for self-defence.

I did not argue with him at all. But I felt this difficulty in my mind. How are we to deal with those people? I suppose there are long lists of them with our police. To expect them to give up their arms when there is a fair chance of their being shot down or some like fate coming to them, is to expect something that is not likely to take place. I am not at all clear in my mind how we can deal with such a situation.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

4. To P.A. Wadia¹

New Delhi

August 10, 1951

Dear Professor Wadia,²

I have your letter of the 3rd August.³ Normally, we have no objection to people going to Moscow or any other place for any serious work. Our experience, however, has been that these conferences are meant almost solely for political propaganda. We are all, I hope, in favour of peace, but I have found that some peace conferences talk more of war than of peace and add to the tension. They attack others so violently that the ultimate result is perhaps to increase the war atmosphere.

At the present moment of growing tension in the world, we have to be as careful as possible not to add to this atmosphere of hatred and mutual recrimination. I am therefore not particularly anxious to encourage our people going to such conferences, even though their ostensible aim is peace or the study of some serious subject. The International Economic Conference, to which you refer and which is going to be held in Moscow from the 1st October, is likely to be very much a one-way affair and dominated by one set of opinion.

However, I do not wish to come in the way of your sending some representatives to this Conference. But I suggest that only a very restricted number of neutral and independent people should be sent. If you are going, we can have no objection and, if I may say so, if people like you go, there will be no objection. There is no question of discrimination, but there are some persons whom, for a variety of reasons, we do not wish to go abroad because we think their visit abroad is likely to be harmful at this juncture. That is an individual matter.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia (1878-1970); taught philosophy and economics, Wilson College, Bombay, 1913-1943; author of *Wealth of India*.
3. Wadia who was the convenor of the Indian Preparatory Committee set up by the India Peace Council for the Moscow Economic Conference, sought passports for the Indian delegates to attend this conference scheduled for April 1952.
4. On 7 August, Nehru consulted Radhakrishnan, India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, about the conference. He replied on 9 August that the conference was being organised with the object of forging economic cooperation and fighting the U.S. legislation which threatened to penalise the countries which traded with the Soviet Union, East Europe and China. He thought that leading businessmen from India, if sent, could gather valuable information about Soviet planning.

5. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi

September 11, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

A few days ago I received a letter from Asaf Ali enclosing a copy of a letter dated 28th August, 1951, from him to you.² This related to a circular which had been issued from the Intelligence Bureau section of our Home Ministry and dealt with students and how to keep them in order.

On receiving this letter I sent for the circular in question. This has now reached me.

I confess to a feeling of shock on reading this circular. The whole approach appears to me so entirely misconceived as to amount almost to a crime. Any student with a spark of life in him would react violently against the methods suggested in the circular. In fact, these methods are more likely to produce indiscipline and make students go to communism than any appeal from the Communist Party.

I have tried to think of what the reaction on me would have been when I was a student. People have changed since then no doubt, but still the normal urges and passions remain the same. So, I suppose that a present-day student would not be very different in this respect from the students of my generation. What amazes me still more is the complete lack of intelligence shown in issuing such a circular. Policemen are excellent in their proper place, but they are completely out of place in other places. After reading this circular, the first idea that struck me was that if policemen have to meddle with these affairs, they should be given a course of instruction in political, economic and like matters. That, I suppose, is difficult. Perhaps if they had that course of instruction, they might cease to be good policemen.

For our Intelligence service to issue circulars about guardians of students being asked to give undertakings to the effect that their wards should not take part in political activities appears to me so extraordinary as to be almost past belief. This is an insult to the guardian as well as to the student and it can only result in either driving the student to wrong courses or to his moral subservience and degradation. I would object to this even if it emanated from

1. File No. 7/18/51-Poll., M.H.A.

2. In a circular dated 7 October 1950, sent to all Chief Secretaries, the Home Ministry, without the knowledge of the Home Minister, had drawn attention to certain suggestions, emanating from a conference of Central and State intelligence officials held in April 1950, for countering subversion in schools and colleges. Seeing the suggestions, some of which related to spying on parents and guardians, Asaf Ali, Governor of Orissa, asked both Rajagopalachari and Nehru: "Was the Intelligence Bureau going to decide education policies?"

an educational authority. Coming from the police or the C.I.D. it is infinitely worse.

The advice given by policemen that lectures should be imparted to students advising them to keep away from communism is interesting. Have we come to this that policemen are in charge of our education and how to influence young people's minds?

C.I.D.s are asked to keep a careful watch over teachers and management of schools.³ I do not know of any country outside the Communist fold, or perhaps Franco's Spain, where any such thing is suggested or done. The more I see of the police outlook in matters outside the strict scope of the police, the more I am frightened at its utter lack of intelligence and at the dangerous results which it might produce.

I see that the Home Secretary sent a copy of this secret circular to various Chief Secretaries and asked for their views on it. In the covering letter some doubt was thrown on the desirability of the suggestions made in the circular. The curious fact is mentioned that the circular had emanated as a result of consultations among senior police officers without the knowledge of the Government of India.⁴ Are police officers free to issue circulars of this or any kind relating to students or educational institutions? What business have they to interfere with education about which they know little or nothing?

I am greatly disturbed about all this.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. One of the measures suggested was that the C.I.D.s should keep a careful watch over teachers and management of schools for any adverse activities and report them to Government for action.
4. Rajagopalachari replied that he entirely disapproved of the circular but added that there was "nothing wrong in the Government being informed of what the intelligence officials had proposed, whatever we may think of the suggestions themselves."

6. On Release of Communist Detenus¹

This matter appears to have been considered more on a theoretical basis than a practical one. The practical approach would have been for us to be told how many of the forty or so Communist detenus in the Bihar prison can, in the

1. Note to Ministry of Home, 23 September 1951. J.N. Collection.

opinion of the Bihar Government, be safely released. After this, the question would have remained as to whether, in existing circumstances, the remaining detenus should continue in detention.

2. No indication of this kind is given, so far as I can find out. The sole approach has been as to whether all of them should be released *en bloc* or not. It is true that the Home Ministry suggested the examination of the individual merits of each case which amounts more or less to what I have suggested above.²

3. I do not attach very much importance to any written assurances given by the Communist detenus, though they may have some value. I do not like the idea of asking for such guarantees. To be asked to give up violence completely seems to me unreal. Few persons, even other than Communists, can honestly give this undertaking, unless they happen to be professional pacifists. Everybody has some idea of communist ideology which includes in its scope an insurrection. I do not think that basically the Democratic Socialists' ideology even differs from this, except that for them this is a theory and for the Communists it may be a practical step if circumstances seem favourable.

4. I think that there can be little doubt that the communist movement in India has taken a turn away from violence.³ This turn may be temporary and it may not be complete. But the turn is there and is likely to last for some little time. The question then arises whether we should consider this turn adequate for a general release or decide to hold on to persons who, we think, are dangerous, indefinitely.

5. My own inclination would be to release as large a number of persons as possible, but keep a few persons who have a really bad record. Not knowing the facts of each case, I cannot give any more precise indication. It may be that, applying my test, thirty out of the forty might be released and ten would still continue in detention. (These figures are hypothetical). I would watch events then and if there was a continuous improvement in the situation vis-a-vis the Communists, I might gradually release the others in ones and twos.

2. The Home Ministry had on 9 July 1951 stated: "There can be no question of releasing Communist detenus merely for the sake of enabling them to take part in the elections. The sole question in considering the release of any detenu would be whether the grounds for which he was detained have ceased to be valid. Equally, there would be no question of withdrawing warrants of detention issued against persons who are underground, if the reasons for the issue of the warrants continue to be valid."
3. On 17 September 1951, the Communist Party declared that it would give up violence and participate in the democratic process of the country, if the Preventive Detention Act and the repressive policy against the party were withdrawn. Soon after the ban on the Communist Party was lifted.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

6. There would appear to be two approaches to this problem of containing communist activities in India. One would be to deal with it in as wholesale a manner as we can manage and detain every person who is suspected of dangerous activities. In effect this would mean, as it has meant in the past, very large numbers in detention. The other course is to release as large a number as possible, keeping only a few, who are considered particularly bad, in detention.

7. There are already a large number of Communists freed either by governmental or judicial action. The first course therefore cannot be followed. I do not suppose that in these circumstances a few more or less in prison make much difference.

8. Communism is, of course, not a thing which can be curbed by police methods only. Police methods become necessary when there is dangerous activity. Otherwise, we have to meet communism on a different plane and by different methods. Ultimately, a decision has to be taken on practical grounds and not on theory. So far as I know (my knowledge is limited), the Bihar Communists are relatively of a milder variety.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

VI. Rehabilitation

1. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi

September 22, 1951

My dear Ajit Prasad,²

Thank you for your letter of September 21, in answer to my letter of the 20th.

I quite realise the difficulties you are facing in regard to evacuee property cases. These difficulties are inherent in the situation and they have to be faced. Personally I am not at all affected by the kind of agitation that has been raised against the Cabinet decisions in the three cases you mention. I am quite clear that those decisions were right and I am prepared to defend them in public, if necessary. I have no sympathy at all for this kind of agitation or the motive that lies behind it. We have to act justly and I am sure that this will produce the right results in the end. In acting justly, of course, we should not act rashly. All this business of refugees looking at Muslim property in India as potentially theirs is pernicious nonsense and the sooner this is made clear, the better. This is against all domestic or international law and much more so against equity. I do not know how we have got into this tangle and why we are submitting to this kind of approach.

The fact of the matter is that, in spite of all our efforts, Muslims in India generally have a strong feeling of insecurity. We complain a great deal about the insecurity of the Hindus in East Pakistan. But we shut our eyes to the same conditions, though on a similar scale, in regard to Muslims in India. I had been horrified by the accounts of what has happened in Hyderabad State and elsewhere. The fact that 18 months ago a very large number of Muslims left their homes and lands in the U.P. and Rajasthan and went to Pakistan was not only significant but a painful reminder of the conditions in which Muslims live in parts of India. We can find excuses for all this and give reasons, but the fact remains that they felt insecure and had to go. Today, probably hundreds of Muslims are leaving almost daily for Pakistan across Rajasthan border. They are doing so without any help and in spite of all kinds of difficulties. In our self-complacency we do not seem to appreciate the significance of all this. But the world sees it and judges us accordingly.

It is not governmental action that causes this, though sometimes it encourages it. This is, no doubt, due to a multitude of factors which go to make the Muslims feel unhappy and insecure in India. He is frustrated and down and out to a large extent. Public feeling is against him and treats him as a potential enemy, whatever his previous record of service. It has been a matter of the greatest pain to me that many Muslims who played a brave part

1. J.N. Collection.

2. He was Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation at this time.

in our national struggle and throughout their lives opposed the Muslim League, cannot find help or relief from us and are hounded out by communal persons, who have never done a day's service in the cause of the country or of freedom. I do not see why I should put up with it, whether the public likes it or not.

It is clear to me that the present hierarchy of the custodian etc., not only functions, as Government departments function, mechanically and without any human touch, but is also basically anti-Muslim in its outlook. That is not surprising, because they reflect the public mind. Sometimes they go much beyond it. If we see this kind of thing even in the Congress, how much more is it likely to be found in other quarters.

I have mentioned the Congress and I have constant complaints, as you know, that a majority in some places has squeezed out the minority. Applying that to this larger question the majority, inflamed with communal passion and greed of property, wants to squeeze out the minority. The administrative apparatus and tribunals that we have provided try generally to function in terms of the law. But their sympathy and urges all pull in one direction, whether they are refugees or not. There may be individual exceptions.

If this is so, then, both in the interests of justice and in the larger interests of the nation, it becomes essential that we should provide some means of bringing the personal and the human touch to the problem. That touch does not help much in the end and if it helps it helps only a few cases. But, nevertheless, it makes a difference for it makes people feel that they are treated like human beings and not like robots or as impersonal pieces of property. It is because of this that I meet many of them, whether they are Hindu refugees or Muslims in trouble, and try at least to give that human touch. I am a little ashamed that I cannot help them much. But I think that the few words that I say to them as gently as I can, does help a little.

We have, therefore, to find and to encourage this human touch, apart from the official machinery. We have to make the persons feel that we are interested in their individual welfare apart from our general impersonal approach. Obviously this cannot be done on a large scale. Still it is worthwhile doing it on a small scale.

I do not particularly fancy our dealing with the Jamiat³ as an official body representing Muslims and yet what is the individual Muslim to do. He is frightened of offices and of officers and he has little approach to them. He sends letters and he gets entangled in the intricacies of the law he does not

3. Founded in 1919 by orthodox Muslim divines, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind wielded considerable influence on nationalist Muslims and worked in close association with the Congress. In April 1947 at the Lucknow session, the Jamiat, decided to abjure politics and to confine itself to religious and cultural uplift work among the Muslims.

understand. Often he is given short shrift by the persons he sees. It is natural, therefore, for him to go to somebody or some organisation which might be able to help him.

Consider the case of a trade union. Old-fashioned employers object to any organised approach to them and want every worker to go to them separately. As the workers know, this approach does little good. So I can understand and appreciate the Jamiat functioning on behalf of people. We may not recognise the Jamiat as such. But there is no reason why we should not take advantage of some Jamiat official or member to rectify mistakes that might have been made. It is quite clear that the individual approach of the sufferer will seldom yield results, because he will get entangled with the lower ranks of officialdom. The higher officials cannot have the time to see so many people. But a higher official can see an intelligent person who can draw his attention to such cases. That really should be helpful from our point of view.

So far as I am concerned, I keep open door to any person who comes to me. I cannot see everybody personally, but I try to see as many as I can. Every morning there is a small crowd at my house. Many letters come to me. I pass them on to various Secretaries and ask them to interview these people who complain. If there is anything in the complaint, I pass it on to the Ministry concerned. This does not mean that I wish to interfere with the discretion of the Ministry. It means that I wish to draw attention to a particular case or matter which might not have had that particular attention paid to it previously.

If Hifzur Rahman⁴ wants to see me, I have to give him time as I give time to others. In fact, I try to make time for him and for his like, just as I try to make time for refugees. I do not think that I am seeing the Jamiat or any organisation, but that I am seeing a particular individual (who happens to be an old colleague also) who brings to my notice cases which might otherwise go by default. Seeing him I pass his complaint on to one of my Secretaries and request him to make enquiries. So in this roundabout way it goes to your Ministry and takes up your Ministry's time as well as my Secretary's. The simpler course was obviously to short circuit this and, therefore, I suggested that Hifzur Rahman need not come to me at all but see my P.P.S. and where there was any matter worth enquiring into my P.P.S. and Hifzur Rahman could meet your Secretary and dispose of the matter. I see no harm in this procedure, not only in the case of Hifzur Rahman but in any other case.

4. (1901-1962); writer; took active part in Khilafat movement, 1919; member, A.I.C.C., since 1936; General Secretary, All India Jamiat-ul-Ulema, since 1942; Vice-President, U.P.C.C., 1946-51; Member, Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu and All India Muslim Educational Conference; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-62.

I am terribly busy now and work till late at night. Nevertheless, I found time to see Moulana Husain Ahmed Madani⁵ this evening. He came with a story of misfortune. It is a case which has been reported to your Ministry. Nevertheless, I listened to him at length and asked him for a full note from him which I shall, no doubt, forward to you later on. Law and rules apart, I had a strong impression that the man (he came also) had suffered unjustly for long.

I have one or two other matters which you have sent me and which I have not had time to go into. I shall deal with them, I hope, soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Prominent leader of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind.

2. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1951

My dear Ajit Prasad,

... It seems to me that the whole conception of the Custodian-General's Office has somehow become perverted and the Custodian-General and his subordinates appear to think that they are protecting the property of, or for, the displaced persons. As a matter of fact, applying the analogy of the Custodian of Enemy Property, the Custodian-General is a trustee for the original owners and he must primarily guard their interests.

Achhru Ram² talks about the "rule of law". The rule of law includes the rule of equity. This is normally so. But, in regard to evacuee property this is very particularly so, because the evacuee property law is an abnormal, unusual and special law for special circumstances. It has, therefore, to be applied with great care and special attention has to be paid always to see that equities are maintained and no injustice is done. In such matters a strict interpretation of the law regardless of equity or justice is completely indefensible.

I have referred to a comparison with the Custodian of Enemy Property. That might have some distant bearing on the property of those who have

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Achhru Ram, the Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, had refused to abide by the directions of the Government to restore by an executive order the property of an emigre, Mohammad Din Chhatriwala, who had returned from Pakistan. Alleging interference in his work, he resigned on 20 September 1951.

finally departed for Pakistan and live there. It has no bearing at all in regard to people who continue to live here and who are presumably Indian nationals, though they may have made some technical breach of the law. We have to protect Indian nationals and any law which harasses them has to be interpreted as widely as possible to prevent such harassment. This is not only the policy of Government, but it is natural justice and even an obligation.

In the particular matter which has given rise to this conflict with the Custodian-General, there was no doubt at all about the intention of the legislature and of the Government which sponsored the legislation. Not only assurances were given on the floor of the House but the mere fact that the new law laid down a certain rule to be observed indicated clearly enough what the legislature wanted. The fact that by inadvertence this was not given retrospective effect should not be allowed to be used for a perversion of justice.

In a temporary law, like the Evacuee Property Law, dealing with a particular situation, while we should not interfere normally with the discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial authorities, it is essential that Government should have the final word in any particular case where it feels that public policy or injustice are involved. Judges act within the four corners of the law. But a government has to consider other matters too, which are equally important. It may be said that a government should change the law. This may take time and it is not right that injustice should take place because of that delay. Apart from this, the law may be generally good and yet there may be hard cases. These hard cases have to be dealt with then by Government separately. This means no disrespect to the judiciary, just as an act of clemency by Government in a criminal case means no disrespect to the judge.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
September 29, 1951

My dear Prakasa²,

I have read your report³ on Assam. It is very interesting, but I find great difficulty in agreeing with some of your conclusions or recommendations. Most of these related to the future. The future is too uncertain for us to plan

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Minister of Natural Resources and Scientific Research at this time.

3. See footnote No. 2 on the next page.

for it in this way. We are short of funds for the most urgent schemes of development. We can hardly think in terms of providing for millions of additional displaced persons at the cost of stopping every kind of development in India.

I have written a note⁴ which I have sent to Ajit Prasad. I enclose a copy of that note.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. See the next item.

4. Note on Rehabilitation in Assam¹

The first few lines of this report² surprised me. These state that the President was pleased to appoint a committee etc. I had no idea that the President had appointed this committee and I do not understand why he should have been asked to do so. The Rehabilitation Committee of the Cabinet decided to request Shri Sri Prakasa, assisted by two others, to visit Assam and report on rehabilitation of displaced persons. This kind of thing is frequently done without the intervention of the President. I do not know who is responsible for bringing the President into the picture and thus giving a certain formal character to an entirely informal proceeding. This creates a certain difficulty. Normally we received such reports frequently. They are secret documents and are considered by the Cabinet or the Ministry concerned. There is no question of their publication. Now because of a formal resolution of Government and the President appointing a committee, it might well be expected that the report should be published.

1

1. Note to A.P. Jain, New Delhi, 29 September 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. Sri Prakasa stated that 12½ million Hindus from East Bengal would come to India. Of these 2½ million had already come and the remaining ten million would come soon. The Government of India should allot one million to each State for rehabilitation. The Assam Government should integrate the work of rehabilitation of East Bengal refugees and their landless labour as part of the same scheme. Only one million refugees should be allotted to Assam, and the tribal people of hills and plains should have the first priority. The Central Government should assign a sum of Rs 20 crores to Assam for rehabilitation. When displaced persons went to Assam they should become Assamese.

2. I am quite clear that the report should not be made public and should be treated, as such reports are normally treated, as a confidential document for our consideration. I would have been of this opinion anyhow, regardless of the contents of the report. The contents confirm this opinion. The references in the report to the probability of practically all the Hindus from East Pakistan coming over to India are likely, if published, to create considerable excitement and even affect our relations with Pakistan. This would also make the condition of the Hindus in East Pakistan possibly worse and they will be induced to migrate more than ever. This fact alone is enough to make us decide that the report should not be published.

3. Personally I do not agree with Shri Sri Prakasa when he says that ten million Hindus more will come out of Pakistan. I would go further and say that just cannot happen. If anything approaching it happened, long before that other very serious developments would take place, including possible war with Pakistan. What the consequences of that might be, I do not know. But it is absolutely clear to me that this process of elimination of Hindus in eastern Pakistan cannot take place rapidly without bringing about other and very serious consequences.

4. The analysis given by Shri Sri Prakasa about the state of Hindus in East Bengal is, by and large, correct. There will always be a tendency for some Hindus to come away. This tendency will grow or lessen, depending upon the Indo-Pakistan relationship.

5. It is interesting to see the figures of migrations during the last eighteen months or so. There was a big exodus in February-March-April of 1950. After the April 1950 Agreement, this gradually died down and a reverse process came in to play. A very large number of Hindus went back to East Pakistan from West Bengal and Assam. Some three or four months back this process of going back stopped and again there was an excess of migrants from eastern Pakistan to India. This can be explained in many ways, but certainly a war-scare was one of the causes. It is interesting to note that latterly there has been no such excess and a certain balance is being kept up in spite of a continuing fear of war.

6. I am therefore led to think that while Shri Sri Prakasa's analysis is correct in so far as it goes, he has not taken into consideration many other factors which produce a contrary result. Probably one of the basic factors is economic. What is likely to happen in the future is not a large exodus, unless something big and dramatic happens as between India and Pakistan, but a continuous trickle. In the same way there has been a continuous exodus from India to Pakistan across Rajasthan. Various economic causes contribute to this. Essentially it is a feeling of insecurity among the Hindus of eastern Pakistan and the Muslims of northern India which drives them to the other country. It is worth remembering that throughout the past two years or so

there has been an average daily exodus of Muslims across Rajasthan amounting to 450 a day. This has sometimes gone over a thousand mark. I believe that in all over 3,00,000 Muslims have passed this way. That is a considerable number and it should make us think rather furiously about the condition of the Muslim minority in India.

7. My conclusion therefore is:

- (1) That no very large-scale sudden exodus need be considered in the present context, unless some big crisis intervenes.
- (2) Even if the big crisis came up suddenly, that itself would physically stop the exodus.
- (3) A small exodus will continue.
- (4) In no event should we think in terms of millions. If ever such numbers started moving, there would probably be war.

8. I would not therefore give any thought to the possibility of having to provide for these vast numbers coming over in the future. I might think of some additional number, say 50,000 or at the most 100,000, no more.

9. As I conceive the problem of rehabilitation, we should concentrate on those who have actually come over and not get lost in the possibilities of the future, although we might bear in mind a certain addition, as indicated above. The problem today is to settle properly those who have actually come over in the course of the last few years.

10. If we look at this problem in this way, it becomes manageable and we can deal with it. Otherwise it is overwhelming. The money required also is wholly beyond our means. Shri Sri Prakasa calculates that we should provide for a million people in Assam at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per family. He arrives thus at a sum of Rs. 20 crores. I do not think we need approach this question in this way and indeed we cannot find the 20 crores. It is not a question of 20 crores only but ten times that much if we took Bengal also into consideration. Manifestly we cannot do this and some other solution will have to be found.

11. Shri Sri Prakasa suggests that the money we spend should be handed over in a lump sum or on an ad hoc basis to the Assam Government who should have full control over it subject to the usual checks and audits. I hardly think it will be practicable or desirable. To some extent and in regard to individual schemes this might be done. But, generally speaking, it seems to me undesirable to give any provincial government free play with money for rehabilitation. This is becoming more and more of a specialised and expert work intimately allied, I hope, to development plans. It can only be properly organised from the Centre in cooperation with the Planning Commission. These remarks apply to all States, most of whom are in financial difficulties and are apt to divert funds to other purposes, or at any rate to some schemes of rehabilitation which are not in keeping with our general idea on the subject.

12. In Assam there is an additional difficulty. The Government is inexperienced and unfortunately is reluctant to profit by other people's experience. We have sent them competent officers but they have not been liked because they were outsiders. The Finance Department of Assam was till lately in a hopeless mess. As a result of this, our Finance Ministry became very chary of helping Assam because they felt that the money would not be properly utilised. Assam, more than any other State, requires both financial help and expert guidance.

13. It is perfectly true that the formalities that have to be undergone in making grants etc., are formidable and legitimate complaints can be made about them. Perhaps those formalities can be lessened or made simpler. But, in the present state of affairs at least, it is very difficult to hand over large sums of money for indeterminate objects to a government which is far from efficient.

14. I think that the immediate approach to the problem of rehabilitation should be, as I have said above, to make proper provision for the displaced persons at present in Assam. The Central Government should help in this in every way because the burdens on the Assam Government are very great and their calamities have no end.

15. As I have said above, I think Shri Sri Prakasa's report should be kept secret and not given publicity. It should be placed before the next meeting of the Rehabilitation Committee of the Cabinet.

5. To C.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi

September 30, 1951

My dear Trivedi,²

I got your telephone message last night, in which you indicated that while you agreed with the general lines suggested by me, you doubted the advisability of your issuing a public statement. Perhaps you are right. But I found it difficult in Ludhiana today not to say something about a subject which was being continually mentioned to me.³

I had a fairly long talk with the Commissioner and the District Magistrate. Both of them said that people were very hard hit by the trade depression and

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Governor of the Punjab.

3. See *ante*, p. 100.

other factors and this recovery of loans especially from the urban people was in some cases bringing them to the verge of ruin. They were totally unable to pay and their property was attached. The Commissioner made a difference between urban property and rural property and thought that the rural people could pay this year, although he doubted if they would be able to pay next year. He was therefore in favour of a good deal of relaxation in regard to the urban people, but he thought that we should recover the advances from the rural people this year. If we did not do so this year, probably we will not be able to do so later. He added however that people in the border areas also deserved some sympathy.

Later I addressed a meeting of a very large number of so-called Congress workers and in the afternoon a huge public meeting. I referred to this question of loans at both and pointed out the difficulty of a general postponement even in the case of urban loans. But I said that I would be prepared to recommend a liberal policy to meet hard cases, especially in urban areas.

I think this is the least we can do in the circumstances. The picture that the Commissioner and the District Magistrate gave me about the condition of these people was disturbing. I hope you will be able to follow this suggestion.

The Commissioner spoke to me about the border areas and the necessity of helping them much more than had been done. He referred specially to the lack of schools there and bad communications. Even the Dera Baba Nanak Road, which was very important, was in a bad state. Border towns like Ferozepur were decaying. Ferozepur had been specially hit by the floods. There was no rebuilding or even repairs.

He also said that it would be worthwhile to be more generous in giving arms licences to the people of the border, taking care of course to give it to the right persons. There were many reliable persons who did not possess them and who might have them. As, however, only a certain quota was given, many good people were left out.

The Commissioner referred to the landlord-and-tenant problem which was causing a great deal of distress, as old tenants were being dispossessed. He referred specially to Mamdot's Estate. I remember writing about this repeatedly to Dr. Gopichand. It seemed to me then that it was very unfair to push out old tenants because somebody else had to be established.

The Commissioner also mentioned that there was no proper accommodation at the border for the border police etc.

My visit to Ludhiana was successful as far as such visits go. The crowds were enormous and there was considerable enthusiasm. I mentioned, among other things, that I was not prepared to have vague and roving inquiries into charges and counter-charges. But, in the normal course, if any specific charge was brought to Government's notice, they would no doubt have a private

investigation.⁴ If this yielded adequate results, then other steps would be taken. So far as the Congress was concerned, they were not concerned with this matter in this way. All they could do was that in selecting candidates, they would try to judge on the facts before them.

Dr. Gopichand, as usual with him, cannot make up his mind and is continually consulting various colleagues of his. I am afraid he will do himself no good.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. See *post*, pp. 741-742.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

VII. The Food Problem

1. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
August 4, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,
Thank you for your letter of August 2nd.²

As regards the food situation, I realise that it has suffered greatly from recent happenings in Assam.³ I feel, however, that your Government is not relying on its own resources as much as it ought to. We have become rather slack because we think that foreign food has come or is coming. This is a very dangerous attitude of mind. It is quite essential for us to do our utmost to procure food in the State concerned. After all Assam had a big surplus a year ago. There is no reason why it should become so terribly deficit as is made out, in spite of floods, etc.

You refer to some areas where food is scarce and purchasing power has gone down. In such areas assistance must be certainly given by public works and even by distribution of free food. This will come out of the Earthquake Relief Fund.

As you know, our Food Minister will be visiting your State soon⁴ and will give every help he can. But he has to bear in mind the all-India situation which continues to be difficult.⁵

I am afraid it is not possible for the Government of India to add to the subsidy they are giving for food. We have gone to the utmost limit already.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(101)/50-PMS.
2. Bisnuram Medhi wrote about the acute food shortage in his State owing to the floods. As the purchasing power of the people had gone down the Government had to sell foodgrains at a rate much below cost. He wanted the Government of India to bear at least 50 per cent of the loss.
3. Assam faced serious problems because of the return of about one lakh Muslim emigres and inflow of about 50,000 Hindu refugees from East Bengal into the State.
4. K.M. Munshi visited Assam from 19 August to 23 August 1951.
5. The crisis arising from natural disasters had compelled the Government to postpone its programme of attaining self-sufficiency in food by December 1951 to March 1952, after which food would be imported only to meet any grave emergency.

2. To Thakur Das Bhargava¹

New Delhi
September 5, 1951

My dear Thakur Dasji,

The Cabinet considered today your Vanaspati Bill,² and the position, as it obtains now, was explained to them both by me and by the Food Minister. I told them what you had said.³ After some discussion, we were clearly of opinion that it would not be right to refer the Bill to a select committee because this does involve acceptance, to a large extent, of the principle of dehydrogenation which Government cannot accept in the circumstances. As you told me, the committee appointed for the purpose has made some progress and presented an interim report. It can go ahead on the lines of this report and, meanwhile, the committee can further investigate methods of preventing adulteration. It would be unfair to the House if we appointed a select committee now and later said that we did not accept the principle of dehydrogenation.

The Cabinet also was of opinion that Seth Govind Das's Bill for the Amendment of the Penal Code in regard to cow slaughter could not be accepted and should not be referred to a select committee. It involves a new and far-reaching principle for the whole of India and this was even considered to be in contravention of our Constitution.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32 (195)/49-PMS.
2. Thakur Das Bhargava had moved a Bill in Parliament on 26 February 1951 for the prohibition of manufacture and import of hydrogenated vegetable oils. It was considered in Parliament on 6 September 1951.
3. Bhargava had said in Parliament that *vanaspati* had become a term of contempt.

3. To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja¹

New Delhi
October 29, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

Your letter of the 27th October. I am distressed to learn of the food situation in Madras. I understand however that there has been some slight improvement owing to recent rains.

1. File No. 31(94)/50-PMS.

The Centre will certainly help you as much as it can, but I confess that I do not understand people advising us continually to import more and more rice from abroad. We are getting the utmost we can get and continually trying to get more. Far from the Burma rice crop having been good this year, the Burmese Prime Minister told me that it was below their expectations. Indeed he wanted us to permit him to reduce the quota allotted to us. I did not agree with this. This itself shows that there is not much room for an increase in that quota. I argued this matter with the Burmese Prime Minister and told him of our grave difficulties.

You tell me of the widespread discontent in Madras because of the short supply of rice. I am sorry I can do nothing in this matter and the sooner people realise it, the better. We shall do our best for you, but we simply cannot supply you with the normal quantity of rice required by you. It is no good deluding ourselves or the public. If a thing is not available anywhere, no amount of discontent will make it available. I suppose we shall have to learn through the hard school of experience that food habits must be changed, when necessity demands it. You point out that next year might be yet more difficult. We should certainly plan ahead. But no amount of planning can enable us to get the quantity of rice from abroad which might be required here. The real planning should be in terms of changing the food habits. Every country in Europe has been forced to do that during the war and after. We cannot long live in an unreal world which does not take cognisance of the facts of the situation.

I am sending your letter to the Food Minister and we shall do our best to help you. But I do wish your Government and the people of Madras to realise what the situation is and not imagine that it is due to any lapse on our part that we cannot get or provide more rice. I like rice myself, but I gave up eating it long ago.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
VIII. The Kosi Project

1. The Kosi Project¹

When I went to Nepal and Bihar, the subject of taking up the Kosi project was repeatedly brought up before me. In Nepal it was implied that the money set aside for this project, i.e. two crores, might possibly fade away because of financial stringency in Nepal, if some beginnings were not made with this project.

2. In Bihar I flew over the entire area, flying low, and got a good impression both of the proposed sites for the dam, barrage etc., and also of the flood area. Subsequently I discussed this thoroughly with maps and charts with the Bihar people. Previously, I had considered this matter also on many occasions. But this time I went more thoroughly into it. I looked upon it not merely as an important project, but more so from the point of view of near famine conditions in Bihar and the necessity for providing work. The Bihar Government had started some kind of petty capital schemes for providing employment,² but they were all rather small and most of them were being stopped on account of the monsoon. The idea of a major scheme, which could employ a considerable number of men and women, appealed to them very much. Apart from this, the Kosi, as its very name implies, has become the cursed river and has produced a complex all over that part of Bihar.³ I was appealed to in the most earnest terms to start some kind of work there, even though it might be on a relatively small scale. This, it was said, would have a powerful reaction all over Bihar and, more especially, over that vast area affected by the Kosi. It would, psychologically, affect the famine situation too. During the monsoon probably not much work could be provided, but immediately after it could absorb a considerable number of persons.

3. I made it clear to the Bihar Government that it was not possible for me to make any commitment in regard to Central funds, but I realised the tremendous psychological importance, apart from practical benefits, of this

1. Note to Finance Minister, New Delhi, 4 July 1951. File No. 17(201)/50-PMS. Extracts.
2. The Bihar Government had initiated building and construction works, which provided employment for about one lakh people. The Bihar Government had also undertaken three irrigation projects, re-excavation of the King's Canal in Madhubani, desilting the old Bagmati river and improving the Adhwara system of rivers in Muzaffarpur district. These provided employment to another 100,000 people.
3. The river Koshi originates from the highest Himalayan range of mountains in the eastern region. Owing to its rocky river bed it flows down with great fury crushing rocks and boulders and causing heavy floods and great devastation in the plains. Therefore in local parlance it is called Kosi, a word derived from the Hindi word *Kosna*, or curse.

scheme at the present juncture. As an act of faith we might begin it with the money provided by the Nepal Government and the Bihar Government, but without any commitment from the Central Government about future financing. Also we had to begin in a small way till we were sure of the future.

4. On returning to Delhi I went into this matter rather carefully with Khosla,⁴ Bhatnagar⁵ and others, who produced figures and statistics, etc.

5. I made it clear to them that it was quite impossible for us even to consider the building of the big dam. Apart from its technical features, it is too expensive for us, whatever the result. I asked them what benefits we would derive from the earlier stages. Khosla told me that each stage was completely independent of the others and was not tied up with them. Thus, each stage could stand by itself and bring adequate results. It could be taken up if and when we wanted to do so. At the same time, it was possible to telescope stages. Thus, 1 and 2 could be taken together or 1, 2 and 3 could be telescoped.

6. The first stage is estimated to cost 10.5 crores and to take three to four years. Second stage is to cost 10 crores and to take three years. Third stage is to cost 12.5 crores and to take three to four years.

All three stages can be taken together and completed in four years or so.

7. The benefits derived from the first stage would not be as considerable as from the second and third, but it would produce electric power for Kathmandu, Darbhanga and Patna which could bring us some dividends. For the rest, the first stage included preliminaries for future construction, e.g. railway line, barrage, road, bridge across Kosi, workshops, power house, residential buildings, etc. To begin with, about five thousand people will be employed, but in the second year this figure can go up to fifteen thousand to twenty thousand.

This would have no effect on irrigation or floods.

Stage 2. Irrigation of two lakhs acres in Nepal and 4 lakhs in Bihar. More electric power and about 25 per cent of flood control. This would employ five thousand men to begin with, and later up to twenty-five thousand.

If stages 1 and 2 are taken together, upto forty thousand people could be employed.

Stage 3. The benefits were: 11 lakhs more irrigation in Bihar, i.e., altogether 17 lakhs in Nepal and Bihar and sixty thousand kilowatts more of power, making altogether ninety thousand kilowatts. Flood control achieved at the end of stage 3, 60 per cent. But probably two crores more might have to be spent for special flood control measures.

4. A.N. Khosla, Chairman, Central Water Power Irrigation and Navigation Commission.

5. S.S. Bhatnagar, Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research.

8. I discussed with them what the annual expenditure would be if only the first stage was taken or the first and second stages together, or the first, second and third together.

9. It seems to me that the most profitable arrangement would be for the first stage to be taken together with only a part of the second stage, which involved digging of the major canal, etc. and employing of a large number of persons. Total expenditure for the first stage and part of the 2nd stage, taken together, would be 13.5 crores spread out as follows:-

1st year	...	2	crores
2nd year	...	5	crores
3rd year	...	5	crores
4th year	...	1.5	crores
Total		<hr/> 13.5	crores

12. I made it clear repeatedly that I could not commit Central funds at all and that we might have to stop work for lack of funds from the Centre. But we may, as an act of faith, and owing specially to the famine or near-famine situation, which was likely to last for a considerable time, agree to work being started with the funds available from Nepal and Bihar. We might contribute something as we would naturally be interested. But I could not give any guarantee or commitment about this.

13. The chief problem in Bihar is no longer the lack of food, but the lack of purchasing power and the necessity of having work. Odd kinds of work give some temporary relief, but that does not go far. It seems desirable to have some major work both from the point of view of employing large numbers of people and in order to produce a certain psychological change in the people's attitude. It is clear to me that such a change would be produced if we made some beginnings, however small, in regard to this project.

14. The technical aspects of this project, I believe, are largely concerned with the construction of the big dam. This, I think, should be given up anyhow. The rest is from the engineering point of view relatively simple. Whether the estimates are correct or not, only experts can say.

15. I should like this matter to be considered, in the light of what I have said above, by the Finance Ministry and the Planning Commission. What I would like to be done is for us to agree to start the first stage only on the explicit understanding that we cannot commit ourselves to go far at the present moment. If it is possible, we shall of course try to complete this stage and take up the first (irrigation) part of the second stage. But all this would depend on circumstances and our ability to go ahead. For the present, we are prepared to start with the funds supplied by Nepal and Bihar.

16. This would be subject, of course, to the technical and financial examination of this part of the project. I would suggest that the examination of the entire project, including the dam, be suspended for the moment, as it is beyond our capacity. An examination of only the first stage and the first part of the second stage, as referred to by me above, should be simple and should not take much time.

17. What I would suggest is that the matter should be considered not only from the point of view of an important project, but also from the point of view of existing semi-famine conditions in Bihar. If we can help in grappling this problem in Bihar, it is worthwhile doing so by this method also. The acute food crisis in Bihar has attracted worldwide attention. We have avoided famine by sending foodgrains there. But an equally difficult problem is providing work. Foreign correspondents abound in Bihar and many of them (American) asked me why we were not starting major schemes like the Kosi to provide work. They said that such a thing would attract American imagination, and we might even get help from America for such a project.

2. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
July 5, 1951

My dear Sri Babu,

I am writing to you about the Kosi project. As I informed you, I had myself come to the conclusion that we must start this, even though we might have some difficulty in continuing it later. The present need for it, both practical and psychological, seems to me to be great. You had told me that you are prepared to give, as promised, a crore of rupees next year and a crore the year after. But I presume this crore means a loan from the Central Government. In effect, therefore, we have to find the money ourselves for the present. I have requested the Finance Ministry and the Planning Commission to look into this matter.

I think it should be clearly understood that we cannot make any commitments about the future. The most we can attempt now is to begin the first stage. Possibly a little later we might take up the first part of the second stage which involves digging the main canal. What I am anxious about is to provide work to a large number of people.

1. File No. 17(201)/50-PMS.

To begin with, I want to put no burden on the Centre, and to proceed with the money that Nepal and your Government might contribute. We hope, of course, to help in the future. Unfortunately, however, the Planning Commission has not included the Kosi project in their plans even for the next five years. This produces a difficulty. However, we are looking into this matter. As I have said, I am anxious to begin as an act of faith. Therefore, I want to limit strictly any possible commitment of the Centre.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Gulzari Lal Nanda¹

New Delhi
July 21, 1951

My dear Gulzari Lal,²

I have been investigating the Kosi project with Khosla. Some time ago I sent you a note on this subject and I have also been writing to Deshmukh.³ I think that it would be a good thing for the Planning Commission to consider various aspects of this as soon as we are in possession of the necessary data.

The first thing to be clear about is that in no event can we take up both the Bihar projects, namely the Kosi and the Gandak; the ultimate choice as between the two must lie with the Bihar Government. Of course, whether we take up either of them or not is a matter for consideration by the Planning Commission, having regard to our resources, etc.

I gather that so far as irrigation is concerned, there is not much to choose between Kosi and the Gandak, i.e., about the same results will be achieved with the same amount of money spent.⁴ The Kosi can be extended much further if we are prepared to spend more money later.

So far as electric power is concerned, there is not much expected from the Gandak, although of course some power may be produced if we need it. From the Kosi a good deal of electric power is expected.

One point very much in favour of the Kosi at present is that it touches the famine-affected area and therefore any works there will afford relief to a

1. File No. 17(201)/50-PMS.

2. Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission.

3. Nehru wrote a note to Deshmukh about the Kosi project on 4 July 1951. See *ante*, pp. 495-498.

4. Both the Kosi and Gandak projects were designed to provide irrigation to large areas of Bihar and Nepal.

considerable number of persons. This is an important factor looked at from the point of view of relief operations.

Apart from the positive results achieved, there is the negative aspect of saving the damage caused by the Kosi annually by floods. I understand that this is roughly ten lakhs a year and sometimes much more. Also, the flooded land is sometimes spoiled for cultivation if the deposit of sand is too great or is partially made less useful from the point of view of cultivation.

It is clear that we cannot think in terms of the whole Kosi scheme which is big and very expensive. The question therefore arises whether it is worthwhile to think of a part of the scheme and will that yield adequate results for the money spent. According to Khosla, every stage of the scheme is by itself worthwhile. The first three stages bring substantial results in many ways, including flood relief. But we cannot even think of the three stages at this time. The most we can think of are the first stage and a part of the second stage (digging of the major canals). This might be examined separately and carefully from the point of view of results, including the effect on famine relief.

In the Kosi scheme we are likely to get two crores from the Nepal Government. The question arises whether they are interested in giving the two crores for only the first part of the scheme. I am told that their chief interest is in getting electric power. This they will get from the first part. Indeed, they are so keen on getting this electric power that if there is a giving up of the Kosi scheme, or great delay in it, they would be inclined to take up some small scheme just to produce electric power for them. The Kosi money would be diverted there in such a case and we would not receive anything from them.

These are some considerations to be kept in mind. Another consideration is, of course, the reaction on the people concerned to the taking up the Kosi project or dropping it for the time. Generally speaking, people are not very much concerned about river valley projects, i.e., the people living there. We have had trouble in various places, such as in the Hirakud scheme, where there was even satyagraha against it because land was being acquired. So far as the Kosi is concerned, there can be no doubt that popular reaction would be strongly in its favour and one can even get a measure of public cooperation and support. Negatively, our not taking it up would no doubt cause a great deal of dissatisfaction almost amounting to despair among the people concerned.

Because of all this, it is worth considering whether we cannot do something however small, as a beginning in the Kosi project, even though we are unable to continue it immediately. That is to say, it is worth considering whether we cannot take up even half the first stage. No adequate results will come from that half stage, but we will have laid the foundation for future fairly rapid

development when we can afford it. It would be a visible indication of our desire to go ahead there. If we have to stop it for some period afterwards, it would not mean very much less.

The Bihar Government in the past have been undecided about their preferences, and have sometimes talked about the Kosi and sometimes about the Gandak. They must be clear about it and keen. It is no good being half-hearted and not able to make up their minds. So far as the Kosi is concerned, about sixty lakhs of rupees have already been spent in preparatory work, surveys, maps, etc. and probably in the course of the next few weeks the scrutiny of the detailed estimates of the first stage plus something more will be completed and will be ready for examination as a whole.

I understand that V.T. Krishnamachari⁵ is in charge of this branch of work in the Planning Commission. Perhaps, you will be good enough to pass on this letter to him. I should like him to discuss this question fully in all its aspects with Khosla.

There is another aspect of this question, not by itself of any great importance, but which nevertheless might be borne in mind. This is the question of our political relations with Nepal. Any joint project like the Kosi adds to our contacts with the Nepal Government and therefore has a helpful effect.

Meanwhile, I am writing to both the Bihar Government⁶ and to our Ambassador in Nepal on this subject. We must know exactly what these Governments want and are prepared to do. It would be for us then to decide what we can and should do.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Member, National Planning Commission.

6. See *ante*, pp. 498-499.

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
IX. Miscellaneous

1. Faith in Democracy¹

Your Highness, Chief Minister, Mr. Speaker and friends,

You have done me honour by associating me with this ceremony and on this auspicious occasion. We put up buildings of various kinds and there are plenty of homeless and houseless people who require shelter, and it is of the utmost importance that we provide them with that shelter. At the same time, we have our public buildings, and I was wondering that when we put up a public building, is it just an engineering feat or does it represent something more than that?

The other day, only four days ago, I visited some of the famous ancient temples in Mysore, at Belur and Halebid, and as I looked at their magnificent sculpture and carving in stone, I wondered what the architects felt and thought of when they were putting up that magnificent structure. It was an engineering feat of course, but obviously it was something infinitely more, and the man who did that work did it with an intense faith in what he was doing, not merely for a wage, not merely just to put up something which will hold together, but something in his mind for a long time to come, something almost ageless, something in which he put his intense faith, and it just does not matter whether you agree with that faith or you have some other faith, or disagree with that; the point is, in that work of that architect and that artist there was intense faith, and therefore, that faith took the shape of beauty, of enduring beauty, which no pure engineer can give it however carefully he measures and calculates in his work. You go a little further, a little north of this place to the temples of Ajanta and Ellora and again you see that wonderful faith at work. Or, you go to Agra and see the Taj Mahal, a monument of an immortal love, and I am quite certain that those who built it, those fine artisans and craftsmen, built it not merely for the paltry wage they might have got, but because of their love of beauty, love of their craft, love of the artistry of it, love of the whole project, and so they put something in that cold marble and stone, something of that fire which lasts and makes some buildings almost immortal. Or, go to Europe and see the magnificent cathedrals of the Middle Ages. Nobody does those things now. We build huge Government offices, or business offices or skyscrapers, no doubt enduring evidence of the advance of engineering, but somehow we are missing that beauty and that timelessness of those old buildings, which represented the faith of a man, faith not so much in the religious sense, but faith in his constructive activity, in his sense of beauty, in his belief in something that he cared for and respected.

1. Speech on laying the foundation-stone of the Vidhan Soudha in Bangalore on 13 July 1951. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

So a building may be looked upon in many ways and when you put up a structure like this, of which you have asked me to lay the foundation-stone presently, the structure to house your legislature, what exactly does that convey to you? Just a place, where you will conveniently hold your debates and pass your legislative enactments? What else? Or, is this something more dedicated than that? Something also in the nature of a temple or a mosque or a cathedral devoted to public service, devoted, shall I say, to the concept of democratic working?

And so we come to democracy, about which we talk so much, and we talk so variously, and yet we know in the modern world, this old concept of democracy is challenged, challenged not so much in argument, although it is challenged even in argument, but rather challenged by the force of events, challenged by the problems set before us. Can democracy solve them? Can the democratic way of functioning in life, can it be considered enough to solve the problems that face us? That is one of the major questions of the age, because democracy is a hard way. It is easy to be an autocrat, although the autocrat may fall, there are risks in it. It is easy to be authoritarian, although any regime of that type in the modern age is not likely to last long. But democracy is the hard way, because it does not suddenly do things as an autocrat or an authoritarian might do them, but it is trying to do them in a more enduring way; that is with the consent and agreement of the people concerned, that is after argument and discussions, that is with the fundamental assumption underlying it that what is done after argument and discussion, by the general consent of the majority, is agreed to by the minority and others with a sense of discipline, with a sense of accepting that, even though they might try to change it, in the normal democratic way. So it is a hard way because it involves that larger outlook, that vision, that capacity for give and take, that capacity for effacing yourself and not pushing yourself as an individual in front and trying to push out others. In other words, democracy means a higher standard of the human being. I have not a shadow of a doubt that the democratic way of functioning is the right way.

But doubts arise in my mind sometimes, as to whether people are wholly educated or trained to that way of functioning. It is not the way that is wrong. If something goes wrong, let us not blame the stars. The fault lies in us. Are we big enough to function in that way? It is not enough to use the word and express it repeatedly. Are we big enough, specially living in this great and magnificent country, a country so full of variety that is India, such an attractive variety, and yet with such a fundamental unity—are we big enough to appreciate that variety as well as that unity, not to impose ourselves on others, to try to develop, as we must, more and more a united way of functioning, because otherwise we do not solve these problems which face us and the world? But, at the same time, that united way is not a way of forcing ourselves

down other people, because that is not the democratic way, and that is not the way that India has practised, whenever it has had the chance to practise, any way, of its own free will.

So these ideas come to my mind. Can we forget our petty differences? Can we forget our provincial differences? Can we forget, for the purpose of the larger good, our religious differences? It requires hard work, it requires selfless work. It requires, above all, in a democratic society, the forgetting of self, the merging of self, for the larger good. Unfortunately, there is a good deal of group action and group thinking, one group rather against another, one province against another, one party against another. To some extent, that is natural and healthy, but only to some and a limited extent. If it goes beyond that, then it defeats its own purpose and the nation suffers. Therefore, we, who are still more or less on the door-step of free India—although three and a half years have elapsed, that is nothing in the history of a nation—how are we, at the beginning of this new and great era of India's history, how are we going to function? What basis for action and thought will we have? How will we draw inspiration from our immemorial past and how will we draw inspiration from the great things of today, which the West has shown us? For the West has gone ahead of us, undoubtedly, and the mere fact that we became a subject country was evidence enough, that we had failed in spite of our immemorial past. Therefore, we have to draw inspiration from the great things of our past and we have to draw inspiration from the great things of today, from whatever country we may draw that inspiration. But, above all, we have to develop some kind of faith in ourselves for any act, any great act, whether it is an act of building a great structure, an architectural monument, or something. Much more so, the act of building up a great nation is ultimately an act of faith, an act of faith in ourselves, an act of faith in that great nation which we seek to serve. And if we have not got that faith and if we have not got that fire in us, then, whatever we do is a lifeless stone, not that embodiment of magnificent sculpture that some of these ancient buildings are. And if we build the nation too, in the politician's way, in the narrow way, each person trying to step over somebody else or push out somebody else, each person trying to become a member of this legislature or that assembly, regardless of the common good, then, we sink to the lower levels and then there can be no faith in that, and there can be nothing that flows from that faith.

So, when I lay this foundation-stone, these thoughts come to me. This building that will arise here, I do not know what it will be like. I have no doubt, however, that it will be an attractive building, because this city is a famous city, and this State a famous State in many ways. It has developed beautiful towns and cities and gardens and it is a pleasure to be here, a pleasure to the senses and to the mind. Therefore, I have no doubt, that you will pay attention to the artistry of what you build. Yet, the question before

me is not that, but rather if within the walls of stone or brick and mortar or whatever it is going to be, there is going to be also that living spirit of democracy, of pulling together, of united working, of give and take, of selflessness and sacrifice for the common good. If so, then you are not building merely a house for your debates but you are building a temple dedicated to the nation.

2. Rectification of the Assam-Bhutan Boundary¹

I confess that I see no difficulty at all about the various points raised.² First of all, to consider this matter as a cession of territory, though it may be accurate strictly legally, hardly explains the position.³ It is a very small, minor rectification of a boundary, the kind of rectification which States have frequently to undergo, which does not mean very much and takes place when two States agree. I am not speaking as a lawyer for the moment, but from an ordinary, if I may say so, commonsense point of view, is it supposed that no rectification, no addition, no variation here and there is ever going to take place in the future? If so, who is going to do it? Parliament, of course, nobody else. To deny the right of Parliament or to say that nobody can ever add or subtract or vary or rectify the boundaries would be I think rather an extraordinary situation to face, because such things do happen, are bound to happen, and there must be some final authority by whose consent this could be done and that final authority can only be Parliament. Therefore, I beg to submit that it is hardly correct for us to say that Parliament itself cannot do it. If that is so, then the only course left open is to amend the Constitution, if the occasion for it arises, not now. But I do submit that these things are within the inherent power and authority of Parliament and the interpretation that some honourable

1. Reply to a debate in Parliament, 7 August 1951. *Parliamentary Debates (Official Report)*, Vol. XIV, Part II (6th August to 27 August 1951), columns 87-91. Extracts.
2. During the debate on the Assam Boundaries Bill for ceding to Bhutan an area of about 32 sq. miles in Assam called Dowangiri, R.K. Chaudhuri, H.V. Kamath, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, V.S. Sarwate and P.S. Deshmukh had raised various points.
3. Kamath stated that Article 3(c) of the Constitution provided that boundaries of States could be changed. But there was no power conferred upon Parliament to cede or diminish any territory of the Indian Union.

friends have put about the State boundaries, etc. is a somewhat strained interpretation.⁴

Then again, my honourable friend Mr. Chaudhuri, I think, rather confused the issue by bringing Pakistan into the picture.⁵ That is a completely different thing which has nothing to do with this matter. Here we are talking about rectification of boundaries—between whom? Not with a foreign country, but with a State with which we are intimately allied, whose defence, whose foreign affairs and communications and various other things are under our control. It is not technically speaking a part of the Union of India, but it is very closely allied, and in fact, in some matters under the control of this Parliament, in regard to those subjects in which it has acceded, or is in alliance with India. It is not a new thing. It is the continuation of an old thing which has now been put on a permanent basis by a treaty, so that one must look upon this, not as though he was dealing with a foreign State, but rather as dealing with a State, which though not technically a part of the Union of India, yet is very closely allied with us.

Secondly, it is not really cession. It is a very small rectification of boundary, mostly of forest land. There are various fairs held in that border and because there was a certain amount, if I may say so of religious sanctity attached to a small area there, we felt that it was far better to give that small area to a close ally of ours, closely associated with us, to gain the goodwill rather than hold on to a bit of forest land, a very small patch.... May I also say quite clearly that the responsibility for this is largely that of the Government of India? But the Government of India's responsibility was not enough. We did try to have the assent and the goodwill of the Assam Government. Therefore, we approached the Government of Assam and after a great deal of consideration, argument, examination, conferences and the like, they agreed to the transfer of this particular territory. So, I submit that this issue does not raise any major legal or constitutional point; nor does it raise any material political point either in regard to the area involved or in regard to the State to which we are transferring this territory, because that State is almost as near to us as any State of the Indian Union. I think it will be a good thing if we treat this State as closely allied to us as possible rather than consider it alien. Of course, Bhutanese subjects need not be considered to be Indian nationals. But

4. Sarwate from Madhya Bharat argued that Article (2) said: "the States and the territories thereof shall be the States and their territories specified in Part A, B and C of the First Schedule." If Article 3 were read with Article 1, it implied that the boundaries of one State and another could be changed, but the whole territory which was referred to in Schedule I could not be changed unless the Constitution was amended.
5. Chaudhuri said that Pakistan had captured Golaganj, which, according to Assam, did not belong to India, and Dauki, one and a half miles inside Indian territory which, according to Gopalaswami Ayyangar, really belonged to Assam.

when this Parliament finally controls major policies about that State, when the Government of India gives them annual subsidies and aids, it is far from an alien State. In fact we want to develop cordial relations with this State by a psychological approach. If we treat them as aliens they cannot come here, we cannot go there. Thus barriers grow up. We want in this treaty of alliance not only to provide for economic, political and other matters and our control so far as foreign affairs, communications and defence are concerned, but also to create a psychological feeling of oneness and kinship. They said that they attach value to this particular area from a religious point of view. Hardly any human beings live there—just a handful. We thought it a very good decision to arrive at to give that area to gain their goodwill. As a matter of fact the whole area does not go anywhere else....

Now all these frontier areas have a mixed population, culturally connected with both areas. Now Mr. Chaudhuri's own province of Assam—a very beautiful and fertile place, potentially very rich, which unfortunately has been suffering from great calamities—has a rich variety of people. Right from the borders of Burma, China and Tibet you see people of all kinds. The term "tribal area" is a very vague one. As a matter of fact there is as much difference between one tribe and another, as between a tribe and the plains people. You cannot therefore consider all of them alike. Even now it is quite a possibility that you may have to deal with some of them in a somewhat different way. It is quite possible that they may come up to you even for slight amendments of the Constitution to deal with somebody in a slightly different way if Parliament agrees to it—about minor things, nothing major.

But the main thing is to make them grow and feel that they are organic units of this great country and that they can live their lives without being imposed and exploited by others, because that is their great fear. People in the mountains have certain virtues, and certain failings. People in the plains have certain other virtues and certain other failings. Normally, people in the plains are cleverer than the people in the mountains—though I am not prepared to admit that they are better. And people in the plains go to people in the mountains and often exploit them in a financial way, grab their land, and otherwise do a bad deal with them. And so a fear has grown among the people of the mountains all over the Himalayas, if I may say so—not confined to this area of Assam or Kashmir or somewhere in Kumaon—that the people of the plains come and exploit them and take away their lands or other things. Therefore they require protection.

This has nothing to do with this Bill. What I am venturing to point out is that these border areas are difficult areas and that they have to be approached not with a big stick but, psychologically, in a friendly way so that they may feel that they are meeting with friends and not people who impose themselves on them. They have affections on either side; they have marriage ties on

either side of the border. They come and go. Culturally speaking, it is a very mixed area. On the one side there is the Tibetan culture flowing into India, and on the other side there is the typical Indian culture going up there. It is good that this is so. I do not object to it. But it does create problems, and one had to adjust oneself to those problems by making those people feel that they can live their own lives and grow without imposition, and by their own free will they become nearer and nearer to us. We want the people of Bhutan as a whole to be much closer to India and looking to India not only politically but even culturally, than to any other place.

If in order to do that we come to certain minor adjustments of territory, a little bit of forest etc., without upsetting anybody, I do not see how we do the slightest injury to our great country. In fact we do something which a great country should always do—to show how it looks upon its little brothers in a friendly generous way and protects and helps them to grow.

I submit that this little Bill which my honourable colleague, the Deputy Minister⁶, has put forward is a very simple proposition which raises no basic issues, constitutional or political, and which, the House may remember, is a story that started a long time ago, years ago. In fact, before the Republic came into existence under this Constitution the thing was really completed, but owing to certain difficulties in giving effect to it the matter has hung over, and we should finalise it now. Not to do so does not do much good or harm to us. But it does make the people feel that we have not kept our word with them and that something that we had agreed to three years ago and more has been disagreed to and the whole thing is upset and all kinds of difficulties are produced about a very small matter.

6. B.V. Keskar.

3. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

I saw a report of the decision of the Economic Committee² about giving ships to the Scindia Company etc., at a certain rate which is extremely favourable to the Scindias. I suppose the Economic Committee is wise in its decision. But I confess that I cannot understand the economic policy that we follow, which very often benefits vested interests and groups at the expense of the

1. J.N. Collection.

2. C. Rajagopalachari was the Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet.

country, whether it is shipping or jute or some other matters. I have a strong feeling that we have got caught up in the coils of out-of-date policies which imprison us and do not allow even our minds to function in freedom.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

Your two letters of today's date about the ships.² I am sorry if I hurt you in any way. As a matter of fact, I knew that the major decision was taken long ago, though not finalised in some respects. I was not criticising the help given to a ship-building firm. What I did not and do not understand, in spite of attempts having been made in the past to make me understand, is why all the advantage from a great rise in prices of ships should go to the firm. We give them the money to build ships and then we sell those ships to them at the rate prevailing when the keel was laid down. Since then there has been a tremendous rise in prices. The firm benefits by this, not Government. The money we have given them is pure subsidy and does not even represent any share in the concern.

All this may be completely in line with modern business methods, but I do not understand it.

As I have said above, I was not trying to criticise the Economic Committee. Some months ago I argued this matter with the people concerned here and had to confess defeat then. Our economic system attaches far more importance to private interests than to public interests.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. C. Rajagopalachari wrote that he had felt hurt by Nehru's remarks on the recommendations of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet about ship-building. The decision had been reached much earlier for encouraging the only ship-building concern in India.

5. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
August 17, 1951

My dear Deshmukh,

Thank you for your letter of August 16, in which you deal with the Scindia ships.² I have no doubt that, in the existing circumstances, your decision was natural. The feeling I have had, however, is that we are too much tied down by our old approach to these problems. If possible, I would have preferred Government buying these ships itself. In view of the ever-rising shipping rates, it would probably pay much more in freight than the cost of the ships.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. C.D. Deshmukh wrote that he was sorry to know that Nehru was unhappy about the decision of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet regarding the Scindia ships to the point of believing that Government of India's economic policy benefited vested interests at the expense of the country. In his view, although it appeared on the surface that Scindias were gaining an advantage, the market for ready ships being good at the moment, the case was really not so because the position of the Government would have been worse had they got no undertaking from the Scindias.

6. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
August 22, 1951

My dear Gopalaswami,

Someone mentioned to me the other day that the Hyderabad factories, some of which have not been functioning for some time, are going to be handed over to the Birlas or to some concern associated with them. I do not know how far this is true. I imagine that if this was done, many people would dislike it and object to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

7. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 31, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

About the Press Bill² we have introduced I think it would be worthwhile and a graceful gesture to invite the two press organisations viz., the A.I.N.E.C. and the Working Journalists Association to send their comments to you or to the Select Committee. In any event, they are likely to write about it in the papers and may be to you. But, if we ask them for their general views and comments, it would be better.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. The Press Bill, which was introduced in Parliament on 31 August 1951, sought to provide against the "printing and publication of incitements to crime and other objectionable matter." This Bill was passed on 6 October 1951.

8. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1951

My dear Gopalaswami,

Thank you for sending me the papers in connection with the Osmania University.

I agree with you that we should take a considered and firm decision as soon as possible as to whether the Osmania University should be treated as an all-India institution and taken over under the direct control of the Centre in the same way as Banaras, etc. As you know, I have long been of opinion that this should be done. I came to this conclusion from a variety of points of view. There are many positive considerations for us to make the Osmania University as a Central one. Negatively, I am almost sure that it will deteriorate gravely if it is left to the State when the State is run entirely on a popular

1. File No. 40(54)/56-PMS.

basis. I think of this university not merely as another university, but rather as one having a special function both from the linguistic and the communal points of view. In view of the fact that Hindi or Hindustani is developing as a national language, it is important that there should be a great educational institution in the south which has this language as its principal medium of instruction. It should serve a large part of the south for this purpose. This medium of instruction should be simple Hindi or Hindustani in content and not the artificial language that is growing up in the north. Both the Devanagari and the Urdu scripts should be encouraged.

The university, if properly run, could well become the centre for bringing about communal harmony. It would bring the south and the north of India nearer to each other. Internationally speaking, I think our action would be appreciated in many countries.

Therefore, I am entirely in favour of this proposal.

I know very little about the financial aspect, which of course is important. I doubt if the Nizam will be prepared to give four crores of rupees. He might go upto one crore, if pressed to do so. The Centre will, in any event, have to shoulder an additional liability. I do not see why you put this at twenty to forty lakhs per annum. I should have thought that ten lakhs should be adequate, unless we extend the university much more.

I agree with you that you might discuss this matter with the Finance Minister and the Education Minister. I think you should add Rajaji also to this small committee.

I am returning the papers you sent me.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. The Study of the Classics¹

I send my greetings to the Lucknow session of the All India Oriental Conference. My own education did not have much to do with the classical

1. Message written on 26 September 1951 for the All India Oriental Conference held from 3 to 5 October 1951, New Delhi. File No. 9/148/51-PMS.

languages. Nevertheless, I have admired them as a layman and respected the men of learning who know them. We live in an age in which science and the application of science dominate the world and fill men's thoughts. We cannot do without science or its applications, for they represent human progress, and, indeed, without them we can neither maintain our independence nor hope to achieve any decent standard of life. Apart from this, science, if properly pursued, should develop the right frame of mind for the search for truth, the scientific temper which does not get swept away by passion or prejudice or by some slogan of the day, by inherited tradition or the latest gadget, but can preserve a certain equanimity and fearlessness in that search for truth.

That is the theory and if it could be made the practice, then all would be well. But, unfortunately, the very growth and advance of science and knowledge in innumerable directions have inevitably led to specialisation. So, we have specialists of the first order in their respective branches of knowledge, eminent technicians and engineers and the like who are so necessary in the world today and yet who may not be good citizens or men of wisdom. Indeed, they may be and are utilised for purposes which wisdom denounces, and science itself in its pride of power may lay ever greater stress on force. Thus, science, for all its innumerable virtues and benefits, may become a curse to mankind, unless it is tempered by wisdom.

Where does wisdom come from? I do not know. But certainly we find many evidences of it in the ancient classics, which were written in an unhurried age when people could think and try to look upon life as a whole and not in isolated compartments. Therefore, the classics must have an important place in any system of education, provided they do not occupy all the place and push out the subsequent developments of the human mind. A proper system of education must be a balanced one between science and the classics. In India specially this is necessary, for we are apt to go to either extreme and thus lose our balance.

All the world knows about the greatness of our classical literature. I sometimes think that others know of it better than many of us, who praise it in exaggerated language and yet know little about it. We have to give a proper place in our educational system to the study of Sanskrit which contains these treasures of the past, but to profit by this study, it must be comparative and it must not be isolated. We should also take particular care that the study of Persian, which has added so much to our cultural inheritance, is encouraged. To this should be added a study, wherever possible, of the western classics also. Thus, we shall not only discover anew our own deep roots in the past, but also learn how many streams have come to India and developed our varied and composite culture.

10. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi

September 28, 1951

My dear Pantji,

I have seen reports in the press that a Bill has been introduced in your Assembly making Hindi the official language of the State. This is as it should be. I have not seen the Bill, but it struck me to draw your attention to one fact which may or may not be relevant.

This is that it would be worthwhile to mention in the course of the Bill that Urdu (including the script) is also a recognised language of the State. It is recognised in the Constitution and the U.P. has been and, I hope, will continue to be the home of Urdu. It would be a worthwhile gesture to mention Urdu in some form in your Bill.

You must know that the exodus of Muslims across Rajasthan to Pakistan continues. The Pakistan press has given great prominence to this, just as we give prominence to East Bengal happenings. Some foreign correspondents have gone there too and sent fairly long messages to their own papers. We find from an enquiry made by our own men that this exodus is continuous and largely comes from the U.P. The numbers vary from day to day, from a few hundred to over a thousand a day. The people usually belong to the lower middle class or to the menial class. The average for the last two years works out at about 450 a day. Occasionally this has shot up much beyond this mark. Various reasons have been given by these people. The two principal reasons are lack of employment and a sense of insecurity. Another reason given is the language difficulty. Teachers, for instance, who did not know enough Hindi have been dismissed. Children ~~did~~ not have the opportunity of learning Urdu and the like.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

11. Responsibilities of Labour¹

I send my greetings and good wishes to the fourth annual session of the Indian National Trade Union Congress. I do so not as Prime Minister, but in my personal capacity.

The I.N.T.U.C. was started only recently,² but it has continued a long tradition. It began, I believe, in the early twenties when, under the inspiration of Gandhiji, trade union work was started in Ahmedabad. During this long period the success of the principles and methods enunciated by Gandhiji for conducting trade union work has been amply demonstrated. I have noticed with pleasure the growth of this movement.

Criticisms are often made that the I.N.T.U.C. is just an offshoot of the Indian National Congress and tied up with the present Governments. I think that this criticism is unjustified. It was natural for the I.N.T.U.C. to be associated closely with the Congress because of a community of ideals and because a large number of Congressmen were in the I.N.T.U.C. The I.N.T.U.C. however functioned in an independent capacity. It was inevitably friendly to the Congress, but it was in no way subservient to it and occasionally, in some places, there were differences of opinion. For my part, I do not object to such differences if the main approach is a friendly and cooperative one.

This applies even more to the I.N.T.U.C.'s relations with Government. Government, as such, have to be impartial in labour matters and deal with trade union organisations which truly represent workers in a particular area. Our Government, and I believe the State Governments, have largely followed this policy. Naturally, we want cooperation with the industrial workers and the trade union movement in the country. But we also feel that a trade union movement should be an independent movement; otherwise, it loses its chief function. Government cannot favour any movements which aim at disruption and which, under cover of trade union activities, pursue far-reaching subversive political ends. No Government can do this. Its sympathy and cooperation, naturally, will be extended far more to those who are prepared to cooperate with it. But this should not mean in any way any subservience of trade union organisations to Government or to any lessening of their independence.

Industrial workers, though forming relatively a small proportion of our population, are a very important section of it and have been in the past and must continue to be spearheads in the country's progress towards economic

1. Message to the fourth annual session of the I.N.T.U.C., New Delhi, 3 October 1951. Newspapers published this message on 24 October 1951.

2. 3 May 1947.

advance and equality. It is only with mutual understanding and a large measure of cooperation between Government and industrial workers that progress on the industrial front, which is so important, can be obtained. While there are bound to be differences among industrial workers or their unions in regard to some matters, it is becoming increasingly necessary for a common front to be evolved if the worker is to play his full part in national activities. I hope, therefore, that the I.N.T.U.C. will not only grow and prosper, but will also find ways and means of cooperating, for the benefit of labour and the country, with other labour organisations which might be outside its fold. Such cooperation can only take place on the basis of some common objectives. There is no reason why there should be difficulty in finding these common objectives. There is far too great a tendency in India to stress differences and not to emphasise the vast field of common endeavour.

Workers in India, whether industrial or agricultural, have a long way to advance and are entitled to many rights and facilities which are today denied to them. But it must always be remembered, as Gandhiji told us so often, that rights cannot be separated from responsibilities and obligations. A disciplined labour force must, therefore, not only claim its just dues and rights but must also be prepared to discharge its responsibilities. Thus it will serve its own cause as well as the cause of the country.

12. An Unnecessary Controversy¹

A language can neither grow nor be suppressed by governmental action. It can and must progress only through its use by the people.

I completely fail to understand the controversy raging in the Punjab over Punjabi and Hindi.² The amusing aspect of the controversy is that it is being conducted by both sides, notwithstanding its fierceness, in Urdu.

That shows this controversy lacks real basis. It may or may not be actuated by political motives but there seems to be no sound basis for it.

History has known many instances of ruthless oppression and suppression by governments. But never could a live language be suppressed by any

1. Address to a convention of Sikhs, Delhi, 19 October 1951. From *National Herald*, 20 October 1951.
2. The convention had demanded that Panjabi be made the *lingua franca* of the Punjab.

government, however ruthless it might have been. Nor had it ever been possible to promote any language by any sympathetic government.

Governmental support might make a difference here or there, but essentially a language grows only through its use by the people.

In my opinion no regional language of India should try to compete with Hindi. Nor should Hindi attempt to compete with regional languages. I feel that all languages must be given a fair and equal opportunity to grow and Hindi, being the national language, must be respected.

Under no circumstances should the mother tongue in any region be ignored, because such an action is bound to stultify the growth of children in that region.

While protection has to be given to backward classes and tribal people, numerical minorities like Sikhs should not demand special rights. Sikhs are full of life, vigour and driving force. If they merely compete for their share on the basis of their merit, they are bound to get much more than they will get through special rights and reservations.

A defensive wall may protect you in times of need, but it becomes a barrier to your progress in the wider field for all times. It may save you from any possible inroads by others; but it also bars your way out permanently.

13. Problems of Adult Literacy¹

There is a need for making an emotional approach to the problem of gaining the cooperation of the common man, to make him a partner in our undertakings whatever they might be.

This library is the first pilot project for public libraries of its kind in the world envisaged by the UNESCO as a part of its campaign for the spread of social education among the newly made adult literates.

We forget that we have got to gain by an emotional approach an appreciation of the other person who is working in the field, factory or wherever it might be. Unless we do that we can never get that complete cooperation that is necessary in a great undertaking.

Failure to gain this appreciation often creates labour disputes. However much we might sympathise with the hard lot of the common man the fact

1. Inaugural address at the opening of the Delhi Public Library, set up by the Ministry of Education with the help of UNESCO, New Delhi, 27 October 1951. From *National Herald*, 28 October 1951.

remains that we live in two different worlds. By we, I mean those who are somewhat more fortunately circumstanced. We live in a world different from the world of the common man, worker or peasant. We sympathise with him and we help him but we do not understand him.

I hope that the library would not be a mere collection of books but represent the bigger idea of trying to understand emotionally the problems of the common man and to create a basis of emotional awareness between those people who form the millions of India.

Not only in this country, but perhaps elsewhere also, our generation is being crushed by a sense of fear and apprehension, both real and imaginary. But what is worse is the unreal fear which still oppresses our generation.

The only way to get away from this sense of fear is to devote oneself to a real understanding of the difficulties and hardships of the common man and to strive to remove them by making each and every worker realise fully that he is as good a partner in any national undertaking as anybody else.

I regret that the adult literacy drive has not produced much result. This is because the approach to the problem has not been the correct one. It is not enough to make a man able to read and write his own name or a few sentences. Education has to be developed and nurtured and full opportunities and facilities have to be given for such development.

I, however, hope that the opening of the library is an indication of the right approach to the problems of adult literacy and the authorities concerned would rise to the occasion by making available all opportunities to the poor and ordinary people.

ADMINISTRATION

1. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 7, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

H.V.R. Iengar sent me a letter he received from the U.K. High Commission about U.K. practice in regard to issue of visas and the impounding of passports. In this it was stated that passports were practically never impounded or taken back and that they had found by experience that it did little good to try to prevent a person from going abroad.

Conditions in the U.K. might be somewhat different than in India, but I think that we should approximate to that practice and only in very rare cases, depart from it.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 26, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

I have received your letter of today's date.² I do not quite know what reply to send you because I have been myself experiencing great distress of mind. I feel very tired and do not see any particular point in functioning as I do. Possibly this may pass.

I would hate to go against your wishes when you put them in the way you have done. I also agree with you that it is not right or fair that you should be forced, in spite of ill-health etc., to carry a heavy burden of work and responsibility. At the same time you will very well realise that there are other considerations also. Will you permit me to have a talk with you soon? In any event the 15th August seems to me not only not to have any virtue from this point of view but far too near an upsetting date.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Rajagopalachari who was the Home Minister wished to retire. "I feel dead done up and I do not wish to die in harness. For reasons of a personal character, I desire to be relieved when I am still not too ill for my age. The 15th August would be a sweet date for this quiet exit."

3. To P.S. Kumaraswami Raja¹

New Delhi
July 26, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

You were good enough to send me in your letter of the 6th July a report about the educational G.O.² I do not wish to say much more about this. But there is one aspect of it which has struck me as peculiar. The backwardness of a person is based on want of education in father or grandfather. How the grandfather is brought in, I cannot understand. A grandfather may be uneducated and a father may not only be educated but may have made a success of life in many ways. How then does the third generation become backward?

It is right that we should give preference to backwardness. But I hope this does not set aside merit. Otherwise all our standards will go down.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Kumaraswami Raja had written about various reservations for backward classes and further preference for those whose father and grandfather lacked education. Nehru sought Rajagopalachari's opinion who thought that "or grandfather" would perpetuate the communal G.O. For example, the son of a deputy collector, if the grandfather was uneducated, would get priority over another boy just as good or better. He felt that individual backwardness should not be a reason for preference except when merits were equal.

4. To B.K. Deb Barman¹

New Delhi
August 5, 1951

Dear Shri Deb Barman,²

Some time ago you wrote to me and sent me some copies of correspondence between you and Shri Gopaldaswami Ayyangar. I am sorry I did not answer your letter earlier. This did not mean that I was not interesting myself in the present condition or the future of Tripura state.

You have yourself pointed out the importance of Tripura in many ways. I recognise that fully. Personally, I am of opinion that every attempt should be

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Brojendra Kishore Deb Barman was the former Chief Minister of Tripura.

made for the development of social and individual cultural units and that it would be unfortunate for them to be submerged and thus lose their special characteristics. How far this is possible in the modern world, I am not quite sure. But I think every effort should be made to that end.

I have myself had a feeling that conditions in Tripura were not at all happy. I hope that some improvements have been made during the last few months since some change in the official set-up.

You must know that we have had to face a multitude of very difficult problems and at the same time a grave financial stringency. This came in our way of helping Tripura, as we would like to do. But we have every intention of giving it all the assistance that we can. I am particularly interested in these frontier states and areas and feel greatly attracted to the people there.

You will presently see the draft of the new Bill dealing with Part C States, which is coming up before Parliament. Considerable changes have been made in the old draft.

We are facing a grave situation vis-a-vis Pakistan. Tripura, as you point out, is a very near neighbour of Pakistan. That may cause some harassment to Tripura occasionally, but it need not and will not come in the way in the long run.

With all good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Enquiries about Indian Students in London¹

Your Ministry has sent me a copy of a letter addressed by them on the 20th April 1950 to our High Commissioner in London. In this letter, reference is made to a request by the Government of West Bengal for a report on the political activities abroad of Government scholars. The High Commissioner has pointed out that he had neither the facilities nor does he consider it desirable for such enquiries to be instituted about our students. Such enquiries mean some kind of a secret supervision. No Government does this except probably

1. Note to Maulana Azad, Minister of Education, 15 August 1951. File No. 40(25)/48-PMS.

the Soviet Government. In the old days, India Office did it and there was a great deal of resentment among Indian students because of this activity.

We cannot ask India House to engage a special staff for this purpose, nor indeed can we ask them to adopt a procedure of secret supervision and enquiry which was so repugnant to us in the old days.

What India House should do is to send us a general report about students, of their work and progress made. If there is anything special to the credit or discredit of any student, this should be mentioned.

I suggest that you inform the West Bengal Government accordingly, although the matter appears to be rather ancient. I am writing to you because this question may arise again in regard to some of the scholars of ours or some other State Governments. I trust it will be borne in mind by your Ministry that the policy we should pursue is not of doing anything which may be considered as spying on our own students. I would also add that we should not encourage British authorities to report to us about our students. Their reports are likely to be biased from their own point of view.

6. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi

August 25, 1951

My dear Gopalaswami,

I am returning to you Vellodi's² letter etc. which you were good enough to send me. It is not necessary for me to be convinced of Vellodi's argument. Indeed, as you perhaps know, I have been feeling the other way. I think that Vellodi has been acting fairly and impartially in this matter. But I am not so sure of some of his Hindu colleagues in the Cabinet. There is a fairly strong, though not numerous, Arya Samajist element in Hyderabad, which has often given trouble during the past ten years or more to my knowledge. I confess I share Vellodi's apprehension about Hyderabad's future government.

In a large city and State like Hyderabad there are bound to be objectionable elements among the Muslims as there are many such among the Hindus. But I am convinced that, by and large, the Muslims of Hyderabad have a feeling of being rather down and out and, to some extent, this is justified.

Some days ago you mentioned that you were considering withdrawing some of the old cases which have been pending or where investigations have

1. J.N. Collection.

2. M.K. Vellodi was at this time functioning as Chief Minister of Hyderabad.

gone on for about three years. I hope you will proceed with this matter. I think that from all points of view, including those of the barest justice, a prolongation of this business is unfortunate and brings discredit to us. Much has been made of this in some foreign circles abroad.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Role of Heads of State¹

May I say a few words on this? This is not, I suppose, one of the very vital matters on which the whole fate of this Bill hinges. Nevertheless, there is something of importance in it. My colleague, the Home Minister, has just said something² with which I entirely agree. I have just a few words to add to it.

Now, I believe in the dignity of the Head of the State, as indeed I believe in the dignity of every Member of Parliament. Dignity has to be kept up in the State. But I have an intense dislike for pomposity, and sometimes this dignity is mixed with a pompous demeanour. I am terribly afraid of doing anything which encourages any person to imagine that he belongs to a class apart and he goes about moving with a brigade of A.D.Cs, Military Secretaries, this Secretary, that Secretary and the like. In regard to certain high officers one has to keep up, for a variety of reasons, and it depends on the holder of that high office whether he does it with just dignity or with a mixture of something else too. But when you come to a Chief Commissioner, to refer to him as Governor, if I may say so, I mean to say not Governors but all the ceremonial that goes about with them (dignity, certainly)—but to have a Chief Commissioner too more or less as a miniature Governor, I think, is wrong. In the old days every Governor had a private orchestra and private band. We have not got it. Though orchestras are good the idea of each Governor having it is bad. I think it will be fundamentally wrong on our part to instil into the

1. Reply to a debate in Parliament on a bill regarding Government of Part C States, 29 August 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1951, Vol. XIV, Part II, columns 1576–1577.
2. Rajagopalachari stated that they had already agreed in principle in the basic structure of the Bill that the Chief Commissioner should be in the Cabinet, presiding over the Cabinet and playing his part not merely as head of the State but also as responsible Minister, though he was not called by that name.

mind of the Chief Commissioner, to make him feel that he is something apart, something superior. He has some powers, of course, which he will exercise naturally in cooperation with his Ministers or under the instructions of the Central Government, whatever the case may be. But to isolate him would be, I think, a bad thing and it will create a certain barrier, and the result would be that there will be a greater tendency both for him to be criticised and for him to resent that criticism, sitting apart—instead of an occasional give and take, as happens in democratic assemblies, and knowing each other more intimately than in official interviews and the like. You will create those barriers. Therefore, by the provision that is made, without taking away anything from his dignity—because dignity will come from him, not from the red-coated *chaprasis* around him, if he is the proper man—you will make it easier for him and his Ministers and others to work in cooperation with each other.

8. To Govind Das¹

New Delhi

September 5, 1951

My dear Govind Dasji,²

The Cabinet considered today your Bill for the amendment of the Penal Code in regard to cow slaughter which is probably coming up tomorrow before the House. We were clearly of opinion that we could not support this Bill or accept its reference to a select committee. Such a reference involves our acceptance of the basic principle which is quite novel and which, it was pointed out by many Members, was opposed to the letter and spirit of our Constitution.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(195)/49-PMS.

2. President, Mahakoshal P.C.C.

9. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1951

My dear Deshmukh,

Sometime ago I received a deputation from the All India Backward Classes Federation. Subsequently they have written to me also. Among their many demands, they lay special stress at present on additional scholarships to backward classes (these do not include the Scheduled Castes). Everybody must sympathise with such a demand, but the question of finances, of course, comes in.

I am sending you one letter received by me from Panjabrao Deshmukh² on this question. If it is possible to make some addition to the grant for scholarships for these people, it would be a good thing. But it is for you to decide.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Member, Provisional Parliament.

10. To Hukam Singh¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1951

Dear Sardar Hukam Singh,²

My attention has been drawn to an article in the *Spokesman* of the 19th September. This article is entitled "Sikhs in the Army". In this article it is stated that there is a widespread feeling among the Sikhs that the Sikh military officers are not having a fair deal and the "non-Sikh and anti-Sikh bosses of Sikh officers strive to blast their careers by hook or by crook". The whole article is written in this vein. It is further stated that Sikh officers "are encouraged and subtly goaded to part with their distinctive Sikh symbol".³

1. J.N. Collection.
2. (1895-1983); Judge, High Court of Kapurthala State, 1947-48; member, Constituent Assembly, Provisional Parliament and Lok Sabha, 1952-67; Deputy Speaker, Lok Sabha, 20 March 1956-62; Speaker, Lok Sabha, 1962-67; Governor of Rajasthan, 1967-71 and later Governor of Tamilnadu; editor of *Spokesman*.
3. This article had sought assurance that "the Sikh soldiers and officers are receiving unalloyed, unadulterated justice and consideration and that there is absolutely no cause for dismay.... As it is the Sikhs are much perturbed and it is essential to give a quietus to their suspicions and forebodings."

I have been greatly surprised to read this. I have not at any time heard of a single case where Sikhs were asked or encouraged to give up their distinctive symbols. Nor am I aware of any such widespread or general feeling as you refer to, or of any grounds for it.

You refer to the necessity for discipline in the army and call upon the Commander-in-Chief to enforce it and redress the grievances of the Sikhs. May I know if you have drawn the attention of the Defence Minister or the Commander-in-Chief to any instances which support the argument of this article? It is a serious matter to write of the army in the way that is being done in the *Spokesman*. Indeed, such articles are likely to affect that very efficiency and discipline which, you say, are important. I think that the writer of the article has been most unfair to the army as well as to the Sikhs, who form such a fine part of it.

If you will communicate to me any specific instances of ill-treatment of the Sikhs or of any interference with their religion or their religious symbols, I shall have an inquiry made into them.

I am writing to you because your name appears as the editor of the *Spokesman*.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
October 6, 1951

My dear Bidhan,

As you must know, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar is resigning from the Cabinet. Rajaji is also leaving the Cabinet. He feels very tired and he has carried on with some difficulty. Not that he is unwell, but he just feels exhausted. During the last two or three weeks he has had to carry terrible burdens in the shape of the Press Bill. As I write this, the last stages of the Bill are being gone through and I presume it will be passed tonight. Rajaji has shown quite extraordinary patience and endurance during these day-long debates.

Ambedkar's departure does not weaken the Cabinet very much. But Rajaji's going away certainly has that effect. I have been giving a good deal of thought to this matter as to who should be taken now into the Cabinet. I have consulted Rajaji too about it. Both of us are of opinion that it would be a good thing if

1. J.N. Collection.

Kailas Nath Katju could come over to the Central Cabinet. The only consideration that deterred us was his leaving Bengal at the present moment and what you would think of it. I wrote to Katju to sound him on the subject. He sent me a long reply. The burden of it, however, was that this was a matter which depended entirely upon you and he would abide by your decision. I am, therefore, writing to you as indeed I would have done in any case. Will you think about this and let me know soon?

If Katju leaves Calcutta, the question of his successor rises immediately. The Governor has no important constitutional role to play and from that point of view it does not matter much who the Governor is. His chief role is, apart from social duties, generally to have a soothing influence and where necessary give his advice, when asked for.

Rajaji and I feel that Asaf Ali would be a good successor. I have not mentioned this, of course, to him. For some months past he has been feeling terribly lonely in Orissa and has repeatedly asked me if he could not do something else. Recently, he took leave and went to Europe and it freshened him a good bit. Orissa is a very quiet place with very little company. You know Asaf Ali very well and so I need not say much about him. He makes a good Governor I think.

Thus far I have not mentioned this matter to anyone except to Rajaji and, as I have said above, I wrote to Katju.

A Governor's tenure now will, of course, only last till a little after the elections when the new Constitution will come into effect.

Could you please let me have your reactions?

Yours,
Jawaharlal

12. To Hukam Singh¹

New Delhi
October 8, 1951

Dear Sardar Hukam Singh,

I wrote to you the other day about an article appearing in the *Spokesman* of which you are the editor.² I pointed out that certain statements have been made in this article which appeared to me to be completely without foundation. I suggested that if you had any facts in your possession in regard to those statements, I would be glad to have an inquiry made.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 531-532.

I have received no reply from you or even an acknowledgement. I suggest that if you have no facts in your possession about the statements made in the *Spokesman*, a public withdrawal of those statements should be made. It is not fair to our army, of which the Sikhs form such a fine part, that such statements should go unchallenged. Either they should be substantiated or withdrawn.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. To Kartar Singh¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1951

Dear Giani Kartar Singh,

I have received today your letter of the 13th October.²

2. You mention various points in it which are of interest to Sikhs. Most of these relate to State Governments and I cannot give a precise answer without going into the question much more deeply and consulting the State Governments concerned. I propose to do so.

3. The question of the Scheduled Castes was considered at some length at the time of the drawing up of the Constitution and subsequently.³ I was not then intimately connected with those discussions. It would be improper for me, therefore, to express any firm opinion without proper enquiry and consultation.

4. The Scheduled Castes have certain privileges given to them. One of these relates to reservation for the elections. The other is assistance in education and like matters. So far as elections are concerned, the question does not arise now, as we cannot make any changes before election time. This question can only have any relevance at a subsequent election. So far as educational and other facilities are concerned, it is our general policy to extend them to all backward classes, in so far as finances permit. Therefore, there is no barrier

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Kartar Singh had drawn Nehru's attention to several points concerning the Sikh community which deserved his immediate attention and assurance. Failure to do so would cause widespread disappointment and difficulties in campaigning among the cultivators, other backward classes, the refugees and the Sikhs. If these demands were not met, he would have to consider whether to fight the elections as a Congress candidate or not.

3. He had written that enumeration of Scheduled Castes under Section 341 of the Constitution was downright discriminatory against the Sikh faith and an inducement to Scheduled Caste Sikhs to revert to Hinduism.

in this respect between the castes listed as Scheduled and other backward castes, whether they are Hindus, Sikhs or Christians. If there is any discrimination in this matter, it should certainly be looked into.

5. Your second point relates to the reservation of a share in the services and in technical and professional institutions for the agricultural classes of the Punjab.⁴ You point out yourself that the previous reservation was not just at all and was against the canons of democratic government. It is not quite clear to me what can be done in this matter now, except of course that it is our duty to protect and advance the backward classes, wherever they might be. As a matter of fact, the backward classes, in India, from an economic point of view, probably include eighty per cent of India's population. The question thus is not of showing favour to a small backward group but of trying to raise the level of the masses of our people. They should be given opportunities of training and of entering the services. But I am quite clear that we should not allow the standards of the services to be lowered. Unfortunately they have gone down somewhat and if we do not take care, they will go down further. The idea of the services being meant to provide people with a living seems to me to be completely wrong. That may be an incidental result, but the services are supposed to be manned for a particular purpose, that is to get certain work done in as efficient a manner as possible. We must maintain standards at all costs. In doing so, however, we must give every encouragement to the vast numbers of our agriculturists.

6. Your third point relates to the grant of proprietary rights in the land allotted to refugee landowners in the Punjab. You know that we have no objection to this. The difficulty comes because of the evacuee property question as between India and Pakistan being still in a fluid condition. In theory evacuee land still belongs to the original owners. In practice, of course, there is no chance of the original owners coming back, and there is no doubt that the persons with whom the land has been settled now will ultimately become proprietors of that land. If we take any precipitate step on our part, the result will be that Pakistan will not only do likewise but probably go further ahead than us. In this we shall be losers. The displaced persons, who have been given land, will no doubt appreciate this, because ultimately it affects their interests. They should realise that nobody is going to take away their land and their present status is temporary.⁵

4. Describing various ways to protect the agriculturists of the Punjab against encroachment on their interests Kartar Singh sought reservations for them in the services and in admission to technical and professional institutes.
5. Emphasising the need of granting proprietary rights to the refugee landowners, Kartar Singh demanded that the landowners whose claims had been verified but had not been allotted land in the Punjab and Pepsu due to shortage, should be granted land in U.P., Rajasthan and other States and a time limit set for giving full proprietary rights.

7. You suggest a time limit of one year. It is possible that the matter might be settled in one year. But if it is not, then we should decide what step we can take to protect the interests of the displaced persons here. I am looking at this question entirely from the point of view of these displaced persons and their interests. They have still certain legal rights in their original lands in Pakistan. I would not like to put an end to this so long as there is no chance of their getting something out of it.

8. Your fourth question is about Gurdwaras.⁶ I really do not understand what you would like me to do in this matter. We have done our best and we are prepared to go as far as we can because we fully appreciate the anxiety of the Sikhs in regard to their Gurdwaras left in Pakistan. But the fact remains that these Gurdwaras are now in another country and all we can do is to bring pressure on that Government, short of declaring war. You would not advise us to declare war on such a question. We shall continue our efforts in this matter.

9. The situation is not made easy by the speeches and statements of Master Tara Singh and others who are continually calling for war against Pakistan. Nor is it made easy by the fact that large numbers of mosques in India have been occupied for other purposes. I do not understand what compensatory arrangements can be made in this matter.

10. As you have pointed out, I spoke on the question of language fully at Ludhiana.⁷

11. I also spoke at Ludhiana of the very special place of the Sikhs in the Punjab and of their having the fullest opportunities of growth there as elsewhere. It seems to me that unnecessary controversies in the Punjab over issues which can be dealt with, with relative ease, if objectively approached, have created many of the difficulties that we have to face today. I see no reason why the Sikhs should feel depressed. They are quite able enough to protect their legitimate interests and they will certainly have the support of others too in the protection of such interests.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Raising the question of Gurdwaras left in Pakistan, Kartar Singh demanded safe and free access for Sikhs to those Gurdwaras both for management and pilgrimage, compensatory arrangements for the properties there and, pending a permanent settlement, enabling the S.G.P.C. and other relevant bodies to prosecute their educational, cultural and religious missions.

7. See *ante*, pp. 97-98.

14. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
October 20, 1951

My dear Rajaji,

I have been somewhat dazed during the last few days. I am trying to recover but not with too much success. Suddenly it struck me that you were thinking of going away in the near future. I cannot now ask you not to do so, but I do hope that you will not leave us without due notice. You know that your going away will make a great difference here both to me and to my work. As far as possible, I should like to fix things up in consultation with you, before you go. I would suggest that you might stay here at least till the end of the first week of November. I do not wish you to exert yourself during these days, but I would like to consult you from time to time.

I feel that Katju must come here. Bidhan Roy has almost agreed. If you also put in a good word for this, the matter might be settled.

The real question is that of Katju's successor. You suggested Mukerjee.² There is nothing against him, but he is a very passive quantity with no individuality. Bidhan has no objection, but he is not wholly satisfied. We might perhaps think of a less passive person.

There is another important matter about which I would specially like your advice. That is in regard to the letter I wrote to London some days ago.³ I expect to have some response fairly soon.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.

2. H.C. Mukherjee.

3. Presumably the reference is to Nehru's letter to V.K. Krishna Menon of 14 October 1951. See *post*, pp. 752-755.

15. To Hukam Singh¹

New Delhi
October 26, 1951

My dear Sardar Hukam Singh

I have your letter of the 19th October. I am sorry for the delay in answering it. I have been terribly busy.

1. J.N. Collection.

You refer in this letter to some cases in which action was taken against Sikh officers. Among these cases are those of Major-General Lakhinder Singh and Brig. Pritam Singh. Both these cases, as well as others, were examined with the greatest care and in fact were repeatedly referred to me. I doubt if any matter of this kind has received the care and attention that was given to these cases. This delayed decisions and I enquired on several occasions why there was this delay. I was told that this delay had been caused because of the anxiety of the army authorities to see that every aspect of the case was fully examined by the various authorities concerned. Indeed, there seemed to me that if the officers had not been Sikh officers, probably the matter would have been decided earlier in the normal way. But the army authorities were particularly anxious to ensure that these senior officers' cases should receive very special attention. I know that I spent a good deal of time myself in looking through their files, although normally the Prime Minister does not deal with such matters. Some members of the Defence Committee were also consulted.

You will thus see that so far as we were concerned, we took special care and we were very anxious that senior officers should not be punished in any way unless facts compelled us.

You refer to what you call cases of apostacy. I confess that I have been considerably taken aback by this. The apostacy you mention is that some officer has decided to become clean-shaven. I do not see how anyone, least of all Government, can interfere with the personal habits of an officer or any other individual, even though those habits may have the force of custom or religion behind them. You refer to what the British Government did in this connection. I can only say that the British Government was completely wrong in interfering in this way. This is for the individuals concerned to decide and Government is not concerned either way. Otherwise you might get complaints from Hindus that a certain officer does not observe some Hindu custom of personal behaviour and, as you know, there are many such customs. The only policy that Government can adopt is not to interfere in any way with the religious customs or usage of people in the army or elsewhere and leave it to the individuals concerned. Your suggestion is that Government should interfere and compel people to behave in a particular way. I imagine that that would be against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and, in any way, it seems to me that this would be highly improper.

We have absolutely no desire to influence in any way Sikh officers to cut their hair or otherwise to give up any of the symbols or customs of their faith. If a few persons have done that, according to what you say, this is entirely their personal decision and they are as free to do it as not to do it. No question arises of an enquiry by Government into this matter.

We all know that the Sikhs have played a considerable part in the army and have a bright record in it. We want to preserve that record and to give

them every opportunity to add to it. But, I am sure you will agree with me that special privileges claimed by a group are not only inconsistent with our Constitution but ultimately do little good to that group. The Sikhs are a wide-awake, well-knit and strong community, who are respected all over India. It would be unfortunate if barriers are created between them and others.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

16. To K.C. Reddy¹

New Delhi
October 30, 1951

My dear Reddy,²

I have just received your letter of October 29th about the case against Raju and others.³ I remember quite well your speaking to me about this case at Bangalore. In fact we discussed this case afterwards too when you came to Delhi. At that time I gathered the definite impression from your talk with me that, at a later stage, you were thinking of asking for a judge from some other Province to try the case. I expressed my agreement with this idea.

I might inform you that I have no sympathy at all with Raju and others in this case. Also that I am anxious that the prestige of the Mysore judiciary should be kept up and that nothing should be done to lower it. Nevertheless, it has seemed to me, from every point of view, desirable that this case should be tried by an outside judge. This in no way involved a reflection on the Mysore judiciary. Indeed I would have thought that the Chief Justice and other Judges of your High Court would themselves make such a suggestion. I

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Mysore at this time.

3. Four prosecutions had been pending against L.S. Raju, an advocate and a leader of the Mysore State Congress, in a murder case. He appealed to the States Ministry to direct the Mysore Government to transfer the cases from Mysore State to some other State. Gopalaswami Ayyangar advised the Mysore Government to do so but they resisted the idea of transfer.

do not doubt the competence or impartiality of a senior Mysore District Judge to try the case.

But we have to consider the circumstances as they are and the great excitement and even passion roused by this case among many people in Mysore. We have not only to see that justice is done but to make people feel that it has been done. When any demand, *prima facie* reasonable, is made to transfer a case, all these surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. I have no doubt whatever that the proper course in Raju's case was and is to avoid even an appearance in some people's minds of a trial that is not completely fair and impartial. The case has become a *cause celebre* and cannot be treated as an ordinary one. Large numbers of people talk about it and discuss it and are excited by it. Therefore, no risk should be taken. It is quite conceivable that at a later stage arguments might be advanced in some superior court on the basis of an unfair trial. It is far safer to undermine such arguments right at the beginning.

I have myself been of opinion that a transfer from Mysore to another State was not, on the whole, desirable, provided that an outside judge was imported. From your talk with me and from what others have said to the Minister for States, I was under the impression that this course was sure to be adopted. It may be that you did not give any assurance, but the impression was there. Because of this impression, we did not take any other step. Now practically the last moment has come when a final decision on this subject has to be made.

I am most reluctant to have the Centre interfere in provincial autonomy and to issue any directives under the Constitution. Indeed, as I have told you, I was anxious that Mysore should be put on the same level as the Part A States. But this was delayed because of these difficulties that have cropped up in regard to this case as well as one or two other matters.

I have discussed this case on several occasions with my colleagues here. Do not imagine that I have been out of touch. I think that your Council of Ministers is not acting wisely in this matter. Indeed the very emphasis that is laid repeatedly on not carrying out the advice given to you from here makes one feel that there is a great deal of excitement over this issue in Mysore. Surely it is the natural thing, in these circumstances, to invite an outside judge and not allow any charge of partiality to be made later, however unjustified it might be.

I still hope that your Government will agree to bring in an outside judge. If not then you put yourselves and ourselves both in a difficult and embarrassing position. Without desiring in any way to interfere with your Government's views or actions, we have a certain responsibility also and we cannot shed it. We have tried our best to impress upon you the necessity for taking a course which we consider right and proper. If, nevertheless, you reject our advice,

then we are compelled to have recourse to the constitutional power to issue a directive. I realise that this will again create an embarrassing situation. But what else are we to do?

I know the facts of the case fairly well. Any detailed knowledge of additional facts is hardly necessary for us to consider the issue before us. I hope you will reconsider your decision.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

17. To Sampurnanand¹

New Delhi
October 31, 1951

My dear Sampurnanand,

Thank you for your letter of October 28th.²

We have not been entirely negligent about our Tibetan border. Full enquiries have been made by air and on land and we are considering reports of these enquiries. Some steps have already been taken on the lines of the recommendations made.

While I agree with you that all necessary steps, within our resources, should be taken as soon as possible, I do not think that we need take too gloomy a view of the situation.

I am a little surprised to learn that prices of rice and sugar etc., have been brought down considerably. Could you send me some further information on this subject?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Sampurnanand, a Minister in the U.P. Government, wrote that some areas adjoining Tibet had become vulnerable because of Tibetan activities supported by China. He wanted the Government to take necessary precautions by laying strategic roads, constructing barracks for soldiers and establishing army outposts on the Indian side.

8
NEPAL

1. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi
July 21, 1951

My dear Chandreshwar²,

I have received your letter of July 14th. I am glad to know that the K.I. Singh episode³ has brought some wisdom to the Nepal Government.

About the Advisory Council, I cannot offer much advice. I think it is certainly desirable. About the composition, much depends upon local knowledge of affairs which I do not possess. I should imagine that a purely nominated body would not be good. Perhaps a partly-elected and partly-nominated body might serve the purpose.

I did not know that the I.N.A. had cancelled their air services to Nepal. I am sorry to learn this. Some arrangement must be made for the continuance of these services. So far as I am concerned, it is immaterial whether the I.N.A. take it up or the Himalayan Airways.

I had a talk with Mrs. Dorothy Woodman⁴ today. She is leaving for England tomorrow. I know her quite well. She is intelligent and a good observer. The British Government will certainly utilise the knowledge that she may have gained. But she is very far from being a normal Government observer. She has been a leftist all her life and has been a powerful advocate of China for many years. I think, on the whole, that her visit will have a salutary influence on the British Government. You will probably have some articles in the *New Statesman* about Nepal.

One of her basic impressions is that the Nepali Congress should be strengthened. In this I entirely agree with her. I have long been of opinion that the principal stabilising factor in Nepal is the Nepali Congress. This can only be done by strenuous and wisely directed efforts. Merely trying to get overhead power is not enough. Above all, what is to be avoided is any appearance of nepotism; that will go against them. M.P. Koirala seems to me the wisest of the Nepali Congress people and he should appreciate all this.

Dorothy Woodman made an unusual suggestion to me. She suggested that the King of Nepal should go to England as the U.K. Government's guest for a while. I did not say much to her, but on the whole, I liked the idea. I think

1. J.N. Collection.

2. India's Ambassador in Nepal.

3. K.I. Singh, who was a leader of a faction of Nepalese revolutionaries, indulged in terrorist activities in western Terai. At the request of the Government of Nepal, the Government of India sent its police force to suppress the revolt. On 20 February, Singh and 357 persons of his group were captured, but he escaped on 11 July. He was rearrested on 10 August and deported to Kathmandu.

4. British author and companion of Kingsley Martin.

a brief visit might have good consequences. But I rather doubt if the time has come for it. In any event, it is for the U.K. Government to send an invitation and we cannot angle for it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi
July 27, 1951

My dear Chandreshwar,

Thank you for your letter of July 25, which Shrinagesh² gave me. I have also had a brief talk with Shrinagesh.

It seems to me clear, as it was even when I was in Kathmandu, that the only proper approach to the problem of Nepal is to build up the strength of the Nepali Congress. I am not thinking in terms of individuals, though individuals count, but rather in terms of an organisation. Apart from the Nepali Congress, I see no integrating force in Nepal, barring the King. The King can play a very useful role, but even that role will be nullified if he functions as an overall and final authority. Apart from this, it is bad in the long run for the King to become more or less an autocratic monarch, however good his intentions might be. The influence of the King will be far more healthy and far more lasting if it is always exercised by way of informal advice than by his coming into the fray himself and deciding for or against any group or party. He must remain somewhat aloof from party warfare. At the same time, in the circumstances prevailing in Nepal, he should be instrumental in strengthening the Nepali Congress movement, without obvious party bias, because that movement, as I have said above, represents one solidifying factor in Nepal. It may be that that movement itself is split up at the present moment.³ If it has no real basis or foundation, it will go to pieces and some other equilibrium will have to be found. There may even be no equilibrium for a long time. But

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Jayavant Mallannah Shrinagesh (1905-1977); joined I.C.S., 1928; Adviser to Nepal Government, 1950-51; Managing Director, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, 1952-58, and of Indian Refineries 1958-60.

3. The brothers, B.P. Koirala and M.P. Koirala, were rivals for leadership in the Nepali Congress.

I still think that the Nepali Congress has an adequate basis on which something can be built, in spite of splits and in spite of deficiencies.

In the circumstances prevailing in Nepal, it is difficult for the machine to run smoothly without constant advice from others. The others may be the King or you or our advisers.⁴ Each of these has to function, of course, in a different sphere. But each of them should take care not to overshadow the normal machine or to make it appear that Government is directed by him. This is not a question of rules, but of tactful handling and advice at the right moment without appearing to impose it too much. Sometimes the advice may be couched, if necessary, in more urgent language if the situation demands it.

If that is the position of the King, that should also be your position and, of course, that of the advisers. Much can be done individually and privately and results obtained, but always both the reality and fiction of the minimum of interference should be observed. Thus it should normally not appear that Ministers are sent for and given directions as if the directing authority was outside. The public should not feel that, and even the Ministers should not have that feeling. There should be a good deal of frankness in informal talks with individuals and the impression that an attempt is made to pull the strings against any individual Minister or the King should always be avoided.

So far as the advisers are concerned, they should function as the employees of the Nepal Government giving them their frank and independent advice in any matter referred to them and at the same time, carrying out the directions of the Government even though they may not be in consonance with the advice tendered. That may not always be liked by the persons to whom advice is given but that is the only way to build up a tradition and to give efficient service. An adviser who is afraid of giving his advice frankly ceases to have value. Of course, any advice given must be tactfully done and not in a way to make the other person feel that it is imposed upon him.

The relations of the Ambassador and the advisers have always to be carefully arranged. The Ambassador has to keep in touch with the advisers. At the same time, it is not good to give the impression that the advisers are tools of the Ambassador to carry out his wishes in the Government. The plant of Nepal's governmental apparatus is a tender one facing all kinds of rough winds. It has to be tended with care. The human element obviously is important as in everything.

The decision of the Cabinet that advisers should not attend makes me wonder why this was done and at whose initiative. The advisers are there to

4. Soon after the coalition Government assumed charge in Nepal in May 1951, it sought assistance from the Government of India to overhaul its administration. The Government of India sent three experts to work as advisers besides a person to act as the King's private secretary.

help and not to interfere. They should be given opportunities to help and do their work. Normally speaking, they would be able to help at Cabinet meetings. At the same time, I can quite understand that the Ministers might want to discuss something in the absence of the advisers. To say that advisers must not attend the Cabinet meetings at any time seems to flow from some particular reason which I do not know. I do not wish to force the advisers down the throats of the Nepal Government. If they are dissatisfied with them, as according to accounts they are not, then why take this decision. What I mean is this. The attendance or not at the Cabinet may have a certain importance, but I am not so much worried about that as the general attitude towards them. If it is helpful and cooperative, then it was all right. If not, then difficulties will crop up at every stage. You might informally point all this out to the persons concerned, the King and the Ministers. As I said, the proper course is for the advisers normally to attend the Cabinet meetings and on occasions for Cabinet to meet by itself, when it so chooses.

You refer to China, Afghanistan and Burma wishing to open embassies at Nepal. I agree with the advice you have given. The matter should be handled tactfully and it is better not to give a blank refusal but rather to delay and say for the moment, owing to various problems and difficulties, the Nepal Government find it difficult to arrange for an inter-change of diplomatic representatives.

I have referred to the Nepali Congress above. I do not know well their principal representatives. But I have been impressed chiefly by three persons, M.P. Koirala, Subarna⁵ and Surya Prasad. I should particularly like M.P. Koirala to play a more important role.

It is difficult for me to say anything about change or reconstruction of the Cabinet. Frequent changes are not good. But a minor change can always be brought about. A wholesale change frequently made brings about instability and no Cabinet can really function that way. Of course, if circumstances urgently require a major change, that cannot be helped. But it is better to wait for those circumstances to arise.

There is no doubt that K.I. Singh's escape etc. has shown the lack of efficiency of the Government. However, that is over and one should deal with the situation as it is. I am not greatly worried with local petty revolts. The chief thing is to build up a strong central government. If that is done, other

5. Subarna Shumsher Rana (1909-1979); Major-General, Royal Nepalese Army, 1929; deported from the country by the Rana regime, 1933; settled in Birgunj, 1937; returned to Nepal, 1947; one of the founders of the Nepali Democratic Congress, 1947, and later of the Nepali Congress, 1949; commander-in-chief, Mukti Sena which was involved in the revolution of 1950; Minister for Finance, 1951; Chairman, Council of Ministers, 1957; Deputy Prime Minister, 1959-60; self-exiled in India, 1960, President of banned Nepali Congress Party, 1960-68.



WITH BIJAYA SHAMSHER, AMBASSADOR OF NEPAL IN INDIA, KING TRIBHUVAN OF NEPAL AND B.P. KOIRALA OF THE NEPALI CONGRESS, NEW DELHI, 13 AUGUST 1951



WITH THAKIN NU, PRIME MINISTER OF BURMA, NEW DELHI, 21 OCTOBER 1951

problems will be gradually solved. I do not expect any real trouble at the Tibet border, but there may well be some infiltration and it is desirable to have some check posts as soon as possible.

I can say nothing about the allegations to which you refer which relate to B.P. Koirala and some money taken from Thapa.⁶ If any evidence is available, this should be placed before Koirala or his elder brother. What worries me is a tendency to employ near relatives in high offices.

If the Central Government functions more or less efficiently, it will easily make itself felt in the distant areas. It is very desirable, however, to pick and choose the Bada Hakims⁷ carefully. They really represent the Government. One should not hesitate to change if a Bada Hakim has proved unsuccessful. It is a good idea to send for some of these Bada Hakims as individuals or in some groups and explain to them the situation and what is expected of them. Some elementary notions of how to work should be put before them.

About the question of your intervention, no one can draw a hard and fast line. The point is how it is done. Intervention can take place without the appearance of intervention. Even an informal advice can go far. The only way to decide what should be done is to use one's own judgment, keeping in view the suggestions I have made above.

I am returning to you Surya Prasad's letter.

I enclose a letter for the King.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Vishwa Bandhu Thapa (b. 1927); leader, Nepali Congress Party; Minister for Home Affairs, Government of Nepal, 1951 and 1960; Bada Hakim of Pokhara and Gorkha districts, 1951-53; imprisoned during the civil disobedience movement, 1953; elected to Pratinidhi Sabha, 1958; Minister for Home Panchayat and National Guidance Council, 1962-63; member, Rashtriya Panchayat, 1963-66.
7. Bada Hakims were district officials in Nepal.

3. Loan of Indian Officials¹

On the reconstitution of the Nepal Cabinet, as a consequence of the major changes that took place there, it was suggested that some experienced officers should be sent to Kathmandu to help and advise in bringing about a proper

1. Note given to the King of Nepal, New Delhi, 20 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

administrative set-up. It was clear that the old set-up was not adequate for the purpose. Indeed there was very little organised administration previously. Therefore it was necessary to lay down rules and regulations so that the normal administrative machine should function with some regularity and ease. This is the basis of governmental activity and unless there is some such machine, the best of Ministers cannot carry out their policies.

2. So far as policies were concerned, it was clear that the Cabinet or the individual Ministers, within their respective spheres, were responsible for them.

3. The change-over in Nepal brought many problems. The first one was of law and order and the restoration of peace. Without this, other progress was not possible. This itself required a well-organised central administration as well as contact with and control of the other parts of the country. There were obvious difficulties in this contact and control because of lack of communications. There was also no proper police force. Indeed there were many lacks which had to be made good in time. The immediate issue was a properly running central administration.

4. This could be divided up, broadly speaking, into two parts—(1) General Administration and (2) Finances. It was suggested that competent and experienced senior officers might be lent by the Government of India to the Government of Nepal for both these purposes, that is, one to advise on general administration and the other on finances. Of course both could be consulted and their advice taken where necessary.

5. In the new set-up, it was clear that the responsibility of the King was considerable and that he would have to deal with a good deal of public matters. He would have to deal with the Cabinet, with his Ministers individually, and with a large number of papers that would come to him officially. Apart from this, he would no doubt have other public contacts. It was desirable, therefore, that the King should have a competent and experienced officer, functioning as his Public Secretary, to deal with these papers and place them before him in proper form. His general work would not be that of a Private Secretary, but of a Secretary dealing with the public aspects of the King's work. The two aspects might not always be separated by hard and fast lines. But, as a rule, they could be kept apart. In the case of the President of India, there are a number of Secretaries. There is a Military Secretary dealing with the household and there is a Private Secretary. Each of these has assistants. A vast mass of papers go up to the President daily and it is not possible for him to deal with them, unless they are properly scrutinised, arranged and, where necessary, notes put up.

6. The work in Nepal would be much less than that of the President of India. Nevertheless, it would be of importance and it was desirable for trained assistants to be placed at the King's disposal, so that this work could be speedily and effectively done. The proposal, therefore, was that a competent

young officer be lent by the Government of India to the Nepal Government to serve as His Majesty's Public Secretary.

7. Thus the proposals were that three officers should be loaned by the Government of India to the Government of Nepal:

- (1) a general adviser on the administration;
- (2) a financial adviser, and
- (3) a person to serve as the King's public secretary.

8. On a request being made by the Nepal Government for the above three officers, they were sent from India. Great care was exercised in their choices by the Government of India because it was felt that our best men should go to Nepal with a view to help the Nepal Government and His Majesty at a time when grave problems of transition faced the country and an entirely new set-up had to be built. The officers sent were of experience and integrity.

9. They could be spared with difficulty by the Governments concerned in India. But these difficulties were set aside because of the desire to give every help to the Nepal Government during this transition period.

10. It is reported that these officers have done good work and laid down the basis of administration. Nevertheless some difficulties and frictions have arisen. These three officers used to attend Cabinet meetings and helped in the drawing up of the agenda etc., for the Cabinet. Recently the Cabinet decided that they should not, in future, attend Cabinet meetings. In some other ways also, these officers have felt that they have not got the same opportunities of effective service, as they used to have.

11. The officers were sent to Nepal because of the need of the Nepal Government and their request for them. If the need is not there or the desire to retain them, then there is no point in their continuing in Nepal. Good officers should not be wasted or have a feeling that they are becoming functionless. It is for the Nepal Government to decide whether they can utilise them fully or not. If they do not wish to utilise their services fully, then these officers can return to India and undertake some other important work here. The Government of India has not got the least desire to keep these officers in Nepal, if the Government of Nepal does not feel the need for them or cannot fully utilise their services.

12. Presuming, however, that there is need for them in Nepal for some time to come, it should be clearly understood what their functions are. Their functions of course are to advise and it is for the Ministers or the Cabinet to decide on any policy or action.

13. The question of their attendance at Cabinet meetings has arisen. This is not a matter of principle but of expediency and utility. Whatever helps in the proper carrying on of the work should be done. It is clear that officers of

seniority and experience can only give useful advice, if they are trusted and if they are kept in touch with developments. Otherwise it will be difficult for them to offer useful advice. From this point of view, they should be kept in intimate touch with matters relating to them. Normally, when such matters are considered, it would be helpful to the Cabinet to have their attendance. Even before that, it would be desirable for the particular officer concerned to put up notes on the items in the agenda of the Cabinet. Indeed, the usual course should be for full noting on important matters so that when they come up for consideration before the Cabinet, they are ripe for decision and all aspects have been placed before the Cabinet. Even so, a discussion during the Cabinet brings out various viewpoints and questions may be asked which require an answer. If the adviser is present there, he might help in answering some questions or explaining some aspects of the matter. This would expedite business. Otherwise there might be delay in making further references. At the same time there might well be occasions when the Members of the Cabinet desire to consider some matter by themselves and without the presence of any officer.

14. The practice of the Cabinet in India has been to summon any particular senior officer of a Ministry for subjects concerning him. When a subject concerns two or three Ministers, two or three officers might be summoned at the same time. They are present when such subjects are discussed by Cabinet and answer questions or give such information as may be required.

15. The Indian Cabinet thus sometimes has some officers present and sometimes not. But the Cabinet always has the Cabinet Secretary (and his Assistant Secretary) present. The Cabinet Secretary himself is a very senior officer, who is often consulted by the Cabinet. Frequently, when any matter involving finance or planning is considered, a financial officer is present.

16. If this practice, which has proved helpful in India, is applied to Nepal, normally the adviser on general administration would be present at Cabinet meetings, because most matters that come up before the Cabinet would in some form or other concern him. When any financial matter is considered, the financial adviser should also be present. Thus on some occasions both may be present; on other occasions one of them may be there. This should always be considered from the point of view of effective work.

17. The question of the advisers being present or not present at Cabinet meetings appears to have been considered thus far from a somewhat wrong point of view. First of all, there should be no question, normally speaking, of the advisers functioning as a group. In some matters, their joint advice might be taken but, as a rule, they function as individuals in their respective spheres.

18. So far as the King's Secretary is concerned, his position is different. He is the King's Secretary and not the adviser of any Ministry or of the Government as a whole. He functions under the directions of the King. He

has to keep the King in touch with public activities, and more especially with the functioning of Government and Cabinet, he would receive all papers, etc. His presence at a Cabinet meeting, if so desired, would be of a different kind from that of the administrative adviser or the financial adviser. His presence would only serve the purpose of keeping the King in touch with the proceedings of the Cabinet. It is entirely for His Majesty and for the Cabinet to consider whether his presence at Cabinet meetings is necessary or not. It may be that on particular occasions this was considered desirable and on other occasions it was not considered necessary.

19. The point to be borne in mind is that the sphere of activity of the King's Secretary is different from that of the two advisers. Further that the two advisers do not function jointly as a rule but in their individual spheres. It would, however, be a good thing if the two advisers conferred with each other frequently, because they deal with common matters and finance comes into the picture in most things. Any Minister could confer with either of them or both. The adviser on administration would naturally have to maintain contacts with every Ministry and department. The financial adviser would be principally under the Finance Minister, but would have to be in touch with various Ministries and departments.

20. It would be desirable for His Majesty the King to grant interviews to the two advisers separately once a week so that they could report to him their own work and the work of Government and receive any advice or directions from him. The advisers would of course keep in intimate touch with the Ministers.

21. The purpose of our loaning officers to the Nepal Government is that they might help in building up the administrative structure and train Nepalese officers to discharge their new functions adequately and effectively. The two advisers should therefore keep in constant touch with the senior Nepalese officers in various departments so that they can help them to work on right lines. Sometimes it might be desirable for a number of senior officers to meet the general administrative adviser to discuss administrative matters and the way to deal with them. This procedure might be repeated in connection with financial matters with the financial adviser. The whole purpose is to build up a sound administrative apparatus and to formalise certain routines of work. An administration should not work in a haphazard way. It should be efficient and be capable of giving the fullest assistance to the Ministers, who have to decide policies. In deciding these policies, efficient administrative officers put forward every aspect of the case so that the decision might not be made in ignorance of some fact or some important aspect. Ministers cannot be expected to have everything in mind all the time and it is the function of the administrative officers working under them to note down these various matters to be considered. Hence the value of noting in files, which is a record which can be consulted whenever a necessity arises.

22. In the Government of India, this noting on files has been carried to an excess and we are trying to reduce it. In Nepal there is no such danger. Indeed the danger lies the other way of the total absence of noting. Therefore, the practice of at least one full note for every matter discussed in Cabinet or elsewhere should be encouraged. The writing of a note clarifies ideas and forces the writer to think. It is a test of his capacity. If he cannot write a note properly, than he has no clear ideas on the subject and his advice is not very valuable.

23. Any advice given by an officer to his Minister is of value only to the extent that it is the advice of an independent and trained observer. That is to say, the advice should be independent advice and should not be given merely to fit in with the advice of the superior. That does not help at all. Of course the final decision is of the superior. But officers should always be encouraged to give their opinions frankly.

24. At any time, and more especially in the formative stage of an administration, it is very necessary to lay down a sound foundation. If the foundation is not good, the superstructure will also be unstable and unsound. Hence the great importance, during this transitional stage of Nepal's history, to lay down sound foundations of the administrative set-up and the practices and conventions to be followed. This does not mean that some dead routine should necessarily be followed. Changes are taking place in Nepal from day to day and there must be an adaptation to them. Nevertheless, proper ways and methods should be laid down and certain conventions observed even when bringing about adaptations from time to time.

25. The personal element in an administration is always important. The best of administrations will fail if the personnel is lacking in competence. Therefore, care has to be taken to choose the right persons and to give them such training as is possible.

26. Competence is important, but integrity is more important still. In the choice of officers, the greatest stress must be laid on integrity and in their subsequent functioning also, this matter should always be borne in mind. It is for this reason that Public Service Commissions are set up, so that general rules are followed in the choice of candidates and no personal preference or nepotism is encouraged. Public Service Commissions make mistakes. But still it is better to have some such organisation than to leave matters to personal preference.

27. It is at least as important for the public to appreciate that right methods are followed in the choice of officers and in the method of doing work. This is important at any time but more so in a democratic set-up. It is not enough for the right thing to be done, it is necessary for the public to feel that the right thing has been done. The public does not usually take much interest in administrative working, except when it affects their own interests. But the

public takes a good deal of interest in appointments to the public services. Because of this, no appointments should be made, which give rise to any marked public criticism of favouritism or nepotism.

28. The best of Governments cannot go far without having a large measure of public cooperation. Therefore, an attempt should be made to keep in touch with public feeling and to rouse public enthusiasm for the policies and programmes undertaken. There is bound to be criticism by rival groups and disgruntled persons. This will not matter provided the right steps are taken and the right methods are employed and the right persons chosen.

29. In governmental work, there should be constant discussion so as to evoke a spirit of cooperation. There is sometimes a tendency for petty intrigue. This is obviously harmful and jealousies arise. Whenever there is any kind of a complaint or suspicion, the matter should be discussed immediately by the persons concerned so as to remove the suspicion which grows by being ignored.

4. Telegram to C.P.N. Singh¹

Your telegram No. 136/51-HE dated 25th.² I have clearly explained to the King and to others our analysis of the situation there and our advice that frequent changes in the Cabinet are not desirable, unless circumstances compel such a change. Stability is the first necessity for Nepal and frequent changes in the Cabinet come in the way of stability. Nothing can be worse than for different groups in the Cabinet to attack each other and thus create instability and impede progress.

I cannot give more precise advice as I am not in intimate touch with the changing situation. I can only give general advice. Any steps taken must be carefully weighed and consequences considered. This is not merely a matter of changing members of Cabinet, but of reaction of this on general public opinion as well as particular groups like the Gurkhas. Having considered all these matters, such a decision as the Nepal Government wish can be taken, but with a full sense of responsibility of consequences. If situation worsens as a result of change, India will not be able to help. We have no desire to meddle in internal Nepal affairs, nor to assume any responsibility.

1. New Delhi, 26 September 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. C.P.N. Singh had reported that the King and Nepali Congress Ministers sought the removal of the Rana Ministers, including the Prime Minister, Mohun Shamsher, from the Cabinet. When the King hinted to Mohun Shamsher of his desire to drop him, he replied that he was in the Cabinet as arranged by India.

5. Telegram to C.P.N. Singh¹

Your telegram 139/51 dated 26th September.²

General Bijaya³ saw me this evening and spoke of Cabinet crisis in Nepal. I replied to him in terms of my telegram to you yesterday. There was no question of our being pledged to maintain *status quo* in Nepal, but we were naturally anxious for stability and progressive administration. Before any change was decided upon full consideration should be given to every aspect and possible consequences. We cannot hold ourselves responsible for these consequences.

Bijaya asked what would happen if one group resigned from Cabinet. I replied that presumably this would mean reconstruction of whole Cabinet and King playing considerable part in this.

1. New Delhi, 27 September 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. C.P.N. Singh reported that M.P. Koirala and five Nepali Congress Ministers favoured the reconstitution of the coalition Cabinet by the Nepali Congress alone without the advisory council. The Rana Prime Minister, Mohun Shamsher, and the Rana Ministers, held that India had pledged to maintain the *status quo* and no change in the Cabinet was possible until the constituent assembly met. Singh observed that both sides were afraid of taking any step for fear of India's views.
3. General Bijaya Shamsher was the son of Mohun Shamsher and Director in the Nepal Foreign Office. He acted as the representative of Mohun Shamsher in Delhi at this time.

6. To King Tribhuvan¹

New Delhi
3 October, 1951

My dear Friend,

During the course of the past year, certain events and developments in Nepal, in which Your Majesty has played a considerable part, have brought about

1. J.N. Collection.

closer intimacy in the relations of India and Nepal.² On several occasions we have discussed with you, your Prime Minister and your other Ministers, these developments which took place because the then existing order was not in tune with the times and there was a strong desire on the part of large numbers of people in Nepal for change that would make the system of Government popular and progressive. You yourself sympathised with these popular feelings and the great weight of your position and influence was thrown on the side of change and a popular government.

We in India had on many occasions previously pointed out to the then Prime Minister the urgent necessity for changes in Nepal and the danger of delay. We were naturally interested in the future of Nepal because of our long-standing friendship with that country and our desire to see it progress on democratic lines. We were also deeply interested in any development in Nepal because this affected our own security. Great changes were taking place in the interior of Asia which required fresh thinking and new adjustments both in Nepal and India.

We welcomed, therefore, changes in the direction of democratic progress in Nepal which were introduced early this year. We know that the initial stages of this journey would be difficult. Democratic change, after a long period of autocratic and authoritarian rule, releases many suppressed forces which tend to be indisciplined in the early stages, and a sense of responsibility, which is essential for ordered freedom, takes time to grow. Thus there is always a danger that the new freedom might lead to growth of indiscipline and even licence and the stability of the State be weakened, delaying reform and even endangering the freedom gained.

We were anxious, therefore, in the interests of Nepal as well as in India's interests, that stability should be assured in Nepal during the difficult months ahead. On our advice being sought, we suggested certain immediate changes in the Constitution and Government of Nepal, to be followed by the election of a constituent assembly which would draw up a new constitution for the country. This advice was given in close consultaion with Your Majesty and your advisers and was accepted by you.

The changes suggested were brought about and, we believe, were widely welcomed by the people of Nepal. They sought to put an end to the previous

2. In February 1951, Nehru secured the acceptance of the Rana leadership for setting up a constituent assembly based on adult suffrage. King Tribhuvan, who had taken asylum in India following political disturbances in Nepal in 1950, returned to Kathmandu and a Rana-Nepali Congress interim ministry was set up. In the subsequent power struggle in May 1951, Nehru mediated to bring about an agreement between the Rana and Nepali Congress leaders to work in a coalition Cabinet for the political and economic development of Nepal. India also helped Nepal in April 1951 with its police forces to quell lawlessness.

autocratic rule and to bring about as large a measure as possible of cooperation in the working of the new Government. We felt that this cooperation was especially necessary during this critical period of change in Nepal. We knew that no arrangement, however good, would solve, by itself, and at once, the many difficult problems that the country would have to face; such a solution could only come gradually. What was essential in the early stages was a stable government which would re-establish law and order throughout the country, take immediate steps in the direction of political and economic reform, and thus make a start with building up a modern, progressive and efficient administration.

It was our earnest desire that Nepal should retain her independence and progress rapidly so as to bring higher standards of living and greater happiness to her people. We did not wish to interfere in any way in the internal administration. Because Nepal lacked trained personnel, at your request, we gladly gave some of our senior officers to act as advisers.

Subsequently certain internal conflicts arose and these resulted in some further changes both in the Government and in the administrative set-up. Your Prime Minister and other Ministers came to Delhi to consult us, and we were happy to give such help in the shape of advice as we thought desirable. In giving this advice, we made it clear that it was not our desire to interfere in the internal arrangements of Nepal and that our principal interest was in the stability of Government and in progressive administration. Somewhat later, Your Majesty favoured us with a visit in Delhi and I discussed various matters with you. On that occasion I handed to you two notes which were in the nature of *aides memoire* of our conversations.

Since then we have been receiving information about Nepal both from our own Ambassador in Kathmandu and Your Majesty's Ambassador in Delhi. We have learnt with satisfaction of some improvement in the law and order situation in the interior of Nepal and also of certain land reforms which are being initiated.³ I do not know the details of these land reforms. But I have long been convinced that agrarian reform was an urgent step for Nepal to take.

We have also learnt that there has been a great deal of internal conflict in the Government and proposals are being constantly made for some change or the other. Any changes taking place in the Government or Cabinet of Nepal are not our direct concern and, if the public interest demands it, changes have to be made. No arrangements previously made can be regarded as permanent. What has troubled me, however, is the fact that constantly new and sometimes contradictory proposals are made. I understand that my name is brought in occasionally as supporting or objecting to some proposal. I have a feeling that

3. Land legislation had been initiated to revise the structure of land ownership in Nepal.

the various elements in the Nepal Government have no clarity or singleness of direction and that various people are pulling in different ways. Such a process of drift can only produce instability and consequent injury to the country.

It is for this reason that I have taken the liberty to write to you. I could understand differences of opinion on matters of principle or on proposals of reform. I do not know, and I have not been told, about such differences. I conclude, therefore, that these differences are largely personal and due to intrigues and rivalries. It is this aspect of recent happenings in Nepal which distresses me, because it can only lead to a progressive deterioration of the situation and to the strengthening of anti-social and anti-national elements in the country. Reports in the press as well as the information we receive from other sources, often do not fit in with each other and contradictory statements are made by Ministers or other leaders of public opinion. Without desiring to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of Nepal, I have felt that I cannot remain a silent spectator of any process of progressive disruption. It is for this reason that I have ventured to draw your attention to these disintegrating tendencies. They would have been unfortunate at any time; in the present state of affairs in Nepal, as well as in Asia, they are deplorable. The security of our own country is likely to be affected by any further deterioration in the situation in Nepal.

What troubles me most is the rather casual way in which proposals are made and contradicted, and the lack of an impersonal and cooperative approach to the grave problems that confront the country. Personalities count and must continue to count, but problems should not be considered in terms of personalities only, otherwise they would be reduced to the level of personal intrigues.

Your Majesty is aware of the developments in Tibet.⁴ Both India and Nepal have a long frontier with Tibet and such developments, therefore, must necessarily affect both our countries. Fortunately our relations with the People's Government of China are good. We hope that in the near future we shall still further stabilise these relations and come to an agreement about matters that might still be considered to be in doubt. Such an agreement would obviously be to the advantage of all countries concerned, including Nepal. But any attempt at such agreement would be hindered if the situation in Nepal deteriorates in any way.

Because these matters are of high interest to both our countries, I have drawn your attention to them in the hope that Your Majesty and your Government will give thought to them and come to conclusions only after the

4. China occupied Tibet in 1950 and rejected India's suggestion that Tibet's autonomy be respected.

fullest consideration of all the consequences of any step that might be taken. My Government and I would always be happy to offer such advice as may be needed but without in any way interfering with the responsibility and freedom of your Government to take decisions. Should any decisions so taken appear unhelpful to us, my Government naturally will be unable to assume any responsibility for any consequences that might follow.

If your Majesty so wishes, you can bring the contents of this letter to the notice of your Prime Minister and other Ministers, or if you prefer it, our Ambassador in Kathmandu can do so.

I need hardly assure you that we earnestly desire the progress of Nepal towards democratic freedom and the well-being of her people. I know that you are devoted to this ideal yourself and are seeking to realise it. It is because of this community of objective that I have ventured to write to you so fully and frankly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. The Threat from Tibet¹

...The possibility of a regular invasion of Nepal or India by Chinese forces through Tibet can be ruled out even as a remote contingency. In any event, in the present state of affairs, it is not a proposition which we need consider. I need not go into the reasons for this, but it seems to me an obvious conclusion. What might happen is some petty trouble in the borders and unarmed infiltration. To some extent this can be stopped by checkpoints, which are necessary. Ultimately, however, armies do not stop communist infiltration or communist ideas. They have to be dealt with by other methods, namely a strong, stable and progressive civil government undertaking major reforms, more particularly relating to land.

1. Nehru's comments on the note written by G.S. Bajpai, Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs, who had suggested that "though a large Chinese army or a Tibetan army under Chinese inspiration and leadership may not attempt an invasion of India, the possibility of small forces dribbling in through the numerous passes, and then combining to make trouble for us cannot be and had not been ruled out." 5 October 1951. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

Any large expenditure on the army will starve the development of the country and social progress. That is much more likely to endanger the stability than the lack of army to protect frontiers.

8. Telegram to C.P.N. Singh¹

Your telegram No. 148/51-AMB, dated 6th October.² You presumably want instruction on two points:

- (1) Continuing crisis in Nepal Cabinet,
- (2) Composition of recently announced Advisory Council.

It would be premature to discuss No. 2 until the outcome of efforts to solve No. 1 becomes known. Those already nominated to Council cannot be removed, though a few additions might be made to bring in elements who have been left out. If Advisory Council is used by dominant group merely to strengthen its own position and try to eliminate others, then it would accomplish little. It would be desirable if Advisory Council did not discuss matters relating to the King and the Cabinet.

As regards No. 1, I have already written to the King and it is for him and for his Ministers to take a final decision with due regard to consequences and in full awareness that they must bear responsibility for those consequences. The fact that loyalties of people and Services are divided is itself a reason for effort to be made to prevent any development which puts a strain on these divided loyalties and thus brings about a crisis with consequent instability. As far as we can make out, the Maharaja's attitude in Cabinet is cooperative and certainly not obstructive. This appears from unanimous decision regarding *birta* lands.³ Advantages should be taken of this attitude to further reform in administration, solution of land problem, etc. These reforms, coming from a joint Cabinet, would be more easily accepted by great majority and would

1. New Delhi, 8 October 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. C.P.N. Singh had asked Nehru's advice on the renewed tension created by the nomination of 32 persons of the Nepali Congress to the Advisory Council by the King without consulting all the political parties. The Rana Prime Minister had protested that since no independent member or anybody from his group had been taken in "the purpose behind the Advisory Council had been completely thwarted."

3. Much of the land in Nepal was under the *birta* (rent free) system and belonged to a few favoured families.

thus strengthen Government. If break takes place in Cabinet on obvious lines this might produce homogeneity in Cabinet, but would lead to any proposed reforms meeting with strenuous opposition from organised groups, apart from other consequences. Proper time for Cabinet changes would be if there was conflict on some important issue and not merely on personal grounds. We do not know of any such conflict at present, even though there might be lack of confidence in each other.

Our friendly interest and disinterested purpose in Nepal is in stability and progress. Present Government represents interim arrangement to deal with urgent matters and to bring into being as quickly as possible constituent assembly. We are not in a position to weigh all relevant factors. But it appears to us that whatever division of loyalties there might be, present conflict is largely personal and personal differences should not be allowed to come in the way of requisite measure of cooperation and harmonious working. If this cannot be achieved, then those primarily concerned must take decision that they consider best and assume full responsibility for consequences.

This advice is meant for all, King, Maharaja and other Ministers and Congress.

9. The Crisis in the Coalition Cabinet¹

We have discussed the position in Nepal fully with our Ambassador and with some representatives of the Nepal Congress, as well as a Minister there. It seems to me clear that the present position is highly unsatisfactory. This is not due so much to any marked differences in policy, but rather to personal conflicts, aversions, jealousies and ambitions. The human material available is limited. Therefore, any changes made would largely amount to reshuffling, though there is some room for the introduction of new elements.

2. A great deal is said about the Prime Minister coming in the way of the popular group and of intriguing against the dominant group in public and in private. But, so far as I know, he has not come in the way of any policy or even any executive act. This is chiefly due to his weak position and fear of consequences. In effect the Prime Minister and the so-called Rana group have no real authority or power left. They may still have a certain vague influence

1. Note to Secretary-General, M.E.A., New Delhi, 28 October 1951. J.N. Collection.

and prestige in the country, though even that has greatly diminished. A factor to be borne in mind is the personal dislike of the King for the Prime Minister.

3. The two other elements are the King and the popular Ministers, so far as the Government is concerned. There are, of course, other elements in the country. The King occupies a dominant position in many ways. He tends to act on his own initiative. Probably he means well, but he is totally inexperienced and is apt to follow the latest advice given to him. In the matter of the appointment of the Advisory Council or Assembly, he acted wrongly in not consulting his Government and was too precipitate in his action. I think he realised that later. Anyhow, the King remains as a unifying factor and all one can do is to help in establishing conventions which might prevent precipitate or autocratic action.

4. The popular Ministers do not seem to be a very happy or homogeneous group, though, on the whole, they pull together. B.P. Koirala is the leading spirit among them. He has certain virtues, but he has some obvious failings also. He is precipitate and impetuous and often makes mistakes. It appears also that he is anxious to increase his own power and authority. He is accused of nepotism. It is stated that he has grown very unpopular and, to some extent, his activities have made the whole Government unpopular.

5. Among the other members, the prominent ones are General Subarna and S.P. Upadhyaya.² General Subarna is in close association with B.P. Koirala and, on the whole, they pull together and, between them, share a great deal of power and authority. S.P. Upadhyaya is probably one of the most competent members of the Cabinet. His advice is sought, but not always acted upon. His position is not at all a key one. Bhadrakali Misra,³ a young man from the Terai, has no particular influence and is rather ignored. But he appears to me to be a good, earnest and competent young man who should be encouraged. As he comes from the Terai and often presses the claims of the Terai, he is disliked by others, who think much more of Kathmandu or other areas of Nepal.

6. I think that the present Prime Minister cannot last for long in this position, and we must come to the decision that he should go. It would be better to make this departure as gentle and courteous as possible. There is no particular point in having another Rana as Prime Minister. The only such person available appears to be General Kaiser.⁴ In some ways he will be

2. (1913-1984); began political career in India; imprisoned at Varanasi during Indian freedom struggle, 1943-46; leader, Nepali Rashtriya Congress Party, 1948; member, Drafting Committee of the Constitution of Nepal; Secretary, Nepali Congress Party, 1956-57; Minister for Home Affairs, Law and Justice, 1960.

3. Leader of the Nepali Congress.

4. Field Marshal Sir Kaiser Shamsur Jang Bahadur Rana was the brother of the Prime Minister and commander-in-chief.

better than the present Prime Minister but the inner conflicts will not cease if he is appointed Prime Minister. It is quite possible that in that position he might take a stronger line than he does today. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the new Prime Minister should be other than a Rana.

7. Obviously, he must then come from the Nepali Congress group. I have long resisted this for a number of reasons which I have stated. But I am now driven to the conclusion that it is better to have a Nepali Congress Prime Minister.

8. I do not think that B.P. Koirala would be the right choice as Prime Minister. Any such appointment would weaken the Government instead of strengthening it. B.P. Koirala's tendency to concentrate powers in his hands would be encouraged and he would tend to become more and more autocratic.

9. There is an obvious danger in Nepal of autocratic behaviour increasing. This may be on the King's side or the popular side. I think this should be discouraged.

10. The only suitable Prime Minister that I can see is Maitrika Prasad Koirala, the present President of the Nepali Congress. He is somewhat reluctant to take this up, but I am almost sure that he will agree, if pressed to do so.

11. Although the Rana group has little importance left, nevertheless, it counts in many ways and it would be exceedingly unwise to ignore them or to keep them out of Government. They should, therefore, be included in the Cabinet, though the old idea of parity between them and the Congress need not be given effect to.

12. Any reconstitution of the Cabinet must be based on an adequate representation of the people in the hills and the people in the Terai. There is far too much of a tendency to think in terms of Kathmandu and rather to ignore the hill people and, more especially, the Terai. This is very unwise and is bound to lead to trouble in the future. The Cabinet should, therefore, be representative from this point of view and should include, apart from the dominant Congress group, the Ranas, and representatives of the hill people and the Terai. As far as possible, competent persons should be chosen. This is necessary not only from the point of view of good work, but because it produces a good impression on the public.

13. The King is in a very special position. This position will continue till the elections of the constituent assembly and perhaps, to some extent, even after that. Nevertheless, the King should normally function as a constitutional monarch, that is to say, he must act on the advice of his Cabinet and not independently.

14. The King's appointment of the Advisory Council without consultation is wrong and had given rise to unnecessary trouble. The Maharaja Prime Minister was also wrong in publicly criticising the King in this matter. However, the Prime Minister has said that he was misreported. In view of this

fact, and even more so in view of the possible changes that are coming, no stress should be laid on this disagreement with the King. If the Prime Minister has to go, and I think he should go, this should be done with as much courtesy and as little ill-will as possible.

15. I think that the proper course would be for the King to inform his Prime Minister and his Cabinet that in view of the many difficulties that have arisen, he feels that the Cabinet should be reconstituted. The Nepali Congress being the largest popular body, should assume greater responsibility in Government. He should, therefore, ask the Cabinet to resign and send for the President of the Nepali Congress to form a Government. The President at present is M.P. Koirala. It is understood that new elections will take place in the Nepali Congress next month. Probably, M.P. Koirala will be elected President again. In any event, the King should invite the head of the Nepali Congress to advise him about the formation of the new government.

16. This new Cabinet would be M.P. Koirala as Prime Minister and an adequate number of members of the Nepali Congress. The hill tribes and the Terai should be specially represented. Also the Ranas.

17. I think that M.P. Koirala should anyhow come into Government and should succeed the present Prime Minister. But I do not want the King to function on the basis of personal preference. I want him to go to the head of the organisation which is considered most important. That head should be M.P. Koirala. Some other members, inevitably, will be General Subarna, S.P. Upadhyaya and Bhadrakali Misra. I would suggest a second representative from the Terai region (apart from Bhadrakali Misra) and two representatives of the hill tribes.

18. The question has arisen about additional appointments to the Advisory Council. These appointments should be made after consultation with the Cabinet and should be drawn from such areas as are not at present adequately represented in the Council, more especially the hill areas and the Terai.

19. It is important that only men of known integrity should be chosen for the Cabinet. Further, they should be competent.

20. A change in the Government might be brought about in a more or less normal course without any appearance of sudden action. It might, for instance, take a month.

21. It would be desirable to release all political prisoners, other than a very few who have misbehaved badly. Any such release will create a very good impression and add to the strength of the Government.

22. The question of the powers of the Advisory Council is apparently being discussed. I have not gone deeply into this, but it seems to me that giving full powers to a nominated body would hardly be wise. In practice, they should have powers to recommend anything and Government should

normally accept their recommendations. But the Government should have the authority not to accept them.

23. It is important that the judiciary should be independent. I understand that it is not so at present. This applies to the Public Service Commission also.

24. The Government and the King should set an example of avoiding wasteful expenditure and of relatively simple living. There is far too much criticism today of the way in which some of the Ministers and the Ranas behave in their personal lives. No one wants to interfere with their personal lives, but certain standards have to be maintained. Also any appearance of nepotism has to be avoided.

10. Resolving the Crisis in Nepal¹

I dictated a long letter² to the King of Nepal this evening, the draft of which is being sent to you separately. Since dictating that letter, I have received a note³ from our Ambassador in Nepal, which I enclose. In this note, he suggests that the formation of what he calls an all-party government is more desirable than a homogeneous government with the President of the Nepali Congress as Prime Minister. His idea of a homogeneous government is that it should consist of two Ranas, three Nepali Congress people, two from the hills and two from the Terai and one or two others.

As a matter of fact, I have myself suggested in my letter to the King that the Cabinet should have adequate representation of the Ranas and the hills and the Terai. The difference therefore between what I have suggested and the proposal of the Ambassador is not very great. Perhaps it amounts to this that in an all-party government, the Prime Minister need not necessarily be the President of the Nepali Congress and that the Ministers chosen from the Ranas and the Hills and the Terai should be chosen independently and not because of their affiliations to the Nepali Congress. That is to say that the

1. Note to the Secretary-General, M.E.A., New Delhi, 28 October 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. See the next item.
3. In this note C.P.N. Singh had stated that there was a want of cooperation between the Rana and the Nepali Congress Ministers in the coalition Cabinet and a consequent drift and unsteadiness of the present Government and suggested the formation of an all-party government.

choice should rather lie with the King than with the President of the Nepali Congress.

It seems to me that if we decide not to have a Rana as Prime Minister, and this follows if the present Prime Minister retires, then the only choice as Prime Minister is that of the President of the Nepali Congress, that is M.P. Koirala. The responsibility for choosing the other members of the Cabinet must be jointly shared by the Prime Minister and the King. That is to say, they must be such as are agreeable to the Prime Minister and can cooperate with him, and they must also, in the existing circumstances, be approved of by the King. The King comes into the picture because of his dominant role today and in order to prevent too much of a one-party government. It is important, however, for the President of the Nepali Congress as Prime Minister to shoulder full responsibility and to have colleagues approved of by him. Such colleagues should not be dummies but competent men of some importance and popularity.

As for the number, I should think that two Ranas, two men from the hills and two from the Terai, apart from the direct representatives of the Nepali Congress, would be a fair distribution. I do not quite know what "others" means. If some outstanding independent person is available, he can certainly be included. But I doubt if it will be advisable to include representatives of some of the other groups which have been openly hostile to the Nepali Congress. Their coming into the Cabinet would bring in a disruptive and obstructionist element and difficulties are bound to arise in the future. The Prime Minister will cease to have a feeling of responsibility.

In my letter to the King, I have made some reference to civil liberty, release of political prisoners, an independent judiciary and a proper functioning of the Public Services Commission. I do not think that I should add anything about defence and foreign policy or the other matters suggested by the Ambassador. These are no doubt important matters, but they do not fit into the letter.

Nor have I said anything about the powers of the Advisory Council, although this subject is under discussion there now. I think this might well be dealt with separately, if necessary.

If you think it desirable, we can write a separate note which the King can see. I would not, however, like to mention in this that defence and foreign policy have to be fully coordinated with India. This should be taken for granted. Nor should I like to say anything about the adviser. I have already written to him about the advisers previously and we need not go beyond that.

I think you might see the Ambassador and discuss his note and my comments on it as well as my draft letter to the King. I shall try to see the Ambassador and M.P. Koirala separately either tomorrow evening or perhaps day after tomorrow morning. I would like to see them after I know the result of your conversations with them.

11. To King Tribhuvan¹

New Delhi

30 October 1951

My dear Friend,

I must apologise to Your Majesty for the delay in dealing with the various matters referred by you in your letters of October 9th and October 16th. As I wrote to you in my letter of October 14th, I have been very fully occupied not only by my normal work, which is heavy, but with additional responsibilities which consume all my time. I also wished to have a consultation with our Ambassador in Kathmandu before writing to you more fully on these subjects; he came here a few days ago and we have had talks with him and given full consideration to the various aspects of the problems that confront Your Majesty, your government, and the people of Nepal.

2. In my letter² of the 3rd October, I expressed my grave concern at the situation in Nepal, which appeared to me to be one of continual drift. What distressed me was a personal element of animosities, intrigues and rivalries, which might well lead to progressive deterioration. In any event, this would come in the way of stability and progress which are so necessary for Nepal.

3. Further consideration of these problems has confirmed these impressions, and I feel that it is necessary for this process of drift to be stopped. As Your Majesty has asked my advice in this matter, I am venturing to write to you frankly as to how I feel and what action would be advisable in the circumstances. I need not assure you of my desire to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Nepal. But circumstances have brought about a special degree of intimacy in the relations of Nepal, and India, and the independence, progress and stability of Nepal are of close concern to us, as they no doubt are to Your Majesty. Moreover, because of our larger experience of political developments and social forces, our advice might have practical value.

4. At the time of the change-over in Nepal, early this year, it was stated in Your Majesty's Proclamation³ that your objective was the establishment of a democratic form of government and that a constituent assembly was to be elected in due course to frame a constitution for Nepal, which would provide a lasting foundation for this form of government. Although its precise nature would be determined by the constituent assembly having regard to the circumstances and to the wishes of the people of Nepal, it was generally

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 556-560.

3. The King's proclamation of 18 February 1951 announced the drafting of a democratic constitution by an elected constituent assembly.

understood that this Government would be largely a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional ruler as Head of the State. Your Majesty, of course, would be the constitutional head.

5. When the constituent assembly has been properly elected and is functioning, the normal conventions and rules applying to parliamentary government would come into force. Meanwhile, there is a period of transition when there is no such assembly or parliament, and yet an attempt is made to have a popular government which responds to the wishes of the people. The check of an elected assembly of parliament being absent, certain conventions should be observed as far as possible. The objective being a democratic form of government, the normal features and processes of autocratic government have to be avoided both by the King and by the government. The King is in a very special and delicate position and has to shoulder a heavy load of responsibility. The Cabinet must be appointed by the King. If there were an elected assembly, the Cabinet would be appointed by the leader of the majority party on the invitation of the King. As there is no elected assembly or parliament, the King has to choose such a leader, keeping in view the representative character of his party. The King's advice should count in the selection of the members of the Cabinet. Once the Cabinet is formed, however, the King should function as a constitutional head and act on the advice of the Cabinet. The King will, however, in the circumstances, always have the right to change his Prime Minister and Cabinet. But this right should be exercised with care and only when reasons of State make it absolutely necessary. In the intervening period before the constituent assembly comes into existence, this overriding power of the King must necessarily remain, though it should be exercised with restraint.

6. In an autocracy or a totalitarian form of government decisions are taken by the Head of the State and his personal views normally prevail. In a democratic government, this concentration of authority in one person is avoided as far as possible and decisions are arrived at impersonally by various organs of the State which are separated so that they might function with independence. Thus the judiciary is kept separate from the executive and the executive is not supposed to interfere with the functioning of the judiciary. The public services are recruited and, to some extent, controlled by a Public Service Commission, so as to avoid the exercise of personal patronage without regard to efficiency. This approach is important even at this stage of Nepal's growth. The judiciary should function independently and should not be interfered with by the executive. Appointments to the public services should also generally be governed by rules and should be made on the basis of merit, and not as favours dispensed to chosen persons. It is in this way that a government builds up a reputation of governing with impartiality and efficiency and stability and progress are achieved.

7. These principles would apply of course to the army and the police also. An army is only as good as its officers and men. If political and personal considerations come into appointments of high-ranking officers, then the army will deteriorate and lose efficiency.

8. I have stated these general propositions, perhaps unnecessarily as they are well-known, because I feel most strongly that they should govern the entire approach to the various problems of Government in Nepal. A government functions through various organs. These organs have to be sound or else the government is weak. At the top of the government is the Cabinet. This Cabinet is automatically formed in a parliamentary system by the leader of the majority party. The Cabinet has to be homogenous in the sense that its members can work together and share responsibilities. But, at the same time, care has to be taken by the Prime Minister to make it really representative so that the various parts of the country and the various sections of the community are satisfied. In a country like India, for instance, we cannot have a cabinet which would consist entirely of north Indians or only of south Indians. We have to have people from various parts of the country.

9. I now come to the questions Your Majesty has put to me. You point out that, according to the Rana group, the present basis of a coalition government has to continue till the elections of the constituent assembly are held and, further, that one group must not have a dominant voice as this may lead to a suppression of the development of democratic ideas. I do not think that there is anything sacrosanct in the present basis of a coalition government. Governments change according to the needs of the times. I think the present basis was the right basis to begin with, and it has helped to tide over a difficult period, in spite of difficulties. If it has ceased to serve the purpose aimed at, then there is no reason why it should not be changed. What we have to consider is what is the best course to follow at the present moment? There is no previous commitment to prevent that being done if it is considered necessary.

10. I think it will be unfortunate if any one group functioned in Nepal in an autocratic manner and tried to suppress other groups. This would certainly come in the way of the development of democracy. At the same time responsibility should not be divided, as this leads to delayed decisions and inefficiency. A proper government should, therefore, as I have already stated, be representative as far as possible of the more important interests but should, at the same time, avoid internal divisions and a divided responsibility.

11. As the situation has developed in Nepal in the course of the past year, it has seemed to me that the two principal stabilising factors are Your Majesty and the Nepali Congress, which is the dominant popular party in the State. The Rana group certainly has a certain importance even now, but it is far less important than it used to be and, even in the course of the past few

months, this importance has diminished. There are certain other groups and parties in Nepal, the importance of which I am unable to judge. But I have an impression that they are relatively small. But apart from parties, there are areas and distinct cultural and economic groups in Nepal which have importance. Apart from Kathmandu and the valley, which, of course, have a basic importance, there are the people of the hills and the people of the Terai. Both these represent distinct groups which play an important part in the life of Nepal and which should be given adequate representation in any government. This is necessary not only from a theoretical point of view but for very practical reasons; for only then will it be possible to inspire in the country the feeling that the cabinet is truly representative.

12. It might even have been possible to carry on with the present Government, with minor changes, if there had been a spirit of cooperation. As I pointed out previously, I have been unable to find any clash over policy between the two groups in the Cabinet and even major reforms have been agreed to by both the groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is an inner feeling of conflict between the two groups and this must come in the way of cooperative work. What is worse, this leads to personal intrigues and rivalries and to pulling in different directions. It is for this reason that I think that a major change is necessary.

13. This change should, as far as possible, be made on impersonal lines. His Highness the Prime Minister has, I think, accommodated himself to the new situation to an extraordinary extent. Considering the authority and power which he had previously and the vital nature of the change which ended that power, I think that His Highness should be congratulated on the way he has endeavoured to adapt himself to changing conditions. In view of His Highness's age and health, he cannot continue for long in his high office. In the circumstances existing today, there is also this inner conflict which must be embarrassing to him and to the other members of the Cabinet, as it is undoubtedly to Your Majesty. His Highness has, on several occasions previously, suggested to me his desire to resign from his high office. I think that it would be in the fitness of things if His Highness gave effect, in the near future, to this desire of his and relieved himself of the burden of office with all the responsibility that entails. This should be done in all friendliness and with the courtesy to which His Highness is entitled.

14. The Prime Minister's resignation would cast the burden on Your Majesty to appoint another Prime Minister and to invite him to select his Cabinet, such selection being made in full consultation with Your Majesty and with your approval. I think that the proper course would be for you to invite the President of the Nepali Congress, Shri Maitrika Prasad Koirala, to undertake this task. I suggest this not for any personal reasons but because he is the head of the largest popular organisation, which in fact has been mainly

responsible for the changes that have taken place. If there had been a parliament, Your Majesty would have invited the leader of the majority party in parliament. There being no parliament, the right course is to invite the president of the majority party in the country. It will, of course, be not only Your Majesty's prerogative but duty to ensure that the new cabinet is broad-based and representative in the manner that I have described. For, although it is to be expected that the new Prime Minister will include representatives of the Rana group as also of the people of the hills and of the Terai, choosing them so as to have a homogeneous team, it is equally necessary that there should be no impression that one party, however important it may be, is conducting the government for its own party purposes. Once the responsibility of government is placed fully and squarely on the Nepali Congress by calling upon its leader to become Prime Minister, it becomes the duty of the Prime Minister to discharge that responsibility in a spirit of generous statesmanship. People generally in the country must have faith in the government and its *bona fides* and impartiality.

15. There has been, I believe, some criticism of the Nepal Government for the action it has taken in regard to rival groups. It is not for me to say how far this action was justified. Circumstances arise when some such action becomes necessary. But care has always to be taken not to create an impression that a dominant party is utilising its position to crush opposition. It is not only in the fitness of things but, in my opinion, essential that rules defining civil liberties and their enforcement are prescribed and scrupulously followed. Political prisoners might be released unless there are any who are considered dangerous. Any such release will create a good impression and will add to the strength of the government.

16. The men chosen to form the government should be of known integrity and competence and should avoid wasteful expenditure even in their personal lives. I mention this obvious matter, because I have heard some criticism of this kind. The old standards during the Rana regime cannot obviously fit in with the present conditions in Nepal or elsewhere and have to be changed. Those in high positions have to set an example of simple living.

17. In Your Majesty's letter of October 16th, you refer to a statement reported to have been made by His Highness the Prime Minister in regard to your Proclamation appointing an Advisory Council.⁴ I understand that the Prime Minister has stated that the press interview was not correctly reported. As

4. The King had written of the aggrieved feelings following his announcement of names of the members of the Nepal Advisory Council. The Prime Minister had issued a statement "rather derogatory to my position" and the King sought Nehru's advice in the matter. He also wrote that he was considering the "question of nominating some more members to give representation to elements who have remained unrepresented."

reported, it was certainly an improper comment. From the point of view of the general conventions governing the relations of the Head of the State to his Prime Minister, it was unwise, if I may say so, for Your Majesty to appoint an Advisory Council without full consultation with all your Ministers. The Prime Minister might well have expressed his objection to this procedure. But this should have been done privately and not publicly. In any event, in view of what I have said in this letter about the formation of a new government by Your Majesty, I do not think any further notice need be taken of this incident.

18. I have ventured to write to Your Majesty frankly and at some length so that you might know how I have been thinking about these matters affecting the future of Nepal. As you know, I am intensely interested in that future and would like to be of help whenever possible. I have tried to analyse the situation and to indicate the objective to be aimed at and the steps to be taken to attain that objective. But whatever the goal and whatever the means adopted to reach it, much depends on how a thing is done. The same action can be taken with grace and goodwill, or without them. I am sure that anything that Your Majesty may do will be done with grace and goodwill, for these are not only good in themselves but produce good results. I hope also that in future there will be much less of the personal rivalries and jealousies which have marked the activities of Government in Nepal. The formation of a new government should be an important new step of advance forward which should be accompanied by goodwill all round and an absence, as far as possible, of personal conflicts.

With all my good wishes to you,

I am,
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. Foreign Policy

1. Consensus on Foreign Policy¹

During these two days of this debate many honourable members have spoken and touched upon a large number of points. On the whole they had been good enough to express themselves in kind words about a large part of our Government's policy and more especially the foreign policy of this country. Much has been said about which I would myself like to say something in reply; much has been said which has rather embarrassed me, more especially when it was obviously meant to be a kind of praise to me but which struck me as something as the very opposite of it like the honourable speaker who spoke last. So I think perhaps it would be better for me not to cover a large number of subjects, to try to reply to many points that had been raised. That will become a very discursive argument and perhaps lose all point or substance. It will be better for me to confine myself to one or two major issues. Indeed the House itself has spent more time in discussing those major issues than the others. I therefore propose to say something generally about foreign policy and more particularly about our relations with Pakistan and the question of Kashmir.

I am grateful for the wide support given to the foreign policy in this House on this occasion as on previous occasions. I am grateful for something that I sensed that lay behind the words that we have said because even as such words carry much meaning behind them, but I had a sense of the real and substantial support in the minds of honourable members than even what their words conveyed and I am grateful for that.

My colleagues and I during these days have had to carry a very heavy burden and heavy responsibilities, and though sometimes we may appear light-hearted, nevertheless the burden is heavy and we want as large a support as possible, not support merely in kind words and phrases but intelligent support, understanding support, real support. I wanted that not only from this House but perhaps even from a wider circle. I have during the past few days ventured to go out into the market place and the field to see large numbers of the people of Delhi and round about, to tell them about these big questions that troubled us, the great burdens and great problems that we have to face and to ask for their support, and wherever I have gone, it has heartened me to see the support of those people whom we presume to represent and whose ultimate will counts and whose morale counts more than any resolution.

1. Speech during the debate on the motion of thanks on the President's Address in Parliament, 11 August 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, Vol. XIV, Part II (6 to 29 August 1951), columns 476-496.

Now, I claim no virtue for myself or for my Government or if I may say so with all respect for my country.

I suspect those persons who claim too much virtue for themselves or their group or even their country. We all get into the habit of talking big about ourselves but we know that the noblest words sometimes become currency in the mouths of base men and lose their meaning. We talk about patriotism and love of the country and the like and often enough in the name of patriotism indulge in actions that are not good. Everybody in every country does that. So it does not very much matter what fine language I might use or other honourable members might use in this or any other connection. Ultimately we are tested by action. It is in the hot fire of experience and trial. Many of us in this House in past years have had some kind of a test in our lives, and sometimes we have faltered and sometimes we have stumbled. Nevertheless, we had that test and we were the better for it because in spite of all our weakness we had some glimmering of principle to hold on to, some light through which we were drawn and we went in our weak way towards it and were strengthened thereby, and we did not mind then if sometimes, instead of a garden, we had to go through a wilderness. In this way many of my generations in India have been nurtured. I repeat this not as a personal matter. I repeat it because people even in this country, and people in other countries, have short memories and forget this past which is not such a distant past. They forget that we may be feeble, we may be weak as persons or we may make mistakes but when we think that something is important or is a matter of principle, then we have not learnt yet in our lives to bow down to evil, whatever it may be. We did not bow down to it when that was represented by a mighty force against us, and we appeared feeble and unarmed. How then are we going to bow down today when we are stronger, at least in the normal ways of strength? Are we stronger in other ways, in our minds, in our hearts, in the way we pull together or do not pull together? That is what gave us strength in the days of old. Does it give us strength today?

It is that problem that has been troubling me in this and many other ways, because after all strength comes from that and not so much from our defence forces. I do not think that our defence forces without that basic strength of the people behind them can go very far in the time of trial. Listening to honourable members here, I heard of many criticisms, of preparedness, of civil defence and the like and I heard of other difficulties, of somebody being totally unable to eat wheat or that they could only live on rice or something like that.² It seems to me that there is some hiatus, some gap when these petty matters are brought up, when big questions are at issue.

2. On 11 August 1951, Kesava Menon of Madras said this.

We may have to live on wheat or something else worse than wheat, if we are serious about it. There is no good talking of rice or that we are not used to wheat. We will have to get used to many hardships that we are not used to. How many of us in this House had to live in jails which we were not used to previously in the last 10 or 20 years. Are we born, all of us, to live lives in the wilderness or prisons or the like? We did not complain. But if everybody wants the commodities to which he is accustomed, rice or wheat, the demand must be met at the cost of someone else. Are you prepared to pay that cost? One part of India may have to pay the cost of another part. I mention this merely just to beg of the House to consider these matters in a proper perspective. Let us have all the rice we can and the wheat we can. I am not opposing that, but let us remember that first things come first and other things come afterwards.

We have followed a foreign policy about which I have often addressed this House and this House has, if not unanimously, with a very wide measure of support, agreed with it. I have pointed out often enough that policy is not a negative, is not a neutral, is not a passive policy; it is a very active policy so far as I can see it. I am not going into the details of that; but I do feel after giving daily and hourly thought to it that the policy we have pursued has been the right policy, is the right policy, and is going to be the right policy. Therefore, so far as I am concerned, I am going to follow it. I know that that has not met with the goodwill, sometimes, of other people and other countries. I know that it has been criticised by people. I know that sometimes an attempt has been made to bring some pressure to bear upon us in order to change it. Nevertheless, I am convinced that that is the right policy. Whether in the west or east, we do not wish to interfere with other countries. We do not wish to play a large part in the affairs of the world. We have troubles of our own. But, where our voice is sought, it will be given in accordance with our views and nobody else's views, whatever the pressure. Even if we have to suffer for that, I hope we shall be prepared to suffer rather than to give up our independence of judgment and independence of action.

What are our tests? What are our objectives? It is difficult to define them. But, broadly speaking, the last twenty, thirty or forty years of experience has, I think, conclusively proved to any person, whose mind is not quite closed, that no big problem is solved by a big war. Wars have come, big and small; we have seen many of them. There have been great victories and great defeats. After a war is over, no problem has been solved; but a hundred new problems have arisen apart from the terrible misery that followed. Therefore, it seems to me that every intelligent person should seek to avoid war. Every intelligent person should realise that, apart from the inhumanity and apart from the terrible destruction and horrors of war today, war just does not solve any problem and the very problem you think it is going to solve, it makes worse.

Nevertheless, no country can do away with the apparatus of war. At least no responsible government dare take that step. Because we live in a harsh and cruel world, if we value our freedom, we cannot depend on other people's good nature only. We have to depend on our own strength. It is a delicate balance, perhaps. Nevertheless, the emphasis should be clear. We try our utmost to avoid war, world war or any other domestic war anywhere. Yet, we have to be prepared for it lest our freedom might be suppressed. We have tried to follow that policy in the councils of the world, wherever we have been, whether it is in Korea³ or any other parts of the Far East, when questions come up, our answer is always judged by this yardstick; does this increase tension or does it lead to war? Or does it lessen tension and perhaps lead to a settlement or peace?

I find that more and more the test of statesmanship in western countries is becoming what is called the military test. My honourable friend, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, appealed for statesmanship in his speech.⁴ I shall come to that presently. I entirely agree with him. But exactly what is statesmanship is not such a simple or clear matter. But, then as I said, gradually, the minds of men in great countries think of statesmanship more and more in military terms and military language, that is to say, they think more in terms of war or preparation for war.

Countries have to be prepared for war if war comes and it is not for me to say that they should not prepare. But I do wish to say that if it is statesmanship to think only or largely in military terms, then he who does so has ceased to be a statesman. He may be a good soldier for aught I know, because the soldier's job is to defeat the enemy by any means. The soldier does not think too much of what happens after he has gained his victory over the enemy. The soldier does not think too much of what the masses of men think or feel or how they act. He only thinks of military objectives. When I see that more and more military objectives become the goals of statesmanship, frankly, I am a little nervous, and I am a little afraid as to where the world is going. In our own feeble way, we try to put in the international assemblies a different point which we hope will lessen tension. Our voice does not go very far. But it does give us some satisfaction that we have said what we feel is the right thing to do.

This approach has governed our actions in foreign policy and we have tried to govern our actions even in our relations with Pakistan more or less

3. India was a member of the U.N. Korean Commission set up by the Political Committee of the General Assembly on 9 December 1948.
4. On 11 August, S.P. Mookerjee remarked: "Today statesmanship lies not in casting aspersions against each other, not in doubting the *bona fides* of each other, not in doubting the motives of each other, but in finding some common ground for common action for facing a common emergency."



WITH CHESTER BOWLES, U.S. AMBASSADOR, NEW DELHI



26.9.1957

My dear Rajaji,

I had and have no doubt at all that such papers (Pranab's) should not be published. The difficulty that has arisen is that Nirmal Bose, who was with Bapu in Washahat, has apparently written about this subject rather fully in a book which he intends publishing. He was asked by various persons, including Amrita Kumar, not to do so but he persists. Then Pranab thought that if perhaps Nirmal Bose might desire if he (Pranab) dealt with this matter in his own way. I have not seen Nirmal Bose's account.

I am afraid I do not understand all the business at all. It is beyond my depth. I do understand, however, that the effect of all this on large numbers of people will be bad.

I think that in any event Pranab should not write this, whatever Nirmal Bose might do.

Yours affly
Pranabachari

with that approach. Of course, very special considerations apply to our relations with Pakistan, because of our past history, because of the conflicts between us, and a hundred and one other things. Nevertheless, that basic fact remains that a major conflict between India and Pakistan would be a disaster of the first magnitude for us as well as Pakistan. I say that, and I shall repeat it because, many honourable members, and many people outside, do not wholly appreciate or realise that. Because, if it is suggested that a problem is difficult and therefore we should go to war to solve it, whatever the result of the war, that problem will not be solved. Other problems will also arise. War is not a solution of problems. It is only a solution in the sense that it puts an end to a large number of human beings and property. It is only a solution, if that is a solution, if you think of a war in terms of extermination of a whole population. That may be some kind of a solution. But, that does not happen even in these days of atomic warfare.

So one must not imagine that war is a solution of any problem. War, nevertheless, may come for various reasons, among them being that somebody else is foolish enough to start a war. Well, if somebody is foolish to start a war, you cannot run away; you have to face it with all your strength and put an end to it. Therefore, we have always thought of war in India as a defensive war and not as an offensive and an aggressive war, not only vis-a-vis Pakistan, but anywhere in the world. I want to be perfectly frank about it, because the House and all must realise it. If we wanted to reduce our army it was from that point of view. Many honourable members did not like that and I can very well understand the reason why they did not like it. However, in the balance, we decided to do that. Later we decided to stop that process and it is stopped, and obviously till there is any grave risk or danger, that process will remain stopped. Pandit Kunzru asked me that question.⁵ Well, this is my answer.

So, that is the basic approach and it is not, if I may say so, an approach of, shall I say, piety or some kind of pacifism, good or bad. It is an approach based on hard facts, on a cool, cold-blooded, objective realisation of facts, because there is always danger in such cases and in such matters of people being swept away by passion, by some notion that by quick action or war you can achieve your results. Well, you do not. Do not imagine that some kind of police work is war. That is a different thing entirely, whether the police functions on a small or big scale. When you think of war, you come into another region. The qualities are different and the consequences are terribly different.

Now, that being our main approach, we naturally have tried to avoid war. We offered Pakistan a no-war declaration which Pakistan did not wholly accept

5. H.N. Kunzru, on 11 August, had suggested to Nehru to postpone the reduction of the armed forces as the times were not normal.

or agree to. And even recently, a few days ago, this was repeated to them and they would only agree to it if we kept Kashmir apart from it.⁶

Now, when we consider this question of Indo-Pakistan relations, let us look not only at the broad picture, including not only Kashmir on the one side, but also Bengal and Assam and East Bengal on the other side, and the many other problems that have arisen. Think for a while of past history too, because what we see today has grown out of the past.

I am not going into the story of the past; but I do wish you to bear that in mind, because it is important and relevant not only for the past four years, but the longer period of the previous twenty or thirty years. It is out of that that all this has come out. In those years, in those early years, some twenty or thirty years ago, most of us stood, as we stand today for inter-communal unity, for a peaceful solution of our internal problems, for a joint effort to win our freedom, and then to live together in that freedom. Those who brought about Pakistan, had a different gospel, not of unity but of disunity, not of construction, but of destruction, not of peace, but if not war, at any rate, discord.

I do not think that they, or the people of Pakistan, are any better or any worse than we or the people of India are. I disclaim all special virtue. I want to make this perfectly clear, and if any man talks of our being more virtuous than others, then I suspect his virtue, because I know we have failed quite often enough, and the person who talks most of his own virtues is the least virtuous. All the same, it does make a little difference what kind of ideals you place before yourself, and some groups of persons might function differently if given a somewhat different direction to look at. Fortunately for us, we had a certain ideal placed before us in this country during the last twenty to thirty years. It affected our thinking and our action. In spite of everything, that continues to be our guiding star. That is the major difference between India's policies today and Pakistan's policies, which are naturally derived from the previous record of discord and hatred, the deliberate propagation of hatred and disunity. It goes on. I am quite convinced that a country that follows such a policy will injure itself. I am quite convinced that it is bad for an individual and for a nation to follow that policy, and I do not want India to follow that policy, come what may. It is really because of the close, reasoned approach to the problem, and to a realisation of the consequences of such a policy that I say so.

My friend talked about statesmanship. Well, I do not quite know how to

6. In his letter to Liaquat Ali Khan of 29 July 1951, Nehru stressed that "not the slightest step of an aggressive character" would be taken by India so long as no aggression by Pakistan took place on Indian territory including Kashmir. See *ante*, pp. 236-239.

define statesmanship.⁷ There may be many definitions. But if I may suggest a few, it is to think not only of your immediate urge, not only of the action before you, but also of the consequences of that action, to think not only of today but of what tomorrow and the day after might bring. In other words, to have some perspective, some vision, some objective towards which we go and not to be driven about by the urges and the passions of the moment.

Now, if you apply that test to many things that have been said here since yesterday, what do we find? Some proposals have been made in regard to East Bengal or Pakistan or Kashmir.⁸ Apply that test and see where it leads you to. It is not enough, just because you are angry with Pakistan, to say: "To hell with Pakistan. Let us do this or that." It is not enough to say, because you are angry with something that is happening: "Let us do the same thing." You have to think of tomorrow's consequences. I am leaving out anything about, shall I say, standards of morals. I am merely applying the pragmatic, opportunist test of action. Because, any action you may indulge in has consequences and these consequences flow from that action as inevitably as any law of physics or chemistry. Therefore, think of those consequences and then adhere to your course of action.

Now, various proposals have been made. May I say that my honourable friend, Dr. Mookerjee, seemed to think that we have forgotten East Bengal or the people coming from East Bengal or who are still there.⁹ Allow me to assure him that there have been very few subjects or matters which have been of more anxious concern to us than this problem. We have not talked about it too often, for a variety of reasons. Talking would not do much good. But obviously this problem of East Bengal and any other problem like that of Kashmir or anything else, are all parts of a single big problem, that is Indo-Pakistan relations. You cannot separate them. And Indo-Pakistan relations have their roots in all kinds of factors in the last four years, and in the past twenty or thirty years. When you talk about solving one problem, you may deal with it for the moment, you may improve it, but you cannot solve it until you solve the final problem.

7. S.P. Mookerjee said on 10 August 1951 that while a "wordy battle of telegrams" was going on between Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru, India was supplying coal, timber and other sinews of war to a country which threatened *jehad* against India. "Is this generosity or foolishness or want of statesmanship?" he asked.
8. Mookerjee suggested that India should take responsibility for the safety of the minorities in East Bengal. He recalled that Patel had suggested that India would be entitled to demand one-third of East Bengal if one-third of the population of East Bengal was forced to come to India. He demanded that India should impose economic sanctions against Pakistan in view of Pakistan's "threats of *jehad*".
9. Expressing pain at the absence of reference to the East Bengal situation in the speeches of Nehru, Mookerjee said that the minorities were ill-treated and "the process of driving out the minorities" by Pakistan "is going on in East Bengal."

One and a half years ago there was an agreement between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and myself on the 8th April in regard to the situation in Bengal and Assam.¹⁰ That matter was discussed in the House and there was a good deal of criticism of it then and later. I am often asked today by newspapers and elsewhere, what about your agreement; what has happened to it? That question surprises me, because I think that that agreement is among the things in the course of the last few years that can be called one of the greatest successes that we have achieved, not because it solved the problem of East Bengal, of course it did not; nobody expected it to solve the problem of East Bengal. It was meant to solve the immediate difficulty and ease the situation, to bring relief to millions of people and open out the way for further improvement. Other issues come in the way. If the Indo-Pakistan relationship deteriorates somewhere else or something else happens, naturally that affects East Bengal too. So far as that agreement is concerned I can say with great confidence to this House that the results it achieved were remarkable in the sense of the human misery it had stopped. Millions were given relief by it for a considerable time in a variety of ways, whether they came here or remained there.

Having said that, it is perfectly true that it did not solve the problem of East Bengal and the problem of East Bengal cannot be solved till the major problem of Indo-Pakistan relations is solved or is nearer solution. That is a big thing.

Honourable members asked me—though they did not put the exact question—why have you not solved the Kashmir problem or why have you not solved this or that?¹¹ I can name a few dozen major problems of the world which go on and on without solution. They go on in spite of the United Nations. Any number of them, honourable members know, go on and on, in spite of the best efforts of people.

I doubt if there are more than a handful of persons in the wide world who want war in any country. Nevertheless, the fact remains, as I pointed out, that the whole world or a large part of it is becoming more and more military-minded and preparing hard. Why is that so? Everybody knows that if there is a big world war, it would be terrible. It would destroy the proud structure of European civilization, apart from the enormous and widespread misery that ensues. Everybody knows that, everybody wants to avoid war and yet they go on preparing for war as if driven by some elemental and uncontrollable urge. So these problems cannot be dealt with in this way.

10. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Pt. I, p. 178.

11. On 11 August, B.S. Mann suggested the following amendment: "...regret to note that the Government have not taken adequate measures, civil as well as military, to deal firmly and effectively with the aggressive designs of Pakistan particularly as regards its intentions regarding Kashmir, East Bengal Hindus, and evacuee property."

Two or three suggestions were repeated on this occasion as it was done previously also. One was about asking Pakistan to offer territory in proportion to the number of migrants who come over. The other reference was to some kind of exchange of populations and that also presumably involves an exchange of territory. Let us be perfectly clear that such a demand means war. I hope nobody here would say that by sending a registered communication this can be effected. It means war and if it means war, let us not think of exchange of territory or population but of war. Let us not get confused. It is too easy to give suggestions and try to escape the consequences of what we say. Therefore let us be clear about it. All this business of exchange of population or of exchange of territory or any other ways suggested, have absolutely no meaning at all, and the only thing that it means is that by a process of war you want to do whatever you desire.

I have dealt with the question of war and tried to put before the House that if one fact is certain it is that by war you will not get what you want apart from victory or defeat. You will only get a generation of terrible misery, a generation of putting an end to every single aim that you have in mind and the burden of terrible poverty all over. It does not matter how effectively you win the war.

So let us consider these problems a little more realistically and not just jump to the conclusion that by some kind of strong action we can achieve our objective. Because of this we decided that no effective result can be achieved through big-scale warfare.

I would like to add something else to that. So far as the problem of East and West Bengal and Assam is concerned it is impossible for me to conceive that this process of squeezing out of large numbers of people could continue as it has to some extent continued during the last two and a half months.¹² I might say it is slightly less now than it was but that has no particular meaning. During the last year, for a year I would say, there was a reverse tendency. Only in the last two or three months it has again turned this way. It is not wholly inconceivable that for the moment it may lessen, but there is no doubt in my mind that the general conditions in East Bengal are such that there is some kind of a continuous pressure there on the minority population. They may put up with that pressure and if it becomes a little too much they come out. But there is no doubt that it is there and it is an abnormal situation which continually keeps tension going, not only there but all over the Indo-Pakistan relationship. It is a matter which never will allow us to settle down unless the problem is settled. I cannot find a magic remedy for it. It is one of those difficult problems which can only be settled by some kind of a basic

12. By May 1951, 30.7 lakhs people came to India from East Bengal and 24.3 lakhs moved in the opposite direction.

improvement in the situation. We may provisionally deal with it in the best way possible locally. But ultimately it is the big question of Indo-Pakistan relationship. Personally I rule out war for the settlement of that, because I do not think that a war will settle or solve it. But I cannot rule out war independently or unilaterally. If the other party brings it in and as the other party talks so much about it and shouts so much, I have to be perfectly ready for it.

I shall say a few words about Kashmir. May I say that the House had the great advantage of hearing today the authentic voice of Kashmir speaking in this House? I am exceedingly glad that we had that exposition of Kashmir's position from one who is perhaps more entitled than almost any other person in Kashmir to give it, because the honourable member who spoke is the General Secretary of the Kashmir National Conference.¹³

In considering the question of Kashmir we should not confine ourselves to the present. We should go back certainly four years, when this trouble arose there, but we should go back really eighteen or nineteen years to understand it, when this movement in Kashmir began against autocratic rule there, and gradually built itself up to challenge the Maharaja's rule. In the course of these eighteen or nineteen years there were many ups and downs, people were imprisoned and shot down; the kind of developments that we had known in India happened in Kashmir. It is interesting to try to remember what exactly was the part that the leaders of Pakistan were playing in those days when the people of Kashmir were struggling for their freedom; not the people of Kashmir only but the people of all the States of India. Because the House will remember that the Muslim League supported every autocratic rule in India—in every State—they did not interfere, and privately they helped it.

So also in Kashmir. It may have been a Hindu Maharaja, but the odd thing is that the Muslim League, helped by the Hindu Maharaja's Government in Kashmir, was in some ways in alliance with those who were against the national movement there. Not that there was much love lost between them, but because the major movement was this great national movement for freedom, every odd group that could be brought to oppose this major movement was helped, as is the practice of all governments. So in the past this great movement was built up which challenged the autocratic rule there and there was no rival to it there; there were small groups and parties no doubt, but nothing very effective.

May I tell you how in the course of those years and till recently—I say,

13. Maulana Mohammad Saeed Masoudi; professor of Arabic, Prince of Wales College, Jammu, 1932-36; imprisoned for participation in freedom struggle in Kashmir State, 1932, 1934, 1942 and 1946; General Secretary, National Conference, 1939-49; liaison officer in Baramulla, 1947; member, Constituent Assembly and Provisional Parliament, 1948-51, Lok Sabha, 1952-57.

just before this invasion of Kashmir took place—time and again, efforts were made by the leaders of the Muslim League to woo Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah to win him over to their side? All kinds of ways—by going to Kashmir, by inviting him till the eve of partition and even, I think, just after partition—were tried to woo him. The efforts did not succeed because they held two diametrically opposed viewpoints. You heard today the approach to these questions which the honourable member from Kashmir gave you, an approach which was as diametrically opposed to a communal approach, as anything could be, an approach which I wish some of us could equal in clarity because we talk a great deal about a secular State, and my friend, Mr. Alva¹⁴ stretched himself to his full length of five feet seven and talked about a secular State.¹⁵ I wish we were much more of a secular State than we are at present. I wish we would approach the ideal we have put down in the Constitution, because we do not, and, let us be clear about it, because there are too many people attacking that ideal, too many people trying to undermine it; too many people, if they do not attack it, acting in a way which ultimately undermines it—too many communally-minded people in this country today. Let us be clear about it, let us therefore not lose ourselves in words and phrases but look at things as they are happening.

In Kashmir it was a straight fight, between communalism and this ideal that we hold, and it is a straight fight there today and all the time. It is quite absurd to talk of India and Pakistan fighting for possession of Kashmir as if it was some booty to be seized by the stronger person. In Kashmir the struggle has been for a basic ideal and the Kashmiri people have fought that struggle even more than our armies. Do you remember that before our armies went there, there were three days when there was no proper government, no proper police in the Valley of Kashmir because, I regret to say, those who were in authority ran away taking their bag and baggage along with them. So there was nobody in authority there and there was the enemy raiding and pillaging, almost at the Valley's doorstep.

What happened then in the Valley of Kashmir? Surely, if there had been any real sympathy for the invader the whole Valley would have been offered on a silver platter to the invader. Even apart from sympathy, if there had not been a strong feeling of national unity and national consciousness the whole place would have gone to pieces, just disintegrated, because the governmental apparatus had gone, the police had gone, there was the enemy at the gate, the

14. Joachim Alva (1907-1979); imprisoned during freedom struggle, 1932-33, 1941; editor, *Forum*; member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52, Lok Sabha, 1952-67.

15. On 11 August, Joachim Alva said: "We have the highest idealism of Mahatma Gandhi which has been handed down to his heir, our President, our ex-Governor-General and other Hindu leaders who have looked upon Christians, Muslims and others with utmost affection and kindness."

people would have run away and there would have been panic and all that. Instead of that during those three days, with constant and instant danger threatening them, it was the people of the Valley who kept the peace; their volunteers without arms, volunteers of this National Conference and the leaders of the National Conference, it was they, without arms, without anything, just because of their personal influence and their appeals and their day-and-night watches, who kept the peace and to the last day there was not a single shop that was closed in Srinagar, even though the enemy was six miles away.

When people talk about a plebiscite, and people talk of India imposing itself on Kashmir, they should keep this picture before them. I have not a shadow of doubt in my mind, as Maulana Masoudi said, that the result of a plebiscite in Kashmir can only be one result and that is in favour of the present Government there.

You know the subsequent story about the invasion and what happened and all that. It is a very remarkable thing that, after all that has happened, somehow or other, some of our friends in foreign countries write and speak and behave in the manner they do. I can understand that their knowledge of events is limited, nevertheless, the assurance with which they try to lay down law, sometimes the effrontery with which they try to advise us, amazes me. When I think of the story of Pakistan and Kashmir, when I think of Pakistan's case and the way they put it forward repeatedly, I am reminded of a story—the story of a young man who murdered his father and mother—and when he was tried for this, he pleaded for mercy and clemency on the ground that he was an orphan. It is really extraordinary how everything has been twisted out of recognition in the way Pakistan puts forward its case. I have often wondered where we have erred in the last three or four years in regard to Kashmir. We may have committed many small errors here and there, but I just cannot find out in my mind any major step that we have taken which can be called a wrong step. The House will remember that a year and a half ago or more, there was a ceasefire, and after that or just about that time the U.N. Commission passed a resolution. There was one before that, and we accepted that. Thus we accepted both of them. The first resolution that we accepted some time in 1948 was not accepted by Pakistan.¹⁶ Later, another resolution came which we accepted after long parleys with the Commission and after an exchange of letters, because we wanted to be quite clear about it and we wanted no misunderstanding to be there. So we cleared it up and those two or three matters were cleared up in letters exchanged between us and the members of

16. On 13 August 1948, the U.N.C.I.P. adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire, for a truce agreement, for the reaffirming by the parties of their wish that the future status of the State be determined by plebiscite, and for an agreement to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine conditions for such a plebiscite.

the Commission.¹⁷ May I say regarding the letters that we exchanged that before we sent our letters to each other we jointly drafted them. Before I sent my letter to the Commission and after they approved of it, then I signed and sent it to them, so that it was a mutually arranged matter to clarify any difficulty. This related to the disbandment and disarmament of the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' forces and to certain northern forces. I mention these two matters because these two very important matters came in the way of any progress later, because Pakistan refused and said that it did not have anything to do with them. We insisted—naturally—we said, "We stick to them. We have accepted that resolution, and this is part of that resolution, so far as we are concerned and so far as the Commission is concerned, and we are not going to give it up."

I shall not take the House into the intermediate stages. The Commission ultimately left it at that; they could not reconcile our interpretation of those resolutions based on our correspondence and Pakistan's, and they went away. Later, other developments took place. Sir Owen Dixon came, and others. But in the last resolution passed by the Security Council a strange sea-change came. In this resolution they ignored largely what had been agreed to previously between us and the Commission. Naturally, we objected to this. We pointed this out to them. After all, we can only be asked to do what we had agreed to do, but those two or three major points that we had raised with the Commission, and to which the Commission had agreed in writing, are there for anybody to see. They were completely ignored in the last resolution of the Security Council, and further, the Security Council went on to say that in certain eventualities arbitration would take place about differences. We ventured to point out to the Security Council that this was something entirely different from what had been agreed to previously and said that we were just not going to give up the previous agreement in the face of any such new order of the Security Council, and we were not prepared in matters of this kind where the fate of millions of people were involved to submit them to an arbitrator. That is why we voted against and rejected that resolution in the Security Council, and I greatly regret that when that resolution came up before the Security Council two great countries, friends of ours, took up a line which was exceedingly unfriendly to us, which seemed to me extremely illogical also, which seemed to flow from a great deal of ignorance of the problem and what had been done before, and which seemed to me to be based on some entirely extraneous considerations which had nothing to do with this problem. However, it was a matter of great regret to me. Now, Pakistan goes on saying that we have spurned the United Nations and the Security Council. I deny that. All that we have told the Security Council is that we stand by our previous agreements

17. The Ceasefire Agreement of 31 December-1 January 1949.

and it is they who have forgotten their agreements, and we are not prepared to accept anything which either forgets the basic fact of the previous assurances or which challenges our self-respect or independence or honour. That is the basic difficulty; and now Pakistan lays the greatest stress—of course taking advantage of this fact—that they agreed to the last resolution in the Security Council and we did not. They have agreed to many things later on because it so happened that whatever was put forward by some others happened to be to their advantage and they quickly agreed to it. That is the position in regard to Kashmir.

A great deal of fuss was made in the Security Council and elsewhere because the constituent assembly was called to meet in Kashmir.¹⁸ Why was this so, someone asked. What business is it of anybody to interfere with some internal arrangement which we had in Kashmir or anywhere else in India? We have told them, and given them the assurance, that this does not come in the way of the Security Council. How does the Security Council function in such matters? We went to the Security Council with a complaint, a simple complaint, of Pakistan's aggression. It is odd that we have not had any decision of the Security Council on that yet, although three years after that Sir Owen Dixon did say that Pakistan's action was a breach of international law or some such thing. The House knows all these facts and I am sorry to take up the time of the House in detailing these facts in this way. I do wish honourable members to remember some facts that are in the books, if I may say so.

In Kashmir there is a basic conflict between two ideals, and the real conflict is being fought, not by Indian troops or other troops, but by the people of Kashmir themselves. It is further a conflict between progress and uttermost reaction and bigotry. I invite honourable members to go to Kashmir and see for themselves the progress that has been made in spite of all difficulties, governmental progress, progress in the economy of Kashmir, all kinds of public works, supplies, transport, in every sense, and particularly the very great land reform that they have brought about quickly.¹⁹ The whole face of the country is changed.

Go to the other side, as Maulana Saeed said—the 'Azad Kashmir' of course you cannot go there. But there the conditions are amazingly different. The fact of the matter is that from the psychological, from the real basic point of view, the battle of Kashmir has been won and this terrible shouting that is going on in Pakistan is the result of uttermost frustration, because they

18. The Security Council suspected the move as an attempt to bypass the Council and wanted the Government of India to give an assurance that this would not in any way interfere with the commitments made by them. The constituent assembly should settle only internal matters leaving international issues unaffected.
19. Under the land reforms introduced in Kashmir, early in 1950, land was distributed to the tillers and the big landholders were deprived of their titles.

know they have lost it. They have lost it not because of our army or anybody's army, but because the contrast is so tremendous, because of the ideal for which the National Conference and Shaikh Abdullah fought for these twenty years, for which they stand today and for which we stand here, that is the ideal of communal unity, of working together, not of the two-nation theory and one community trying to rule over the other. That has been instilled in the mind of every Kashmiri and the results seem to have convinced them of the rightness of Shaikh Abdullah's approach, quite apart from his personal popularity and that of other leaders. So, it is this feeling that Kashmir has slipped out of their grasp that has completely upset the rulers of Pakistan. On the other side, in the so-called 'Azad Kashmir', there are continuous squabbles and quarrels. The whole place is some kind of an occupied area by the Pakistan army.

There are some other matters between Pakistan and us. There is the evacuee property matter²⁰ and canal waters. In regard to both these we offered, and we offer still, judicial determination by properly constituted courts of Pakistan and India with provision made for final decision. We are perfectly prepared for that.

In this connection I want to make one point clear, because in foreign countries a great deal has been said in connection with Kashmir and its rivers, as if the rivers of Kashmir affect the destiny of Pakistan and if Pakistan did not control Kashmir, the rivers can be cut off or turned off somewhere and the whole of Punjab would go dry. First of all, please do not mix up the so-called canal waters question with the Kashmir question because the canal waters question does not deal with the rivers in Kashmir; it deals with the rivers in East and West Punjab, about which, as I said, we are prepared to have proper judicial determination about our rights and their rights. That issue has no relation with the Kashmir rivers issue. In regard to the Kashmir rivers, as most honourable members should know, the rivers are the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. All that is necessary is for honourable members to look up the map of Kashmir and just see what one can do with those rivers. It is fantastic to mix-up the Kashmir question with the canal waters issue. In England and America much is made of this.

20. At an Inter-Dominion Conference in which evacuee property and the position of minorities in Bengal were discussed, and which concluded in Calcutta on 18 April 1948, both the Indian and Pakistani delegations decided, among other things, to discourage the mass exodus of minorities and to facilitate, as far as possible, the return of evacuees to their former homes. Again it was agreed, at a conference between India and Pakistan in New Delhi from 6 to 14 December 1949, that a committee should be appointed to expedite the transfer of copies of revenue records regarding agricultural property, that liaison officers should maintain close touch with the Custodians of Evacuee Property so as to enable refugees to obtain more easily information about their property and that a joint agency should be established to facilitate the return of movable property.

Here we are at this stage, at this critical stage, in our relations with Pakistan. I hope the crisis will pass. I am convinced that the only thing that will ultimately settle our various problems is friendliness between India and Pakistan. I am quite convinced that that is bound to come, even though in the intervening period our relations may be bad, or may go even worse. Friendly relations between us are inevitable; in what form they will come I do not know. If so, why should we not try to get that sooner rather than later, after passing through all kinds of disasters and troubles. So far as we are concerned, in spite of all the provocation that Pakistan has given, in spite of the daily talk of *jehad* and the rest, we shall always be ready to solve every problem peacefully and to develop friendly relations with Pakistan. At the same time, as things are today in Pakistan, on account of threats that are continually being raised, we have to take every precaution. I cannot detail to the House all the precautions we have taken in the military sphere, except that for more than a month past when this situation developed in this way, we have given the most careful thought to it.

A good deal has been said about civil defence. Many honourable members have mentioned it. The way Professor Shah did so seemed to me somewhat different from the other approaches. His idea of civil defence appeared to me something in the nature of conscription,²¹ limited or not, for all kinds of works. That is not exactly civil defence. It may be suggested on other grounds. For my part, I think it would be a very good thing in this country, quite apart from the Pakistan issue, if there were conscription in which every man, rich or poor, was enlisted to do ordinary labour work. And so long as we do not make people like ourselves take a spade and dig, I do not think it will be good for our souls or for the soul of the country. We think we are very wise and clever because we sit in our office with fountain pens in our hands. This conception that a clerical job is a better one will ultimately degrade the whole nation.

Leave out conscription. What is the talk of civil defence? What exactly does it mean? I know something about it. When people talk to me about civil defence, I want them to talk to me intelligently about it, not vaguely throw the word at me. Do you mean what Pakistan is doing, or do you mean something else? Pakistan is digging trenches all over; Pakistan is having black-outs all over; Pakistan is talking about fire brigades and the like. What do you mean by it? Let us consider it item by item as to exactly what we can do. I say and I say definitely and if I may say so rather aggressively put down the idea of civil defence, and I will continue doing so, after the gravest and

21. K.T. Shah suggested on 11 August that people should be trained to face an emergency as mentioned "in an article in our Constitution which provides that not only should everybody be given suitable work, but that they should also be made available for conscription."

fullest thought given to it. I have called upon all our State Governments not to have it. I have done it because I know my job not through ignorance because I understand what I say and I understand what I have told them. I am not going to allow our people to waste their time in digging trenches and the like, in getting excited and getting other people excited. It is true that everybody has realised that morale counts. Well, I am a better builder of morale than most people perhaps know, and I am going to build up the morale of this country. And morale is not built by the stage tricks of Pakistan. There are other ways of building up morale. When I see the duplicity and the trickery staged there it does not affect me powerfully at all.

I was talking about Kashmir and the wonderful way the people of Kashmir have risen to the occasion. I deeply regret that some small sections of the community there, in Jammu specially, have in rising to the occasion played a game which can only be of advantage to Pakistan. And those are some Hindus of Jammu. It amazes me how the spirit of communal fanaticism blinds people even to their own advantage.

Take this constituent assembly which is going to be elected there next month. They are trying to put as many difficulties in the way as possible, creating as many difficulties in the way of the National Conference, of the present Government in Kashmir, of Shaikh Abdullah, and doing so in the most vulgar language. That is why I have often said that it is this kind of immature mentality which produces communalism. It is not a grown-up man's thought that can do it. It is immature, childish; or it may be that it is when a person has outgrown his own wisdom. If today in India I am a little anxious about things, it is only of one thing, and that is the communal spirit in India. I can deal with the communal spirit of Pakistan. I want to deal properly with the communal spirit in India, the communal spirit of the Hindus and Sikhs, not so much of the Muslims. But I can deal with them too.

I want this House to realise that if anything is going to come in our way, if war comes or anything, it is this spirit that will come in our way and that will weaken us. I do not think that anybody will try deliberately to do that. But if you spread that spirit, that idea abroad, then in times of excitement people misbehave. And if people misbehave, then your front weakens because we have to meet this front before that. That has to be remembered. We cannot fight the enemy if behind our backs mischief is done. No army can fight with its base being upset by wrong actions.

Therefore, it is of utmost importance that all this wild and vague talk of communalism be put an end to at any time, more especially now. I attach the greatest importance to this. I am stressing this, because there is a tendency always for a person to become a great patriot by cursing Pakistan, by cursing Muslims. I want this House, and I want this country, not to curse Pakistan. I want this House and this country to feel friendly to the people of Pakistan, because those poor people of Pakistan are not much to blame anyhow.

What would you do and what would I do if day in and day out I had to read those newspapers containing stories full of falsehoods and hear the radio, and all the time be enveloped in this atmosphere of fright and fury. It is not the fault of the people, naturally. I do blame those who are responsible for it. It is a heavy responsibility. It is not for me to say much about it. Let us not create a feeling of ill-will for the common people there or for the country as a whole, because these feelings of hatred and violence somehow weaken us.

In the last fortnight or so honourable members must have seen many leading Muslims in this country, many important Muslim organisations in this country, coming out criticising Pakistan's action in this matter in Kashmir or in these other matters and offering their full support to our Government and to us.²² I am quite sure I do not always attach value to these things, and some people may do it just to gain favour, but I am quite sure that many of these matters that have come to us represent the true feelings of those who have sent them. That kind of thing represents more strength to us than an army corps or many army corps. It represents strength in many ways, because it means that our nation is cohesive before a common danger. It means strength to us because thereby we strike at the very root of what Pakistan stands for, that is, this two-nation theory and all that. Therefore, that strengthens us and we should welcome it. We should work for it and we should make it quite clear to all our minorities and all the others who may be at all afraid of anything happening that it is our proud privilege to give the fullest protection and opportunity to the minorities in this country. I dislike this word "protection" and I dislike "minority" too. But for the moment I use them. I want these words to cease to be.

Therefore, it is the very worst approach for the minds and hearts of the people if you think in terms of civil defence. We can dig in trenches in twenty-four hours, take it from me. But you will not require them. Trenches are dug for people, if I may say so, who expect invasion. We are not going to be invaded, whatever happens. Do you think if even war comes we wait to be invaded? Is that your test of India's strength? We are not going to be invaded. Because of that we are not going to dig in trenches and have any blackouts. But whether you have any outside blackouts or not, I should like our people to put an end to the blackouts inside them and not to lose themselves in passion and fury and anger and hatred, but to think coolly and collectively of the situation, not complacently. Nothing could be more foolish than to be complacent. We should be ready for every eventuality and carry on our work normally.

22. For example, on 31 July 1951, a meeting of Muslims in Bombay pledged to "stand by our Prime Minister in the defence of the motherland." Similar statements were issued by Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and other organisations and by prominent individuals.

2. Graham's Proposal for World Disarmament¹

Dr Graham came to see me two days ago immediately on arrival. He said that he realised how terribly busy I was and he was loath to take up my time just then. If I could give him some other time later when we could have a leisurely talk, he would be grateful. I admitted that I was heavily occupied, but nevertheless I would try to find time for him whenever he wished it. I suggested his coming to dinner with me two days later for a quiet talk. We discussed various matters for about half an hour and then parted. Kashmir was not mentioned.

He came to dinner tonight with me and we had a talk by ourselves after dinner for about an hour and a quarter. He said that he had accepted his present job rather reluctantly, as he was getting on in years and had spent a long time outside the United States. His wife had tried to dissuade him. But ultimately he had thought it his duty to come because he felt that he might help a little in easing the world tensions. He had looked upon his coming here as a part of the world problem of peace. He was considered an idealist, though he was a practical idealist. He had long felt that an imaginative lead was necessary for the world, and he could not think of any person who was more suitable to give it at present than the Prime Minister of India. He had read some of my books and had been powerfully influenced not only by my ideas but also by my gift of expression, which impressed those ideas on others.

The world was going rapidly towards disaster and the only way to stop this terrible drift was for a powerful appeal to be made for widespread disarmament. He was not thinking of Governments so much, although Governments came into the picture, but rather an appeal to the people of all countries, and finding a ready and widespread response among them, he was convinced that there would be a tremendous response all over the world, because people everywhere were hungering for peace. He could certainly say that of his own country, and he felt sure that people in Russia must feel likewise, so far as peace was concerned. If such an appeal was made, many leading Senators in the United States would back it up. He could answer for twenty or more of them. But he was much more interested in the common man, not the politicians or the businessmen but the others. Such an appeal should be worked up from the grassroots so to say.

The appeal should involve widespread disarmament, including atomic weapons, but also that money so saved should be diverted for development

1. Note to the Ministers for Education, Home and Railways and Secretary-General, M.E.A., New Delhi, 15 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

purposes to do away with poverty and misery in various parts of the world. In the U.S., the churches would take it up, and the women's organisations and the youth leagues and many other organisations. In other countries too, there was bound to be a great response.

He added that the appeal should not for the present come in the way of countries arming or rearming for what they considered defence, because they were afraid. That might be left out. Because if we include this, it would immediately rouse people's fears. But if the appeal had a widespread response and was part of a wider programme of help etc., it would result in lessening fear and leading to disarmament.

Although this appeal should be made to the people and should be worked up from the grassroots, it was inevitable that some international organisation should make itself responsible for it later, and the only organisation that could do so was the United Nations. Disarmament would also involve an adequate police force for the United Nations.

Dr Graham discussed and elaborated on this proposal and went on repeating that I was the only person he could think of, who could make an effective appeal. Further that there was no time to lose as the situation was drifting dangerously.

In this connection he mentioned rather casually that it would make a tremendous impression if I made an appeal and this was backed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan and later included in its scope some of the South Asian countries, and possibly some of the western Asian countries.

Throughout this conversation there was no mention of Kashmir, but it was implied that, as a preliminary to the appeal, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan should come to some kind of a settlement between themselves. Dr Graham said that he saw no point in his making a report to the United Nations about his mission here. It would be far more effective and far-reaching if, instead of his making a report, this appeal came from me, supported by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

In my reply, I said that I entirely agreed with him about the malady of the world and the need for a remedy. Also that the peoples of the world were hungering for peace and would respond readily to any proper and practical appeal. But however good in itself an appeal might be, it would be a damp squib unless it was made at a psychological moment in the right way. It was right to appeal to the people, but governments were there and they came in the way if they were ignored or if they disapproved. War comes in spite of the desire of peoples to avoid it. We have any number of peace organisations and a vast number of people of goodwill. But they all feel that when a crisis comes and fear takes possession of them, an ineffective appeal would not do any good and might perhaps do some harm. It must not be just a pious expression of goodwill and it must not be adventurist in character. However,

this question was obviously important and deserved careful consideration. If a practical appeal could be made at the right moment, it was certainly worth considering. But I was a little afraid of such appeals being made and falling flat.

I did not refer to Pakistan or to Kashmir.

Dr Graham asked me if I would like him to jot down, for my personal consideration only, his ideas on the subject. I said that he could certainly do so. Thereupon he replied that he would give thought to this matter during the weekend and produce something.

3. Avoidance of War and Preservation of Peace¹

This Congress reaffirms the resolution of the Nasik Congress in regard to foreign policy.

The great need of the world today is the avoidance of war, which will inevitably bring irretrievable disaster to mankind. This Congress earnestly hopes that the great nations of the world, on whom rests a heavy responsibility, will pursue policies which ease the present tensions and lead to peaceful solutions of present-day problems. The policy of interference with another country with a view to bring about political or economic changes there, as well as the policy of controlling another country and depriving it of freedom to shape its own destiny, must lead to conflict.

The United Nations Organisation was formed to provide a common platform for all countries, even though they differed from each other in many ways, and was based on each country having freedom to develop in its own way and not interfering with another. If that basic policy of the U.N.O. is followed, the fear that grips the world today will gradually lessen and a peaceful consideration of problems will become easier. This Congress approves of the policy pursued by the Government of India in seeking friendly relations with all countries and in avoiding any entanglement in military or other alliances which tend to divide the world into rival groups and thus endanger world peace.

In particular, the Congress approves of the decision of the Government of India not to participate in the San Francisco Conference, which was held for the purpose of signing the Japanese peace treaty² and instead to have a separate

1. Resolution drafted and moved by Nehru at the Subjects Committee meeting of the A.I.C.C. in New Delhi on 16 October 1951 and adopted on 17 October. File No. G-16(B), A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See *post*, pp. 603-624.

treaty with Japan. Peace in the Far East, which has been gravely disturbed by hostilities in Korea and subsequent developments, has to be based on the cooperation of the countries of the Far East and the other countries chiefly concerned. Any partial arrangement which does not include all these countries is likely to increase the tension and lessen the chances of a peaceful settlement.

This Congress hopes that the negotiations for a ceasefire in Korea will meet with success and that this will be followed by a larger settlement in the Far East.³

The colossal programmes of rearmament which present-day conditions have led many countries to adopt add to international tension and cast a heavy burden on the people of these countries, which results in a lowering of their standards of living. The progress of the underdeveloped countries of the world is also impeded by these programmes of rearmament. If this vast expenditure on rearmament was diverted towards constructive purposes and to the advancement of underdeveloped countries, that would be a surer guarantee of peace than preparation for war.

The Congress trusts that the United Nations Organisation will devote itself to the furtherance of the aims so nobly set forth in its Charter and reorganise itself for this purpose, where this is considered necessary.

The Congress deeply regrets the continuing tension between India and Pakistan, which injures both countries and poisons their relationship. India has and can have no aggressive designs on any country including Pakistan. But India has always to be prepared to meet any aggression that might be made on any part of her territories. The Congress would welcome peaceful settlement of all Indo-Pakistan problems.

In regard to Kashmir, it has been the declared policy of the Government of India, with which the Congress is in entire agreement, that the people of Kashmir themselves should decide their own future. The Congress would welcome an early plebiscite in the Jammu and Kashmir State under proper conditions which have been clearly stated by the Government of India. The Congress welcomes the constitution of a constituent assembly in the Kashmir State and hopes that through its labours the State will make even greater progress than it has done during the last two or three years.

3. The negotiations, which began in Kaesong on 8 July 1951, were concluded on 27 November 1951. The U.N. and the communist forces agreed provisionally on a ceasefire line if an armistice were signed within thirty days.

4. To James Loeb Jr.¹

New Delhi

25th October, 1951

My dear Mr. Loeb,²

I have received the letter, dated October 3rd, signed by a number of distinguished American nationals, a copy of which you have been good enough to transmit to me through our Ambassador in Washington. I appreciate the spirit that prompted the signatories to address me as they have done.

India's foreign policy has been repeatedly explained by me in a number of speeches, including some that I delivered in the United States during my visit in the fall of 1949, a visit of which I have happy recollections. India's attitude towards aggression, from whatever quarter it may come, was explained by me in my address to the Congress of the United States of America, from which I quote the relevant passage:

...We have to meet aggression and to resist it and the force employed must be adequate to the purpose. But even when preparing to resist aggression, the ultimate objective, the objective of peace and reconciliation, must never be lost sight of, and heart and mind must be attuned to this supreme aim, and not swayed or clouded by hatred or fear.³

This remains India's position. Our policy is not neutralist but one of active endeavour to preserve and, if possible, establish peace on firm foundations. On fundamental issues, such as the liberty of the individual and the rule of law, there is no difference between India and other like-minded countries. It is only as regards the methods to be employed to achieve the purpose that you have felicitously described as "the survival of freedom with peace" that differences exist, and as I have explained at length in my public pronouncements, there is both room and justification for such differences. With the governments and peoples of the western democracies, we sincerely desire and ceaselessly work for full cooperation in the cause of liberty and peace.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. collection.

2. Then National Executive Secretary, Americans for Democratic Action.

3. Address to the U.S. Congress, Washington, 13 October 1949. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 13, pp. 301-304.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

II. The Japanese Peace Treaty

1. To M.A. Rauf¹

New Delhi
July 23, 1951

My dear Rauf,²

Your letter of the 20th July. I have also received Thakin Nu's letter of the 20th July which you have sent me.

I shall send an answer to Thakin Nu in a day or two's time. So far as reparations are concerned, we are not insisting on any from Japan. But if Burma wishes to lay stress on them, she has every right to do so and we have no objection.³

The whole question of the Japanese peace treaty is being viewed by us on more basic grounds.⁴ For us to sign it practically means giving up the position which we have thus far occupied in foreign policy. It means lining up with the U.S.A. in world politics. It means accepting American troops and bases in Japan. It means finally almost a break with China, because China and the U.S.S.R. attach the greatest importance to this matter. They look upon this treaty as a direct challenge to them, because it involves Japanese rearmament under American auspices and this can only be against China or Russia. Because of all these it is difficult for us to sign this particular treaty.⁵ We are perfectly prepared to sign an independent treaty with Japan simply ending the state of war without any qualifications and other commitments. However, we are considering this matter fully and shall come to a decision some time later.

About the Pakistan war-scare, we have declared as clearly as possible that on no account will we attack Pakistan or take any other aggressive action

1. J.N. Collection.
2. India's Ambassador in Burma at this time.
3. Burma insisted on reparations to compensate for the wealth that Japan had drained out of Burma during the war-time occupation.
4. The Government of India maintained that the terms of the treaty should concede Japan a position of honour, equality and contentment among the community of free nations, and that they should be so framed as to enable all countries specially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty, sooner or later.
5. The terms of the treaty that were circulated on 3 July 1951 to all countries as a memorandum envisaged the signing by "any or all nations at war with Japan who are willing to make peace on the basis proposed." Japan would be asked to recognise the independence of Korea, agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, and accept the future decisions of the Big Four about the status of Taiwan, the Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The security of Japan would be maintained by the U.N. with continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese forces and the United States. There would be no reparations.

against her, unless we are attacked ourselves. If Pakistan says the same thing, then there is no question of war at all. Personally, I think that there is not much chance of war and the fact that we are prepared to meet a challenge has largely prevented it.

I do not see the point in having a conference of India, Indonesia and Burma. In any event, we should know what this conference is about before we can consider it. It is not possible for me to leave India for the next two or three months or more. I am terribly busy now and Parliament will be meeting soon for its final session before elections. If anyone comes here, I shall gladly meet him.

I have telegraphed to you already that the Burmese Foreign Minister⁶ can come here about the end of the month.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Sao Hkum Hkio.

2. To Thakin Nu¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1951

My dear Thakin Nu,

Thank you for your letter of the 20th July which our Ambassador in Rangoon has forwarded to us. I understand that your Foreign Minister is coming here day after tomorrow. I am glad he is coming, as this will give us an opportunity of discussing the Japanese peace treaty as well as other matters also.

So far as the Japanese peace treaty is concerned, I entirely agree with you that Burma's claim for compensation or reparations is very strong. In our own preliminary reactions² to the drafts received by us from the U.K. and U.S.A., we had naturally considered the question of reparations from our own point of view. We had come to the conclusion that we should not demand

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Government of India were critical of the seven-point memorandum the U.S. circulated to members of the Far Eastern Commission in October 1950. India was unwilling to see the Yalta decisions on Sakhalin and the Kuriles reopened. It desired that the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands should be left under the sovereignty of Japan and favoured restoration of Taiwan and the Pescadores to China. It was against any treaty provision to retain Allied troops on Japanese territory. It did not object to Japan's entering into security arrangements with the U.S. or any other power after the treaty came into force and was willing to waive reparations. India wanted the treaty to be drafted by a conference of all States belonging to the F.E.C. and with the Beijing Government representing China.

such reparations on behalf of India. This was due to the fact that damage done by the Japanese to India was relatively small. Also the fact that the history of reparations in the past in Europe showed that it was hardly possible to realise them, even if promises are made. After the First World War, enormous reparations were fixed on Germany. Actually hardly any payment was made and ultimately Hitler repudiated them. They were only a source of continuous irritation.

Applying this analogy, we felt that any stress on reparations would really have no particular meaning in economic terms, and, as I have said, we were not particularly affected in India. As a matter of fact, we have paid from forty to fifty lakhs of rupees in war damages to the people of the North-Eastern areas of India out of our own resources. These damages were caused partly by the Japanese and partly by the Anglo-American forces there.

In our reply to the U.K. and U.S.A. about the peace treaty, we therefore laid no stress on reparations and said that so far as we were concerned, we did not press for them. I realise, however, that Burma's case is different and Burma has suffered a very great deal. She has, therefore, every right and justification to claim them. How far she can get them is another matter. In any event, we are prepared to say that your claim is just.

In our consideration of the draft Japanese treaty, we have laid stress on a number of other matters. A few of our minor proposals were accepted by the U.K. and U.S.A., but the major ones have not been accepted. Our approach has been that this treaty should help towards the future Far Eastern settlement and not make matters worse. As far as we can see, the present draft will lead to a considerable worsening of the situation. That draft permits American troops and bases to be kept in Japan. Apart from being a derogation on Japanese sovereignty, this is considered by China and the U.S.S.R. as direct threat to them. Formosa has been one of the major issues between the rival blocs. Now, Japan will become a still bigger and more vital issue. In the future it seems to us impossible for any real peace in the Far East, unless there is some measure of cooperation between Japan and China. The U.S. policy is to rearm Japan against China, just as it is to rearm Germany against the U.S.S.R. Both of these add greatly to the tension, and in fact might well lead to war.

Then again, in all probability, the present Japanese regime will recognise Chiang Kai-shek, and the Formosan Government will probably sign the treaty. This will create another difficulty for those who have recognised China. I am putting these difficulties before you briefly. We are considering these matters fully and we hope to arrive at some decision fairly soon. I shall discuss all this with your Foreign Minister. We shall, of course, keep you informed.

I might add that the present Japanese Government is anxious that India and Burma and Indonesia should sign this particular treaty at San Francisco. I think that what they are aiming at is to get as much help as possible from the

U.S.A. and build up a powerful Japan under cover of that help. Australia, though she will sign the treaty, is apprehensive of this new development.³ Many people in the U.K. do not like it at all. The only organised party in Japan which is against some of the terms of this treaty is their Socialist Democratic Party.⁴ I forget the exact name of the party. This is relatively small at present.

We would prefer very much to sign a separate bilateral treaty with Japan in simple terms.

With all good wishes to you.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Australia was not convinced that Japan had experienced any change of heart. It wanted guarantees against possible renewed Japanese aggression through the creation of a security pact of which the U.S. was a full member. It also wanted treaty limitations on Japanese rearmament.
4. Japan's Democratic Party was not happy with the terms of the peace treaty to be signed with one group of countries to the exclusion of others. It resented the proposed retention of foreign troops on Japanese soil.

3. To Thakin Nu¹

New Delhi
July 27, 1951

My dear Thakin Nu,

I am very glad that your Foreign Minister, Sao Hkun Hkio, with his other colleagues came here even for a day. We had a long talk this afternoon. This talk largely revolved round the proposed Japanese peace treaty. But it also covered other grounds.

I have explained our position, as clearly as I could, to him and also given him a draft prepared by us for being sent to the U.S. Government.² This draft contains suggestions for modifications in the treaty. It has not been finalised yet. It will however give you some idea of how we are thinking. I shall send you a copy of our final message to the U.S.A. in regard to the peace treaty probably in the course of two or three days.

I have already written to you on the subject of reparations. So far as we are concerned, we shall be happy indeed if you can get reparations from Japan. But I fear there is very little chance of this.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. See *post*, pp. 608-610.

Apart from minor matters, our main approach to the draft treaty has been to see whether it leads to a peaceful settlement in the Far East or not. It is clear that a proper settlement should include China and the U.S.S.R. China of course is most concerned with this matter and China has also suffered the most from Japanese invasion. The future peace in the Far East depends greatly on the relationship of China with Japan. The original agreement between the great powers was that a treaty should be a joint one and should include China and the U.S.S.R. That would have been right. At the same time it is hardly proper to hang up this matter indefinitely simply because one or two countries do not agree. Therefore a peace treaty is desirable, even though some countries are left out.

But such a peace treaty should not be objectionable to the countries left out and should leave the door open for them to come in or to have separate bilateral treaties with Japan. The present draft treaty contains some proposals which are particularly a challenge to China and which China can legitimately think are directed against her. For instance, if Japan gives bases to the U.S. or keeps U.S. troops and if Japan is rearmed, obviously this can only be aimed against China or the U.S.S.R. It is not surprising that China objects to this strongly. The rearmament of Japan is patently aimed at China. You know that the rearmament of Germany has become a major issue in Europe and might well become a cause of war. So also the rearmament of Japan is likely to give a lot of trouble. Certainly it will cause fear and apprehension in many minds. It is directly contrary to the decisions taken by the powers after the war.

It is true that it is not an easy matter to prevent Japan from rearming, if later she chooses to do so just as Hitler did. We can take the risk. But practically to aim at this in the peace treaty is to invite trouble and to shut the door to the possibility of China and the U.S.S.R. joining in this treaty or even having a separate treaty with Japan. It should have been possible to avoid this. But the U.S. insisted. The U.K. did not like this, but ultimately surrendered to the U.S. pressure.³

There is little doubt that this new treaty will later be signed by Chiang Kai-shek's Government and Japan will recognise it. This will create another difficulty. It would practically mean a continuing state of near-war between China and Japan.

Now we cannot prevent this. But should we not avoid becoming parties to it? If we sign this treaty we become parties to all this and, as countries recognising the People's Government of China, we are put in a very

3. Britain's differences with the United States on the terms of a peace treaty arose over the question of who should represent China, with America insisting on Nationalist China and Britain, which had by then recognised the new government in China, pleading for People's China.

embarrassing position. Our relations with China and the U.S.S.R. will naturally suffer a very serious setback. We shall in fact practically align ourselves with the U.S.A. bloc. This means a major change in the foreign policy we have been pursuing.

I think that this would be undesirable from every point of view and therefore it is not our intention to go to San Francisco and to sign the treaty. For the present we point out to them the minimum changes necessary. It is almost certain that they will not accept these changes as they have already rejected them in the past. When we are told so we shall inform them that we regret we cannot sign the treaty.

The position of India and Burma and Indonesia are roughly similar in this respect. We all recognise the new China and have refused to deal with Chiang Kai-shek. We have followed a policy of friendship with foreign countries without alignment with any bloc.

Your Foreign Minister mentioned your suggestion that there might be a conference of Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers of Burma, India and Indonesia.⁴ I rather like this idea, but I feel that the time for it will be after the San Francisco signing of the treaty when we can consider the position and perhaps make a joint suggestion to Japan to have a simple treaty of peace with our three countries without any other commitments.

I hope you are keeping well.

With all good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Thakin Nu cabled on 27 July 1951 that after his Foreign Minister's departure he received an important message from Burmese sources in Pakistan that the border situation was becoming dangerous. He proposed that the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia should see Nehru and the Prime Minister of Pakistan to discuss measures for relieving the tension.

4. On the Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan¹

1. The Government of India have again carefully examined the draft and are in full sympathy with the underlying object of terminating the state of war with Japan as soon as possible and admitting her to the community of free

1. Note drafted by Nehru and sent to the United States Government. New Delhi, 28 July 1951. J.N. Collection.

sovereign nations. The Government of India are also glad that, unlike similar treaties in the past, the proposed treaty with Japan is not punitive. The Government and the people of India have had and have friendly sentiments towards the people of Japan and would welcome closer relations with independent Japan.

2. Another objective of the peace treaty with Japan should be to lessen the existing tension in the Far East and to help towards a peaceful settlement of the problem affecting that area. The terms of the treaty should therefore not be such as to give just cause for offence to other interested powers, and more especially China and the U.S.S.R., which are vitally interested in the Far East, and thus imperil the prospects of a stable and enduring peace. Even though China or the U.S.S.R. cannot, for a variety of reasons, sign the treaty now, there should be nothing in the treaty which would make it impossible for them to sign it, or a bilateral treaty, on substantially the same terms, at a later date.

3. In view of the negotiations for a ceasefire at present going on in Korea, which the Government of India earnestly hope will come to a successful conclusion leading to a further consideration of the problems of the Far East with a view to an enduring settlement, it is particularly necessary to avoid taking any step which may imperil that settlement. It is possible that the Korean settlement may create a different situation than the one that exists today in the Far East. It would be undesirable for any provision of the treaty to be such as not to fit in with this new situation and to come in the way of a more permanent settlement.

4. The Government of India would suggest that the draft treaty be amended so as to satisfy the objectives set above. In particular, they would invite attention to the following provisions:

- (a) Article 3 of the revised draft is no doubt an improvement on the original draft in so far as Japan has not been required to surrender sovereignty over Ryukyu and certain other Islands but the present draft provides for placing these Islands under trusteeship, with U.S. as the sole administering authority, and pending this arrangement, provides for the continuance of the administration of these Islands by U.S. In effect, therefore, the sovereignty of Japan over these Islands would be nominal. This further limitation on her sovereignty is likely to be resented.
- (b) Article 2(b) and 2(c) provide merely for Japan renouncing all rights, title and claim to Formosa and Pescadores as also to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin but are silent about the disposal of these territories. While the question as to when Formosa should be returned to China may be considered separately, the Government of India feel that unless the treaty provides for Japan ceding these territories to China and

Russia respectively it would be impossible for these countries to subscribe to the treaty even at a later date.

- (c) Article 6(a) of the revised draft, while providing for the withdrawal of occupation forces, envisages the possibility of foreign armed forces being stationed or retained in Japanese territory under bilateral or multilateral agreements with Japan. This provision is bound to be regarded both by China and the U.S.S.R. with apprehension as an instrument directed against them, and will lead to greater tension in the Far East. In any event we do not see the need for such a provision as Article 5(c) provides that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements. Such arrangements would be more appropriately made later with independent Japan than as a condition of independence.

5. Government of India would, therefore, again earnestly urge reconsideration of the provisions in the draft, with a view to removing the objections stated above.

5. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi

August 1, 1951

My dear Radhakrishnan,

I received yesterday your letter of the 23rd July about the proposed Japanese peace treaty.² You had sent this letter *via* London.

I have considered your points carefully. As a matter of fact, we have had many of these points before us and, as you must know, we have sent our proposals to the U.S. Government. These proposals are, generally speaking, based on the viewpoint you have expressed, though we have not gone into all these details. It is very unlikely that our proposals will be agreed to, because previously they were rejected by the U.S. If that happens, we cannot go to San Francisco or sign the treaty.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Radhakrishnan, India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union at this time, wrote that People's China was not only not represented in the proposed conference but was deliberately excluded from entering into a bilateral treaty within three years after coming into force of the peace treaty; many issues had been kept vague in the clauses under 'territorial'; India had thought that peace would enable Japan to be free from occupation forces, but according to the draft treaty the U.S. armed forces were to remain in Japan; and the rearming of Japan had been permitted in the name of unrestricted sovereignty of Japan.

In this matter the Burmese Government, on the whole, agrees with us. Probably the Indonesian Government does so also, but the pressure on them from the U.S. appears to be great and our latest information is that they are likely to sign the treaty.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1951

Nan dear,

...I saw a report today of a conversation between Loy Henderson and a correspondent of *The Times of India*. Henderson, who had recently returned from America, said that he had found cell after cell in the State Department full of hostility towards India and even Acheson's views were unfriendly. He (Henderson) had a very difficult time in the State Department trying to convince ill-informed and prejudiced people against all the dangers of U.S. policy towards India. He thinks he succeeded a little after many meetings and personal discussions, and gradually a change began to come over the State Department. According to Henderson, at the final meeting presided over by Acheson, Henderson's point of view with regard to India and Kashmir was accepted and Acheson admitted that even he had been misled in the past. But Henderson added that it would take some time for the State Department to reverse the policy which they had pursued in the past. Indeed he said it would take six to eight months' time.

I am passing this on to you, though it has no great importance. Henderson, of course, tries to make out that he is trying his utmost to put across the Indian point of view. I have no doubt that he does so to some extent. But I doubt his capacity to change the State Department. The U.S. Government wants "faithful allies" to carry out their bidding and they do not like countries that come in the way of their general policy. I was reading the other day an article by some prominent American commentator, in which he dealt with America's aid to Spain.² He was addressing an English public because in England a great deal of criticism has been made about the U.S. Spanish policy. He made it clear that the only consideration that counted with the U.S. was

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. The U.S. had signed a defence agreement with Spain in July 1951 despite objections by Britain and France.

the military one. They wanted bases and facilities for the war to come and they wanted faithful allies who would carry out their policy. Spain was apparently going to be a faithful ally in this respect, and so it did not matter what Franco's policies were in the past or present. There was a slight hit at the British who were often critical of American policies.

With this background, it is fairly clear why the U.S. State Department should be irritated with India and should side with Pakistan. Have you read Gorer's book, *Americans*.³ It is a remarkable book which does make one understand the peculiarities of the American outlook.

In the world today, more and more, extremists are lining up against each other. On the one side there are of course the communists; on the other the democracies and other countries rely increasingly on the old fascist, Nazis and militarists for their defence. There is the question of rearming Germany and Japan, the aid to Spain, and generally supporting reactionary and semi-fascist regimes. Apart from one's likes and dislikes, even from the narrowest point of view of opportunism, this is a dangerous policy for the democracies. There is still strong feeling in Europe and elsewhere against fascism and Nazism. This is roused up by their pro-fascist policy, and the communist countries take advantage of this. The U.S., looking at everything from a purely military point of view, misses, or deliberately ignores, this major psychological factor which ultimately affects the morale of nations and of armies. As a matter of fact, I doubt very much if a rearmed Germany, or rearmed Japan will be pillars of strength to the U.S. or to the U.K. They might well turn against them. But, in any event, large numbers of other people turn against them because of the encouragement of fascism and the appeal of democracy grows feeble.

The result of all this is that moderate tendencies and really democratic ways and policies find less scope and the fascists and the communists hold the field against each other, ultimately probably leading to war. So far as we are concerned, we want to keep out of this and while we are certainly not lining up with the communist countries, we have an equal distaste for the fascists. Any other policy might mean disruption in India.

It is from this larger point of view that the Japanese peace treaty should be considered. You advised us to sign this treaty. Our Ambassadors in Peking and Moscow and London advised us very strongly not to do so and gave plenty of reasons for this. You know the answer we have sent to the State Department suggesting various major changes. There is no likelihood at all of those changes being adopted. In effect, therefore, we will not be in a position to sign the treaty.

3. *Americans: A Study in National Character* by Geoffrey Gorer, a British anthropologist, published in 1948.

In this matter my mind is quite clear. To accept the Japanese treaty as it is now is to put an end to our present policy and, in fact, turn a political somersault. It might mean almost, though not quite a political break with China. We would have no logic left in any policy that we pursue. This goes against my grain completely.

Bajpai, on the other hand, thinks otherwise and has advised us to sign the treaty after making such protests as we like. K.P.S. Menon⁴ is, on the whole, against signing the treaty. Most of the members of our Foreign Affairs Committee are against signing the treaty and it was their decision that was communicated to you.

I need not go into all the arguments, but I want you to appreciate the far-reaching consequences of our signing the treaty. It means a reversal of what we have been saying and acting upon thus far. It means a submission, under pressure or fear, to American policy in the Far East and Asia. The consequence of not signing it means greater illwill in the United States. I realise that, but still my mind is clear that we cannot sign this treaty. No doubt the treaty will be signed without us and will take effect. We cannot stop it and do not come in the way. But I see no reason whatever why we should be, in a sense, guarantors of the treaty and of the many provisions in it which we utterly dislike. We would prefer to sign a simple bilateral treaty with Japan.

It is possible that we might be rather isolated in the business, except perhaps for Burma. Indonesia will probably not hold out for long.⁵ The U.S. can exercise great pressure there. The Burmese Foreign Minister came to see me a few days ago and more or less agreed with what I said.

Parliament began today with the President's Address.

We have definite information that Pakistan is trying to bring about the assassination of Shaikh Abdullah and of some of his colleagues. As a matter of fact, some persons have already been arrested in this connection. But there are no doubt others also.

With love
from Jawahar

4. K.P.S. Menon was Foreign Secretary at this time.

5. Indonesia had suffered the loss of about four million lives and material damages to the extent of billions of dollars under the Japanese occupation. It participated in the San Francisco Conference and signed the peace treaty but declined to ratify the treaty till the reparations issue had been settled.

7. To M.A. Rauf¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1951

My dear Rauf,

I have already sent you a reply to your telegram about the Japanese peace treaty.

We have received the U.S. reply to our comments.² It does not take us far. In fact it leaves things much as they were. I am not quite sure if the U.K. will send any reply, though they have informed us that they are considering our suggestions carefully.

It is clear to me that we cannot possibly accept this and therefore cannot sign this treaty. Therefore, we should not go to San Francisco at all. But, before we make a formal announcement, we should have the final draft before us and given it consideration. There is no particular advantage in making a public statement before we have got the final draft.

I am glad the Burmese Government are more or less of the same opinion as we are in regard to the Japanese peace treaty. We should certainly act together in this matter, and if possible the Indonesian Government. But I rather doubt if Indonesia will follow suit.

This matter of the Japanese peace treaty is, from many points of view, of great importance and we should not allow it to appear that we are acting in a hurry or without giving full consideration to whatever might be said about it. Therefore a few days' delay will not make much difference. Normally, I suppose we could announce our decision by about the 20th or so. There is one factor, however, which might induce us to delay it by another day or two. We have summoned our Ambassador in Washington, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, to come to India for consultation. This consultation has not much to do with the Japanese peace treaty. It is meant for other purposes. Nevertheless, it seems to me proper to wait for her arrival here before we announce our decision about the Japanese peace treaty. That will not delay matters much.

Please inform the Burmese Government about this and tell them that we would be glad to synchronise our announcement with theirs.

We have had an interesting piece of information from Tokyo. India's attitude, though not publicly stated, is fairly well-known now. This has roused up many sections of the Japanese people, who thus far had been acquiescent. The editor of the biggest newspaper in Tokyo expressed his appreciation privately and said that he wished he had started a campaign on these lines

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In the U.S. reply of 12 August 1951, none of the major suggestions put forward by India was accepted.

previously. He would try to do something even now, though it could not be on that big scale. I am almost sure that our action will be approved by a majority of the Japanese people, though the present Yoshida Government may not like it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. On San Francisco Conference¹

I am inclined to agree with you about our attending or rather not attending the San Francisco Conference.² This Conference is now likely to become a major factor for wordy warfare and mutual recrimination and our position will become very embarrassing and difficult, holding the views as we do...

1. Note to Secretary-General, M.E.A., New Delhi, 15 August 1951. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. Bajpai, in his note to Nehru, had written on 15 August that since the signing of the treaty by India was impossible, the right course would be "to communicate our objections to the treaty and not to attend the Conference at San Francisco...." "There would be substantial differences in that we should not be parties to the day-to-day debate and, as such, victims of day-to-day criticism in the western press of open alignment with the U.S.S.R."

9. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram 10256 dated 16th August, Japanese peace treaty.

Our provisional decision was to send our criticisms of draft treaty to U.S. and if no major change was made in draft then not to attend San Francisco Conference. U.S. have sent elaborate reply to our proposals but have agreed to no substantial change.

Burma's attitude is more or less in line with ours, except for addition of claim for reparations. Indonesia, though largely agreeing with us, is likely to sign treaty for fear of offending America.

1. New Delhi, 16 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

Announcement of Soviet decision to go to San Francisco came as a surprise.² It is clear that they are not going to sign but to use platform of Conference for stating their objections. Our position, if we go there, would in such a case be even more embarrassing. We are therefore still inclined to think that we should not attend San Francisco Conference. But we shall take final decision after few days and when we have had further information from Moscow and Peking. Vijayalakshmi coming here on 20th.

You can certainly send by airmail detailed note on this subject.

2. On 13 August 1951, the U.S.S.R. decided to attend the San Francisco Conference despite its opposition to the U.S.-sponsored treaty.

10. Cable to A. Soekarno¹

We have kept your Government informed about various steps we have taken in regard to proposed Japanese peace treaty. We have felt that certain clauses in this treaty are such that they will increase tension and not bring peace in Far East. Hence we suggested to U.S. Government some important changes. We regret that U.S. Government was unable to accept them.

Having given full consideration to this matter, we have decided that India should not participate in San Francisco Conference and consequently not sign the peace treaty. This decision will be placed for formal approval soon before our full Cabinet. We intend sending a note to this effect to U.S. Government about 25th August. Till then we shall not give any publicity to this decision.

As you perhaps know, Burma has also decided not to attend San Francisco Conference. We hope to coordinate our activities in this matter, as far as possible, with Burma. I hope that your Government will also take up similar attitude in this matter so that there might be full cooperation between our three Governments.

We intend to declare end of state of war between India and Japan soon after Japan attains independent status as consequence of San Francisco treaty. Later we shall have to consider question of bilateral treaty with Japan. Burma's Prime Minister had suggested joint meeting of Foreign Ministers of Burma, Indonesia and India in Delhi for this purpose. We would welcome such meeting. Probably suitable time for this would be after San Francisco Conference when position will be clearer.

Greetings and good wishes.

1. New Delhi, 18 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

11. Cable to S. Radhakrishnan¹

Your telegram 99 dated August 19.² You might ascertain what procedures Soviet delegation intend adopting at San Francisco Conference in view of U.S. declaration that no change can be made in final draft of Japanese treaty and fixed time table for signing. Also Russian reactions to Kaesong ceasefire talks and Iranian oil situation.

There is general impression that Soviet relations with China are not very cordial and there is growing rivalry. Have you noticed any such development. For your personal information we have decided not to participate in San Francisco Conference. Burma will also not participate. Our decision will be finalised soon in full Cabinet and conveyed to U.S. about 25th August. After that publicity will be given to it.

1. New Delhi, 20 August 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Radhakrishnan had cabled: "Gromyko wishes to see me tomorrow 21 hours. May be about Japanese peace treaty. Anything you wish me to ascertain?"

12. India and the Japanese Peace Treaty¹

The House will be interested to know of the latest developments in regard to the proposed peace treaty with Japan and the Government of India's decision thereon.

The war against Japan ended six years ago. This was followed by a military occupation of Japan which has continued till now. India, in common with other powers, was interested in putting an end to this unsatisfactory state of affairs and terminating it by a treaty of peace. Owing to differences in the approach to this question between different powers, little progress could be made.

The Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom thereupon took the lead in drafting a peace treaty with Japan. There were originally two separate drafts which differed materially from each other. Finally some minor changes were incorporated in the United States draft and the Government of the United Kingdom accepted it. The United States and the

1. Statement made in Parliament, 27 August 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, Vol. XIV, Part II (6th August - 29 August 1951), columns 1357-1362. Extracts.

United Kingdom then became joint sponsors of the revised draft treaty and this was communicated to us on the 20th July 1951.

The Government gave careful consideration to this revised draft and communicated their views on the 28th July to the U.S. Government in regard to it. In this reply it was stated that the Government of India were in full sympathy with the underlying object of terminating war with Japan as soon as possible and admitting her to the community of free sovereign nations. It was pointed out that the other objective of the peace treaty with Japan should be to lessen the existing tension in the Far East and help towards a peaceful settlement of the problems affecting that area. In order to satisfy these objectives, attention was drawn to some provisions in the draft treaty and certain proposals were made on behalf of the Government of India.

On the 12th August 1951, the Government of India received the reply of the U.S. Government to their comments. Some minor variations were made in the original draft, but none of the major suggestions put forward by the Government of India was accepted. The Government thereupon, after careful consideration, came to the conclusion that India should not sign the peace treaty or participate in the San Francisco Conference. It was further decided that immediately after Japan attained independent status, the Government of India would make a declaration terminating the state of war between India and Japan and, later, a simple bilateral treaty with Japan should be negotiated.

In accordance with this decision, the following communication was sent on August 23rd 1951, to the Government of the United States, through our Embassy in Washington:

The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the reply of the Government of the United States of America to the representations which they had made on the Japanese peace treaty in their communication dated the 30th of July, 1951. They fully appreciate the consideration given to their views by the U.S. Government and wish to assure them that the present reply is conceived in a spirit of frank and sincere friendship for the Government and people of the U.S.A.

2. Throughout the negotiations that have taken place between the two Governments on the subject of the treaty, the Government of India have laid emphasis upon two fundamental objectives:

- (i) the terms of the treaty should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality and contentment among the community of free nations;
- (ii) they should be so framed as to enable all countries specially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty, sooner or later.

The Government of India have, after most careful thought, come to the conclusion that the treaty does not, in material respects, satisfy either of these two criteria.

3. Condition (i) (a): It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire the restoration, in full, of her sovereignty, over territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country. The Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands fully satisfy this description. Nevertheless, the treaty proposes that until the U.S. Government seek and obtain trusteeship over these Islands, they should continue to be subject to the legislative and administrative control of the U.S. It is apparent to the Government of India that such an arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people and must carry the seed of future dispute and, possibly, conflict in the Far East.

(b) The Government of India recognise that, as a sovereign nation, Japan should have the right to make arrangements for her defence as provided in Article 5 of the treaty.² If, in exercise of this right, Japan should decide to enter into defensive agreements with a friendly power, no one could reasonably object to this. But the right should be exercised by the Government of Japan when Japan has become truly sovereign. A provision in the treaty which suggests that the present occupation forces may stay on in Japan as part of such a defensive agreement is bound to give rise to the impression that the agreement does not represent a decision taken by Japan in the full enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation.³ The effect of this, not only on the people of Japan but upon large sections of people in Asia, is bound to be most unfortunate.

4. Condition (ii): As already stated, the Government of India attach the greatest importance to the treaty providing that the island of Formosa should be returned to China. The time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiation but to leave the future of the island

2. Article 5 of the treaty read: "Japan would accept the obligations set forth in the U.N. Charter (a) to settle her international disputes by peaceful means; (b) to refrain in her international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial independence or political integrity of any other State; (c) to give the U.N. every assistance in any action it might take in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the U.N. might take preventive or enforcement action. The Allied Powers, on their part, recognized that Japan, as a sovereign nation, possessed "the inherent right of collective or individual self-defence" referred to in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, "and also had the right to enter voluntarily into collective security arrangements."
3. Article 6 laid down that "all occupation forces of the Allied Powers would be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision would, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under any bilateral or multilateral arrangements which might be made between Japan and one or more of the Allied Powers."

undetermined, in spite of past international agreements, in a document which attempts to regulate the relations of Japan with all Governments that were engaged in the last war against her, does not appear to the Government of India to be either just or expedient. *Mutatis mutandis* the same argument applies to the Kurile Islands and to South Sakhalin.

5. For the foregoing reasons, the Government of India have decided, with regret, that they cannot be parties to this treaty. It is their sincere hope that lasting peace will prevail in the Far East, and to that end, they will continue to cooperate with the U.S. and other Governments in such manner as may be open to them, consistently with the principles on which their foreign policy is based. As a first step, it is their intention, as soon as this may be practicable, to put an end to the state of war between them and Japan, and to establish full diplomatic relations with that country.

6. It has already been announced that the Conference convened at San Francisco to consider the draft peace treaty with Japan will not be open to negotiation, though attending Governments will be free to state their views on the treaty. The Government of India feel that the statement of their views on the treaty contained in this reply, should be adequate to clarify their own position to the Conference. It is their intention, if the U.S. Government have no objection, to communicate this reply to their own Parliament, which is now in session, on the 27th of August. Once the document has been published, it will be available for the information of the Conference and the Government of India will be glad if the Government of the United States, which will act as host to the Conference, will have this reply circulated to its members. As, for the reasons already stated, the Government of India will be unable to sign the treaty, they think that it is not necessary for them to send representatives to it....

13. India's Reply to the U.S.¹

The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge the reply to their note of the 23rd August, 1951, received yesterday afternoon by telegraph from their Charge d'Affaires in Washington² to whom it was delivered. While the Government of India are glad of the assurance that the reply of the United States Government has been made in the same spirit of frankness and friendship

1. Drafted by Nehru, New Delhi, 27 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. M.K. Kirpalani was Minister in Washington.

that animates our note of August 23rd, they regret to have to draw the attention of the United States Government to the note of resentment and reproach in the latter's reply for which they can find no justification in the spirit or phraseology of their own note.

2. The Government of India welcome the assurance that the overriding desire of the Government of the United States is peace in Asia. The Government and people of India have striven to this end, to the best of their ability, because they consider peace of paramount importance to the world and, more especially, to the countries of Asia, which have suffered for many generations under alien domination. Nothing could be more disastrous for Asia than war which would make impossible of early fulfilment the hopes of development that fill the minds of the people of this great continent. It is with this single aim of preserving peace that the Government of India have considered every problem with which they have been confronted. In the task of maintaining peace and developing the nations of Asia, they would always gladly cooperate with the United States and with other countries.

3. The Government of India also welcome the assurance of the Government of the United States that they do not want to be a party to colonialism or imperialism. Opposition to colonialism and imperialism has been the basis of India's struggle. Having experienced the burden and the injury that flow from both, the people of India are convinced that continuance of them in any form and in any part of the world cannot lead to peace or progress or to the happiness of the people concerned. World peace can only be assured when the domination of one country over another ceases.

4. Turning to certain specific points relating to the treaty which arise out of the reply of the Government of the United States, the Government of India wish to make the following observations:

(1) The Government of the United States have expressed the belief that their view of the proposed treaty is shared by the Government and the people of Japan. The Government of India regret that they cannot share this view; such information as they have received does not confirm the appreciation of the situation by the United States Government.

(2) Commenting upon the Government of India's suggestion that the treaty should restore in full Japan's sovereignty "over territories of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her (Japan's) own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country", the Government of the United States point out that the Government of India have never questioned the Potsdam terms of surrender during the five and a half years during which India has served as a member of the Far East Commission, which was established to ensure the fulfilment of those terms. In suggesting the return of the Ryukyu and the Bonin groups of islands to Japanese sovereignty, the Government of India are not

challenging the Potsdam terms of surrender. As the Government of the United States have themselves pointed out, those terms left room for the addition, by agreement, of some minor islands to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaidu, Kyushu and Shikoku, over which Japan was to be allowed to exercise sovereignty. Nor have the Government of India any intention whatsoever of applying dissimilar principles to different parts of territories which have a historical affinity with Japan and which Japan did not wrest from any of its neighbours. If they excepted the Kurile Islands from the scope of their suggestion, it was because the Yalta Agreement provided, without any reservation, that "the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union". The Government of India cannot be held responsible for an inconsistency, which is the result of the Yalta Agreement.

(3) In discussing the Government of India's views regarding defensive arrangements to be made by Japan, the Government of the United States describe them as tantamount to leaving Japan defenceless against proved aggressors. The Government of India fail to find any warrant for such a conclusion from anything that they have said. The draft treaty recognises that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements. Adequate provision is thus made for Japan independently to make whatever arrangement she considers necessary for her self-defence as soon as she has signed the peace treaty and it is not clear to the Government of India why there should be any "period of total defenselessness" for Japan.

(4) In regard to Formosa, the Government of India have suggested that, in keeping with international obligations, it should be stated clearly in the treaty that it would be returned to China. That would determine the future of Formosa leaving the time and manner of such return to be settled at a future date. The Government of India have been and are of opinion that a declaration that Formosa shall be returned to China will help in creating conditions for a settlement in the Far East. But the Government of India has at no time insisted or even suggested that a Japanese peace treaty should be deferred until there is final agreement with respect to the future of Formosa.

(5) The Government of India have been anxious that a peace treaty with Japan should be signed and the military occupation of Japan terminated at the earliest possible moment. All that they have urged is that what they consider to be imperfections of a major character in the draft treaty should be removed, so that the terms of the treaty may promote the prospects of a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues in the Far East. The Government of India do not wish to come in the way of any nation which is satisfied with the terms of the present treaty and are

prepared to sign it. They only claim for themselves their inherent and unquestionable right not to sign a treaty with the terms of which they are not fully satisfied. Of their own resolve to establish the friendliest possible relations with Japan, they have already given proof for, as they have informed the Government of the United States, they intend to terminate the state of war with Japan and to establish normal diplomatic relations with her as soon as possible.

5. The Government of India have no intention of proposing to Japan a treaty of peace, which would in any way be controversial or which would run counter to the provisions of the draft treaty of peace. Their action in not being represented at the San Francisco Conference and in making a separate treaty of peace with Japan, should not, therefore, adversely affect either the friendly relations that exist between the Government of India and the Government of the United States or the cooperation of the two Governments in everything "which is practical and fruitful for peace."

6. The Government of India hope that the observations made in the foregoing paragraphs reveal a unity of outlook between them and the Government of the United States in many vital matters that affect the future of the people of Asia and of humanity in general. The differences that exist between them are differences of method and approach. On international issues of high moment, such divergences of opinion are bound to occur even amongst the friendliest nations. The most effective way to prevent them from coming in the way of continued cooperation is to avoid the intrusion of acrimony into the discussion of issues over which differences arise. The Government of India feel sure that the Government of the United States concur in this conclusion.

14. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

...Argument that our attitude to presence of our own forces in Kashmir differs from our view of presence of American forces in Japan is not valid.² We

1. New Delhi, 9 September 1951. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. Rau had written that Americans were puzzled that "while we claim the Indian Army is in Kashmir for defensive purposes we seem to believe that U.S.A. occupation forces in Japan have a different aim; nor can they understand why we dissociate the pro-treaty Yoshida Cabinet from the people of Japan while claiming that the Abdullah Cabinet represents the people of Kashmir. They seem to think that we have one standard for ourselves and another for U.S.A."

never suggested that Japan should be precluded from agreeing to presence of American forces in Japan if she so wishes. Our argument was that since Article 5 of treaty provides for this, there is no need to refer conspicuously and, so far as Soviet Union and China are concerned, provocatively to continuation of presence of American forces in Japan even after termination of occupation in terms of Article 6(c) of treaty. Comparison between pro-treaty Yoshida Cabinet and Abdullah Cabinet is completely misleading. According to report in *London Times*, Yoshida refused to agree to general election so that new Diet could decide whether or not to ratify treaty. If Yoshida is confident that Japanese sentiment is so overwhelmingly in favour of treaty why should he object to election of new Diet to ratify it. On main issue of continuing accession of Kashmir to India, we are willing to let people of Kashmir give their verdict through free and impartial plebiscite, which is in marked contrast to Yoshida's refusal to consult Japanese people through new election to Diet on Japanese treaty. Americans, who now unfortunately resent slightest deviation from their own policy by other countries, are bound to resort to false comparisons and misleading analogies but we need not be frightened.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

III. The United States

1. Closer Indo-U.S. Relations¹

The American Ambassador and Mrs. Henderson came to lunch with me today. After lunch I had a fairly long talk with Mr. Henderson. I began by saying that I wished to make two points clear. One was that it was my firm opinion that, in spite of marked differences of opinion between India and the U.S. in regard to various matters, there was basic community of views, or, to put it differently, our differences were not deep but rather superficial and temporary. We had no ill-will against each other. Our differences flowed from a different background. We, as a newly independent nation, were powerfully influenced by our way of thinking which had developed during our struggle for freedom, and by the fact that we did not wish to be entangled. It would be quite wrong to think that there was any real ill-will in India for the people of the U.S. Certainly I desired the best of relations between the two countries.

My second point was that whatever differences had arisen between the U.S. and India were due to certain developments which could not be controlled by either party. It was not the fault of individuals. Personally I felt that no Ambassador to India from the U.S. could have done more for the promotion of good relations between the two countries than Mr. Henderson. I wish to make this clear as there had been various hints, chiefly in the American press, that we did not get on well together. There was absolutely no truth in this and, as Mr. Henderson knew well, we had no such difficulty in understanding and getting on with each other. And I greatly appreciated the work he had done in India.

Mr. Henderson was rather moved by what I said, and said that he was happy to hear this from me though he himself knew that our relations had been always good. He did not thrust himself upon me too often because I was a very busy man. The criticisms that appeared in the public press were not based on any facts. He instanced the criticisms in Parliament here of our Ambassador in the U.S. He said that these criticisms here of Mrs Pandit were completely unjustified and misconceived, because Mrs Pandit had always had the best of relations with the State Department and indeed was held in higher esteem than any other ambassador in Washington.

As for himself, he had tried his utmost to promote good relations between the two countries and it was a matter of sorrow for him that he had not achieved the results that he had hoped for. I pointed out that this certainly

1. Nehru's note on his talk with Loy Henderson, New Delhi, 15 September 1951. J.N. Collection.

was not his fault or, for the matter of that, anybody else's fault. In any event his attempts had not failed, though they have not borne obvious results. I was sure that his stay here as U.S. ambassador had done a lot of good.

Regarding my other points he said he was very glad to know from me that, in my opinion, the differences between India and the U.S. were not deep at all and he would like to convey that to the State Department.

The Japanese treaty and India's attitude to it had produced strong reactions in the U.S. and it was being said that India's policy was:

(1) to try to separate China from the U.S.S.R.,

(2) to try to separate Japan from the U.S.A.

I replied that, while it was not true to say that we were trying to separate China from the U.S.S.R., we would certainly like China to function independently and not to be tied up too much with the U.S.S.R. I felt sure that that would happen in the course of time because I could not imagine a great country like China being submerged in a way in the U.S.S.R. or to become just a dependent member of the Soviet system. While that was certain in the long run, a short run counted and, therefore, I was anxious that China should have other openings and other contacts, so as not to depend too much upon the U.S.S.R. China was a great power and was bound to function as such.

The developments in Tibet and Chinese forces coming right near the Indian border has created a new situation for us. We did not think for a moment that there was any danger of invasion of India *via* Tibet (Mr Henderson entirely agreed with this). But, nevertheless, the new situation made us somewhat apprehensive of this long frontier and we had to take some steps in regard to it. Previously we had completely ignored this frontier. Now we could not do that.

Our general policy towards China was governed by the fact that we thought peace could only be assured in the Far East by proper recognition of China, as China is a great nation, and by peaceful settlement of questions in which China was concerned.

Both China and the U.S.S.R. were great and powerful nations. Communism came in the way of our understanding the situation, which was the development of two great and vital nations tending to expand. There was always the possibility of aggression. I thought that it would be exceedingly bad if China went beyond its own legitimate borders. That would create new and dangerous problems not only in the present but for the future.

As regards the allegation that I want to come in the way of U.S.-Japanese relations and to isolate Japan from the U.S., I said that this was a novel suggestion which had never occurred to me. It was true that it seemed to me quite inevitable that geographically and economically Japan should have close relations with China. They supplied each other's needs and to stop this natural

intercourse was to go against normal developments. I had no idea at any time that Japan should be cut off from the U.S. or not have friendly and cooperative relations. Indeed, from a larger point of view and in order to maintain a certain balance in the Far East, it seemed to me desirable that the U.S. should have close relations with Japan just as China ought to have with them. We had previously laid stress on the latter because we felt that there could be no peace in the Far East if China was excluded from the settlement. The same argument applied very much to any attempt at peace which did not have the concurrence of the U.S.

Mr Henderson expressed his appreciation of what I said, and added that he would like to convey all these to the State Department. He assured me that the U.S. realised that China must inevitably play her part as a great nation in the Far East and that it was natural for her to develop good relations with Japan. Unfortunately the Korean war had come in the way. If this matter was resolved, other natural developments would follow.

Mr Henderson assured me that the U.S. did not wish in any way to interfere in our domestic or other policy and he hoped that, whenever there was any misapprehension about this matter, we would talk freely with the new Ambassador.² He further said that there had been some misunderstanding about the U.S.I.S. and it had been said that the U.S.I.S. was interfering with our domestic affairs through their publications and by trying to influence the press here. This was not true, and he wished to assure me that this was not their policy. Some foolish individual temporarily connected with the U.S.I.S. had made a suggestion to Karaka³ which was entirely unauthorised and improper. What the U.S.I.S. wanted to do was to put down their own positive points of view in order somewhat to counteract the communist propaganda in India. Some papers here were attacking America all the time (when I asked him for names, he mentioned *Crossroads*, *Blitz* and, to some extent, others). Also the bookshops here were full of communist pamphlets and literature. Americans who came here complained, when they went back to the U.S., of the absence of any U.S. publicity here, while communist publicity was obvious.

We had some talk also about Iran where Mr Henderson is going.

2. Chester Bowles.

3. D.F. Karaka, editor of *Current* published from Bombay.

2. U.S.-Czech Relations¹

Since the noting on this file, we have received a letter from our Charge d' Affaires² in Prague forwarding a memorandum from the Czech Government. This memorandum makes it clear what attitude the Czech Government or delegation would adopt. They can make out a strong case.

2. The U.S. argument, though based on the actual fact of strained relationship between the two countries, leads to far-reaching conclusions.³ An international agreement dealing with trade and commerce can be set aside because of politically strained relationship. Every agreement, of course, ends when war begins. This principle is not sought to be extended to what is called cold war. The test of a shooting war or a declaration of war is clear enough. It is not so easy to lay down the tests of what is now called a cold war. It might mean that where strained relations exist in any measure, one country can denounce an international obligation.

3. Our relations with Pakistan have been very strained and we have been sometimes on the verge of war. I do not think, however, that we have claimed at any time that because of this crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations we should absolve ourselves from any international commitments. In fact, the U.S.A. attitude weakens greatly the force of any international agreement. I confess I do not see how it can be justified, unless we come to the conclusion that must treat a cold war as something almost equivalent to a shooting war.

4. The example of our relations with South Africa has been referred to. Even at the time when this international G.A.T.T. Agreement was being discussed, we made clear what our relations were with South Africa in regard to trade and commerce. It is true that in the agreement itself no reference is made to this. Nevertheless, I think that this example has no particular relevance in the present context.

5. For the U.S.A. to say that they do not wish to involve us on the merits of the political dispute⁴ between them and Czechoslovakia does not help much, because essentially the step taken is a result of a political dispute. It means,

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 20 September 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. R. Goburdhan.

3. The U.S. Government had announced on 31 July the ending of economic relations with Czechoslovakia because of her "numerous acts of ill-will" and because of "political events." The Czechoslovak Government was notified that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to which Czechoslovakia was signatory, did not prevent the dissolution of the U.S.-Czechoslovak obligations.

4. The suspension of trade relations followed the trial and imprisonment of a correspondent of the Associated Press in Prague on charges of espionage.

therefore, that directly or indirectly, we do offend against paragraph 3 of the Article 86 of the Havana Charter, which lays down that "the members recognise that the organisation should not attempt to take action which would involve passing judgment in any way on essentially political matters". The U.S.A. case thus appears to me to be weak, considered on the merits. There would have been no particular difficulty if Czechoslovakia had also agreed to the course proposed. But, far from agreeing, they object to it strenuously and raise valid arguments in support. We have no desire to enter into these political controversies or needlessly to offend the U.S.A. in this matter. But I really do not see how we can support them. The alternatives, therefore, are either to oppose the proposal of the U.S.A. or to remain neutral and not vote at all. On the whole, I am inclined to prefer the latter attitude, that is, not voting.

6. In answer to the request from the U.S. Embassy here, we might point out these various difficulties and say that we shall have to consider this matter very carefully further and shall await developments.

7. This is important enough and might be considered by the Foreign Affairs Committee, if it is meeting soon.

3. The U.S.I.S. in India¹

We have recently had several cases of the U.S.I.S. trying to influence Indians by offers of money.² There appears to be little doubt that a great deal of money has been spent by the U.S.I.S. in this way. It has been given either to individuals directly or to printing presses and the like for work done, the payment being rather excessive. I understand that recent disclosures have rather upset the American Embassy.

Some information has also reached me of the activities of the American Consular offices which are clearly objectionable. They are reported to have approached and corresponded with Hindu Mahasabha representatives.

1. Note to H.V.R. Iengar, Home Secretary, Government of India, New Delhi, 4 October 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. A U.S.I.S. member had offered D.F. Karaka funds for the re-publication and free distribution of an article in which Karaka had been critical of Nehru's attitude towards the U.S. An editor of a Hindi daily in Delhi was also offered financial inducement by someone on behalf of the U.S.I.S. Both of them had refused. Nehru asked Bajpai to investigate the matter.

In view of the general political situation, and more especially because of the coming elections, it is possible that foreign governments might try to interfere in some way or other in our internal politics. The three Governments that might endeavour to do so are the U.K. Government, the Soviet Government and America.

In all probability, the U.K. Government will not attempt to do anything which is obviously improper. Politically, they are mature. The Russians are careful and outwardly keep aloof. It is from the Americans that there is likelihood of interference in various ways.

It is desirable that some kind of watch might be kept on foreign missions, and more especially the U.S.A. Mission, to find out how far they interfere with our internal politics by giving money or in other ways. There is the U.S. Embassy and their Consulates-General in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. There is also the U.S.I.S. and its various branches in India. It is possible that American firms and banks might also be used.

Exchange transactions through the Reserve Bank of India might occasionally give some useful information in regard to this. Indian employees in the American mission as well as American commercial concerns might also be used.

Journalists are likely to be approached.

Some of our prominent public men have publicly associated themselves with American policy, such as Shri M.R. Masani, Shri Dwarka Prasad Mishra and others. It would be worthwhile finding out whether they get any support from the U.S.I.S.

4. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi

October 5, 1951

Nan dear,

Sometime ago I read your "policy" statement which you issued soon after your arrival in America. It was a good statement. There was one thing in it that I did not quite like. I forget the words, but you referred to our newness or inexperience in foreign affairs or the like. This may be literally true, but I think we are more mature than the State Department.

1. J.N. Collection.

Much has been said about the American press not having given adequate publicity to your statement. I do not know how far this is true and if true, what it signifies. Please throw some light on this.

I hope you are going ahead with the reorganisation of your propaganda machinery. I think something should come out of it. But the major fact remains that only a recognition that we cannot be pushed about or bullied will tell in the end. Our approach must always be friendly and cooperative. We must not run down the U.S. At the same time we must make it perfectly clear that our policy is a firm policy and we are going to adhere to it because we believe in it.

With love
from Jawahar

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

IV. Burma

1. To Thakin Nu¹

New Delhi
September 12, 1951

My dear Thakin Nu,

Thank you for your letter of the 5th September. I have already sent a message to you by telegram² through our Ambassador, which, I hope, has reached you.

The facts you give in your draft note, addressed to the Secretary-General, United Nations, make out a very strong case.³ The U.S. authorities do not come out well. If it is true that the U.S. have been arming these Kuomintang forces on the Burmese border through Thailand, then this is a very serious matter. It may be, of course, that local U.S. representatives have done this without the knowledge of the U.S. Government. In any event, the responsibility is that of the U.S.

As you remind me, I wrote to you in May last that a reference to the United Nations would hardly produce any practical results. Since then much has happened and the facts you state leave you no alternative but to take some such action as you have suggested. The only question is whether this action should be taken immediately or after some slight delay. I would suggest some delay to give another chance to the U.S. Government to take action in the matter.

We sent for the American Ambassador and the U.K. High Commissioner separately today and our Secretary-General pointed out the gravity of the situation on the Burma-China border. He gave them the facts as contained in your note. This was done orally, as we did not wish to give them any document. But a fairly full account was given to them. They were both surprised and somewhat distressed to learn of these happenings. The American Ambassador said that he could not conceive of the U.S. Government being foolish enough to help these Kuomintang troops with arms, etc. He said that he was communicating with his Government immediately.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Not printed. Nehru expressed concern about the Kuomintang troops in Burma and agreed with Thakin Nu about the urgency of taking some steps. He wrote that Bajpai, in his interviews with the U.S. Ambassador and the U.K. High Commissioner, had given an account of Thakin Nu's draft note to U.N. Secretary-General. They had promised to convey its content to their governments. Nehru suggested that Thakin Nu should wait for their reactions and postpone the proposal to approach the U.N.

3. Kuomintang troops had entered eastern Burma in the course of their effort to overthrow the Government of People's China. As the Burmese Government were unable to deal with the situation and dislodge the Kuomintang troops, they wanted to refer the question to the U.N.

The U.K. High Commissioner also promised to communicate immediately with his Foreign Office and suggest that the message might be forwarded to Mr Morrison,⁴ the U.K. Foreign Secretary, who is at present in the U.S.

I think that you might await the result of these communications. It is possible that the U.S. Government might take some effective action now, because they must realise that a reference to the U.N. will do them no good.

Such a reference will necessarily lead to fairly serious developments. At the same time I do not see how you can remain inactive, unless the U.S. Government take definite action. For the present, I would recommend that you might postpone the steps you intend taking. You will probably know the reactions of the U.S. Government through their Ambassador in Rangoon. If we have any information, we shall immediately communicate it to you.

I have just seen a telegram from our Ambassador in Rangoon stating that Burma wishes to issue a notification terminating the war with Japan. We have been asked to ascertain Japanese reactions to such a notification. We shall immediately communicate with our representative in Tokyo and let you know what his reply is.

I am quite convinced that the action Burma and India took in regard to the Japanese treaty was right, in spite of the anger caused by it in the U.S.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Herbert Morrison.

2. To M.A. Rauf¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1951

My dear Rauf,

...About the proposed loan for the elections, I am afraid that I can help very little, if at all. We are having our own elections here on a colossal scale and have to raise money for them. I have decided not to ask any individual myself for a contribution. I have made a public appeal, and we propose to collect small sums from a large number of people. As Prime Minister, I think it is not right for me to ask any individual, more especially any of the financiers

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

or industrialists. I know that some others are doing this, but I am discouraging them. In these circumstances, for me even to suggest to any individual to give money to Burma would not be in the fitness of things. I have found that all such requests inevitably bring some consequences, which I do not like.

I think that Thakin Nu's Government has credit enough to raise a loan of ten lakhs of rupees fairly easily from some banks in India. I would prefer a direct approach by someone on behalf of the Burmese Government without my intervention.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

V. China

1. Cable to K.M. Panikkar¹

We have given preliminary but careful consideration to your telegram No. 327 of 28th September.² We fully share new China's desire for friendly relations among Asian countries in general and India, China, Nepal, Burma and Indonesia in particular. I have little doubt that Chou En-lai's talk with you is related to the larger framework of China's policy vis-a-vis neighbour or near-neighbour countries in South and South East Asia, of which Tibet's boundary with India and Nepal and China's boundary with Burma are only parts.

Chinese Ambassador³ has not yet raised with us question of conversations suggested by Premier Chou to you. Our provisional view is that, in first instance, conversations should take place between China and us regarding our interests in Tibet and common boundary between Tibet and India.⁴ If, as we hope, these progress smoothly and satisfactorily, Nepal can be brought in at later stage. We are not aware of any boundary disputes, at least in recent times, between Tibet and Nepal. Real purpose of suggestion to include Nepal in conversations probably is to prepare ground for early establishment of diplomatic relations between China and that country. For your own information, internal conditions in Nepal are still unsettled, owing to continuing differences between Congress and Rana wings of Cabinet, and growth of numerous small groups which want to share power. Communist element is trying to exploit situation to its own advantage. Until Nepalese Government functions harmoniously, it is doubtful whether it can have any firm policy towards China and there is risk of disgruntled elements in Nepal trying to play India and China off against each other. I am trying my best to impress upon the Nepalese Government through the King the imperative need for cooperative working and creation of stable internal conditions.

1. New Delhi, 2 October 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. At a dinner given by Chou En-lai's wife to Indian Ambassador's wife on 27 September 1951, Chou En-lai had laid special emphasis on the necessity of friendship between India, Burma, Indonesia and China. He was looking forward to Shahrir's visit and hoped that it would lead to a better understanding in South East Asian countries of the Chinese position.
3. Yuan Chung-Lai.
4. Chou En-lai had mentioned that there was no difference of point of view in regard to Tibet between India and China and that he was particularly anxious to safeguard in every way Indian interests in Tibet. He further emphasised that the question of stabilisation of the Tibetan frontier was a matter of common interest to India, Nepal and China and could best be done by discussions among the three countries.

Frontier between China and Burma has, as you know, been cause of disputes in past and remains undemarcated. Burma is also much more vulnerable from the north than India. It is in our interest and in general interest of peace in this region that Sino-Burmese frontier should not become cause of dispute. Thakin Nu is coming here about October 22nd and I am informing him privately through our Ambassador of Chou's approach to you so that, during his stay in Delhi, Thakin Nu can exchange ideas with us. We would certainly welcome discussion between China and Burma and be ready to lend our good offices by direct participation in conversations if both parties desire this, aiming at placing of Sino-Burmese relations on firm and lasting friendly basis. Chronologically, however, we think that these conversations should follow rather than be simultaneously with those between India and China regarding Tibet.

While I agree that Chou's reference to Indonesia is a hopeful sign, I am not sure that Indonesia need be brought into our talks at this stage. Even from the standpoint of overall policy, there is merit in moving diplomatically step by step while keeping the larger goal in view.

I leave it to your discretion to decide how much (apart from what I have said regarding internal situation of Nepal, which is for your own information only) you should mention to Chou En-lai before you leave. Some indication of the friendly response of India to the suggestion for settling matters of common interest by diplomatic negotiation seems desirable before you leave.

9

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

VI. Tibet

1. The Tibetan Delegation in India¹

From today's papers it appears that the Dalai Lama² has definitely decided to go to Lhasa.³ The question of his coming to India therefore does not arise now.

2. So far as the Peking agreement⁴ is concerned, there is no question of our approval or disapproval. We have had nothing to do with it and we have not been consulted at any stage either by the Tibetans or the Chinese. Our general advice to the Tibetan delegation, when it came here, was that we hoped that they would come to a peaceful settlement with the Chinese, preserving their autonomy. This advice was largely based on the fact that it seemed to us that Tibet was incapable of offering any effective resistance, and any attempt at ineffective resistance would probably lead to far greater control of China. It was quite impossible for us to give any assistance and therefore it was not proper for us to raise any hopes in this direction.

3. How exactly we can help the Dalai Lama and Tibet at this stage is not clear to me. The U.S.A., as a part of their larger policy, can incite the Dalai Lama to reject the Chinese treaty. For us to do so would mean no help to Tibet and would simply mean almost our breaking with China. When occasion arises, we can certainly put in a good word on the diplomatic plane to China. For the rest, the only policy we can adopt is to remain quiet observers.

4. As we have said previously, if the Dalai Lama or anyone else came to seek asylum here, we would naturally give it, subject to the condition that India was not made the base of political activity. This question presumably does not arise now as the Dalai Lama is going to Lhasa.

5. You might convey the substance of this note to our representative⁵ in Sikkim.

1. Note to S.N. Haksar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 21 July 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. (b. 1335); recognized as the fourteenth incarnation; temporal and spiritual leader of Tibet; left Lhasa for refuge in India, March 1959.
3. It was reported on 21 July 1951 that arrangements had been completed at Dongkar Monastery for the Dalai Lama, who had fled Lhasa in December 1950 for the Chumbi Valley near the Indian border, to return to Lhasa. He was back in August 1951.
4. On 23 May 1951, an agreement was signed at Beijing by the Government of China and a Tibetan delegation sent by the Dalai Lama. The main provisions were that Tibet would have regional autonomy and China would be responsible for dealing with Tibet's foreign relations.
5. Harishwar Dayal.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

VII. Vietnam

1. Recognition of the Bao Dai Government¹

This is the first time I have seen these papers. I do not like the look of them, or rather I do not like the way the French Government is trying to push us some way in the direction of recognising or dealing with the Vietnam Government.² I am quite clear that we should not take any step which might imply even indirectly any recognition of Vietnam. If this involves our having to close our consulate at Saigon, we should not hesitate to close it.

This position should be made perfectly clear to the French Embassy here.

I would hesitate even to ask the Vietnam Government for an exequatur. However, as things have gone rather far already and as we have actually suggested that an exequatur be obtained from Vietnam, it may be a little difficult to withdraw this request. But, in doing so, it should be stated in the clearest language that this does not imply the recognition of that Government by us. Our policy in regard to non-recognition continues. If the Vietnam Government does not like this, we shall carry on without the exequatur. If they want us to close down our consulate, we shall do so.

It is clear that we will not agree to having a Vietnam consul in India. As a matter of fact, there is no logical necessity for such a consul, because there are no Vietnamese people here, so far as I know.

I think the best course would be to point out to the French Embassy what our position is in the clearest language. The question of our language possibly not being liked by Vietnam should not arise. We cannot help it if they do not like it. But we must be very careful not to use equivocal language which might be misunderstood or stretched to mean something different than what we intended to mean.

It would be best to tell the French Ambassador,³ to begin with, that we feel that the simplest course is not to ask for an exequatur and for our Consulate-General to continue as he has done in the past. But in view of the previous suggestions made on this subject, we are prepared to ask for this exequatur, subject always to the condition mentioned above that it is clearly laid down that this does not involve any recognition of Vietnam by us. He should be asked to make this quite clear.

1. Note, New Delhi, 24 October 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. There was civil war in Vietnam between the nationalist forces led by Viet Minh, under Ho Chi Minh, who wanted to liberate the country from the French, and the Bao Dai Government which was being supported by the French. India supported the nationalists but it did not extend recognition to either side.

3. Daniel Levi.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

VIII. The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

1. The Change in Soviet Attitude¹

The change in the Soviet attitude² towards India results in two factors: (1) a general re-orientation in their world policies and (2) a better appreciation of the situation in India. The Soviet Government is very realistic and does not attach too much importance to local communist parties or their activities, unless such activities help in their world policy. That policy today is to prevent, as far as possible, neutral or semi-neutral countries from siding with the U.S.A. in international affairs and more specially in regard to the matters in conflict with the U.S.S.R.

There is no reason why we should not profit by this change in Soviet policy, provided, of course, that we do not entangle ourselves in any way.

Any discussions with the Soviet Government in regard to future Indo-Soviet relations should, of course, take place either in Delhi or in Moscow. They need not be publicized and the talks, to begin with, can be informal. There is no harm in Mr. Panikkar having talks with the Soviet Ambassador in Peking, but such talks can only be general and meant to convey attitudes of either Government to the other. Information received from such talks can be helpful to us and, therefore, I would not rule out such talks. But it is clear that any more definite approach must be made either in Delhi or in Moscow.³

Two issues arise: (1) The possibility of my visiting Moscow,⁴ and (2) the question of a treaty of friendship with the Soviet.⁵ As regards the first, our attitude is and has been that I would welcome such a visit, but it is almost impossible to arrange it during the later part of this year. I shall be terribly busy during the next few months with Parliament and other developments. Later, there will be general elections. This means that I cannot go this year. The beginning of next year will also be winter time and probably not suitable

1. Note to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, M.E.A. New Delhi, 18 July 1951. J.N. Collection. Extracts.
2. India's position on the Korean war and her stand on the Japanese peace treaty had influenced the Soviet view of India's foreign policy.
3. During a talk with K.M. Panikkar and T.N. Kaul, the Soviet envoys in Beijing suggested a possibility of India and Soviet Union signing a treaty of friendship, trade and cultural relations and a visit by Nehru to Soviet Union. They said an invitation would be forthcoming if the Prime Minister expressed a wish. Panikkar told them that such matters should be discussed in Moscow or New Delhi. Dutt, in his note on 17 July, had suggested a cautious approach.
4. Nehru visited the Soviet Union from 7 to 23 June 1955.
5. An agreement of Indo-Soviet economic cooperation was signed in December 1955 when Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India.

for a visit. This means that the earliest would be some time about the spring or later of next year. This again depends on the general elections and the shape of things after them.

As regards an Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship, including trade matters, we cannot say no to any such discussions. It would be desirable, however, to go a little slow and watch developments. About two years back there were some discussions which seemed to fade out.⁶ I forget what happened. We may, therefore, inform Mr. Panikkar that we are prepared to resume those discussions in Delhi or in Moscow. But it seems to us desirable, in the present context of international affairs, to go a little slow. These papers can be sent to our Ambassador in Moscow. I think he should be told that any initiative for any talks should come from the Soviet side. If such an initiative comes, he can take up the attitude generally suggested above. If the initiative does not come then it is better for him not to raise the matter.

Much will depend upon the outcome of events in the Far East during the next few months. The Japanese peace treaty is, perhaps, one of the most important issues which will have definite consequences in regard to other matters also. It cannot be isolated...

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Pt. I, p. 543.

2. A Visa to the *Pravda* Correspondent¹

The question of granting a visa to the *Pravda* correspondent has to be considered apart from our general policy in regard to visas for Soviet nationals. *Pravda* is a leading newspaper in Russia. To refuse to grant a visa to the representative of a leading newspaper is a thing which is very difficult to justify. It is not enough to say that he will mean merely an addition to the *Tass* people. It is bound to have serious political repercussions and obviously no Indian correspondent can go to Russia after this. The possible harm done cannot be very great. It means the addition of another person to some who are already here. But, on the other hand, refusal to a leading newspaper is a matter of serious principle and in the prevailing atmosphere in India, when our newspapers are angry with Government, this will give them another major cause of complaint.

I think, therefore, that a visa should be granted to the representative of *Pravda*.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, M.E.A., New Delhi, 19 July 1951. J.N. Collection.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

IX. Iran

1. Cable to B.N. Rau¹

While we are anxious to help U.K. we cannot ignore Iran's position² and political effect throughout Middle East, indeed Asia and more particularly in our own country, of adoption by Council, with aid of our vote, of resolution³ to which Iran is fundamentally opposed. In our view real purpose of resolution should not be determination of extent to which each party is right or wrong but to propose basis for negotiations which impartial opinion throughout the world will regard as safeguarding legitimate position of each party and offer real possibility of resumption of negotiation in atmosphere favourable to success....

1. New Delhi, 14 October 1951. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.
2. On 15 March 1951, Iran nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on the ground that her sovereignty was threatened by the existence of a foreign concern in the country controlling an area of 100,000 sq. miles and running a state of its own. During the Second World War, Iran was under the occupation of the Allies and they did not leave after the war had ended. The oil company prevented Iranians from occupying their territory by refusing fuel to their army. The company employed foreigners to man the industry discriminating against the Iranians. The Iranian Government resisted the British Government's intervention saying that the A.I.O.C. was a commercial concern and the company was a domestic issue of the State. Iran refused to comply with the decisions of the International Court of Justice after the issue had been referred to it by Britain.
3. On 12 October 1951, Britain had tabled a resolution before the Security Council calling on Iran to respect the decision of the International Court of Justice and permit the continued residence of British technicians at the Abadan refinery against whom expulsion orders had been served. The resolution also requested the Security Council to call for the resumption of negotiations between Britain and Iran to resolve the differences in accordance with the decisions of the International Court and call for the avoidance of any action which would aggravate the situation.

2. Iran's Request for India's Help¹

About midday today I had a message from the Iranian Ambassador.² He said that he had an urgent message from his Prime Minister to deliver to me personally. I was much too busy all day, but I saw him at 8 p.m. today.

He told me that he had been commissioned specially by the Iranian Prime Minister to ask for our support in the Security Council. He knew that we stood for the independence of Asian countries and would, therefore, support Iran in this matter.

1. New Delhi, 15 October 1951. Note to Secretary-General, M.E.A. J.N. Collection.
2. Mussa Noury Esfandiari.

I told him that his Prime Minister was quite right in thinking that we stood for the independence of Asian as well as other countries. Our own view in regard to the oil question was that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had treated Iran very unfairly in the past; further that it was Iran's right to nationalise her oil industry and their decision in this matter has to be accepted. We felt, however, that it was highly desirable to have some kind of a peaceful settlement, partly because a conflict might have serious consequences. If the principle of nationalisation was accepted, as apparently it had been, then the rest should not be difficult. Accordingly, we had suggested to both Iran and the U.K. Governments that attempts should be made for such a peaceful settlement.

Now that this matter was before the Security Council, there were two aspects of it:

- (1) the competence of the Security Council to consider it, and
- (2) the merits of the question.

As regards the competence of the Security Council, we felt that legally or constitutionally, it was difficult to deny this competence.³ In any event, we had a somewhat similar case in regard to the Indians in South Africa. The South African Union Government raised the question of competence of the U.N. on the ground that this was a domestic issue. We had challenged this and succeeded on this issue. We could hardly adopt a policy now which was contrary to our previous stand. Therefore, we had to accept the competence of the Security Council in this matter.⁴

As regards the merits we were anxious that every effort should be made for a peaceful and mutually satisfactory settlement. A break would be very unfortunate. We had therefore suggested some amendments to the U.K. resolution and had asked our representative to inform the Iranian Prime Minister about them. I gave some account of the amendments suggested by us.

I added further that if no agreement even on this temporary basis could be arrived at now, it was better to postpone consideration for a while.

The Ambassador said that the Iranian Government had made many attempts to settle this matter. It was the U.K. Government that had created difficulties. He said that he did not understand how they could arrange even a temporary working of the plant with the aid of British personnel when they had all departed. He appeared to agree with the suggestion that the matter might be postponed, at least till the British elections were over.

3. Iran, supported by the U.S.S.R., refused to admit the competence of the Security Council to deal with the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute.

4. In 1946 India raised the question of the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa at the U.N. South Africa contended that the treatment given to the minorities in the Union was essentially a matter of the domestic jurisdiction of the State. However India secured a two-thirds majority for a resolution that the treatment of the Indians in South Africa was against the principles of the U.N. Charter.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

X. Foreign Settlements in India

1. French and Portuguese Settlements¹

The Government of India's position in regard to the foreign settlements and possessions in India has been clearly stated on many occasions.² The continuance of colonial rule in these areas is an anachronism and must lead to continuing friction. Whatever justification such islands of foreign authority had in India in the days when India herself was a subject country, has disappeared with the coming of independence to India. An independent India cannot have these islands and footholds of foreign authority adjoining or surrounded by her own territories. Apart from the necessity of any form of colonialism ceasing to exist in these and like territories, geographical, historical, cultural, political and economic necessity lead to one conclusion, that is that these territories should become parts of the Union of India.

The Government of India, however, have pursued the method of peaceful negotiations and settlement, which remains the guiding principle in the conduct of its foreign relations.

Negotiations for the settlement of the future of the French and Portuguese possessions in India were begun by the Government of India in 1947. It was announced in June 1948 that a referendum would be held to determine the future of French possessions. In June 1949 a referendum was held in Chandernagore in which the people voted by an overwhelming majority for merger with India. A *de facto* transfer of power took place in May 1950 and the treaty for the cession of Chandernagore was signed in February 1951. This treaty now awaits ratification by the French Parliament.

No referendum has been held for the remaining French settlements of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam. The Government of India's attitude has been and is that until and unless conditions for a free referendum come into being in these settlements, the Government of India cannot accept the result thereof. Such conditions are unfortunately still remote; in fact the situation seems to have deteriorated as is obvious from the recent elections held in these settlements for the French National Assembly.³

The Portuguese Government, when approached by us for negotiations regarding the future of their possessions in India, informed us that since these

1. Reply to a question in Parliament, 1 October 1951, *Parliamentary Debates (Official Report)*, Vol. X, No. 6, Part I, columns 1857-1858.
2. T.N. Singh had asked whether negotiations were still continuing regarding the future of the French and Portuguese possessions in India and what stand the French and Portuguese Governments had taken.
3. There were many complaints of intimidation and terrorism during the elections held in these settlements for the French National Assembly.

were an integral part of Portugal, no negotiations regarding their future could be held. We cannot accept this claim. Recent constitutional changes made by the Portuguese Parliament, renaming the colonial areas as overseas provinces, have little meaning; economically, politically and culturally, the Portuguese possessions in India in fact remain in colonial subjection, and the movement for freedom is suppressed.

The Government of India have the fullest sympathy for the people of these territories, who are essentially Indians, and wholly sympathise with their desire to become citizens of India.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

XI. Miscellaneous

1. Expenditure of Heads of Missions Abroad¹

Our Foreign Service has grown up thus far without very much plan about it. We started almost from scratch. There were, of course, the High Commissioner in London and our Representative in Washington. Also some representatives elsewhere of a much lesser grade. The coming of independence suddenly made demands upon us and many countries wanted to exchange diplomatic representatives with us. Among the first embassies that we started were Moscow and Washington. Other embassies and legations followed in quick succession.

To some extent it was natural for us to lay stress on the western world which was playing an important part in international politics. We realised from the beginning that Asian countries were obviously important for us. We took special interest in Indonesia and our contacts with Burma and the countries of the Middle East grew. Nevertheless, Europe counted far more than Asia.

In fixing salaries and frais no particular rule was followed. We tried to find out what the British rates were and a proportion of those rates was fixed. Here again there was no planning and in some of the earlier cases a higher rate was fixed. Later we grew a little more cautious. The result is a lack of uniformity.

We have been giving a good deal of thought to this matter and have now graded our missions differently. The great powers naturally take first place. Our neighbour countries in Asia become more important for us than many countries of Europe or of the Americas. Some places like East Africa, although they are still colonies or mandated territories, have actually and even more so potentially, a great importance for us. Africa is changing and growing and it is of vital importance for our relationship with the people of Africa to be directed into right channels. We have considered all these matters and graded our different missions abroad accordingly. Even this grading need not be considered final as nothing is final in this rapidly changing world.

We have also been considering the question of frais. This is a difficult matter, and we want your help and advice in regard to it. As I have pointed out above, we have generally tried to find out what the U.K. rates were and fixed a varying proportion of them. As we progressed, that proportion generally was reduced because of financial considerations. I think it was wrong for us to keep the U.K. rates as a model to be followed. We cannot compete with the U.K. or other great and wealthy countries and we have no desire to do so. It is unbecoming for starving India to be lavish in her expenditure abroad. It is true that certain standards have to be maintained and diplomatic convention

1. Note to all Heads of Indian Missions, New Delhi, 7 July 1951. J.N. Collection.

requires that certain things be done. Nevertheless, there is considerable scope and it must be clearly understood that we are not out to reflect European or American standards. Our background is India, poverty stricken, often famishing, sometimes on the verge of famine.

Apart from this, our whole recent past has laid stress on simplicity and not on pomp and lavish display. It is often thought that we can create an impression by our display or by the lavishness of our entertainments. That is the usual standard. But that does not fit in with our own outlook, nor is it possible for us to maintain it.

It is true that people in India have no idea of the demands made on our representatives abroad and the conditions of life in foreign countries. The devaluation of the rupee has added much to our expenditure abroad. It is also true that some of our missions suffer because we cannot supply their needs adequately.

In spite of all this we feel that an effort should be made to keep our expenditure as low as possible, subject always to propriety, dignity and efficiency. I think it is possible for frais to be reduced in a number of cases and in some of these the frais fixed thus far appear to me not only to be unreasonably high but high also relatively to other missions. These questions are sometimes raised in Parliament. I do not mind that and I am prepared to defend our missions abroad where they need such defence.

I feel, however, that the time has come when each head of mission should consider this matter carefully and report to us what his own views are about possible economies in the frais. I shall be grateful to have your considered views on this subject. I write to you after a personal visit to Bihar where I saw starving and stunted children. That picture does not leave me and I cannot fit it in with any expenditure which can be avoided. Even though we might not be able to save very much, the psychological aspect is important. In India there is a growing feeling that the gap between the lowest and the highest income should be reduced. I have no doubt that this tendency will continue and will gradually affect all our lives. The change may take some time and it may not, and indeed cannot, affect conditions abroad or the way our foreign missions are run, because they have to adapt themselves to outside conditions. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore this powerful trend in Indian life which is, generally speaking, a right trend.

2. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
August 31, 1951

My dear Radhakrishnan,

Thank you for your letter of the 17th August.² Even before you wrote to me, I had gone into some of the figures of expenditure in your Embassy which Gundevia³ had sent. It was clear from those figures that you had brought about considerable economies. I am sure that you have done your best in this matter. All the details that you have sent me will be useful for record in our office.

Our decision about not going to San Francisco has created a furore in the U.S.A. and, to a lesser extent, in the U.K. I have no doubt that it was a right decision.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Radhakrishnan in his letter explained why the expenditure in Moscow was so excessively high. He also gave alternatives which he thought could reduce the expenditure.
3. Y.D. Gundevia, Minister-Counsellor in the Indian Embassy in Moscow at this time.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

11

New Delhi
7 July, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

I sent you a brief letter on the eve of my going away to Kashmir for a week's rest.² I returned on the 4th July and early tomorrow morning I am proceeding to Bangalore for the Congress Working Committee and the A.I.C.C. sessions. I am submitting a report to the A.I.C.C.³ This will be sent to you separately.

2. On my return here, I met Dr. Frank Graham, the U.N. representative for the Kashmir issue. We have had long and informal talks⁴ with him and some of his colleagues.⁵ It was clear, of course, that we cannot implement the last resolution of the Security Council.⁶ As a matter of fact, our talks have not referred to that resolution and what Dr. Graham wanted to know was the general background of this dispute. He is a sincere and earnest man anxious to do what he can to further a settlement. We have to treat him and his colleagues with all courtesy and explain how this problem has developed from its earliest stages and the complicated issues involved in it. I have pointed out to him that, in my opinion, the way the Security Council has handled this matter, especially lately, has been most unfortunate. The Security Council is largely guided, in this matter, by the U.S.A. and the U.K. It might be said that even the U.S.A. Government is considerably influenced by the U.K. Government, which was supposed to be expert in such problems, because of long association with India. A heavy responsibility rests on the U.K.

1. File No.25 (6)/1951, PMS. These letters, except letters numbers VIII and XII, have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.) *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-64*, Vol.2, (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 432-518.
2. From 26 June to 4 July 1951.
3. See *ante*, pp. 399-418.
4. On 4 and 5 July 1951.
5. Graham was accompanied by his military adviser, General Jacob Devers, and his principal secretary, P.J. Schmidt.
6. The resolution sponsored by Britain and the United States and adopted by the Security Council on 30 March 1951 proposed that to solve the Kashmir dispute the Security Council should appoint a successor to Owen Dixon as the U.N. representative to effect demilitarization of the State on the basis of Dixon's recommendations and conduct an impartial plebiscite. In case of failure, the resolution suggested arbitration by a person appointed by the International Court of Justice. It refused to accept the decision of the constituent assembly of the State if it should ever contemplate ratification of Kashmir's accession to India. India rejected the resolution while Pakistan accepted it.

Government for the advice they tendered. It seems to me that the U.K., right from the beginning, started off on the wrong foot and with certain assumptions which were not correct. Many of our difficulties are due to this fact. It is quite possible that we would have been much nearer a solution if the U.K. and the U.S.A. Governments had not taken up an attitude which, in our opinion, is not in consonance with facts, law or justice and does not take into consideration the consequences of their own proposals. They have, in fact, encouraged the Pakistan Government to continue to maintain an attitude which cannot possibly lead to a settlement. In spite of the most blatant and amazing war propaganda in Pakistan,⁷ not a word has been publicly said about it by either of these Governments or the Security Council. But we are chided for supporting the constituent assembly in Kashmir. I confess it passes my comprehension how any impartial authority can act in this way. If, then, we come to the conclusion that the U.K. and the U.S.A. Governments are not impartial in this matter, we cannot be blamed. This is not so much a question of *bona fides* but of wrong premises, wrong procedures and wrong steps taken repeatedly. While undoubtedly both the U.K. and the U.S.A. are anxious for peace and a settlement in Kashmir, they have hindered the coming of a settlement by their own policies.

3. Latterly, as you know, there have been a succession of raids across the ceasefire line.⁸ There is no doubt that this is an organized effort to create trouble along that line and generally promote disorder. According to our information, it is also proposed by Pakistan to encourage sabotage within Kashmir. All this is aimed at preventing the meeting of the constituent assembly. That assembly will, of course, be elected, as arranged, in September next. Whether there are any other plans of large-scale conflict, it is difficult to say. But, in view of the constant war propaganda, it is impossible for us to ignore the possibility of such a conflict. We are, therefore, taking all necessary steps in defence. As you know, we have made it clear that there can be no limited war in Kashmir now. If there is an attack on Kashmir, then, quite inevitably, this will mean an extension of that conflict between India

7. For many months past persistent incitement to war against India on the Kashmir issue had been carried on in Pakistan through official and non-official statements by Radio Pakistan, through resolutions said to have been passed by various political organisations and through the press. For example, Sardar Ibrahim, a leader of 'Azad Kashmir' threatened on 30 June 1951 that the Kashmir issue would not be settled at Lake Success, "but would be decided only on the battlefield." Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan stated the same day that the people of Pakistan would have to find "other effective means" to vindicate the right of the people of Kashmir to decide their fate if Graham failed to bring about a change in the attitude of the Indian Prime Minister.
8. See *ante*, pp. 236-239.

and Pakistan. This is a serious matter. We have to avoid this from happening as far as we can and at the same time be prepared for any contingency.

4. We have drawn the attention of the Security Council to these raids across the ceasefire line and to the general war propaganda in Pakistan.⁹ We have also asked the U.N. Secretariat to withdraw one of the U.N. observers in Kashmir, who has been behaving in a manner which is highly improper.

5. Dr Graham and his party are going to Srinagar tomorrow morning for about a week's stay. After that they will proceed to Karachi and probably return to Delhi about the 19th of this month.

6. The war scare in Pakistan, apart from other causes, has led to a sudden and considerable movement of migrants from eastern Pakistan to West Bengal. This is a reversal of the process that had thus far gone on and it has created a serious problem for us in Calcutta and West Bengal. Conditions in East Bengal, from all reports, have continued to be bad from the point of view of the minority community, who have a continuous sense of oppression. Most middle class Hindus have already left East Bengal. The present migration concerns the agriculturists and such like people. Our Minister for Rehabilitation¹⁰ has hurried to Calcutta to deal with this new and embarrassing problem.

7. While the situation develops in this way towards some kind of a crisis in the relations of India and Pakistan, and the food problem¹¹ continues to demand urgent attention from us, the Railwaymen's Federation has decided on a general strike¹² in the second half of August. Merits apart, I must confess that I am deeply grieved at the lack of responsibility shown by the leaders of the Federation. Government has given the most careful consideration to their demands during the past few months and there have been many conferences and consultations with the representatives of the Federation. In spite of our grave financial difficulties, we have sanctioned an addition of Rs. 5 per month as dearness allowance to all government employees drawing Rs. 250 per month or less.¹³ This means a direct additional charge on central revenues of Rs. 9 crores. Indirectly, a far larger sum is involved. This again affects all State Governments, who are put in an embarrassing position because of the Centre's decision. Many State Governments have protested and objected and, quite

9. See *ante*, footnote No. 6 on p. 312.

10. Ajit Prasad Jain

11. Production of foodgrains had fallen to fifty million tons, the lowest on record. Prices were rising and supplies were short. India had to import three million tons of foodgrains in 1948-49 and take steps to import even larger quantities in 1949-50.

12. See *ante*, pp. 451-453.

13. All railway employees, except those receiving grain shop concessions, were to receive the increase with effect from 1 June 1951.

rightly, pointed out that such decisions involving their own finances, should not be taken by the Central Government without consultation with them.

8. In spite of all our efforts, a general strike has been resolved upon. What the effect on the food situation will be can well be imagined. It is true that the Railwaymen's Federation has said that they will continue to carry the foodgrains. But it is highly unlikely that this can be done once a strike takes place. Past experience shows us that the strike will lead to violence and possibly to acts of sabotage. The outlook, therefore, is dim. Government cannot give up all its functions, because of this threat of strike. It is Government's duty to try its utmost, by negotiation and conciliation, to find a way out. That duty the Government will endeavour to perform, but Government has also to carry on the business of the State and in particular to feed those who would otherwise starve. We have, therefore, to do our utmost to carry on with the transport of foodgrains and other vital commodities. The alternative is to surrender to the demand of the railwaymen at the cost, of course, of the community. No Government can function in this way. It is, therefore, with the greatest regret that we have come to the decision that we must meet this challenge. A strike of this nature, concerning essential services, hits the community hard. In any event, it will cause great suffering and perhaps the railwaymen themselves will be ultimately among the worst sufferers. What is even worse is that it will create an atmosphere of hatred and violence, which will leave a bad trail behind.

9. We have to deal with the situation firmly. But, at the same time, we must not allow ourselves to do anything which adds to the bitterness of conflict. We cannot fight a part of our own people and, in any event, we have to make friends with them and cooperate with them later. But where a challenge of this kind is made, there is no help for it but to meet it with strength.

10. There continues to be some improvement in both the food and cloth situation. But, I wish to repeat, that this can only be kept up by constant effort. That is why I became deeply distressed by the prospect of a railway strike. The other danger is complacency. There is no room for it.

11. I wrote to you a little while ago expressing my great surprise at the mystery surrounding the gifts of free food, intimation of which I had received previously. We had suggested that instead of the actual foodgrains, the equivalent in money should be sent to me and this would be utilized for free distribution of food in the badly affected areas. To my great surprise, very little has materialized and I just do not know what has happened to these gifts and collections. It does not apply to all States but it does apply to a number of States where there is no doubt that foodgrains collections were made. Kashmir is the only State which has thus far helped in this process. I should like you especially to look into this matter, because help is urgently needed. We would like that help to come not only from India but from our

countrymen abroad. We do not want to make a fuss about it or to dramatize famine conditions and the like. But we do wish people to realize that help is greatly needed.

12. In foreign affairs, two events have occupied the headlines in newspapers. The first is the proposal for a ceasefire in Korea and the second is the dispute in Iran about oil in which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is involved. Naturally, we have welcomed the proposals for a ceasefire and we earnestly hope that they will succeed. Nevertheless, I do not myself see any considerable chance of our going towards a settlement there. The difference in approach, outlook and objectives of the opposing parties continues to be very great.¹⁴ Still a ceasefire by itself is an achievement to be welcomed.

13. The Iranian oil dispute is also very far from any kind of a settlement. The Iranian Government has taken up a very strong and unbending attitude and perhaps it may be criticized to some extent. On the other hand, we must always remember that such disputes have long roots in the past. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. does not appear to have shown much wisdom in the past.¹⁵ If they had approached the matter sympathetically a year ago or more, probably no crisis would have arisen now. So far as we are concerned, we have kept out of this dispute. But I have ventured to suggest to the Iranian Government,¹⁶ as well as to the British Government¹⁷ that it is in the interests of all concerned as well as of world peace to have a peaceful settlement.

14. Our Education Minister, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, is at present touring in western Asia. He has been in Turkey and his visit has undoubtedly done much good. He will sign in Ankara a cultural treaty between India and

14. A ceasefire in Korea was to be effected after the meeting of commanders between 10 and 15 July 1951. On 25 June, India had expressed the hope "that something substantial would come out of the move." Meanwhile, People's China suggested on 4 July that the future of Taiwan and the Japanese peace treaty should figure in the proceedings and a settlement of the "entire Korean problem was to be stipulated."

15. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been operating on the terms followed by Britain. The Labour Government did not revise the 1933 agreement in 1946 and allowed matters to drift, while other companies were giving better terms elsewhere. The Persian Government's threat to take it over was met by the British threat of withdrawal of the 2,800 members of the oil company's staff. The evacuation of British personnel would mean the sudden stoppage of work and the cessation of the free flow of oil to the countries of the East. Meanwhile, the Persian Government rushed troops to the oil centre of Abadan as a result of Britain's despatch of the cruiser "Mauritius" to the area. On 26 May, Britain sought the decision of The Hague Court, but Iran contended that The Hague Court had no authority to deal with the crisis.¹

16. This was conveyed to the Government of Iran on 28 June 1951. See also *ante*, pp. 659-660.

17. In fact, Britain had sought on 23 May India's intervention in the Iranian oil dispute.

Turkey.¹⁸ Though we are missing him here in India, his tour has been of great benefit to India's relations with other countries in western Asia. Previous to this tour, he was in London and Paris and led our delegation to the UNESCO.

15. Our new Ambassador in Indonesia is Syed Ali Zaheer, who was previously our Ambassador in Iran. The appointment of one of our senior and experienced diplomats to Indonesia indicates the importance we attach to that country. To begin with, our foreign missions developed more in western countries than in eastern. This development was rather spasmodic, and largely the result of other countries approaching us. Gradually the centre of gravity of our foreign relations is shifting to Asia. Some of the big Powers, such as the U.K., the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., China and France have naturally an importance of their own. But for us, our neighbour countries, such as Nepal, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon and Afghanistan have a peculiar importance. Pakistan naturally is of great importance for us, but unfortunately that is the one country with which our relations are not good.

16. Assam has again been afflicted by floods. Partly these are the results of the change in the terrain brought about by last year's earthquake. During this period our engineers were hard at work to prevent some other catastrophe. To some extent, they made preparations for this, but they could not succeed wholly.

17. During my brief stay in Kashmir I spent several days in trekking on high altitudes from 12,000 to 14,000 feet. Even a few days of living at these altitudes and having strenuous exercise, has done me a great deal of good and I feel much the better for it. I am glad of this because we have heavy work and heavier responsibilities ahead.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. The treaty, signed on 29 June 1951, provided for the exchange of cultural missions, university teachers, scientists and students who wished to receive scholarships. It also provided for imparting training to Government personnel in scientific, technical and industrial institutions.

II'

New Delhi
22 July, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

This is a belated letter. As you know, I was away in Bangalore for the meetings of the Congress Working Committee and the All India Congress Committee. Much has happened during the last two weeks. At Bangalore after prolonged discussions, the Congress election manifesto was adopted.² This is an important document not only for Congressmen, who are intimately interested in it, but for all others. It is important what the leading organization in India, which largely controls the Central and provincial governments, should say on the subject of our future policies and programmes.

2. This election manifesto is not a vague string of hopes and aspirations but, as far as possible, a realistic approach to the problem of what we want to do and what we can do in the next few years. While the policies are fairly clearly defined and even the specific programmes are indicated, details in regard to the programmes are lacking. It was difficult to fill in details at this stage. It may be possible later to add to this manifesto.

3. This manifesto should serve the purpose of helping people to think on constructive and realistic lines. It may be that some people think that it does not go far enough and others that it goes too far in certain directions.³ This kind of reaction is not only natural, but, if I may say so, desirable. These varied approaches help in educating the people and making them think of the pros and cons of the programmes put forward. That is the essence of democracy.

4. The real difficulty we have to face often enough is that the personal element and personal criticism overshadows an objective consideration of policies and programmes. If, however, the personal element is left out and even the party element is for the moment forgotten, the actual proposals can be considered on their merits. I think that if this was done, a very large measure of agreement would be arrived at in the country and among the various groups and parties. There could be full cooperation to the extent of

1. File No. 25(6)/1951, PMS.

2. See *ante*, pp. 3-13.

3. In the debate on 14 July 1951, while some Congressmen felt that the Congress would find it difficult to fight the communist ideology for lack of ideological content in the manifesto, and absence of provisions for social justice, ceilings on land holdings and redistribution, and a half-hearted attitude towards controls, others opposed mention of the rights, privileges and duties of the minorities as they were already stated in the Constitution.

the agreement, leaving the other parts of the programme to be argued about or opposed.

5. All this signifies, of course, that we are thinking more of the country's progress than of party advantage in elections. Unfortunately, the general elections are nearing and this fact alone rather queers the pitch, preventing an objective consideration of any problem. All kinds of odd groups grow up in the hope of winning some seats at election time. Many of these groups have really no programmes or policies, except some sentimental slogans which may, to some extent, attract the people. With such groups there is not much room for argument, because they are not used to thinking in terms of economic or like policies. But with other and more serious-minded groups, there should be a good deal of room for common thinking and common action, provided only that we can get over the great barrier created by personal or party antagonisms.

6. The Planning Commission's preliminary report came out just before the meeting of the A.I.C.C.⁴ There was no time to consider it or even to read it. This consideration therefore will have to take place later. But some of the main principles underlying that report were naturally considered independently by the A.I.C.C. and, on the whole, the Congress election manifesto adopted the same line.

7. The Planning Commission's report, I might add, is not a party document, but the appraisal and recommendations of a competent body of men who have given careful thought to this matter for over a year and consulted not only all the State Governments, but many representatives of various groups and parties. Their approach therefore has been strictly non-party and has been conditioned by their desire to get the largest measure of agreement for the plan they might propose. The plan is necessarily limited by our resources and therefore a careful analysis of our actual and potential resources during the next five years has been made. No such analysis can be precise, and any odd development might affect those resources. Nevertheless, planning can only be undertaken on the basis of such estimates which may be reconsidered and varied from time to time. The Planning Commission is firmly of opinion that any really big effort towards the achievement of the objectives they have set down, must involve widespread public cooperation. The plan should be in effect a national plan and something more than a mere party plan, however big the party. To put it differently, the principal planks of the programme should have this large measure of agreement and a desire to work together for their implementation. Some people or groups may wish to go further and they are at perfect liberty to work to that end.

8. The Planning Commission has drawn up what they call a preliminary outline of a five-year plan. They have invited criticisms from Government

4. See *ante*, footnote No. 2 on p. 14.

and non-official organizations. After receiving these, they hope to finalize their programme. The important question then arises as to its implementation. We have had too many plans in the past which remained at the planning stage and no machinery has been evolved to implement them. Therefore, the most important aspect for us to consider is the implementation and the machinery for it. The Commission have themselves dealt with this and Government will have to give it full thought. It is clear that the Planning Commission is not something which ceases to be, after submitting the plan. It has to continue as it is, or in some slightly different form.

9. The report of the Planning Commission has already been circulated to some extent. It is being printed now and there will be a larger circulation later. I would invite your Government's careful consideration and scrutiny of this report. Apart from the detailed programmes, we have to be clear in regard to our major policies in the economic sphere. There has been and is good deal of confusion and all of us, of course, talk vaguely about certain desirable economic objectives. The time has come when we must be clear as to what we can achieve and then try to achieve it. I think that the Planning Commission has rendered a great service by discussing this essential and practical problem and thus drawing the attention of the country to our actual and potential resources. This will, I hope, make everyone in the country think a little more realistically.

10. Soon after my return from Bangalore, I was faced with some resignations of my colleagues in the Cabinet.⁵ It has been made clear, these resignations had nothing to do with the governmental policy, but flowed from other considerations. I am glad to say that these resignations were withdrawn at my request.⁶ I confess that I feel more and more unhappy at the inclusion of the personal factor in our political discussions. This is perhaps a sign of immaturity, although we are certainly not immature in our general political outlook. I earnestly hope that we shall gradually turn away from this drift.

11. Even before I left Bangalore, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan made public statements about Indian troop movements towards the Pakistan border.⁷ He complained not only to us, but also to the U.N. and some friendly countries⁸

5. On 17 July 1951, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and Ajit Prasad Jain announced their resignations from the Congress and the Cabinet.

6. On 21 July, Kidwai and Jain withdrew their resignations, and announced their support for the Government, but not for the Congress.

7. See *ante*, pp. 311-314.

8. On 19 July, the British Government informed India that Pakistan had spoken verbally of certain movements of Indian forces which the Pakistani Government believed to have taken place.

about this development. You must have followed our exchange of messages. A sudden crisis was precipitated by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's statements⁹ and in Pakistan there has been a good deal of hysterical talk about war. In other countries also there has been fear that some such thing might take place. So far as we are concerned, I have made it perfectly clear that on no account are we going to attack Pakistan, but that if any part of the territory of the Union of India is attacked by Pakistan forces, we shall resist with all our strength.

12. You know that we have been making earnest attempts to reduce our army. Last year we brought about an actual reduction of 52,000 personnel and it was our intention to make a further reduction of 100,000 this year. In fact this was our decision, and plans and plans were drawn up accordingly. This was a brave decision in view of the world situation and the mounting tension everywhere. We made this decision and we were very anxious to act up to it. But during the past six months or so we were worried over the intensive war preparations of Pakistan, both in the east and west and, more especially, at the hysterical outbursts of the press there and of leading personalities. There was frequent talk of *jihad* and war on the subject of Kashmir. At first, we did not take this very seriously and could hardly believe that the Pakistan Government would try to solve Indo-Pakistan problems on the field of battle. Nevertheless, the excitement and hysteria seemed to grow in Pakistan. The fact that Jammu and Kashmir State was settling down and obviously making progress under Shaikh Abdullah's Government, was a constant irritant to Pakistan. When the announcement of elections for a constituent assembly there was made,¹⁰ this upset the Pakistan authorities completely. They felt that this would strengthen the Kashmir Government very greatly and weaken Pakistan in regard to their Kashmir claim. There was then a tremendous outcry and the U.N. Security Council was invoked.¹¹ We made it clear that we could not possibly tolerate any interference by any party in our

9. The position of Pakistan, as revealed in Liaquat Ali Khan's statement of 19 July, had not changed since 1948. According to it, India should agree to abide by United Nations resolutions on Kashmir, which meant the acceptance of a decision for the entire State being taken through a single plebiscite supervised by the U.N., and that, pending such a plebiscite, the Indian side should cease to threaten Pakistan either with military preparation or hostile propaganda.
10. The long delay in implementing the U.N.C.I.P. resolutions and the meagre prospect of a solution at an early date led the Kashmir authorities and the Government of India to order, on 30 April, elections for a constituent assembly.
11. On 29 May 1951, Pakistan objected at the Security Council to the convening of a constituent assembly for Kashmir by India. Gladwyn Jebb, the British delegate, proposed that the Security Council should urge both sides not to take any step that would prejudice the chances of a peaceful settlement. The U.S. delegate feared an explosive situation which would "prevent the establishment of peace and security in South Asia."

internal arrangements in Kashmir or elsewhere. The elections to the constituent assembly would go on.

13. It came to our knowledge that, apart from the general preparations being made, there was a definite intention to create trouble in Kashmir or elsewhere about the time when Dr Graham might go back, and more especially when the constituent assembly elections were to be held. War-talk became intenser.

14. We had to face this situation. With all our intense desire to maintain peace, we could not take the risk of being unprepared for a sudden attack. We have made it clear long ago that a further attack on Kashmir by Pakistan would inevitably result in war between India and Pakistan and military operations could not then be limited to Kashmir. This declaration has, I believe, prevented such an attack. There have recently been some serious raids¹² possibly preliminary to large-scale operations in the future. We have taken serious objection to these.

15. In these circumstances, we decided to strengthen our defences on the Indo-Pakistan border and certain important troop movements were ordered, so that that frontier should be completely prepared for any attack or emergency. There was and is no intention whatever of our attacking Pakistan in any shape or form. Pakistan armies normally are concentrated not far from the Indian border. Recently, these concentrations have been added to. We are not prepared to withdraw our forces from the border unless it is clear to us that there is no danger of attack on India. I am afraid I am totally unable to accept the verbal assurance of any leader in Pakistan to this effect when constant war propaganda is going on there. The situation is, of course, a serious one and we cannot relax our efforts or grow complacent. At the same time, I rather doubt if there is much danger of war now. This danger is less for two reasons: (1) Pakistan knows very well that we are fully prepared and is not likely to incur the grave risk of attack on us, and (2) the attention of the world has been drawn to this crisis and that itself has a certain deterrent effect. It is possible that the present acute crisis may tone down somewhat after some weeks. But a good deal of tension will still continue because that is based, unfortunately, on certain deeper causes of conflict between India and Pakistan. We can only hope that these basic causes will gradually fade away. Ultimately, it is inevitable that India and Pakistan should come to a full understanding and cooperate together. But this may take some time.

16. I have mentioned in a public statement¹³ that the presence of British officers and ex-officers in Pakistan has added to the prevailing tension. I

12. On 9 and 12 July, Pakistani troops committed ceasefire violations. See *ante*, footnote No. 8, p. 353.

13. On 16 July 1951 in Bangalore. See *ante*, p. 312.

referred, first of all, to the large number of British officers in the service of Pakistan. Many of them are in the defence forces and some occupy important civil posts. The British Government is not directly responsible for them. These officers have a very strong anti-Indian bias, partly because of past history, as many of them were previously in India ranged against us in our struggle for freedom. Their services were dispensed with by India later and they left in no mood of goodwill for India. Pakistan absorbed many of them, including some who were notorious for their activities in India previously. I had in mind also the repeated visits of General Gracey and Field Marshal Auchinleck to both western and eastern Pakistan. What they have actually done in Pakistan, I cannot say. But they have visited various military depots and centres and conferred with Pakistani officers. The summer is not normally the season when foreign visitors travel about in India or Pakistan, unless they have some special work to do. Whatever the intentions of these two gentlemen might be, there is no doubt that their visits have had a bad effect in India. General Gracey, it will be remembered, played an important role in the Kashmir operations while he was Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. Early in 1948, he submitted a memorandum to the Pakistan Government, containing an appraisal of the military situation in Kashmir and advising his Government to send regular Pakistan forces into Kashmir. As a matter of fact, Pakistan forces had previously entered Kashmir, but till then this was not considered official. When we knew of General Gracey's memorandum in the summer of 1948, we drew the attention of the U.K. Government to it.¹⁴ In these circumstances, it is not illegitimate for us to take exception to the activities of leading British officers or ex-officers in Pakistan.

17. Though the situation vis-a-vis Pakistan is serious and requires constant vigilance and every necessary preparation on our part, there is absolutely no need for our people to get excited about it, as the Pakistan people have done. The essential need is for us to pull together in the political and other fields and set aside such petty differences as separate us.

18. There is one aspect of the Indo-Pakistan situation to which I drew attention in my last letter to you. This is a reversal of the migration between East and West Bengal. Until about five weeks ago Hindu migrants were going back in some numbers to East Bengal. Since then a much larger number are coming from East Bengal to West. These people are chiefly agriculturists from the Khulna district. This class from this district had not been involved in any previous migration. This creates a new problem and the West Bengal Government have had to face difficult situations. The difficulty is not merely of looking after these migrants but is also due to the fact that the political

14. Nehru wrote to Attlee on 20 December 1948. See *ante*, pp. 341-344.

groups are taking advantage of this new development and making it a political issue.

19. The question of a general strike on the railways is still undecided, and I hope that this strike will not materialize. Government had to issue an ordinance declaring any such or like strike on essential services illegal.¹⁵ It was no pleasure to Government to issue this ordinance. But I do not think any Government would have hesitated to do so when faced with this position. We want to do our utmost to come to terms with the representatives of the railwaymen. But if unfortunately we do not succeed, then we have to meet the challenge and danger of the strike. Not to do so would be a complete surrender and paralysis of Government. At any time a general strike of the railways brings far-reaching and harmful results. At the present moment, with our food situation as it is, such a strike might bring infinite misery and starvation to many. Recently, the Pakistan development has taken place and we face national danger. In such circumstances, I cannot conceive how reasonable people can advise or participate in a railway strike. Our Railway Minister has again made it clear that he is willing to negotiate with the Railwaymen's Federation on all points other than dearness allowance and those already decided. I earnestly hope that the Railwaymen's Federation, which is meeting now, will decide to give up completely this idea of a general strike.

20. The food position in India, though certainly better than it has been, is still difficult and we have to be constantly on our guard. The difficulty is enhanced by the lack of purchasing power in many areas. The only way to meet this position there is to provide work or doles. Work is always preferable. The monsoon has been erratic and not at all satisfactory in some parts of India. Here in Delhi after an initial downpour early this month, there has been no rain at all. If the rains do not come in parts of northern India, especially during the next week or so, the situation will be very bad.

21. Last night Government issued an ordinance¹⁶ dealing with the controlling interests in companies. Many instances have recently come to light where changes of management have taken place suddenly and have been followed by dissipation of the resources of the company. Managing agents' allowances have been increased and high commissions have been paid. The whole system of managing agents, etc., has to be reviewed in future and legislation will have to be brought forward before Parliament. Normally we would have waited for that, but even the rumour of such a legislation leads to improper changes being effected previously. Therefore, something had to be done immediately to avoid such transactions and changes. The ordinance is in the nature of a freezing ordinance so as to prevent this happening.

15. On 11 July 1951.

16. On 21 July 1951.

22. I am glad to say that an Indo-Burmese Treaty of Peace and Friendship has been signed.¹⁷ A cultural agreement between India and Turkey was also signed recently in Ankara. Fortunately, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was present then in Ankara and signed on behalf of the Government of India.

23. Maulana Azad returned to Delhi two days ago after his visits to England, France, Turkey and Iran. These visits of his have helped greatly some of these foreign countries in understanding the situation in India. In particular, he had a very warm welcome from the Governments and peoples of Turkey and Iran. For a long time past, Pakistan has been carrying on virulent propaganda against India in these countries. The Maulana's visit dispelled the many falsehoods that have been spread and has resulted in bringing Turkey and Iran closer to India.

24. In Iran the oil dispute continues¹⁸ and for the present, there is no way out visible. It is possible to criticize the parties concerned. It is, however, necessary to keep in mind the background. That background has been one of long exploitation by foreign interests in Iran. These interests have often interfered with internal politics, controlled governments by their money power and greatly added to corruption in high circles. The people of Iran grew more and more frustrated and angry at the treatment they were receiving. This is a long story and I remember reading a book nearly forty years ago called *The Strangling of Persia*. This was by an American financial adviser, Morgan Shuster,¹⁹ who disclosed a strange tale of the treatment accorded to Iran by the then British and Russian Governments. Since then much has happened and no doubt improvements have taken place. But the old type of officials continue, oblivious of a changing world. I have no doubt that a satisfactory settlement could have been arrived at a year or two ago if these old officials had not been so rigid and out-of-date in their outlook.

25. A second and a deeper cause is the upheaval in people's minds in colonial and semi-colonial territories. This is indeed one of the dominating

17. The treaty signed on 7 July 1951, was intended to develop ties of "perpetual peace and friendship." Both countries promised to respect the independence and rights of each other.

18. On 9 July 1951, Truman urged the Prime Minister of Iran to abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice and deputed Averell Harriman, foreign affairs adviser, to help decide on the modalities of settlement. Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities had on 11 July seized all direct communications of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at Abadan and threatened that if Britain took the oil dispute to the United Nations, Iran would retaliate by producing documents seized from the A.I.O.C. which proved British interference in her domestic affairs. On 15 July, serious riots occurred in Teheran during an "anti-imperialist" demonstration leading to imposition of martial law.

19. William Morgan Shuster (1877-1960); American lawyer; financial adviser in Iran, 1911-12.

features of the world situation today. In various forms and degrees it has applied to India, China, Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, Iran and the countries of the Middle East. It applies to some extent to Africa also.²⁰ We see this process at work in various stages in different countries. In India it led to the independence of India and Pakistan and that primary problem was solved. So also in Burma and Indonesia. In China, quite apart from communism, those basic feelings continue. It is not surprising, therefore, that this upheaval and outburst should take place in Iran. No solution which does not deal with these basic causes can be enduring.

26. The present Prime Minister²¹ of Iran is popular because the people of Iran, after long and bitter experience, feel that at last they have got a man who cannot be corrupted by money or other favours. The situation is difficult and there can be no doubt that if a peaceful settlement is not arrived at, both the U.K. and Iran will suffer. Iran's economy depends upon oil and if the oil business stops or is not carried on properly, that whole economy is upset. We have, in a friendly way, expressed our earnest desire that a peaceful settlement might be arrived at in conformity with Iranian national claims.

27. In Korea, the ceasefire talks are continuing.²² They have come up against a big hurdle. Apparently, the Chinese and the North Koreans demand the withdrawal of all foreign armies from Korea. On the U.N. side, it is said that this is a political question which should not be considered during the ceasefire talks. It is possible that this hurdle may be overcome and a ceasefire result. But immediately after we shall have to deal with these major political issues, including the question of China going to the U.N. and the future of Formosa. Therefore, if even a ceasefire comes off, as we hope it will, it should not be assumed that the major difficulties are over.

28. Yet another highly important matter affecting the peace of the Far East is the proposed treaty of peace with Japan. The U.S.A. and the U.K. have put forward a draft²³ and it is proposed to sign this treaty in San Francisco in September next. We are all, of course, desirous of an early peace treaty with Japan and the recognition of Japan as an independent nation. The question is how best to do it so as not to add to the existing fears and tensions in the Far East. A really satisfactory treaty should have included China and Soviet Russia. At the same time, if China and Soviet Russia are not prepared to sign, it is not fair to hold up peace because of this. But in having any treaty of peace, the fact has to be borne in mind that the door to China and the Soviet

20. Rioting in Capetown following a massive demonstration before Parliament against the Coloured Voters' Bill took place on 30 May 1951.

21. Mohammed Mossaddeq.

22. On 27 July 1953, an armistice was signed at Kaesong.

23. See *ante*, footnote No. 5 on p. 603.

having a peace treaty with Japan is not closed. Otherwise, there will be no peace in the Far East.

29. You might be interested to know about recent happenings in East Punjab. After the President's proclamation suspending the Constitution,²⁴ the Governor was given powers to function there on behalf of the President. There has been a great deal of improvement in the administration and fairly widespread action has been taken against corruption and inefficiency. Over a hundred civil supply officers have been removed from service and a large number of black marketeers have been arrested and are being proceeded against. The general reactions in the Punjab have been very favourable to all the steps that have been taken by the Governor.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

24. The East Punjab Cabinet headed by Gopichand Bhargava resigned on 16 June 1951 in response to a directive issued by the Congress Parliamentary Board. On 20 June, Governor's rule was imposed and it was to continue till the new legislature came into existence after the general elections.

III¹

New Delhi
1 August, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

In my last letter to you, I referred to the growing tension, almost amounting to a crisis, in Indo-Pakistan relations. Since then, there has been an exchange of telegrams between Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and me.² These telegrams have

1. File No. 25(6)/1951, PMS.

2. The developing crisis produced an exchange of telegrams between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan from 15 July to 11 August 1951. Nehru in his cable to Liaquat Ali Khan on 24 July (see *ante*, pp. 236-239) reaffirmed that nothing in the way of a plebiscite could possibly take place until Pakistan had "vacated its aggression" in Kashmir by withdrawing all forces from the disputed territory. "The question of Kashmir", Nehru said in another cable to Liaquat Ali Khan on 29 July 1951 (see *ante*, pp. 331-335) "would have been decided peacefully long ago in accordance with the wishes of the people there had it not been "for the major fact that Pakistan first encouraged, and then actively took part in violent aggression against the State and its people." This offence against the norms of international behaviour should be set right.

been published in the newspapers and you must have seen them. In a sense, the critical situation has worsened because of the continuous warlike propaganda in Pakistan and their blackouts,³ civil defence measures,⁴ and the like.⁵ On the other hand, it may be said to have rather stabilized itself, as people get used to a repetition of threats and hysterical utterances. I think it is generally recognized, even by those who have been unfriendly to us in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, that Pakistan has overshot the mark and its attention has been drawn to this.⁶ The patent contrast of warlike Pakistan and peaceful India is too obvious not to be noticed by even the casual observer. Gradually it is sinking into the consciousness of outside observers that there is something wrong about the tumult and shouting in Pakistan.

2. But the fact remains that the situation is serious and we must be vigilant all the time and not be caught unawares. I think there is little chance of that happening, and it is because of this that I think the chances of war taking place are not great. In Pakistan, there is a full realization that we are earnest and there is no bluff about what we have done or said. We have been studiously moderate in our utterances, or at any rate, most of us, but there has been no lack of firmness about what we have said. We have sometimes been criticized for not taking special measures in regard to what is called civil defence. That is so. Civil defence measures become necessary in case of war, although some of them adopted in England at the time of the last war are inapplicable or of not much use in India in present circumstances. There is far too great a tendency for people to think in terms of imitating what was done in western countries during the Great War. But some such measures certainly would be necessary if war came. We have to decide whether we should take them as a precaution now or avoid them. I am quite clear that we should do nothing which leads to public excitement and an expectation of war. The harm that does is far greater than the possible good it might do. It interferes with the normal life of the community, with trade and commerce, and tends to produce a psychosis, which Pakistan has been deliberately encouraging and which we wish to avoid. If, unfortunately, necessity drives us to some such recourse, we shall undoubtedly have to take such measures and take them speedily and efficiently. But for the present, all that is necessary is to be clear in our minds as to what may be

3. Trial blackouts were carried out in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Karachi between 23 July and 5 August 1951.
4. By an ordinance promulgated on 26 July, the Pakistan Government assumed powers to prepare civil defence and take other precautionary measures including requisitioning of property.
5. On 27 July, four battalions of the Pakistan National Guards were incorporated into the Pakistan army.
6. On 30 July, Krishna Menon reported from London that "Pakistan has been repeatedly told that they are playing with fire and that the war and *jehad* talk is highly injurious."

required in an emergency, so that we might be prepared for it. No public steps should be taken.

3. Apart from defence preparations, involving the army, etc., the most important element in a conflict is the morale of the people. I am happy to tell you that the morale of our people, all over northern India, is excellent. There is not the least sign of panic or even of obvious excitement. This is not due to a lack of appreciation of the seriousness of the situation, but rather to the wish to avoid war, and to a feeling of calm strength that if danger comes, it will be faced without flinching and with confidence. Three days ago, I addressed a public meeting in Delhi.⁷ That was one of the most exhilarating experiences I have had. It was, of course, an open air meeting and a vast crowd, estimated at 200,000, had gathered. Throughout the meeting, it rained continuously, and sometimes heavily. And yet, that tremendous audience not only stood the rain but was cheerful throughout. I spoke to them about this serious situation and told them all what Pakistan was saying and doing and of the steps we had taken. I dealt with the situation as objectively and calmly as I could and I watched carefully the reaction of that great crowd. I have a sense of crowds, and of mass feeling and the reactions I got, pleased me. We have heard a great deal during past months about our internal troubles and disintegrating forces and the like in our public life. And yet, when I saw that vast multitude under the most unfavourable circumstances, I had the consciousness of buoyant strength without any bluster. My comparison of the 'clenched fist' of Pakistan with the *Asoka Chakra*, our symbol of peace and righteousness, evoked the loudest applause.

4. I would therefore suggest to you to deal with the present situation in a way which demonstrates to the people that we are not in the slightest upset by it and that we are going to carry on our work in the normal way, and in effect better than the normal. We should, of course, keep wide awake and follow events carefully. We should have in our minds what we should do in case any particular emergency arises. But we should not do anything which might lead the public to think that war is on the doorstep. I do not, in fact, think that it is anywhere near. But I cannot and you cannot relax our vigilance.

5. As usual, we have received, and I suppose Pakistan has received also, communications from the U.K. and U.S.A. Governments, pointing out to us the dangers of the situation and stressing the need for peace. Good advice is always welcome, though sometimes it may not be appropriate. Our desire for peace with Pakistan would not have arisen but for the policies pursued by the U.K. and U.S.A. Governments in regard to the Kashmir dispute. They have consistently encouraged the intransigence of Pakistan. Is it surprising then that Pakistan, so encouraged, has gone far in the wrong direction?

7. See *ante*, pp. 69-77.

6. Nothing has surprised me so much during the past months or even years than the deliberate policy pursued by the U.K. and U.S.A. Governments, in the Security Council of the U.N. and elsewhere, in regard to Kashmir. I hope I am not entirely incapable of taking an objective view of the situation. I have tried to do so and I cannot understand why some foreign countries should be so hostile to us in this matter. There must be some basic cause for it, which has little relation to the merits of the dispute. It is clear that long ago the U.K. and the U.S.A. Governments came to the conclusion that Kashmir must go to Pakistan. That had nothing to do with the merits of the case. Having come to that conclusion, naturally the policy they have pursued have been meant to further that objective, why did they start with this premise? If we trace this, perhaps we will have to go back to pre-partition days when the British Government encouraged the Muslim League and separatism in India. We shall also have to go back and try to understand the policy of the U.K., which led them to support feudal and reactionary regimes in the Middle East and sometimes even favour the idea of Pan-Islamism or an Islamic bloc. In the old days, this was against Czarist Russia. Later, communist Russia became a major danger. Of course, there was oil in the Middle East and the routes to India and the Far East had to be protected. After the First World War, the whole of the vast area from Afghanistan to Turkey was more or less under British occupation and Mr. Winston Churchill even suggested the creation of a Middle Eastern Empire. But other developments took place. There was the new Soviet Russia, weak and facing a civil war, but nonetheless a power, with a new kind of strength. Kamal Atatürk⁸ drove out the allied occupation forces from Turkey and later defeated the Greek army, which was supported by the British. Raza Shah Pahlavi⁹ became dominant in Iran. In the Arab countries, all kinds of new situations arose. Iraq remained largely under British control.

7. Even so, the attempts to keep some kind of control of the Middle eastern regions continued. It was little realized by the diplomats and the policy-makers of western countries that new and powerful forces were rising all over Asia and that they could not be dealt with in the old way, either by military pressure or financial inducement. It seems astonishing how lacking in awareness western nations have been and, to some extent, even are today, about these forces. They seem to think that their analysis of the situation is complete when they talk of the communist danger which must be met.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, communist expansion must be met. But it cannot be met adequately with the

8. Mustafa Kamal Pasha.

9. (1877–1944); Prime Minister of Iran (Persia), 1923–25; Shah (King) of Iran, 1925–41.

10. On 20 July, George M. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State, told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that the United States proposed to spend \$ 540 million in military and economic aid to the West Asia and Africa in view of the Soviet intentions to dominate that region.

support of reactionary and feudal regimes. It is there that European and American policies have failed. The U.S. supported the reactionary Kuomintang regime in China and came to grief. Even now they support the remnants of that regime in Formosa.

8. It is in this context of Middle Eastern policy that one can fit in the old British policy in India, of encouraging separatism and ultimately building up of Pakistan. Pakistan was to become a part of this Middle Eastern Islamic bloc. It was not realized that while Islam is undoubtedly a great force, the new nationalisms of Asian countries were, on the political plane, a much greater force. India was and is considered very important, as it undoubtedly is. But there was no uncertainty about India's policy, as it followed an independent line of its own. Pakistan, for all its loud talk, was a much more pliable instrument and easy to control. Hence Pakistan was to be the centre of this Islamic bloc of nations in western Asia and it was through Pakistan that this bloc could be most easily controlled. It became important therefore to build up Pakistan for this purpose, both internally and externally. The vast and well-established publicity machine of the U.K. worked to this end. Pakistan publicity had little to do, because others did its work much more efficiently and thoroughly. All it had to do was to make clear that it would fit in with the general policies laid down for it. Inside Pakistan, there continued, both in the defence forces and the civil service, a considerable number of British officers, nearly all of them of the old colonial type. They influenced policies there and even day-to-day activities.

9. If Pakistan had to be built up, then it became necessary that Kashmir should go to Pakistan both to give it additional strength and so that the borderland touching the Soviet Union should be under control. Hence the basic policy of the U.K. in regard to Pakistan. This flows from the old policy and it is easy to justify it on the simple plea that Kashmir is predominantly Muslim and therefore it should go to Pakistan.

10. The U.S.A. did not have this background of Middle Eastern and Indian policies of the U.K. But, in such matters, they followed the U.K. advice and lead. This was all the more easy because they felt with the U.K., and perhaps even more so, that Pakistan was easy to keep within their sphere of influence in regard to wider policies, while India was an uncertain and possibly not reliable quantity in this regard. Because of this also, both the U.K. and the U.S.A. have been irritated with Afghanistan, which does not fit in with their idea of how Pakistan should develop, and have continually brought pressure to bear upon it to fall in line with Pakistan. Afghanistan has refused to do so and continues to be hostile to Pakistan because of the Pakhtoonistan issue.

11. This whole policy which the U.K. and the U.S.A. have pursued in varying degrees in Asia may meet with some success in some places and on some occasions. But it is basically misconceived, because it fails to take into

consideration the major factor, that is the new urges that move masses of men and women in the different countries of Asia. In the Far East this policy has led to an impasse; in Iran it has created great difficulties for the U.K. As I pointed out to you in my last letter, the oil dispute in Iran is but the outward manifestation of something much bigger.

12. I hope that the analysis I have made of the past and present policies will help us a little to understand the situation in relation to India, and especially Kashmir. We are often blamed for our propaganda and some of the criticism is no doubt justified. We are, of course, at the same time told to economize and not to waste money in foreign countries. We cannot have it both ways. As a matter of fact, Pakistan throws money about in foreign countries on its propaganda and uses many methods which we do not consider desirable. But, in the main, they have the benefit of vast propaganda machines of other countries which we do not and cannot have, if we pursue our independent policy. This is, of course, a simplified way of describing a complicated situation. In the final analysis, however, it is thoroughly understood in the U.K. as well as in the U.S.A., that India counts far more than Pakistan.

13. There is another aspect of the situation which is perhaps not kept in mind by us as much as it ought to be. Our frequent declarations that we are a secular State are appreciated abroad and raise our credit. But they are not wholly believed in and it is often thought that a few leading personalities represent this viewpoint, and not the mass of the people or even many important organizations. The picture of India that most people abroad have had is that of a caste-ridden country split up into innumerable social compartments with large numbers of untouchables and the like. Our social habits are not understood and are disliked. We do not mix easily with people. We do not generally eat and drink with them, as Pakistanis do. And so there is a general feeling of dislike and distaste in regard to India. It is little realized here what great injuries to our credit abroad is done by the communal organizations of India, because they represent just the things which a western mind dislikes intensely and cannot understand. When these communal organizations attack openly the secular idea of the State, this is supposed to represent a prevailing sentiment among Hindus especially and all our protestations about the secular State fail to convince. The recent inauguration of the Somnath temple,¹¹ with pomp and ceremony, has created a very bad impression abroad about India and her professions. Pakistan, of course, has taken full advantage of this and made it one of the principal planks of its propaganda.¹²

11. On 11 May 1951 by President Rajendra Prasad.

12. For example, on 12 May 1951, a resolution was passed at a public meeting in Karachi denouncing the renovations at the Somnath temple as an insult to Muslims and an act of aggression against Pakistan "as Junagadh is part of Pakistan's territory."

14. Thus, in our contacts and propaganda abroad, we have to contend against a positive, widespread and well-organized propaganda machine of great countries working for Pakistan and often against us; and on the other hand, in negative dislike and distaste for the social habits and many things that are observed in India. In addition to this, the money we spend in propaganda is strictly limited and trained persons with a full appreciation of historical trends and political issues are also not easy to find. Propaganda abroad is not merely a part of an efficient newspaperman but requires, in addition, other qualities.

15. I have mentioned the disabilities we suffer from abroad. There are advantages also and they are by no means negligible. The story of India's long struggle for freedom under Gandhiji has powerfully impressed the world and, more especially, the Asian countries as well as the people of Africa. That tradition and Gandhiji's name are tremendous assets. In the eyes of large numbers of people we have stood for certain principles and we have adopted a certain technique and policy which brought us success. Because of that, they still look to our country for a certain kind of lead and for advice based on experience. In the past, India was the chief example of the new colonialism and it was partly because of India that other countries also suffered subjection, because they lay on the route to India. Then India became a symbol of a struggle for freedom against that colonialism, carried on against great odds, without stooping to objectionable methods. In many ways we influenced the nationalist movements of other countries and they looked up to us. They still do so, to some extent. The independent policy that we have pursued in foreign affairs has helped to maintain that old tradition and to add to our credit abroad. Also the mere fact of our great potential resources, our geographical position, and the belief that we are destined to play an important role and perhaps make some difference in world affairs, adds to the respect which comes to us.

16. All these are valuable assets provided only that we ourselves maintain that old tradition, adhere to our principles and our independent policies. But it is not merely enough to repeat old truth and slogans. We have to live up to them. This is the great test of us. Unfortunately there are many people in the country who repeat those old principles and act in opposition to them. There are still others who denounce those principles and openly proclaim something entirely different. Whatever harm communalism may do in India, and it can do great harm because it is a disruptive and degrading force, the harm it does to India in other countries is tremendous. Immediately the high edifice that we have built up in their eyes begins to crack up and totter and we appear to them as narrow-minded bigots following social customs which nobody in the world understands or appreciates. We talk of high philosophies and our ancient greatness but act in narrow grooves and show intolerance to our neighbour. These are basic questions for us to keep in mind, for our future depends on the answer that we give to them.

17. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad came back from his foreign tour a week ago. Apart from visiting England and leading our UNESCO delegation in Paris, he visited Turkey and Iran. In both of these countries he received a cordial welcome and his very presence there helped to remove many of the misconceptions that had been spread by our opponents. This visit shows that if a right approach is made by the right person, substantial results follow.

18. Communal organizations, old and new, are functioning with some vigour nowadays, probably because of the coming elections. They appear to have ample funds. There are enough reactionary and anti-social elements to provide them with these funds and they can always exploit the name of religion and ancient culture. Essentially their appeal is more dangerous for India's future, because it is insidious, than many other appeals, coming from obviously dangerous quarters. Whenever the tension with Pakistan increases, these communal organizations take advantage of this to preach their misguided views. As the Muslim League did before the partition, they preach the gospel of hatred and separatism. They go about saying continually that Muslims are not to be trusted and thus creating popular feelings against them. There may be Muslims who cannot be trusted. But I am quite sure that in the case of a conflict with Pakistan, the dangerous element will be the communal Hindu element which will then try to act up to its declared policies against the minorities. Therefore, we have to be particularly careful of the activities of the communal organizations at such a critical juncture.

19. You have heard that the proposed Japanese peace treaty has now taken some shape. After mutual consultations, the U.S.A. and the U.K. have presented a joint draft. India, of course, is anxious that a treaty of peace should be signed with Japan and that Japan should function as a free and independent country. We are anxious even more that there should be peace in the Far East. We have viewed this draft treaty therefore from this point of view. Some of the minor amendments suggested by us have been accepted. But I regret to say that there has not been much difference in the basic approach to the problem. We have again pressed for a change,¹³ but it seems unlikely that our suggestions will be accepted at this stage. These were not approved

13. In her reply to the United States on 28 July 1951, India stated that if the objective of the treaty was to relieve tension in East Asia, it could not be achieved by excluding People's China and the Soviet Union from the peace settlement with Japan. India was also critical of the proposed continuance of the U.S. trusteeship of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands, without returning them to Japan, the failure to restore Taiwan to China, and the presence of foreign troops in Japan after the occupation had ended. See *ante*, pp. 608-610.

of previously. The result is likely to be that we shall not join this multilateral treaty, as we cannot concur in some of its provisions, though they do not affect us directly. In such an event, we would prefer to have a simple bilateral treaty with Japan.

20. The test we apply to this draft treaty is: does it ease the tension in the Far East or will it add to it? It is clear that there can be no peace in that region unless the countries principally concerned are parties to it. Among these countries are obviously China and the U.S.S.R. Any peace treaty that ignores them or shuts the door to them will not lead to peace. The proposal to continue foreign bases and foreign troops in Japan not only means a diminution of Japanese sovereignty but is bound to be considered as a direct threat to China, just as the support of the Formosan Government of Chiang Kai-shek is considered a threat. We recognized the People's Government of China more than a year and a half ago and our relations with it are friendly. We can hardly encourage a move, which is directly hostile to China and which later may lead to indirect association with the Formosan Government, which we do not recognize.

21. International questions are being judged more and more from the military point of view. There is the vital question of the rearmament of Germany and now the rearmament of Japan is being discussed. The old military groups in these countries, against which so many voices were raised in the past and a great war fought, may again come back to power. Spain, which has long been in Europe a symbol of a fascist regime, is now being helped by the U.S.A. so that Spanish bases might be available in case of war.¹⁴ All this may be justified from the narrow point of view of military exigencies. But all those who grew up in the old traditions against fascism and all that this implies are naturally greatly disturbed by these new developments.

22. In Korea, the ceasefire talks are continuing and appear to have reached a stage of semi-deadlock on the question of the ceasefire line. I think that, some time or other, this deadlock will be resolved because both parties are thoroughly tired of this war and want peace at least for the time being. But even if a ceasefire is agreed to, that does not mean a settlement. It is only then that the major political problems will come up for discussions. These involve not only Korea's future, but that of Formosa, and of China's entry into the U.N., and now the Japanese treaty and all that it implies.

14. It was reported on 18 July that Spain had been assured that if she agreed to allow the United States to use her bases in Spain and Morocco, the United States would sanction economic aid for modernization of the Spanish army and permit her to become a member of NATO despite French and British opposition.

23. I had a visit some days ago from the Foreign Minister of Burma.¹⁵ He came specially to discuss the terms of the Japanese peace treaty. We were largely in agreement in our views on this subject. Burma, however, is very anxious to get reparations from Japan because she suffered greatly from the Japanese occupation. We can understand that desire, though I doubt very much if any reparations are available or can be obtained. So far as we are concerned, we had not asked for any reparations.

24. There has been frequent reference in the press recently to resignations from the Central Cabinet. I confess I have been greatly troubled over this matter, for the two persons concerned have been valuable colleagues who have fully justified their membership of Government. There was no question of a difference of opinion in regard to governmental policy. Difficulties arose about other matters relating to the National Congress. I do not propose to say anything about this subject here because you will probably soon see some statements in the press which will explain the present position. That position only indirectly affects the Government. Essentially it is a question of the future of the Congress. This is not only of interest to Congressmen but to everybody in India, because the role of the Congress had been great.

25. The next session of Parliament begins on Monday next, August 6th. This is the last session before the elections. It has heavy business before it, some of which is of importance and must be passed during the session. Probably this session will last for about two months.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

15. Sao Hkun Hkio met Nehru on 27 July 1951.

IV¹

New Delhi
9 August, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

The Indo-Pakistan situation shows no signs of improvement.² The most that can be said is that it has not grown any worse, but it is bad enough. On the

1. A special letter in addition to the Fortnightly Letters. J.N. Collection.

2. There had been a continuous and intensive propaganda for war in Pakistan for many months. The Pakistan press played up communal sentiments and demanded war. Responsible leaders including ministers talked of war and preparation for a *jehad*. Hundreds of ceasefire violations in Kashmir were taking place.

Pakistan side, feverish preparations for war are taking place. Whether there is war or not, depends on many factors, among them the attitude of the U.K. and the U.S.A. Governments. I do not mean to say that either of these Governments want war. I do not think they do. But I am quite sure that if they make it perfectly clear to Pakistan that it must not indulge in its warlike activities, then there would be no war, because Pakistan has been depending a great deal on such direct or indirect support it might get from them. A great part of the press in these countries writes in favour of Pakistan and that by itself can almost be described as incitement to war.

Considering this question locally, I do not consider war likely. But logic does not explain everything and, in any event, we cannot base our activities on pure logic. Logic would not explain the spate of propaganda, full of hatred and falsehood, that issues from Pakistan.

Because of this grave situation, many people are asking us why we are not taking measures for civil defence.³ I have consistently opposed any such measures which have become quite common in Pakistan. I still hold to that opinion. I do so, not from any feeling of complacency and not because I wish to take risks. On a clear analysis of the situation, I am convinced that by our taking these measures, we shall gain very little indeed and we might lose a lot. Most people who talk about civil defence think in terms of what was done in the warring countries during the last Great War. That is not a good comparison, because there the air warfare was on a terrific scale. In India or Pakistan it can only be on a very moderate scale, because of the smallness of our resources. In comparison, our resources are greater than that of Pakistan in the air, or land and on the sea. Nevertheless, our air arms are relatively small.

When civil defence is talked about, it is usually in connection with two matters: (1) inner border defence, (2) distant internal defence from air attack.

In the nature of things, air attacks cannot be on a major scale. At the most there might be some small-scale bombing. The best defence is in the air, apart from anti-aircraft guns. The other defence, that is civil defence on the ground, can be built up rapidly. It will not really make much difference because of the small-scale bombing. To think in terms of internal air defence and big trenches, air shelters, fire guards, etc., is to waste our energy and resources on something that is relatively unimportant in the scheme of things, but which creates a great excitement, war fever, fear and, to some extent, panic. In the balance, this is not to our advantage. The chief requisite for civil defence is

3. For example, T.M. Zariff of All India Muslim Convention on 24 July, *Amrit Bazar Patrika* in its editorial of 25 July, the provincial conference of Jan Sangh at Calcutta on 29 July, and S.P. Mookerjee in his speech at Bangaon on 1 August 1951.

morale and lack of fear. If we make people afraid to begin with, we are, in that measure, weakened. The extensive preparation for civil defence in Pakistan has, on the whole, spread this war fever among the people and made them more war-minded and, on the other hand, it has spread fear. A very large porportion of the population of Lahore has left the city.

As regards border defence, inevitably this is the principal responsibility of the army and air arm. But behind the armed forces, civilians certainly have a role to play in many ways. To some extent, we have given thought to this even in the past. Again we have to balance various factors. To lay stress on civil defence near the border is to create a feeling of semi-panic and many people may go away. As a matter of fact, our strongest defence is the steadiness of the people at the border and I am glad to say that, from all reports, their steadiness and morale are excellent. We have even discouraged officers' families from coming away from the border.

Therefore, it seems to me that those people who talk so loudly about civil defence and preparations, etc., have not given careful thought and proceed on certain understandable reactions. The whole psychology of defence in this context, is nearly allied to an expectation of an invasion and partial defeat either on land or in the air. I do not wish to encourage this psychology and there is no adequate reason to do so either.

Sometimes it is said that there might be bad elements among the Muslims who might give trouble. That is quite possible, but I think it is highly unlikely that any major trouble will come from that direction. We should be careful of course in regard to strategic areas or vital spots.

I think it is much more likely that trouble may come from Hindu or Sikh communal elements. They would like to take advantage of the occasion to misbehave towards Muslims. If any such thing occurs, it will have very bad consequences and will weaken us. Therefore, this kind of thing must not be allowed to happen. This is of major importance and we must give protection to our minorities. This means also that we must not permit any propaganda on the part of Hindu or Sikh communal organizations, which is on a par with Pakistan propaganda on the other side. There have been some recent instances of this where, lacking originality, the Hindu Mahasabha people have tried to imitate the Pakistanis. They did not succeed to any extent. But it is quite possible that if we are unwary, and some incidents happen, the communal elements might take advantage of them. I would, therefore, specially request you to keep this in mind.

Having said all this and discouraged you from taking any civil defence measures or the like, I have to ask you, at the same time, to be ready for any emergency. That is to say that your Government should secretly think out what should be done in case an emergency arises. Plans must be ready on paper and in the minds of some persons. I do not want any talk of this or

even any reference to district authorities as far as possible. These plans will be, in the main, plans for maintaining security and discipline in an emergency. Of course, if unfortunately, such an occasion arises, full directions will be sent to you.

It is always possible for an enemy country to make a sudden attack. It is possible that Pakistan might do so. But I am almost sure that if Pakistan does so, it will be in Kashmir and not in any other part of India. That has been their policy and programme. If they attack Kashmir suddenly, we shall of course resist and we are prepared for it. We have made it clear that such an attack would lead to an all-out war. We have a certain advantage here because if Pakistan attacks Kashmir suddenly, then the initiative for the next step lies with us and we can take it when and in the manner we choose. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan will make a sudden attack on any part of India, apart from Kashmir.

These are speculations which I am sharing with you. We have to be prepared for all emergencies and, in a military sense, we are so prepared from now onwards. I still hope and partly believe that there will be no war, and I do not wish to do anything on our side which might perhaps tip the balance on the side of war. Hence my earnest request to you that no public activity that savours of war preparation should be indulged in or encouraged in others, while at the same time our minds must keep prepared.

You will please keep this letter as top secret and not to be shared with others except, perhaps, a very few.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

V¹

New Delhi
19 August, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

This letter has been delayed by four days. You will no doubt appreciate that the burdens on one grow and it is not always easy to adhere to the strict timetable about these letters, much as I would like to do so.

2. The subject which has naturally created a good deal of public excitement, not only among Congressmen, but others also, has been the internal

1. File No. 25(6)/51, PMS.

crisis in the Congress.² The immediate cause of this has been my resignation from the Congress Working Committee. This letter is hardly the place for me to discuss this matter, important as it is in its wider implications. I took the step I did after the most anxious and continuous thought, keeping in mind the various possible consequences. There were certain obvious risks involved and yet, in the balance, I came to the conclusion that I must take the step and that ultimately it would bring some clarity in our thought and in our actions. Our politics have had a tendency of becoming more and more foggy. Our intentions are good; our expression of them is also usually good, and yet somehow I have a feeling that we lose grip of the situation. It is not enough to feel that we have done our best, nor is it enough to think that others are to blame. As persons holding responsible positions, whether in the Government or in a great popular organization like the Congress with a noble record behind it, we have to think in terms of something more than good intentions and hard work. We have to produce results and those results include popular reactions of the right kind. Any democracy has ultimately to base itself on the positive goodwill and support of the masses of the people. That is perhaps truer of us than of many others, because we have grown from strength to strength in the past, and because large masses of our people were in tune with our urges and our activities. If that essential link is weakened, then we grow weaker as a positive force and only carry on by some momentum gained in the past.

3. I have long felt that there is this lack of clarity about our thinking and consequently about our actions. We live, to some extent, in the past, and when I say we, this applies to large numbers of people all over the country. While the past pursues us, the present overwhelms us with its problems and we try to keep pace with it to the best of our ability.

4. Of the many problems that confront us, the major problem has seemed to me not some programme of governmental activity, important as that is, but how to bring about some kind of communion between those in Government or outside, who give the lead, and the masses of our people. That lead has to be realistic. There are too many adventurist slogans and appeals, which lead

2. Despite his Unity Resolution having been unanimously accepted by the Congress, the differences in outlook and policy with Tandon, the Congress President, made Nehru increasingly feel "not in tune" with the organizational authorities of the Congress. After failing to persuade Tandon to reconstitute the Working Committee and the Central Election Board, Nehru resigned on 6 August from membership of the Working Committee. Tandon, in turn, offered to relinquish the Presidentship of the Congress. The A.I.C.C., at a specially convened meeting on 8 and 9 September, accepted Tandon's resignation. See *ante*, pp. 172-173.

us nowhere. At the same time, the so-called practical man has his eyes and nose too much near the ground to see further or to sense those movements and urges that influence people's minds. The most practical aspect of the programme is that it attracts and draws the people towards it, and helps in creating that cooperation which is so essential for success.

5. Most of us have felt that this general cooperation has been lacking; that, indeed, there is inertia and a certain inertness about the people. We tend to criticise them for this inertia or for something worse. Our criticism may or may not be justified, but it does not help very much. We have to find the remedy and that remedy has to be not only our activity producing results, but also some key to people's mind and hearts. The same people, given the right atmosphere and the right lead, perform brave deeds; lacking these, they function at much lower levels. The question arises as to how far the fault might lie with us—our way of thinking or action or our lack of proper approach to the people. Nothing perhaps is more dangerous than complacency, more especially at a time of change and crisis which demand constant thought and adaptation.

6. At such a moment, foggiess of mind, a diffused way of thinking, and a reluctance to look down to the roots of the problem, are necessarily harmful. We become static and unprogressive and tend to cast the blame on others. A sense of frustration creeps in. We begin to distrust others and others begin to distrust us.

7. You will forgive me for this digression. I am convinced that we have to be straight with ourselves before we can influence others and make them understand us. Hence, I thought that my resignation from the Congress Working Committee might help in making people think hard about our problems and come to clear decisions. Without this clarity and a reasoned approach, no action can be effective. I have myself felt much better and calmer in mind since I took the decision to resign from the Congress Working Committee. I am convinced that it was a right decision and, though I am very much concerned about the future, I am not over-anxious or worried about it. If we have the right stuff in us, a few shocks now and then will not do us harm, but may well do us good. If we have not got that right stuff, then it does not very much matter what we do or do not do. For my part, I think that the result of all this will be good for the country.

8. As you know, this crisis in the Congress has had its repercussions on the Government. My colleague, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, has left the Government and I think we are the poorer for his leaving. He made a success of his Ministry and was full of new ideas. For the moment, no new Minister has been appointed to take his place. There are some proposals under consideration for an amalgamation of some Ministries.

9. Since I wrote to you last, the new Parliamentary session has begun and the President has surveyed the scene in his opening Address to Parliament.³ There has been a debate on his Address and, in the course of my reply, I dealt at some length with our foreign policy and more especially with Indo-Pakistan relations.⁴ These relations have grown more and more tense and, though we carry on our normal vocations, there is a sense of impending tragedy about us. I still hope and think that there will be no war and yet there can be no certainty of this, and the next two months are difficult and critical. It is certain that we, on our part, will not undertake military operations. But the Prime Minister of Pakistan has made it clear, in the course of a long correspondence with me, that he will not promise not to attack Kashmir. We, on our part, have also made it equally clear that an attack on Kashmir is an attack on India as a whole and will result in a war between India and Pakistan.⁵ There the matter stands, and my correspondence with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has for the present come to an end.

10. Reports and rumours reach us of concentrations of Pakistan troops near the Indian borders and of other preparations for war, both in western and eastern Pakistan. For our part, we have made such defence preparations as we considered necessary. But we have sternly discouraged what is called civil defence measures and the like, because we thought that these would result in creating an atmosphere of impending war and we wished to avoid this as far as we could.

11. There are reports that regular soldiers of the Pakistan Army have gone to 'Azad Kashmir', disguised as tribal people. If this is so, then there is a possibility of some kind of an arranged attack, ostensibly made by tribal people, but really by trained soldiers, on Kashmir. The situation is, therefore, far from safe and yet, I repeat, I do not think it likely that war will come; and my main reason for thinking so is that we are perfectly prepared for it.

12. It is more important, from the point of view of civil defence, that there should be no panic and no uneasiness among the people and especially

3. The President's Address reiterated India's determination to avoid war unless it was thrust upon her and said that defensive measures had been undertaken in the interest of peace. It expressed the hope that the tension between India and Pakistan would disappear. It also mentioned the Government's proposal to constitute a National Development Council with the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers as its members, and spoke of the Government's determination to check rising prices.

4. See *ante*, pp. 577-594.

5. Nehru made this clear in his letter to Liaquat Ali Khan on 4 August 1951. See *ante*, pp. 349-351.

that our minority communities might feel safe. Their feeling of insecurity would be a weakening factor, apart from this being a slur on us. It is for this reason that I have laid repeated stress in these letters on creating a feeling of communal harmony and on suppressing with speed, and even a measure of ruthlessness, any attempts to break that harmony and bring about discord.

13. A heartening feature of the situation has been the response of large numbers of leading Muslims all over India to this situation. Many Muslim organizations and individuals have given public utterance to this and pledged their loyalty to India, even against Pakistan.⁶ The most important of these statements is the memorandum given by Dr Zakir Husain and other eminent Muslims in India to Dr Graham.⁷ This memorandum is a closely reasoned and well presented case for the Indian Muslims, bringing out an aspect of this matter which perhaps is seldom borne in mind. It is a perfect answer to the cries of *jehad* in Pakistan and to the criticisms made in foreign countries to our policy in regard to Kashmir and Pakistan. I would commend your attention to this memorandum which should have the greatest publicity.

14. Dr Graham is in Delhi and our talks take place from time to time on rather general topics. As you know, we have not accepted the last resolution of the Security Council in regard to Kashmir. But we have shown every courtesy to Dr Graham and supplied him with such information as he desired to acquaint himself fully with the problem.

15. The Independence Day celebration in various parts of India have given an impression of solemnity and calm strength. In particular, this was so in Delhi where a vast concourse of people gathered under the walls of the historic Red Fort. In spite of all that has happened, August 15th has a particular appeal for our people. That is as it should be, for that day will be remembered as a historic day not only for us, but for the world.

16. Parliament has a heavy agenda before it. It has already dealt with the situation created in the Punjab by the suspension of the Constitution. It will soon take up some important Bills like the Part C States Bill⁸ and a new Press

6. On 5 May 1951, a Muslim convention in Calcutta reaffirmed faith in Nehru's leadership.

7. The memorandum of 16 August 1951 stated: "We say with all the emphasis at our command that Pakistan's policy towards Kashmir is fraught with the gravest peril to the 40 million Muslims of India.... If the Security Council is really interested in peace, human brotherhood and international understanding, it should heed this warning while there is still time."

8. The Bill was passed on 3 September 1951.

Bill.⁹ The Part C States Bill goes very far in bringing democratic institutions in these States. I am happy that we are going ahead in this matter, even though some people fear that there are risks involved in these changes. There are risks in every step that we might take, and there are sometimes greater risks in not taking a step for fear of consequences. Having taken the road to democracy, it is difficult to stop halfway or to seek a diversion from it. We have to trust the people if we ask for their trust.

17. Another important measure, long pending, is the Bill dealing with the development and control of industries.¹⁰ Then there is the Hindu Code Bill which comes up regularly before each session of Parliament. It would be a pity if all the labour spent on this Bill was wasted. We hope to make an effort therefore to put it on the statute book before this session ends. If this happens, as I hope it will, I am sure that our present Parliament will be remembered more because of this measure of social reform than for any other piece of legislation or activity.

18. I am glad that the proposed railway strike has been postponed¹¹ by the All India Railwaymen's Federation. The postponement is for two months; I wish it had been abandoned altogether. I hope that in the intervening period negotiations will lead to a satisfactory settlement of some of the outstanding problems.

19. The first ship carrying foodgrains from the U.S.A. under the Loan Agreement reached Bombay some days ago, and many more ships are following it. Nevertheless, the food position is not wholly satisfactory in some parts of India and we have to be careful. Belated rains just prevented a further tragedy in some provinces. But the lack of rains during July and part of August has gravely injured our crop prospects, especially in the U.P.

20. In the Punjab there has been a marked improvement in the general administration, and certain steps taken by the Governor to deal with corruption and black marketing have produced substantial results. In Pepsu the situation is unsatisfactory and there is a great deal of communal tension between the

9. The Press (Objectionable Matter) Bill passed on 7 October sought to curb subversive activities and certain very grave offences including scurrilous writings in the press. All laws violative of fundamental rights were repealed; there was to be no pre-censorship of any newspaper nor any anticipatory action taken; security could be demanded if the freedom of the press was abused and forfeited by an order of the judicial authority.

10. The Indian Companies (Amendment) Bill, enacted on 14 September 1951, replaced the ordinance which had been issued to check such abuses as monopoly practices in the open market. The Bill restricted the appointment, tenure and powers of the managing agents.

11. The strike, which was to start from 27 August, was postponed by the Federation on 10 August.

Sikhs and the Hindus.¹² The unfortunate State of Assam has had to deal with big floods again.

21. I have pointed out in my previous letters that there has been an increasing flow of migrants from East Bengal to West Bengal. This continues. It may be partly due to the monsoon season when such migrations occur; it is certainly due also to the war scare in Pakistan; and then it is due to the living conditions of the minority communities in East Bengal which are such as to exercise continuous pressure on them. This is a serious problem which may become very serious indeed. Thus far, the numbers involved, though considerable, are not overwhelming. We try to deal with this problem of Bengal separately and our efforts have often met with some success. But, essentially, it cannot be isolated from the major Indo-Pakistan problem and difficulties will continue till that major problem moves towards a solution. Some fantastic remedies are sometimes put forward, such as, exchange of populations or a slice of territory to be taken from Pakistan for the rehabilitation of the migrants.¹³ Both these suggestions are foolish in the extreme. Indeed, they cannot be given effect to without war; if we rule out war for this purpose, then we have to think differently. If, unhappily, war comes, then far from settling this problem, it will produce a host of others, apart from the enormous injury it would do to the countries involved.

22. In Korea, the Kaesong talks continue without producing any results. It is extraordinary how the two delegations can manage to continue discussing the same point day after day and week after week without making the slightest progress. The question at issue is the ceasefire line. The U.N. Commanders want, more or less, the present line which, in some places, goes beyond the 38th parallel. The North Koreans and the Chinese want to have the 38th parallel as the ceasefire line. As the present military position is much more favourable to the U.N. than the 38th parallel, they are very reluctant to give up this advantage. I am still inclined to think, though the hope grows dim, that the ceasefire talks will ultimately succeed.

23. In Iran there appears to have been another deadlock between the U.K. representatives and the Iranian Government. The U.K. had accepted the basis of nationalization of the oil industry there and had offered otherwise also

12. The Akali Dal was at this time agitating against the Congress ministry.

13. S.P. Mookerjee, speaking at Calcutta on 30 July 1951, said that if the Government of India did not wish to interfere in the matter of the security of Hindus in East Bengal for fear that it might lead to armed conflict, the only other possible solution was to effect a planned exchange of population and property at Government level.

much more favourable terms.¹⁴ But, so far as the latest news goes, the Iranians are not satisfied with this. It is interesting to note that, as an indirect result of the conflict, the Iraq Government has profited and they will now be given a royalty of 50% on the profits of the oil business there.¹⁵ This is a considerable advantage. If the oil companies had been a little wiser and offered something like this to Iran a year or two ago, there would probably have been no crisis there now.

24. One of the major issues before us at present is the proposed Japanese peace treaty. This has been sponsored by the U.S.A. and the U.K. Governments. The other powers concerned, excepting China, have been consulted about it. We made a number of suggestions towards change, but only a few minor ones were accepted; our major proposals were rejected.¹⁶ Our whole approach to this has been that such a treaty should not only make Japan an independent nation, but should lead towards a lessening of tension in the Far East and be some step towards settlement. We have felt that the proposed treaty might well produce a contrary effect. First of all, any such arrangement which leaves out China, the country most concerned, is obviously incomplete and not realistic. Then again, the proposals to station American troops in Japan and have U.S. bases there appear to us to be objectionable. The presence of those troops will be a constant irritant to nearby countries who will think that they are meant for their invasion. There are many other points involved in this draft treaty, but I need not trouble you with them here. After the most careful consideration we have come to the conclusion that we cannot sign this treaty.¹⁷ Hence, we are not sending any representatives to the San Francisco Conference. This conference is meant to be a formal affair where no discussion can take place about the treaty and only signatures are asked for. It has been stated, however, that any country can record its objections or its criticisms to some part of the treaty. The record will in no way lessen the legal significance of that treaty or

14. The British proposal of 13 August, recognizing the principle of nationalization of the oil industry, suggested that the ownership of oil be vested in an Iranian company and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company transfer all its assets in lieu of compensation; the production and refining could be jointly controlled by the British and the Iranian agencies; and its transport and marketing outside Iran retained by Britain. On 18 August 1951, Iran rejected the proposals as inconsistent with her plan of nationalization of the oil industry and stated that she could not give a monopoly of sale of her oil to the oil company.
15. The arrangement was signed at Baghdad on 13 August between the Iraq Government, the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Barrah Petroleum Company.
16. The United States, on 12 August, expressed their inability to accept the Indian proposals.
17. This was communicated to the United States on 23 August 1951.

lessen the responsibility of the signatory country. For us to sign this treaty would have been to go counter to many policies which we have thus far pursued, and it would have made us indirectly responsible for certain decisions which we entirely disapprove.

25. In this matter we have had full consultations with the Government of Burma, who are equally dissatisfied with the proposed treaty. They have also decided not to sign it.¹⁸ We do not yet know what the final decision of the Indonesian Government will be. It is possible that, under great pressure, they might sign it, even though they disapprove of it. Both the U.S.A. and the U.K. Governments have attached considerable importance to India's signature to this treaty, and yet they have paid little heed to India's advice and suggestions. The old practice of deciding about Asian questions in Europe and America, and not thinking too much of the opinion of Asian countries, still holds. That policy has not succeeded in the past and is not likely to succeed in the future.

26. Our decision not to sign this treaty will naturally cause disappointment and some resentment in the U.S.A. We are sorry for this, and it is because of this that we gave the most earnest consideration to the draft treaty. We could not, however, give up our basic position even though some of the consequences might not be to our liking. I am sure that, in the long run, India's attitude will be appreciated. We propose to finalize our decision about this peace treaty in the course of the next few days. Probably in a week from today we shall communicate our decision to the U.S.A. It will later be published. Till then no publicity should be given to it.

27. The King of Nepal has been on a short informal visit to Delhi.¹⁹ This has given us an opportunity of discussing with him many of the difficult problems which the people of Nepal have to face.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. The Burmese Government communicated their decision to the United States on 23 August 1951.

19. From 13 to 21 August 1951.

VI¹

New Delhi
31 August, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

The outstanding event of the past few weeks, from the international point of view, has been India's refusal to attend the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese peace treaty. Among the Asian countries, India and Burma have refused. Indonesia is sending a delegation to San Francisco but has not yet decided whether to sign or not. It is probable that they will ultimately sign the multilateral treaty.

2. India's decision not to sign the treaty has a peculiar and far-reaching significance. Because of this fact, considerable irritation has been caused in official circles in the United States at our decision.² Indeed the reply of the U.S. Government was couched in language which is not usual in correspondence between Governments.³ I confess that we were somewhat irritated at it, but after much thought, we decided not to use strong language in our reply.⁴ As our action was strong and definite, there was no necessity for the language to be unnecessarily strong.

3. I wrote to you in my last fortnightly letter about some of the reasons why we could not support the American draft treaty. Many other reasons can be advanced for this decision, and I have been quite clear in my mind that this was the only possible decision we could take in the circumstances. Any other decision would not only have been wrong on the merits but harmful to us from every point of view. It would have been a reversal of our policy completely and would have brought far-reaching consequences in its train. It may have given some immediate pleasure to the United States, but it was unlikely even to bring us any benefits. Having surrendered on the main issue once, we would have been unable to hold out on other matters which affect us. I think it is clear that the respect for India and for her independent line has gone up in other countries, including the U.K. and the U.S.A., even though

1. File No. 25(6)/51, PMS.

2. For example, Senator Herbert H. Lehman, an advocate of aid to India, said on 27 August that he expected "a lot of repercussions" in the U.S. Congress over India's attitude to Japan.

3. The U.S. Government's reply on 25 August 1951 to India's objections to the draft treaty regretted that India was applying a double standard in its policy towards the disposal of the islands near Japan.

4. The Indian Government in its reply of 27 August 1951 merely reiterated India's "inherent and unquestionable right" not to sign the treaty and said that the separate treaty with Japan would not run counter to the main provisions of the draft treaty to be signed at San Francisco. See *ante*, pp. 620-623.

they may dislike our decision. In Asia, our decision has had a powerful effect. It seems to me fairly clear that the Japanese people, or a great majority of them, approve of India's action even though they might not express this approval publicly. We have had some evidence of this. In Japan, the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, has recently faced an angry Diet, which demanded new elections.⁵

4. Our general policy is not intended to side with any group or country, or to oppose any group or country for opposition's sake. We have tried, in spite of difficulties and misunderstandings, to keep friendly relations with rival countries. We have had a large measure of success in this. But the issues that come up repeatedly have to be judged from the wider point of view of war and peace in the world. Unfortunately, because of fear, the western countries are inclined more and more towards fascist and military elements in Germany, Japan, Spain, etc. The rearmament of Germany under the old leadership, and the proposed rearmament of Japan, also under the old military leadership, are being encouraged. This is a dangerous trend, which would do little good even to America. In any event, what is happening is that extreme elements on both sides are coming to the front. On the Russian side, we find communist expansionism; on the other side, we find reactionary elements joining together. The middle groups tend to disappear. India cannot line up with the Soviet or the other communist countries, nor can it line up with these militarist and fascist groups. It is difficult to live in splendid isolation. But, in effect, India is not isolated and a wide circle of people all over the world welcome the general policy we are pursuing and think of it as something that gives hope for the prevention of war. In spite of our desire to remain aloof of international entanglements, a certain leadership is thrust upon India in pursuing the policy we have adopted which has a large appeal to considerable numbers of people abroad, more especially in Asia.

5. The rearming of Japan can only lead to war on a big scale. It may be that if unfortunately the Kaesong ceasefire talks fail, the war there, which has never stopped, will become fiercer. Attempts might be made to train up and send Japanese troops to Korea. If this happens, there will be strong resentment in Japan and the war in the Far East might well spread further. Our action, though criticised by some, is some kind of a brake in the spread of war mentality.

5. The Socialist Party, during the Diet (Parliament) session on 17 and 18 August 1951, accused the Prime Minister of secret diplomacy, criticised the Allied powers for violating pledges not to seek territorial aggrandizement; declared that the draft treaty in no way satisfied the wishes of the Japanese people; and resented the proposal to retain United States troops in Japan after the treaty came into force.

6. Indo-Pakistan relations continue to be tense, though, on the whole, I have a feeling that the situation is slightly easier than it was. But this does not take us very far and the immediate crisis might well last another two months or so. I think that if we can prevent a conflict during the next two months, there will be some slow toning down of the crisis. But we cannot expect miracles to happen and even the process of toning down and healing will take time. At the present moment, the only policy we can pursue in regard to Pakistan is not to surrender on any important point, to keep ourselves strong and prepared to meet any contingency, and at the same time to keep perfectly cool and strive for peace. Rather wild demands for war, made directly or indirectly, exhibit complete immaturity of thought and understanding.⁶ The Hyderabad operations have had one bad effect on our people. They seem to think that any war would be a brief affair involving little troubles. As a matter of fact, if we are entangled in war with Pakistan, that war will neither be brief nor gentlemanly, if I may use this word. It is likely to be a bitter conflict, full of suppressed hatred. The influence of reactionary and extreme elements will increase in both countries. So far as our country is concerned, we have to take very special care, in the present context of affairs, that we do not forget our basic stand against communalism. I am sure that it would have been easier for us to deal with Pakistan, if our own hands had been clean in this matter.

7. Dr Graham has just come back to Delhi from Karachi on his fourth visit. I have met him again. We have not proceeded far and I rather doubt if these talks, which have been conducted wholly informally, will yield fruitful results. Meanwhile, the preparations for the Kashmir constituent assembly go on and elections will take place in September and October. The assembly will meet there sometime afterwards, possibly in November, or a little earlier. I am going to Kashmir for the next weekend, Saturday and Sunday, partly because of the convocation of university there, but chiefly to have an opportunity of discussing various developments with Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues. It is important that we should remain in full touch and harmony with each other.

8. I had taken some pride in the fact that the morale of our people near the border was good. I am afraid I cannot congratulate myself quite so much about this matter now. It is true that the morale is excellent, generally speaking. But it is true also that during the last fortnight, fairly large numbers of people have left border cities like Amritsar. We must check this exodus, as it is a

6. For example, D.P. Mishra, who resigned as Home Minister of Madhya Pradesh on 22 August 1951, stated that the only honourable course left for India was to issue an ultimatum to Pakistan demanding that she ensure the safety of the Hindu population or face invasion and occupation by Indian troops.

sign of fear and apprehension, and fear is contagious. There is really no reason for people to run away from the border areas. If, unfortunately, war comes as a result of Pakistan's attack on us anywhere, we are strong enough to prevent our territory from being invaded. There may be some petty raids which it is impossible to prevent. There may also be occasional bombing of some of our cities. The bombing cannot go far because of the lack of resources in Pakistan. In any event, we should not be frightened by an odd bomb dropping nearby.

9. There is one matter which I should like to mention to you, as it distresses me. Because of this talk of war as well as the internal crises, including what is called the Congress crisis, the astrologers appear to carry on a flourishing trade, making all kinds of prophecies, sometimes adverse and at other times more optimistic. This emergence of astrologers among our responsible people is greatly to be deplored. We cannot run a country on the basis of astrologers' predictions nor can we run a war with this background. Even if there was an element of truth in astrology, which I do not believe, it is wrong to refer to astrologers to guide our actions. I should therefore like you and your colleagues to discourage sternly and even ruthlessly this practice of clinging to the stars and expecting them not only to guide us but to control our activities. True or false, this is a harmful practice and it lessens our credit both in India and abroad.

10. The so-called Congress crisis continues and will continue till at least the next meeting of the A.I.C.C. on September 8th and 9th. But this crisis has already had one good effect. It has roused up the people to think of fundamental matters and there is more reality in our discussions now. That is all to the good.

11. I have recently spoken both at the Congress Parliamentary Party meeting and a press conference and have dealt with many of the issues that are troubling our people. I will not repeat what I have said there. But I would draw your particular attention to it as explaining our approach to these problems. It seems to me that what is necessary is clarity in Congress decisions and in the activities governing Congressmen. There has been in the past far too much of an attempt to shirk this clear thinking. Recent events have shown the importance and vitality of the Congress because the whole country has been roused up by this so-called crisis.

12. You will be interested to know that the People's Government of China are sending a cultural goodwill mission to India.⁷ This will be coming sometime in October and will spend some weeks in India. The mission will include prominent educationists, scientists and artists.

7. A delegation of twenty-one members visited India for one month from 28 October 1951.

13. The food position is not as satisfactory as I would like it to be. We avoid severe crisis, but we have not been able to provide for the future as much as we wanted to do. The rains have been poor in several parts of the country and much depends on the next ten days or so. If rains come in even now, they will do much good, although some loss has already been caused by the dry period in July-August.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

VII¹

New Delhi
17 September, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

The last fortnight has been a very heavy one for me. The meeting of the All India Congress Committee took place in Delhi and resulted in a fresh burden and responsibility being cast upon me.² I am afraid the next few months are going to be a very difficult test of my powers of endurance.

2. Early in this month, Dr Graham returned from Karachi and we had long talks. Ultimately, he made certain suggestions in regard to "demilitarization." This was his first formal communication to us since he came to India.³ To this we have sent a formal reply.⁴ Dr Graham went to Pakistan and from there has proceeded to Geneva.⁵ His visit to India and Pakistan has thus ended and he will now present his report to the Security Council of the U.N.

3. In our reply to Dr Graham we made clear our position again in regard to the withdrawal of our forces from Kashmir. We had no desire to keep them there except for reasons of security. As the situation improved, we would

1. File No. 25(6)/51, PMS.
2. Nehru assumed the Presidentship of the Congress on 9 September 1951.
3. Graham returned to India on 30 August 1951, and on 7 September suggested to Nehru a solution based on the U.N. resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which had been accepted by both India and Pakistan. He also suggested that detailed negotiations should take place before the proposals were finally accepted.
4. On 11 September 1951.
5. He went to Pakistan on 8 September and left for Geneva on 12 September 1951.

gladly withdraw them. But we must always keep in mind the dangers that threaten Kashmir State. In any event, Pakistan had to withdraw all her troops, regular or irregular, and disband and disarm the so-called 'Azad' forces. That is to say, that the area at present occupied by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir State should be cleared of Pakistan influence. We would, on our part, withdraw some of our forces, as the danger lessened.

4. You may remember that two years ago we had agreed to a resolution of the U.N. Commission, which laid down that Pakistan should withdraw all her forces and that India should thereupon withdraw the bulk of her forces. Pakistan did not act up to this resolution. As a matter of fact, throughout 1949 and 1950, and even early in 1951, we continued the process of withdrawal of our forces and actually withdrew a little over 40 per cent of them. Thus, we have gone very far in withdrawing the bulk of our forces. During the last few months of crisis, we have sent back some forces to Kashmir.

5. I do not know what Dr Graham is likely to report. I imagine that he will indicate the differences which still exist between India and Pakistan in regard to this matter. He did not discuss with us any question other than that of withdrawal of forces. The Security Council will then presumably consider his report. So far as we know, an attempt will be made to avoid any kind of a break.

6. The situation vis-a-vis Pakistan appears to have toned down to some extent. There is not quite the same amount of war-mongering there, but occasionally threats are thrown out. We cannot take any risks and have still to be prepared for any contingency, though I think that the chances of war have somewhat receded.

7. We have informed Japan⁶ of our desire to put an end to the state of war between India and Japan as soon as the San Francisco treaty⁷ has been acted upon. This has been appreciated very much in Japan⁸ and also by some other countries. In the U.S.A., our refusal to attend the San Francisco Conference and sign the Japanese peace treaty led to angry comments. Second thoughts were a little calmer and gradually there has been a slight understanding of our position. I am sure that the stand we took will be appreciated more and more later. Meanwhile, the Kaesong ceasefire talks have practically ended

6. On 8 September 1951.

7. The treaty was signed by 49 nations including Japan on 8 September 1951.

8. The Japanese Government communicated their appreciation of India's stand on 10 September 1951.

and war is in full progress in Korea.⁹ There appears to be little chance of a resumption of the ceasefire talks. Probably there will be an intensification on warfare after the partial lull that we have had.

8. There has been a controversy between India and Pakistan about the exodus of Hindus from East Bengal to West Bengal. We have no doubt that our figures are more or less accurate. There still continues to be a marked excess in the movement of Hindus from Pakistan to West Bengal. The average daily figures have recently been:

	Going from East to West Bengal	Going from West to East Bengal
Hindus	3,324	2,500
Muslims	1,247	1,424

These figures, of course, include casual travellers as well as migrants.

9. The Pakistan press has complained a great deal about Muslims going to West Pakistan from India across the Rajputana border. There is no doubt that there is such a flow, though it is difficult to give numbers. These Muslims go without permits and at their own risk. Probably several hundreds go every week.

10. The days of the present Parliament are numbered and it is difficult to say how it can be extended beyond the 6th October. After that there are *Dussehra* or *Puja* holidays and then *Moharram*. Immediately after comes the Congress session in Delhi.¹⁰ We are, therefore, trying to finish our work by the 6th October. This is by no means easy, as we have got many important bills to be considered and passed. The Press Bill took a full week even for reference to the select committee.¹¹ Today the Hindu Code Bill was taken up. In view of the shortness of time available, it has become quite impossible to think of passing the entire Hindu Code Bill during this session. At the same time, we do not wish to arrive at no final result. We have, therefore, decided to proceed with Part II of the Bill, that is, dealing with marriage and divorce and finalize that at least during this session.

9. After North Korea suspended the talks on 23 August 1951 over the alleged violation of the neutral zone by American troops, the radio broadcasts on both sides blamed each other for the failure of the talks. Amidst continuous reports of alleged violations of territory by American troops, the acceptance of the charge of an American plane having bombed the Kaesong neutral zone led to rejection of suggestions for the resumption of the ceasefire talks made by the United States on 6 September.

10. It was held from 17 to 19 October 1951.

11. It was referred to the select committee on 15 September 1951.

11. There has been scarcity of rice in some districts of Madras as well as in some other parts of the country. The rice we had hoped to get from abroad has failed us. I think there is no way out for us but to encourage the consumption of wheat, *milo*, tapioca, etc. The argument that people are not used to this kind of diet does not take us very far. When necessity arises, we must get used to what is available.

12. After a long gap, which caused considerable damage to our crops, the rains have come and have been fairly widespread. This has retrieved the situation to some extent and, if all goes well, we might have a fair *rabi* harvest.

13. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan¹² paid a visit to Delhi on his way back to Afghanistan from America.¹³ He had a very enthusiastic reception here and addressed Members of Parliament also.¹⁴ I believe he has gone back with pleasant memories of his stay in Delhi and our friendly relations with Afghanistan have been strengthened.

14. The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Loy Henderson, has been transferred¹⁵ to Iran and in his place a new Ambassador, Mr. Chester Bowles,¹⁶ is due to come.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. Shah Mahmud Khan Ghazi (1886-1959); Prime Minister of Afghanistan, 1946-53.

13. He came to Delhi on 4 September after arriving in Bombay on 1 September.

14. On 5 September 1951.

15. The transfer of Loy Henderson and appointment of a new Ambassador was announced by the U.S. Government on 12 September 1951. Chester Bowles, the new Ambassador, presented his credentials to the President of India on 1 November 1951.

16. (1901-1986); a leading Democrat from Connecticut; held several administrative posts between 1943 and 1946; Ambassador to India and Nepal, 1951-53; member of U.S. Congress, 1959-61; Ambassador to India, 1963-69; author of *A View from New Delhi* (1969), *Mission to India* (1974), and *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (1971).

VIII¹

New Delhi
September 19, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

I enclose for your information copies of letters I have sent to the Presidents of Pradesh Congress Committees and to the Chairmen of Pradesh Election Committees.² You are no doubt intimately associated with the work of these committees and I should like to have your help in carrying out the suggestions I have made. We have to travel far and to go fast. Much has to be done and time is limited. We can only succeed with clearness of vision and singleness of purpose. That is why I have ventured to put down some of my ideas in the hope that they will appeal to my comrades in the Congress. I invite your cooperation in this task.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Misc. File/1951, A.I.C.C. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. See *ante*, pp. 33-40.

IX¹

New Delhi
22 September, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

I would like to draw your special attention to the Home Ministry letter No. F. 25/59/51-Ests. dated the 5th September, 1951, regarding tours of Ministers in connection with the election campaign. I have no doubt that these views, which are based on sound political convention, are fully acceptable to your colleagues and yourself and that you will so regulate your tour arrangements as to avoid any criticism that ministers are misusing their official position for Party advantage during the elections.

2. The Home Ministry letter does not refer to the question of travelling allowances of Ministers for journeys which have, for their main purpose, the election campaign. For such journeys, I am sure you will agree that no

1. A special letter in addition to the Fortnightly Letters. J.N. Collection.

travelling expenses or daily allowances should be charged by Ministers. This view is, on the face of it, a fair and sensible one; it is also the view, which, on technical grounds of the interpretation of Constitution, the Comptroller and Auditor-General has also reached.

3. The general principles mentioned in the Home Ministry letter should be applied from now onwards. It should be easy to separate purely election meetings from meetings meant for explaining governmental policies and the like. Nevertheless, this may not be possible during the lengthy period of time and the two might overlap. Generally speaking, public meetings should be sponsored non-officially, although Government officials may give some assistance for reasons of security and order. This should be considered a general rule, though there may be obvious exceptions when the function is largely governmental.

4. As general elections are taking place in January 1952, it may be presumed that for some weeks previously the activities of Ministers on tour are much more concerned with elections. Therefore, during the month of December specially, care should be taken to keep Government officials apart from public meetings which are likely to be election meetings. This does not apply to any security arrangements and the like.

5. I would also like to draw your attention to a letter you must have received from our Election Commissioner dated 7th September, in which he has made certain suggestions about the organization for elections. These suggestions are important and I hope that the attention of your State officials has been drawn to them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

X¹

New Delhi
4 October, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

The Parliamentary session continues and as it approaches its end, its activity becomes more and more feverish. There is so much work to be got through and so little time. Perhaps there would be enough time for all our work if the

rules of Parliament were not such as to permit unlimited speeches and discussions. We have had one speech lasting four hours on a particular clause of a Bill. (This was a clause of the Hindu Code Bill). Unless the rules of Parliament are changed, it will become increasingly difficult to get through any substantial amount of work. If this is so now with less than 300 members, the difficulties later on with a much larger membership of Parliament will proportionately increase. There will also be two Houses after the elections. The prospect for important legislation is not encouraging.

2. Ever since we came into office, and indeed long before that, our major plank was the abolition of the zamindari system. There was not much delay on our part and many State Governments, soon after assuming office, undertook this legislation. The subject was complicated and various committees investigated it. The question of compensation became a major stumbling block. Various States dealt with it in various ways. Ultimately, some States passed these zamindari abolition laws, but the courts then came into the picture and issued injunctions and the like. As you know, this was one of the major reasons for our amending our Constitution. We did that and yet again the matter was referred to the courts and progress was stopped. Probably we shall get over the particular hurdle also.² We do not know what other difficulties and hurdles we may still have to overcome.

3. This exasperating slowness in a matter of high urgency and importance makes one think furiously. It is obvious that this pace is much too slow and we shall be caught up by other events and developments, if we do not move faster. It has often been said that agrarian reform is the most important question in Asia today. We realized that long ago and even took steps to that end. But the Constitution and rules we have framed have made it difficult for us to increase the pace of progress.

4. The Hindu Code Bill has been pending for four or five years, apart from the long investigations that preceded this. It has come up for debate repeatedly before Parliament and interminable speeches have been delivered. It was obviously a controversial measure and it was not our desire to suppress debate or even to treat this as a strictly Party measure necessitating a whip. The result has been that after every effort, we have failed thus far to get even a part of it through. In our attempt to get something done during this session, we decided to take up Part II of the Bill only, that is marriage and divorce. Even that has been hung up and, with the utmost reluctance, we have had to postpone its consideration, because there simply was no time for it during this session.³ I have no doubt that a considerable majority in Parliament desired

2. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the validity of the zamindari abolition acts was challenged in the courts by the zamindars and the process of abolition delayed. An amendment to the Constitution placed the zamindari acts beyond the purview of the courts.

3. It was postponed on 26 September 1951.

the passage of this Bill with major alterations. But that majority was helpless before a determined minority and we had to confess defeat for the moment at least.

5. I do not think, however, that all this time on the Hindu Code Bill has been wasted. It has kept this important subject before the public and made people think about it. It had made it one of the major issues in India and I have little doubt that it will have to be taken up and passed sometime or other. For my part, I am convinced that progress in India must be on all fronts—political, economic and social. Unless this happens, we shall get held up. Some people think that we should keep the social aspect apart and concentrate on the political and economic. There can be no such division. Our social organization has shown both virtues and vices in the past. It has displayed an amazing cohesion and continuity. It has also progressively weakened the political and economic set-up, apart from other consequences in the social domain. Whatever its virtues might have been in the past, it is clear that major changes are required in the present. The Hindu Code Bill represents an attempt to bring about some changes without shaking up too much the social organization. The Bill, as drafted, was not perfect and no doubt could be changed. But the essential principles underlying it were important and could not be given up. The struggle to achieve these changes will have to continue.

6. As I write this letter, the Press Bill is being hotly argued in Parliament.⁴ There has been a fierce attack upon it in the press and much misrepresentation has been indulged in.⁵ It is stated that the Prime Minister and the Home Minister have broken the assurances they gave.⁶ This is completely untrue. Many of us, and I am of that number, are most reluctant to pass legislation limiting the freedom of the press or of expression. But it seems clear to me, and indeed it is generally recognized, that something should be done to clarify the present position in regard to the press. This present position is chaotic. It is also generally admitted that some sections of the press are being used for purposes which are most injurious from various points of view. They preach

4. The Press Bill introduced in Parliament on 31 August 1951 was passed on 7 October and received the President's assent on 23 October.
5. On 24 June 1951, the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference resolved to suspend the publication of newspapers on 12 July as a protest. It urged on the electorate to demand from every candidate standing for election to Parliament and State Legislatures a pledge to work for the repeal of the amendment. Certain sections of the press and some members of Parliament charged that the Press Bill restricted the freedom of the press and feared that the clause defining objectionable matter would be utilized to punish innocent people.
6. On 3 October 1951, several members of the opposition in Parliament charged that the Home Minister and the Prime Minister had gone back on the assurance given during the discussion on the Constitution Amendment Bill that all clauses in the Press Emergency Act which were criticized in the newspapers would be removed from the new Bill.

rank communalism and inflame people's minds and passions. Their moral standards are terribly low and often the purpose of some of these disreputable journals is just pure blackmail. Something has to be done about this.

7. The chief objection to the press laws in the past was that they armed the executive with excessive powers and that executive was an irresponsible one then. Today the executives are popular and responsible; even so, the Press Bill does not give the executive any final power to take action. The decision has to be by judicial process. This itself is a tremendous change from the old press laws. The question in debate, therefore, should be a very limited one as to how far we should go in defining what should not be done. I think you will find that these definitions have been strictly limited and it is not fair to say that the Government wants to interfere with the freedom of the press or with any kind of legitimate criticism. There is always a risk of a wrong step being taken, however good the law. There is also a more obvious risk of our public life being poisoned by a certain section of depraved journalism. Anyone can bring out a newspaper; any monied person can use the press for his own personal advantage.

8. It must be remembered that the press today is something different from what it was even a generation ago. Mechanical devices have made it easy to produce newspapers and periodicals on a large scale. Only money is required. There is no other standard of capacity or moral behaviour. No one suggests that the more dangerous weapons of war should be given freely to anybody who wants them or who can even pay for them. A press which is allowed to sink below a certain standard of behaviour might be more dangerous than any weapon of war, even the atom bomb, in degrading society and indeed in pulling down the standards of even the higher newspapers. Having said this, I should also like to say that when we try to control the press, we enter upon dangerous ground and great care has to be taken not to misuse any power that might be given.

9. I cannot even now say how long our present session of Parliament will last. We had hoped that it would end by the 6th October. But that seems almost impossible now. Apart from the Press Bill, we have the highly important Industries Bill⁷ and then we have to consider the Planning Commission's report and certain Delimitation Orders. We shall have to continue the session till the

7. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Bill passed by Parliament on 12 October 1951 received the President's assent on 31 October 1951. The Bill encompassing 37 basic industries envisaged setting up of development councils to deal with the problems of production and social responsibility of these industries, and a central advisory council to advise the Government on issues relating to the exercise of control over their management.

11th of October or a day or two more.⁸ There will, of course, be holidays in between because of *Dussehra*.

10. There will have to be another session of Parliament after the elections. This will be necessary for certain appropriation Bills. That session may consider other matters also, but it is doubtful if any major piece of legislation can be considered or passed by it, because elections will have taken place by then and this Parliament will be a dying one.

11. You must have followed with interest the proceedings taken by Parliament in what is called the Mudgal case.⁹

Parliament viewed the conduct of Mr. Mudgal with extreme disfavour.¹⁰ There has been a tendency in the past not only in Parliament but probably in the State Legislatures also, not to keep up to proper standards of behaviour. The Mudgal case is an example and a warning and there must be no laxity shown when any such matter arises. If once the reputation of our Legislatures goes down, then democracy itself will be in peril. Therefore, the reputation of these legislatures, as also of our services, must be strictly guarded and any misbehaviour should lead to inquiry and action.

12. While we have been carrying on debates and arguments in Parliament, an event of high significance has been taking place in Madhya Pradesh.¹¹ This is the walking tour of Acharya Vinoba Bhave. I am sure that this tour of his will yield as rich results as his tour of the Telengana area in Hyderabad.

13 We had hoped and believed, for the wish was father to the thought, that this year's monsoon will be a good one after so many failures in the past. I am exceedingly sorry to say that our hopes have not been fulfilled and in many areas of India there has not been enough rain and the situation is serious. It is not serious in the sense of lack of food immediately, for we have imported

8. The session ended on 16 October 1951.

9. On 8 June 1951, a special committee of Parliament concluded that H.G. Mudgal had abused his position as a member of Parliament by promoting the interests of several business firms of Bombay and in his oral and written communications to the Prime Minister had concealed his connection with the Bombay Bullion Association. The committee held that his conduct was derogatory to the dignity of the House and recommended his suspension from Parliament.

10. Accepting the committee's findings on 24 September, Nehru moved a resolution for Mudgal's expulsion from Parliament. But before the resolution could be passed, Mudgal tendered his resignation protesting that members were "not free" to express their views on the subject. On 25 September, the House passed an amended resolution, stating that Mudgal deserved expulsion from the House and that the terms of his letter of resignation constituted a contempt of the House.

11. Between 14 September and 13 November 1951, Vinoba Bhave covered a distance of 800 miles from Wardha to Delhi and *en route* received 21,000 acres of land as donation for distribution among the landless.

large quantities of foodgrains. It is serious for the future because we cannot continue for long with this enormous gap in our own production and consumption. In particular, there has been a lack of rice. I think that we must try again, and to the utmost of our capacity, to vary our food habits and get people accustomed to eating other foods than those to which they have been normally accustomed.

14. In Assam, there have been heavy floods again and that unfortunate province is faced by this new calamity. In large parts of Bombay and Saurashtra, famine is dreaded; in Uttar Pradesh, heavy loss has been caused. In some other parts of the country also, there has been this lack of rain and altogether the situation is a depressing one. In this connection, it seems to me that the State Governments should investigate modern methods for encouraging rainfall. This is not difficult, provided the clouds are there. If rain-clouds are not present, then, of course, it is exceedingly difficult and almost impossible. But I am told that if some rain-clouds are present, it is fairly easy by sprinkling them with some chemical powder from an aeroplane to induce the rain to come down. Anyhow, even the season of clouds is passing and we have to face the situation, however difficult it might be. It becomes necessary that all States in India should cooperate in this matter and such as have more should give of their abundance. Unfortunately, sometimes, there is a tendency to hold on to what one has got regardless of another's difficulty or misfortune.

15. There has been no great change in the Indo-Pakistan situation, although one does sense a lessening of tension or rather of talk of war. The fear of war has sensibly decreased on both sides. Recently, there has been a fresh outburst in Pakistan against India, no doubt because the Graham report is expected to be out soon.¹² That is the Pakistan way. There have also been despatches in the British press, sent by their correspondents in India, which suggest that the United Nations should take strong measures on the Kashmir issue. Whether these represent individual flights of imagination of the correspondents or are a concerted effort, I do not know. We do not propose to say anything at present so long as the Graham report does not come out. But I might make it perfectly clear that we do not propose to allow ourselves to be bullied by anybody and we will not permit any interference either from outside. We have gone pretty far in our desire of a peaceful settlement and to have a plebiscite in the Kashmir State. Any fair-minded person who sees what we have done will, I am sure, agree about our *bona fides* and our earnest desire for a peaceful settlement. We shall stand by that and go no further.

16. Reports from eastern Pakistan continue to be most distressing. It is true that the influx of Hindus from eastern Pakistan into India has gone down

12. It was released on 16 October 1951. See *ante*, footnote No. 6 on p. 302.

very greatly. In fact, it is hardly abnormal now. Many of those who came away have returned to their lands in East Bengal because of the difficulties of employment in India. Pressure of circumstances has sent them back, not any desire to do so. Living conditions for the minorities in East Bengal are such as to bear down upon them continuously and tend to squeeze them out.

17. There is another side to this picture also to which I have referred in a previous letter. Muslims continue to trek across the Rajasthan-Sind border from India to Pakistan. This has been a continuous process for a considerable time past and the average has worked out to about 450 a day. These people go without permits or other facilities. Why do they go? For a variety of reasons. Unemployment here and the hope of employment on the other side, fear and a general feeling of insecurity about the future. Most of the Muslims who are going in this way are of the lower middle class or the poorer classes. While we are perfectly justified in protesting against conditions in East Bengal, we must not forget that we cannot be satisfied with conditions in some parts of India, so far as Muslims are concerned. These conditions are largely the result of communal propaganda by various organizations who try to frighten Muslims in India. The large number of refugees here are often easy victims of this propaganda, because it appears to them that they will profit if the Muslims go and leave their houses and lands. It is necessary, therefore, for all our State Governments to pay particular attention to this matter and to go all out to produce a sensation of security and fair treatment to our minorities. It brings little credit to us that we cannot act up to our professions.

18. The near approach of elections has galvanized all kinds of communal parties into fierce activity. This activity seldom concerns itself with any positive proposals. It is largely a denunciation of Government and more especially of what is called the 'appeasement' policy of Government towards Muslims. This kind of thing, adorned with an abundance of vulgar abuse, sometimes goes down with the crowd. I have, therefore, taken special pains to lay stress on the dangers of this vulgar and foolish approach and the inherent poison of communalism, which, if allowed free play, would break up India. I have always found a very ready response from the people I have addressed when the full facts are placed before them. Indeed, my optimism has grown because of this warm response that I have had from vast numbers of human beings, who have attended my meetings. These numbers are colossal. In Ludhiana,¹³ the whole countryside seemed to have poured into that little town. That is particularly a Sikh area and I was happy to see vast numbers of stalwart Sikh farmers attending my meetings and lining the roadsides for miles. In Delhi also, every

13. Addressing an election meeting at Ludhiana in Punjab on 30 September 1951, Nehru called for an "all-out war" on communalism. The audience numbered about one lakh. See *ante*, pp. 90-102.

meeting I have addressed has been attended by over a hundred thousand. They have been quiet and orderly meetings, the people listening with attention, trying to understand the argument and appearing to agree with it.

19. Behind these communal bodies are the forces of every kind of social reaction. Some of the old ruling princes, deprived of their powers but having enough money, the jagirdars, the big capitalists, support these communal bodies and talk loudly of a Hindu State or a Sikh State and of ancient Hindu culture. Behind this garb of ancient culture, they hide the narrowest acquisitiveness and reaction. Essentially, these communal bodies are fascist in ideology and technique. They indulge in violence and disturbance and try to terrorize people or appeal to their lowest instincts. This has seemed to me, therefore, the major evil today and I have consequently laid great stress upon it.

20. A recent incident has attracted some notice in the press. This is the resignation of Shri Achhru Ram from the post of Custodian-General.¹⁴ Contrary to all practice and decorum, he has rushed to the press and justified himself against Government.¹⁵ In doing so, he had condemned himself. He was appointed Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, which meant that he was a trustee for the owners of that evacuee property. Instead he had functioned, according to his own saying, in the interests of those persons who are after acquiring this evacuee property. This strange reversal of roles has naturally affected his activities throughout, and Government have not viewed with favour much that he has done. Repeatedly, we drew his attention to this. Ultimately, we pointed out to him that he did not fit into this office and thereupon he resigned. The Custodian-General's position was not that of a normal judicial authority, although he exercised quasi-judicial functions. The evacuee property laws are very abnormal and affect vast numbers of people. Essentially, they are the resultant of political conditions and have to be judged from the political angle. Government have to see that they do not bear down harshly upon any of its nationals, whatever their religion. They have in fact created a great deal of apprehension in the minds of many Muslims in India. Communal organizations have taken full advantage of this situation to carry on their vicious propaganda.

21. In Kashmir State, the elections to the constituent assembly are proceeding and will probably be over in Jammu within a few days. A very large number of these elections have been unopposed and the candidates of the National Conference have got in. In some foreign papers this led to the

14. On 20 September 1951.

15. On 29 September, Achhru Ram alleged that there was great interference in the day-to-day functioning of his department by people who wielded political influence. He added that both bribery and political influence were being used to circumvent the application of the laws regarding evacuee property.

criticism that the elections were not fair and were a put-up job. Anyone who has been to Kashmir and seen things for himself, knows how untrue this allegation is. The fact of the matter is that the National Conference has become the symbol of freedom and progress to the people of the State. It has grown in power and popularity during the last two or three years and people naturally flock to it. Those who are opposed to it have not strength enough to do so in public. Only in Jammu, there has been stiff opposition and this has come from the Hindu communal elements, who very foolishly play into the hands of Pakistan, which they detest. This is a significant example of the communal approach to our problems which is prepared to cut off its head in order to spite somebody.

22. In Nepal, there have been dissensions in the Cabinet and a good deal of trouble and intrigue.¹⁶ I am rather distressed about this state of drift and uncertainty there. We do not wish to interfere in any way, and yet we cannot remain silent spectators when harm is done. Apart from our interest in the welfare of the people of Nepal, our own security is involved in this matter. We are, therefore, taking keen interest in developments there.

23. The oil dispute in Iran has, as you know, become one of the major world issues.¹⁷ We have tried our utmost to suggest a settlement by negotiation. There can be no doubt that the Iranians have suffered a great deal in the past and have smarted under many indignities. At the same time, we have felt that a settlement by compromise is obviously desirable and previous wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. We do not wish to interfere, but, where possible, we have informally given our friendly advice to the parties concerned.

24. Dr. Shahrir, ex-Prime Minister of Indonesia, has been on a visit to Delhi¹⁸ on his way back from Europe. He is an old friend who is always welcome and his visit here has given us an opportunity to discuss many problems.

25. Thakin Nu, Prime Minister of Burma, is likely to come to Delhi for consultations about the 22nd October. India and Burma were the two countries which adopted an identical policy in regard to the Japanese peace treaty. We shall discuss future steps in this matter as well as many other matters of common concern. Recent developments in China and Tibet have raised new problems for both of us. Fortunately, as you know, our relations with the

16. It was reported that the relations between the Nepali Congress and the Rana groups in the coalition Cabinet had again grown tense on the question of reforms which the Nepali Congress wished to introduce quickly.

17. In September 1951, Britain rejected the Iranian proposals for resumption of oil negotiations and the Iranian Government consequently expelled the remaining 300 British oil technicians and took over the oil industry. On 1 October, Britain, with the support of the United States, took the issue to the United Nations.

18. He came to Delhi from Karachi on 23 September 1951 on a fortnight's visit to India.

People's Government of China are good and we hope that a friendly settlement of any outstanding issues will be arrived at. I might mention that a strong cultural mission from China is coming to India towards the end of this month.¹⁹ They will be the guests of our Government and they will tour India in two parties, one consisting chiefly of scientists and the other of literary men and the like. I hope that if they visit your State, you will give them a warm welcome.

26. We have had a new addition to our Cabinet. Shri Gulzari Lal Nanda, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, has now become a Cabinet Minister at the Centre.²⁰ He continues his association with the Planning Commission. An existing member of the Cabinet, Dr. Ambedkar has however intimated his desire to resign at the conclusion of this session because of ill-health.

27. A recent letter received by me from the Chief Minister of Saurashtra²¹ gives a very encouraging account of the revolutionary changes in land that have been brought about there in recent months. In Saurashtra there was feudalism in the land. All traces of feudalism so far as agriculture is concerned have been completely eliminated. This has been done largely by consent. Further steps are being taken now in regard to non-agricultural lands and debt redemption and the prevention of fragmentation of holding. Only recently every inch of land in Saurashtra was under a feudal lord; all this has ended now.²² I wish that in other States progress had been as good. In Jammu and Kashmir State, of course, as I have told you previously, there has also been a rapid and revolutionary change in the land system.²³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

19. The mission led by Ting Si-lin reached Calcutta on 28 October 1951.

20. On 15 September 1951.

21. U.N. Dhebar (1905-1977); Chief Minister of Saurashtra, 1948-54; President of the Congress, 1957-59.

22. Following the recommendations of the Agrarian Reforms Commission of 1950, the Saurashtra Government passed three acts between September 1951 and February 1952 abolishing the system of intermediaries. Direct relations between the cultivators and the State were encouraged and the cultivators offered protection and fixed rents.

23. By the legislation enacted on 22 October 1951, all land holdings in excess of 125 acres were confiscated for distribution among the tillers of the land to whom the proprietary rights not exceeding the limit of 20 acres per head were given. A resolution was also passed in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 31 March 1952 providing for the confiscation of large estates without payment of any compensation.

XI¹

New Delhi
21 October, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

The writing of this letter has been delayed and it is going to be a brief one. You will appreciate, I am sure, the reasons for this delay. The Congress session is just over² and you will have received both my presidential address³ there and the resolutions that we passed.

2. There are only three important resolutions, those dealing with foreign policy,⁴ with anti-social and disruptive tendencies⁵ and with the economic programme.⁶ These three resolutions give a certain definiteness to the Congress outlook and programme today, which is also the government's programme. The Congress session and what has gone before has helped to clear our thinking in India and there can be no doubt as to what the Congress stands for.

3. The outstanding event in the last few days has been the assassination of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan.⁷ This tragic event evoked an immediate and widespread response in India, and for the moment our controversies were forgotten. In Delhi, apart from feeling references on several occasions, a great public meeting was held⁸ which was attended by the President and presided over by Shri Rajagopalachari. I am sure that this big-hearted reaction in India must have produced good results in Pakistan.

4. It is a little early perhaps to judge of the consequences of this assassination. The act itself need have no great significance, as it was probably that of an individual. There is no reason to think that there were others behind that individual. Nevertheless, the consequences of the act are bound to be far-reaching. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan played a dominant role in Pakistan and his

1. File No. 25(6)/51, PMS.

2. On 19 October 1951.

3. See *ante*, pp. 210-222.

4. See *ante*, pp. 597-598.

5. It reaffirmed the party's faith in the establishment of a secular State and condemned casteism and communalism as contrary to the true spirit of religion and the cultural tradition of India. The resolution reaffirmed that equality of rights and opportunities to every citizen irrespective of caste, creed or religion was the bedrock of India's policies. See *ante*, p. 207.

6. The resolution welcomed the aims and objectives as laid down in the preamble of the first five-year plan. It stressed the need for self-sufficiency in food, underlined the importance of industrial development for creating opportunities for employment, and laid emphasis on the progressive extension of the public sector in industries, cooperative farming, encouragement of cottage industries and an equitable distribution of wealth. See *ante*, pp. 422-425.

7. He was assassinated in Rawalpindi on 16 October 1951. See *ante*, p. 363.

8. On 17 October 1951.

removal makes a difference. The new Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, is a temperate and moderate person and his appointment, therefore, should be welcomed from this point of view. But there have been many currents below the surface in Pakistan and the sudden removal of the man who had more or less kept them in check might lead to these currents coming out on the surface.

5. There has been a good deal of trouble in the Frontier Province and the tribal areas.⁹ Indeed, it is probable that internal conditions in the Frontier Province and these areas are more of a headache to Pakistan than even the Kashmir situation. So far as the latter is concerned, there has also been a good deal of internal conflict in the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' areas between the two leaders, Ghulam Abbas and Ibrahim.¹⁰

6. It is reported that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan went to the Frontier Province to deal personally with this difficult situation. One of the objects of his visit was to settle the differences of Ghulam Abbas and Ibrahim. He never met them because he was shot and killed a little before the appointed hour of meeting.

7. The conspiracy trial against a number of high officers in the Pakistan army, which has been going on for some time, has also been a disturbing factor in Pakistan, more especially in the army.

8. Dr Graham has just presented his report.¹¹ It is going to be considered by the Security Council in Paris by the end of this month.¹² Presumably, Dr Graham's request will be agreed to and he will get another six weeks to carry on as a mediator. We shall probably have to send some people to Paris when this matter is taken up. As you will have noticed, Dr Graham confined himself during his discussions here and in his report to what is called "demilitarization". He did not touch other issues. On this object some progress was made and we went a good way to come to some agreement on this narrow issue of withdrawal of armed forces. Indeed, we went to the farthest limit consistent with safety. Even so, the gap between the position of Pakistan and that of

9. Tension was reported on 4 October in Ting state situated between Kashmir and Afghanistan following the state's forcible annexation by Pakistan. There was also large-scale migration from Chitral to Afghanistan. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan declared support to the people fighting for Pakhtoonistan in the frontier areas.

10. Rivalry between Ghulam Abbas, the head of the 'Azad Kashmir' Government, and Sardar Ibrahim, his predecessor, led to the latter planning to form a parallel government.

11. Graham had suggested simultaneous demilitarization but India was prepared to do so only after Pakistan had withdrawn.

12. On 10 November 1951, the Security Council adopted a joint Anglo-American resolution instructing Graham to continue his efforts to obtain the agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of Kashmir and to report to the Council within six weeks.

ours is still difficult to bridge. If it is bridged, which is unlikely, then other important questions arise. It would thus be seen that even an acceptance of Dr Graham's proposals by both Governments does not by itself end the dispute.

9. Meanwhile, the elections to the constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State have been concluded¹³ and the assembly will meet by the end of this month.¹⁴ It will thus overlap somewhat with the Security Council. These assembly elections have been criticized because a very large number of them were unopposed.¹⁵ As a matter of fact, the position of the National Conference was so strong that it could not be successfully challenged. Where it was challenged, the opponent of the National Conference had his security forfeited. The coming of the constituent assembly immediately introduces a dynamic factor in the Kashmir situation.

10. The situation in the Middle Eastern countries has become explosive. The Iran oil dispute has led to no final result yet, but it is clear that the U.K. has suffered great loss and prestige. Indeed, we see now the collapse of the British power in the Middle East. I must say that British policy there has been singularly inept, both in the past and the present. It has not taken into account the tremendous forces of the new nationalism in these Middle Eastern countries. All this represents another shift in the balance of power.

11. Shri Panikkar has just arrived in Delhi¹⁶ for consultation and we shall take full advantage of this visit. It is important that we should know what the new China is and in what direction it is going. It seems clear that the People's Government of China has strengthened and consolidated itself and is a very popular one. For the first time, China possesses a strong Central Government whose decrees run even to Sinkiang and Tibet. Our own relations with China are definitely friendly. China's cultural mission will be coming to India soon and will spend about six weeks here.

12. Thakin Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, has come to Delhi for consultations.¹⁷ We welcome his visit as we attach importance to our friendly relations with Burma.

13. Parliament is at last over. The session ended on the 16th of this month.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. On 15 October 1951.

14. On 31 October 1951.

15. From 73 out of 75 constituencies, the National Conference candidates were returned unopposed; the remaining two were returned by defeating independent candidates.

16. On 16 October 1951.

17. He was in Delhi from 21 to 30 October 1951. He described his visit as undertaken primarily to strengthen the Indo-Burmese treaty of friendship.

XII¹

New Delhi
October 31, 1951

My dear Chief Minister,

A question has arisen as to whether Speakers of Legislative Assemblies should stand as party candidates or as independents. Some of the Speakers are of opinion that they should stand as independents and should not be opposed. There can be of course no guarantee that there will be no opposition.

We have given careful consideration to this matter and we are clearly of opinion that Speakers should stand for election like other candidates, either as party candidates or as independents, who are liable to be opposed. Any other course is full of difficulties and would mean that if a person is chosen as Speaker once, he should continue as such for the rest of his life.

I want to make this clear so that there might be no misapprehension and I should like you to inform your Speaker of this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11

MISCELLANEOUS

I. Cases of Corruption

1. The Mudgal Case¹

The House will remember that in the month of June, this year, I brought forward a motion in regard to certain allegations about the conduct of a Member.² Such a matter is always rather distasteful. But, when certain information was brought before me as Prime Minister, I gave careful thought to it and I proceeded to draw the attention of the honourable Speaker to that information. On his advice, I moved the House in this matter so that a Committee of Inquiry may be appointed. It is obvious that the House could not possibly go into any details of inquiry, and it was necessary that no step should be taken without an inquiry, without the fullest opportunity being given to the honourable Member to explain his viewpoint or his activities. So, the normal course was taken of appointing such a Committee of Inquiry if some kind of *prima facie* case was established. The House was good enough then to appoint this Committee of Inquiry.³ This Committee has laboured during these months, and as honourable Members are aware, has produced a report which itself shows how much trouble they have taken over this matter, and how carefully they have gone into every allegation, the evidence they have taken and the opportunities given to the honourable Member concerned, namely Mr Mudgal.⁴

That report with all the evidence and other papers connected therewith have been distributed to the Members of the House. I do not therefore propose to go deeply into the evidence in this case. Indeed, I do not think it is normally possible for this House in a sense to convert itself into a court and consider in detail the evidence in the case and then come to a decision. Of course, the House is entitled to do so; but it is normally not done; nor is it considered the proper procedure. Therefore, the House appointed a Committee of Members

1. Speech in Parliament, 24 September 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1951, Vol. XVI, Part II, columns 3194-3202, 3238-3239, 3241-3242 and 3255-3256. Extracts.
2. On 6 June 1951, Nehru moved a motion in Parliament that a five-member committee of the House be set up to investigate the conduct of H.G. Mudgal, a Member of Parliament, and consider whether it was derogatory to the dignity of the House. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Part I, pp. 257-260.
3. The Committee of Inquiry consisted of T.T. Krishnamachari (chairman), K.T. Shah, Syed Nausher Ali, Durgabai Deshmukh and Kashinatharao Vaidya.
4. Mudgal was charged with the abuse of his position as a Member of Parliament by promoting the interests of the Bombay Bullion Association. He had tabled questions in Parliament and in return for receipt of money requested the Finance Minister to grant an interview to the spokesmen of the Association.

with experience who could consider the matter and report to the House; and then it considers the report of that Committee. We have now the report of this Committee before us and the conclusion that Committee has arrived at is entirely unfavourable to the Member of the House whose conduct has been inquired into.

Now, while I do not propose to go deeply into the evidence of other factors, I would like to draw the attention of the House to some parts of the Committee's report and some parts of the evidence. The Committee's report ends up, as I have said, with the following finding:

The finding of the Committee is that Shri Mudgal's conduct is derogatory to the dignity of the House and inconsistent with the standards which Parliament is entitled to expect from its Members.

Previous to this, honourable Members will observe that on page 28 of this little book containing the report of the Committee, there are the conclusions of the Committee...⁵

...When this matter was first brought to my notice, I was disturbed by certain facts. I did not then know how far they were true or not true. The House would perhaps remember that I asked Mr Mudgal to see me. I wrote to him and he replied to me in writing. I had talked to him; I had letters from him. He denied a number of charges that had been brought against him by others and in other documents. Nevertheless, there appeared to me, and there appeared to the honourable Speaker when I consulted him, sufficient reason for an inquiry into this matter.

Since this inquiry has taken place, a large number of additional facts have been brought out. Among these facts are the 'Mudgal Publications', or if you like, his organisation. The House will notice what the Committee has said, how they have found it difficult to distinguish between the two, and how they have received money from various sources...⁶

This and many additional facts came to light during the course of the investigation. I would only draw the attention of the House to para 27⁷...

5. Nehru read out the relevant extracts of the report of the Committee which established that Mudgal had in his oral and written communications to the Prime Minister misrepresented the facts about his connection with the Bombay Bullion Association.
6. Nehru quoted an extract of the report which mentioned that Mudgal had received a loan of Rs.12,500 from L.N. Birla and Rs.13,000 from the U.S. Information Service in return for publicity.
7. This paragraph in the report stated that Mudgal after being elected a Member of Parliament claimed to be the spokesman of 200 business firms and offered his services to the business community.

Then in the next paragraph towards the end there is reference to the evidence of Mr Lalwaney⁸ and to the contacts which Shri Mudgal and Shri Lalwaney had with each other. They are rather complicated—these contacts—and I am not for the moment referring to Mr Lalwaney; but they do not bring any credit to Mr Mudgal. I may mention here that a few days ago I received a communication from Mr Lalwaney—a long communication—which is in answer to the last letter⁹ that Mr Mudgal wrote to me which is included in this present report at the end, and which really was received after the inquiry was over. Mr Lalwaney challenges many things as given in the last letter of Mr Mudgal. But I do not propose to deal with that letter because it is not before the House, nor is it necessary...

In paragraph 28 of the report there is reference to this document....¹⁰

Another rather interesting and significant fact is that Mr Mudgal gave a testimonial to Mr Lalwaney. This testimonial which is printed on pages 15 and 16 of the report, was given after the inquiry had been instituted and before Mr. Lalwaney had given evidence. Obviously it had something to do with the evidence that was to come, and one has to draw the inference that this was an attempt to influence that evidence. I will not read out that testimonial, but it is a rather extraordinary document, given just before the person gives his evidence.

A still more extraordinary document is given at pages 19-20 of the report. This is a letter dated the 18th March, 1951, from Mr Mudgal to Mr Lalwaney....¹¹

It will be noticed that the first paragraph is rather remarkable. It makes a claim from the "Bullionites" as they are called, and they are assured that if they pay up the sum demanded, they stand to win Rs. 25,000 in one day—each of the directors. It is rather a difficult matter for Parliament or indeed

8. K.G. Lalwaney, an assistant editor in Mudgal's publishing company.
9. In this letter Mudgal had stated that in the course of his professional work as a publisher and editor of commercial journals he and his staff had helped the Bombay Bullion Association by preparing and presenting a pamphlet and a memorandum for submission to the Government. He contended that the payment was for these professional services and there was nothing wrong in it.
10. Paragraph 28 referred to the conflicting evidence as to the exact amount proposed for the publicity work. Lalwaney deposed that Rs. 25,000 was suggested by Mudgal. Mudgal, on the other hand, mentioned that Lalwaney had given him to understand that the Bullion Association was willing to spend any amount between Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 50,000.
11. In this letter, Mudgal had asked Lalwaney to persuade the Bullion Association to pay Rs. 7,000 for the drafting of a memorandum, arrangements for delegation and other parliamentary contacts. "If half of what they want is accomplished the directors alone will earn an extra Rs. 25,000 in one day... Anyhow get as much as you can from them. I'll try to get an appointment for them with Deshmukh also."

for any public work to be carried on if there are chances of large sums of money like this being dangled before them or before any high Government official. Therefore, whenever we have any dealings in any matter concerning such sums of money, any governmental agency, and very much more so of course, Parliament, has to be exceedingly careful. And in this case there could be no doubt whatever that, whatever the result of it may be, large sums were talked about, were claimed and were asked for and to some extent paid.

So, as a result of the facts fully stated in this respect, the Committee came to the conclusion which I have already placed before the House....

In addition to the joint report of the Committee there are separate notes by some members of the Committee. These notes really refer not to this particular case so much but rather suggest the grounds for Parliament for making rules or conventions for future guidance. Their suggestion is that a Committee might be appointed by Parliament, not by this Parliament, to go into this question. I entirely agree that we should have certain general rules for the guidance of Members of Parliament. I am not quite clear as to how far it is possible or desirable to be exceedingly specific in regard to it. Anyhow that is a matter for the consideration of Parliament or the Committee to be appointed by Parliament. But it is most important and it should be clearly understood that Parliament is bent on maintaining the highest standards for its Members.

In these separate notes of Shrimati Durgabai, Prof. Shah and Shri Vaidya,¹² some indication is given of the kind of things which are supposed to be improper for a Member of Parliament and with much that is said there personally I am in full agreement. Probably the matter has been put in one sentence by Syed Nausher Ali¹³ in his note, where he says:

No representative of the people, far less a Member of Parliament, should utilise his position as a representative for the furtherance of his personal ends.

I think, generally speaking, that is a good rule but of course in interpreting it there is much scope, may be sometimes, for difference of opinion. Therefore, it is desirable not only to have this broad rule but other indications also.

In the joint note of Prof. Shah and Shri Vaidya they have pointed out that the acceptance of any monetary consideration, even for professional services connected with Parliament, would be highly undesirable for a Member of Parliament.

12. Kashinatharao Vaidya.

13. Syed Nausher Ali (1891-1972); member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1929-36 and of Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937-46; Minister for Public Health and Local Self-Government, Bengal, 1937-38; Speaker, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1943-46; member, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52; member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-56 and 1962-68.

So personally I agree with the suggestion made by some of the members of the Committee that this general matter might be inquired into in the future....

We are dealing with the conduct of a Member of this House but of course, as I said, indirectly, it involves other people outside who seek to profit by this kind of business and sometime or other this House will have to consider how they can check these other activities in so far as it is possible.

In our Constitution no particular course is laid down in regard to such matters. If we refer to clause (3) of Article 105 it refers us back to the practice in the British House of Commons....

Apart from that, even if the Constitution had made no reference to this, this House as a sovereign Parliament must have inherently the right to deal with its own problems as it chooses and I cannot imagine anybody doubting that fact. This particular Article throws you back for guidance to the practice in the British House of Commons of the Parliament in the U.K. has been and is. There is no doubt as to what the practice in the House of Commons is. Cases have occurred from time to time there, when the House of Commons has appointed a committee and taken action....

So there is no doubt that this House is entitled inherently and also if reference be made to the terms of Article 105 to take such steps according to the British practice and expel such a Member from the House.

The question arises whether in the present case this should be done or something else. I do submit that it is perfectly clear that this case is not even a case which might be called a marginal case, where people may have two opinions about it, where one may have doubts if a certain course suggested is much too severe. The case, if I may say so, is as bad as it could well be. If we consider even such a case as a marginal case or as one where perhaps a certain amount of laxity might be shown, I think it will be unfortunate from a variety of points of view, more especially because, this being the first case of its kind coming up before the House, if the House does not express its will in such matters in clear, unambiguous and forceful terms, then doubts may very well arise in the public mind as to whether the House is very definite about such matters or not. Therefore, I do submit that it has become a duty for us and an obligation to be clear, precise and the decision should also be clear and definite. The facts are clear and precise and that decision should also be clear and precise and unambiguous. And I submit that the decision of the House should be, after accepting the finding of this report, to resolve that the Member should be expelled from the House...¹⁴

14. Here Nehru moved the resolution.

...I have listened with patience to the honourable Member or who used to be a Member, or who is a Member, I do not know.¹⁵ We have listened to him in patience because we wanted to give him a chance. He cast reflections on this House, on Members of this House, on the Committee, on the Speaker—he cast most fantastic reflections. And then he tried to circumvent the inevitable result that is going to flow by writing his resignation on a piece of paper as he was going out, and even in that resignation he made further charges and further libellous statements. It is a most extraordinary state of affairs that a man who is a Member should be allowed to get away in this manner. I do feel, Sir, that even expulsion cannot be enough for the honourable Member and it is for this House to consider what further and additional punishment we should give to him, because he has tried to circumvent that by the step he has taken.

In any event one thing is dead clear to me what you yourself said—that this proceeding goes on. Whether he is a Member or not, this House is considering what to do with him. Whether to punish him or not and, if so, what punishment to give, goes on. It may be that because of the step that he has taken some variation might have to be made in the motion I placed before you. It is a possibility that has to be considered. But to have all the proceedings and all the labour of the proceedings and all the labour of the House simply ended and circumvented by the step that he took seems to me to confess that this House is powerless to deal with misdemeanours and grave injuries to it. Therefore, these proceedings must go on, while you think and decide upon the other aspect of it as to when his resignation takes place. That is for you to decide. But these proceedings go on and this House has to come to a conclusion about his previous action as a Member and how he should be dealt with whether as a Member or as a non-Member.

15. While Parliament was discussing the report of the Committee, Mudgal left the House after handing over his letter of resignation to the Deputy Speaker in language which constituted a contempt of the House. He had stated: "Why should a Committee appointed to safeguard the dignity of this House produce such a prejudiced and unrelated-to-fact-and-truth report?"

2. Corruption in the Punjab¹

For a considerable time past, numerous charges have been made against the ex-Ministers of the Punjab Government and enquiries have been demanded.² The Punjab newspapers have supported this demand. This matter has been fully considered by us and the Punjab Governor has also been consulted.

At the public meeting at Ludhiana recently, I referred to these charges and said that it was not possible or proper for us to hold roving and general inquiries into an administration.³ Therefore, we did not propose to have any such inquiry. But whenever any specific case of alleged corruption was brought to our notice and *prima facie* there appeared some substance in it, it was Government's duty to have further investigation, whoever the person concerned might be. If, therefore, any such specific case of corruption was brought to our notice and we felt that it was worthy of further investigation, we would have such a private investigation made. The result of this investigation would then be considered by us. If the data obtained was such as to warrant further steps to be taken, we would take such steps.

We should now follow this line of action. We have received specific complaints against Sardar Ishwar Singh Majail⁴ and Shri Prithvi Singh Azad,⁵ two ex-Ministers of the Punjab Government. A secret inquiry by our Intelligence should be conducted and the reports placed before us. It must be clearly understood that this is to be done by Central Intelligence and not by the Punjab police. Although this investigation is meant to be secret, the fact that some such investigation is taking place is bound to leak out. That cannot be helped and should not deter us from carrying out the investigation.

1. Note to H.V.R. Iengar, Home Secretary, 4 October 1951. J.N. Collection.
2. Some former Ministers of Punjab had been charged with acquisition, through illegal means, of large areas of farm land which belonged to the State either by virtue of its being the property of persons who had migrated to Pakistan or because of its being non-cultivable or uneconomic.
3. See *ante*, pp. 90-102.
4. Akali leader with Congress association; imprisoned during freedom struggle, 1929, 1931-32, 1938-39 and 1942; editor of *Akali Patrika*, *Vartman*, *Inquilab* and *Sher-i-Bharat*; minister, Government of the Punjab, 1948.
5. Congress leader of the Punjab; Joint Secretary, Punjab Harijan Sewak Sangh, 1939-47; General Secretary, Bharatiya Depressed Classes League, 1938-48 and its President, 1949-52 and 1966; member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-48; member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1946-52 and 1967-77; Minister, 1947-52; member, Legislative Council, 1958-64.

Two persons have been named above. If any other specific instance of corruption is discovered in the course of the investigation, that should also be investigated. One person against whom there have been many charges for a number of years, though I do not know of any specific one, is Seth Sudarshan⁶. If any facts are found relating to him, these should also be investigated.

I want to make it clear that no vague and general inquiry is meant. Only specific charges which appear to have some basis should be inquired into.

It is desirable that the person inquiring into these charges should first see the Governor of the Punjab.

6. A Congressman from Punjab; elected to Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937.

11

MISCELLANEOUS

II. Concerning V.K. Krishna Menon

1. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi

July 19, 1951

My dear Deshmukh,

... A difficulty about the London mission, as you know, is the High Commissioner and his methods of doing work. He works himself nearly to death and tries to deal with almost everything himself. Of all our Ambassadors and High Commissioners abroad, if I may say so in confidence, there are only four persons who are first-rate in their different ways and who have achieved substantial results. These four are Krishna Menon, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Panikkar and Radhakrishnan. They are all different types. But they have political flair of a high order and an understanding of events. They are also good at contacts. In some ways Krishna Menon is a person of remarkable ability and capacity. From the purely intellectual point of view, I cannot remember having met any person with a keener intellect. He is a man of high integrity and his whole life has been one of simplicity and sacrifice.

So much for his good points. At the same time he has a number of serious failings. He is not an easy person to get on with; he is highly sensitive, somewhat self-opinionated, and tries to do everything himself which no head of mission should do. His capacity for work is remarkable, but even so he overshoots the mark. His physical ill-health is continually coming in his way and he lives on tonics and the like.

A man like this is a problem and difficulties continually crop up. One has to balance his extraordinary capacity for good work with failings. During these last four years or so, his record of achievement has been very considerable. But his health is failing and I have been trying to induce him to go away from work somewhere for at least some months, but without success thus far....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Extracts.

2. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
July 25, 1951

My dear Krishna,

...You complain of being harassed by petty and big things. Of course you are harassed and I am harassed and all of us are harassed. But I feel that a good part of the harassment is perhaps due to your own reactions which are sudden and sometimes strong.

You advise me on various matters and I consider your advice very valuable. But you seem to think that I function here as an autocrat and that you should also function there in London in a similar capacity. It is difficult, even if it was right, to function in that way. Certainly it is not possible for me with Parliament and all kinds of persons continually nagging at me and trying to find fault with me. If you read the Indian newspapers carefully, you will find the kind of things I have to put up with. Even then you would only get a very small part of the picture.

I have written to you about your telegrams to me, which are almost always "strictly personal."² Sometimes these telegrams are in answer to some enquiry from me. I am asked by my colleagues in the Cabinet what you have said in reply. Your reply is often such that I cannot place it before them and I am put in a difficulty. Therefore I have suggested that you should confine your personal telegrams to particular messages in addition to the main telegram. I cannot and should not take major decisions without reference to my colleagues. The impression gets abroad that you hold them and most people here in contempt or consider them as completely misguided and unable to understand a situation. That may or may not be so, but does not help at all. We have to work with such material as we have got, including the services.

You refer in one of your letters to my trust and confidence. Of course you have got that as well as my affection. But that does not necessarily mean that your judgment of what is happening in India or what can be done here is right. After all we have to carry people here and the mere rightness of an opinion is not enough. Sometimes your approach makes it difficult for me to carry people here, even when I agree with your views. I think that often you do injustice to yourself and needlessly add to your own difficulties and others' difficulties.

I have written to you repeatedly that you should take leave and cut yourself off from work completely for some months. I meant it even though I knew

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. Extracts.

2. In his cable dated 22 July 1951, in which he had commented on the work of officers who had gone from India, Krishna Menon had requested Nehru to treat the cable as "strictly personal".

that this kind of physical rest may be extremely distasteful to you. I am glad that you are better as a result of your treatment. Nevertheless, I still hold to the opinion that it will be good for you to get away. I am gradually coming near a conclusion that I should do something of this kind. But about you, I am quite sure. I said in a letter to you that your staying on is neither fair to you nor to your work and you have asked me what I mean by this. I meant first of all that a person who is in ill-health and often in a highly nervous condition cannot give his best to the work and his nervousness comes to others. It is true that even so your work is much more valuable than anyone else's can be. But you do not give yourself a chance and it may lessen in value later. I also think that it is good for any set-up not to revolve completely round an individual. It must be capable of functioning for some time at least by itself without that individual. The bigger the organisation, the more this applies. There is a virtue in a one-man show, but there are grave disadvantages also. You do not like people telling you that you take too much upon yourself and do not allow others to assume responsibility. Yet that is a universal impression. Sometimes your letters and telegrams seem to indicate that you would like me to function in that way. I am sorry I can't, even physically, and I do not like doing so. Much therefore is done without reference to me or by subsequent reference. It may be it goes wrong. I take the risk. I am sure that it would be better for India House if you allowed others to function with responsibility and without reference to you within their particular fields. Of course you would be the boss and can call up any matter and generally keep an eye on everything. If things cannot function unless you yourself do practically everything, then the arrangement is wrong and things must get held up when you are away or unwell or even when you are well. You refer very often to the terrible hard work done by you as well as by many others in India House. I am sure this is so. But I often wonder how far this is due to the faulty organisation and to a lack of spreading out responsibilities. There is no particular point in having senior officers if they do not have that responsibility. It must produce a sense of frustration in them and merely add to your burdens.

When I read some of your telegrams and letters, I sense high excitement, and I have a feeling that you are worked up to something. I can almost feel a temperature. That is not a good impression to give. That is undoubtedly due both to your ill-health and overwork, as well as your extreme anxiety that something should be done. But somehow it has a slightly different effect and one begins to think less of the subject you refer to and more of you.

Everyone who comes back here from London brings reports of your ill-health and nervous condition. Letters from various friends repeat this also. Whatever the truth may be, the fact of creating this impression is itself relevant. I have had reports of conversations of several British Ministers. Each one is

reported to have said that you were far too ill to work and should take rest and go away from work.

The world is a very complicated affair and not always amenable to our wishes and so repeatedly we suffer pain and disappointment. If we are sensitive, we suffer more. One has to get used to it and to react less to the good and the bad of it and to give that impression to others also. Otherwise we do not carry such conviction as we might do.

People tell me often that I am indispensable in India and all that. I recognise my worth and my importance in the context of things today. But nothing is more foolish, I think, than to consider oneself indispensable and, if one is really indispensable, then it is a bad lookout for the country. Things depend too much on that individual and the machine goes all wrong when he is not there. I am inclined to think that it would have been a very good thing for India if I had dropped out of the Prime Ministership some time ago. I could have come back probably with greater mental and physical vigour and at the same time people generally would have had a different kind of experience. There is a risk of course, but the risk has to be taken. As it is, I grow stale and the country slowly gets rather tired of me.

I have written to you frankly because I am myself facing much of the time, and more especially now, some kind of a crisis here. Because of this, I have been forced to think of all these matters.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 25, 1951

My dear Krishna,

I have not replied to your brief letter of the 3rd August, because I did not quite know what to say about it. That letter of yours was in reply to my letter of the 25th July.² You say about this that you did not expect to live to see the day when I would write to you the kind of letter as of July 25th. I wrote that letter after a great deal of anxious thought which led me to the conclusion that we knew each other well enough for me to write frankly. You would not expect me to write otherwise. I had hoped that you would not misunderstand me and that you would realise that I could only have written that letter to a

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See the preceding item.

person for whom I had great affection and respect and to whom I was closely attached. I know that parts of my letter might perhaps hurt you a little. But I had to take that risk, because I wanted you to know what I had in mind. And I felt that you would understand what I had written and not ultimately be either hurt or displeased by it. In fact, my writing to you in the way I did was itself an indication that I could speak freely to you as to an intimate friend.

You know my attachment to you, and you ought to know how I value your judgment. But surely you do not expect me not to exercise my judgment occasionally even though it might not fall in line with yours. I would not expect you to do anything of the kind to me. You have been, for a long time past, physically unwell and your ill-health increased. I was shocked to see you in London,³ when I went there in January last, and in Paris subsequently.⁴ I suggested to you to come to India for some weeks for two reasons. I wanted to discuss at some leisure many matters, both relating to our internal politics and to international affairs. Even more so, I wanted you to get out for some time at least from your normal routine of India House. I know that when I feel even slightly unwell or below par, my first desire is to get out of my routine, so that I might recover my mental peace. When you came to India, you continued to be ill and indeed could not function normally because of your ill-health. You had to be quite rightly often in bed. I could hardly talk to you for any length of time and certainly not freely as I would normally have done, because of the effect I produced on you. You went back and again had several relapses, apart from your general ill-health.

I realised well enough that your trouble was not so much of the body, though the body was affected, as of the mind and of extreme dissatisfaction with many things that you disapprove of. Whether the trouble was of the body or of the mind, it seemed to me that the right way and the only way was for you to take rest from your work for some months. Not to work might well prove a greater burden to you. Nevertheless, in such circumstances, as I wrote to you, it is not fair to you or to the work to carry on without rest for a while.

Perhaps you think, indeed you have said so sometimes, that I hear tales about you and people come to me to complain against you. I have no doubt that there are many people who would like to complain, but nobody dares to come to me or to say anything about you, because they realise that I do not like this kind of thing. All the information I had about you during these months was from persons who are our mutual friends and who have great affection for you and wish you well. Everyone of them expressed his or her alarm at your physical condition and urged me to press you to take long rest.

3. Nehru attended the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London from 4 to 12 January 1951.

4. He visited Paris from 18 to 20 January 1951.

I felt strongly that, as things are developing, we would have to face serious problems in the near future and that your health in dealing with them would be very necessary. I wanted you to be fit for them and not to break yourself over any number of relatively insignificant matters.

You have done a fine job in India House. But I have never been able to understand why it is necessary for you to deal with almost every matter yourself. You may say that I am wrong in making this remark and that anyhow if you did not do so things might go wrong. Possibly. Nevertheless, that is a clear impression that I have gathered. I feel that, in the long run, that is a bad policy. That is the opinion of everyone who has spoken to me on this subject. You yourself have told me that you check the use of cars. No doubt you save some money thereby. But for the High Commissioner to spend his time over such matters seems to me astonishing.

The other day Maulana Azad came back here. He spoke highly of your work, but he mentioned a curious incident to me. I had sent him an immediate telegram which was not delivered to him for several days, perhaps a week. When he enquired about this delay, he was told that it could not be delivered because you had to pass it and you were unwell at the time. This kind of concentration of work in oneself can hardly be good under any circumstances. Personally I cannot work in this way and I prefer other people's mistakes to my burdening myself with so many details of administration.

You have a feeling perhaps, and you have hinted at it, that I do not trust your judgment sufficiently. May I say that you show sometimes a great lack of trust in my judgment. I have to deal with the situation here and have to function according to my lights. It cannot be easy for you to understand that situation from London. You judge individuals and I would accept your judgment unhesitatingly, unless I had occasion to know them well and to form some opinion myself. You will not expect me to ignore my own experience or opinion completely.

We are living through difficult times and I never know what the next few weeks or months might bring. I do not know today whether I shall be Prime Minister a month hence or not. All kinds of things are happening which distress me. I try to take them in my usual stride and do not allow myself to get excited over them. I am not responsible for the world or even for India. If I can manage to behave with some decency and in the belief that I am acting rightly, that is about as much as I can do. For me to live on a high plane of excitement would neither help me nor others. For me to get angry with everyone who does not agree with me would also not be helpful at all.

I am writing to you today with some hesitation, because I do not know what reaction a letter of mine might produce on you. That feeling itself is not good, because that comes in the way of my free writing or talking. Besides, these letters and arguments do not help very much.

Some days ago Mathai told me that he would like to go to London to meet you and he wanted some leave for the purpose. I gladly agreed. I have told him that he can go when he likes and he need not hurry back. He can spend two or three weeks there. Perhaps he might go about the middle of next month.

I am overwhelmed with a multitude of problems. They seem to grow in number.⁵

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

5. In his reply of 24 September, Menon protested that he was not so sick and that his loyalty would bear the strain of Nehru's "cruel letters."

4. To M.O. Mathai¹

29-9-1951

My dear Mac,
You need not apologise.

I decided some months ago that Krishna must leave the High Commissionership. But I was not in a hurry and I wanted him to suggest. I came to this decision partly because of his growing unsuitability for the work in view of his ill-health but chiefly because this was in his own interest. I saw a progressive deterioration till a time might come when he would disgrace himself not only before others but before himself. That is the only real tragedy in life and the tragedy is all the greater when it comes to a man of Krishna's brilliance and integrity and self-sacrifice. Death or suicide are bad and painful but they do not wipe out the past. They just put a full stop to it. But inner degradation and disintegration are far worse and the memory of old days is largely covered up by recent unhappy memories.

So your notes and letters² have not come as a big shock to me so far as the decision is concerned. Shock there has been to find how far the process of

1. J.N. Collection.

2. Mathai, who had gone to London, wrote to Nehru that his impression, after talking to various people associated with Krishna Menon, was that Menon was very ill and should be replaced without delay.

disintegration has gone. That shows that we have delayed too long. This should have come a year ago. I felt that way last January but I temporised.

After my return from Ludhiana I shall have a talk with you.

Find out carefully how long Dharma Vira³ would normally stay in Geneva or wherever he has gone.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. Commercial Adviser to the High Commissioner for India in the U.K. at this time.

5. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1951

My dear Krishna,

I received your letter of the 24th September two weeks ago when Mathai came back from London. I have not answered it or even acknowledged it all this time because I wanted to give the fullest thought to this matter and not to arrive at any hurried decision. Indeed I have been giving thought to this question for many months.

2. You know that I have been greatly worried about your state of health. I have often spoken and written to you about it. You insist on saying that you are fit or as well as you can be. You will forgive me for not agreeing with you. I have seen you in London, in Paris, and in India so unwell that I was greatly alarmed. What troubled me greatly was not some occasional ill-health, but rather something more basic which was obviously weakening you and which was in evidence again and again. I could not imagine any person putting up with this kind of thing without taking immediate steps to undertake a complete cure. With your strong will you held yourself up and continued functioning, but it was obvious to me that this was not the right course to adopt. When I was in London last January, and later in Paris, I asked you to come to India for some considerable time. I wanted you to stay here for at least a month. This was chiefly because of my alarm at your deteriorating health and also because I wanted you for leisurely conversation and discussion about a number of matters. While you were here, you were almost continuously

1. J.N. Collection.

ill and practically in bed. In fact you told me that you had undertaken the journey almost against your doctor's advice and with the help of strong tonics and the like. It was obvious that you were trying to keep going with the assistance of some powerful tonics, which necessarily produce strong reactions afterwards.

3. Soon after your return to England, I wrote to you that you must take at least three months' complete rest, preferably in a nursing home, and put yourself under your doctor's treatment. Although I had expressed myself quite forcibly, you did not act up to it and continued to assure me that you were physically well and could carry on. I was not at all convinced by what you told me. Even your letters and telegrams bore the obvious traces of illness, if I may say so. Some time later, I wrote to you even more frankly and forcibly. My letter hurt you very much. You refer to it in your letter of the 24th September as having stung you. You know that I am the last person in the world to hurt you. I only wrote what I did because I felt compelled to do so. There are very few persons in the world for whom I have had a higher regard than you. I have affection for you, of course, but I looked upon you as something more than a friend, as an unusually gifted person with certain rare qualities which were particularly precious in the circumstances of today. For some years you had functioned with outstanding ability as our High Commissioner in London. I do not know of any other person who could have done what you have done during these years in London and done it so well, in spite of many difficulties. Our problems continue and we always suffer from lack of first-rate human material. Your health and fitness for work thus became of very special importance to me, not only personally but from the larger point of view of our country's work. More and more I felt that you must not be allowed to deteriorate physically. I became convinced that you must stop your work for some months, even though you might not like this, and have a proper treatment in a nursing home. Because of this conviction I wrote to you the letter which hurt you.

4. I was a little surprised to find that even that letter did not bring about the result I aimed at. It might be that you had slightly improved in your physical condition under your doctor's treatment. But it seemed to me that this was very partial and very temporary and a longer and more thorough-going rest and treatment were essential. A person is not well when he faints and collapses repeatedly, when he has to keep going by continuously taking powerful tonics.

5. Mathai has now given me a full and frank report. As you know, he saw your doctor also and some other intimate friends of yours. It was the doctor's firm opinion, as well as that of your other friends, that you must give up all work for a fairly considerable time and go to a nursing home. He suggested, I believe, some place in Switzerland.

6. I have been receiving similar reports from many other persons, each one of whom is devoted to you. I have even received indirectly messages from British Ministers, including Attlee, to the effect that you were ill and suggesting that you should have rest and treatment. Diplomats have spoken in the same terms. This general reaction itself has importance. Obviously, you cannot yourself be made a judge of your physical condition. If your doctor, who knows you well, gives a firm opinion, that must be accepted, more especially when that is confirmed by every other person. It is not fair in your own interest or in the interest of the work you have been doing that you should continue your work in your present condition and perhaps progressively deteriorate in health and in your capacity for work. A time is bound to come when you just cannot carry on. I am anxious that you should not be permitted to do this and that you should recover and then have many more years of responsible work before you.

7. In your letter you refer to three courses which were open to you. I am quite clear that the first course should be adopted, i.e., that you should take leave immediately. You should put yourself in the hands of your doctors in London and arrange with them for treatment in some nursing home in Switzerland or any other suitable place. Obviously, you should not have this treatment in London, because then you will be too near the scene of your activity to have mental rest.

8. I know that you feel that your being cut away from work will itself distress you and create mental unrest in you. That has to be faced and after a while you will get over it. I wish you had some experience of prison because that would have at least accustomed you to sudden cessation from normal activity and being cut off from the world.

9. I am conscious of the fact that your going away from India House for a period might well upset there. But I am prepared to take that risk. Indeed I see no alternative to it. A time may come, sooner than most people imagine, when I might be wise enough to cut myself off from my normal work for a period. I feel stale and flat, and I do not think I can do good work when I feel this way. If I was at all physically unwell, I would not hesitate for a day and would give up all work immediately till I got well.

10. You must therefore apply for leave for six months. That I think, it should be enough; it should be no less either. You must give a full chance to the doctors and to yourself to get well. It is no good playing about at this. I want you to take this leave immediately, and go off to Switzerland or wherever the doctors send you. Do not trouble yourself about your expenses on treatment or travel. That will be our responsibility.

11. Do not worry either about what will happen in India House. Some things will go wrong, no doubt, and some things will not be done. That will be my worry. I have so many worries now that an addition of one or more

does not make much difference. Indeed, I do not want to put any burden on you by even discussing this matter with you. I should like you to forget about all this and think only of rest and treatment for the next six months. After that get yourself examined by a proper medical board. We must have competent medical advice then. I hope you will be quite fit by that time and can assume heavy responsibility again. But this must be stated by competent doctors.

12. You know very well that our mission in London is far the most important of our missions abroad, and I am anxious that it should be carried on as effectively as possible. In these days of continuing crises, normally one does not want to take risks. But there is no end to these crises and, as I have stated above, I am quite convinced that the risk of keeping you on in your present state of health is far greater than any other risk. I shall make such temporary arrangements as I can for India House. Immediately, your Advisers there can carry on after your departure till other arrangements are made by me. India House is not a place where I should like any of our civil servants to be in charge, except for brief and temporary periods. I shall go into this matter myself.

13. I have taken a long time to come to this decision and there is no need now to argue about it. It should be treated as a firm decision and acted upon without further delay. After your treatment in Switzerland, or wherever it might be, and when you are declared fit, I should like you to come to India for a month or so. There is a great deal I want to talk to you about. The next four months are going to be very very difficult months for me. They rather frighten me and it is only a certain pride that keeps me going. After that I shall have to think myself as to what I should do and how I should function.

14. I shall expect you to write or telegraph to me asking for six months' leave on account of ill-health.

15. This letter of mine might again give you a shock, but you know me well enough, I hope, to realise that I have written to you because of my great affection and regard for you and because of my strong wish that you should get well and continue for many years the service of India to which you have devoted your life.

16. I might mention that I have not said anything about this matter to anyone in the Ministry here. No one has had the slightest hint.

Mathai has typed this letter.

My love to you,

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

6. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

I have given very careful consideration to your telegram No.11027, 21st October² and to your letter of 15th October³ with which you sent me doctors' opinions. I have naturally attached importance to what your doctors have said. I am glad you are better. I have delayed replying to you so that I might give fullest consideration to the various aspects of this serious matter affecting you and me and our work. Having done so I am still convinced that from all points of view it is desirable and necessary for you to take leave in accordance with what I wrote in my letter of the 14th October.⁴ Your sudden recovery is good but there can also be sudden relapses. Your strength of will is a great asset which keeps you going. But you can exhaust that reservoir of energy. We have to think more of the future than of the present and it seems essential that there must be a considerable break in your work so that you can recover normally and not merely by exercising will power. I realise the possible risks in this but the other risks seem far greater. I do not think it is right for you to carry on and not giving yourself a full change and rest and treatment. I would therefore repeat what I said in my letter of 14th October and ask you to take the steps mentioned there.⁵

You can certainly come to India.⁶ But a very brief visit will not serve any purpose, and will hardly enable you to have talks with me. I am terribly busy for some time and may not be in Delhi. A suitable time for this will have to be fixed a little later. When you come here you should stay for some time.

1. New Delhi, 26 October 1951. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Krishna Menon informed Nehru that he consulted two expert doctors who certified that Menon was recovering and that his recovery had occurred suddenly without previous indications and so it was not desirable that he should proceed on sick leave.
3. Krishna Menon wrote that as his illness had become a kind of propaganda and was exploited by friends and foes alike, he consulted Dr. E.A. Bennett, a leading psychiatrist, who said that Menon was healthy and capable of doing everything that he had been doing and there was no point in restricting him.
4. See the preceding item.
5. Menon asked Nehru if he would be allowed to come to see him early in November.
6. Menon thought of himself not being so ill as to quit the post. He, however, relinquished his office on 13 June 1952 after being the High Commissioner in London for five years.

11

MISCELLANEOUS

III. General

1. The Ideal of Secular Democracy¹

I send my greetings to the All India Shia Conference which is going to be held in Lucknow under the presidentship of His Highness the Nawab of Rampur. During these critical days, all of us have to be clear as to what we stand for and what we aim at. I hope, therefore, that the All India Shia Conference will consider these major problems of today, in so far as they affect our country, and give its lead to all its members.

In India we have declared ourselves, firmly and unequivocally, in favour of what is called a secular democracy, that is, a State where people of all religions or denominations have the same rights and same opportunities in practice. All of our people may not live up to this ideal and might be swept away occasionally by misguided notions. That makes it all the more incumbent that we have our minds clear about our aim. We must not allow another's error to lead us to wrong action. For India this is the only path, and who go against it do injury not only to the larger cause but also to the narrower good of the particular group they may represent. It is only by keeping this larger vision before us and always trying to act upto it that we can build up a strong and progressive nation at peace with ourselves and with our neighbours and the rest of the world.

I send my good wishes to the conference and wish it success.

1. Message to the All India Shia Conference, 2 August 1951. J.N. Collection.

2. To Satyaranjan Bakshi¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1951

Dear Bakshi,²

I have received a copy of your letter and T.C. Goswami's³ of the 29th July. For some odd reason I have not received the original.

1. J.N. Collection.
2. (1897-1983); arrested during freedom struggle, 1929-30; a close associate of Subhas Chandra Bose; associated with *Forward*, *Advance*, *Nation*, and *Banglar Katha*; founder of Synthesis, a political party.
3. (1898-1957); joined Swaraj Party, 1923; elected to Central Assembly, 1923 and to Bengal Assembly, 1937; Minister, Bengal Government, 1943; member of Synthesis; associated with *Liberty* and *Forward* for some time.

I have read this letter with interest. It is written in your happy style and with your idealism. I can hardly answer you at length and discuss these matters and argue about them. They are too deep for that and are the web and woof of our existence. I can only hope that however much we may stumble in the dark, we shall try to hold the principles that have guided us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Observance of Festivals¹

May I suggest to the honourable Member and the House that the best way to observe a festival is to work hard for the service of the nation.²

H.V. Kamath: Will that apply to all festivals on which holidays have been declared by Government?

JN: It will not apply to all holidays because a sudden change in this direction might have an upsetting effect on many people's minds. But I should like a gradual adoption of that principle, so that ultimately it might apply to most holidays.

1. Reply to debate in Parliament, 4 September 1951. *Parliamentary Debates, Official Report*, 1951, Vol. XV, Part II, column 1894.
2. H.V. Kamath had observed that the House should not sit on Ganesh Chaturthi day.

4. To the Committee on a Declaration of Freedom¹

New Delhi
September 20, 1951

Dear Friends,

I have received your letter of September 4th, sending me a copy of the text of a Declaration of Freedom. May I say that I entirely agree with the approach made in this draft declaration, and I believe that human individuality is the

1. J.N. Collection.

basis of every value in human life. I would have no difficulty in subscribing to the Declaration of Freedom, in so far as it goes, but for the fact that as Prime Minister of a country I do not give my name to manifestoes and the like.

There is one aspect of the matter which, no doubt, you must have had in mind, but which finds no expression in the draft declaration. Human individuality cannot develop, except in rare cases, if there is want and starvation and the lack of the absolute necessities of life. Therefore, freedom from want of such necessities, or some kind of economic freedom, seems to me to be necessary so that human individuality might have full scope.

With all good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To Julian Huxley¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1951

Dear Professor Huxley,²

I must apologise to you for the great delay in acknowledging your letter of July 27th, which I was glad to receive. There is no doubt that a great deal of attention is being paid to the question of population regulation and control now in India. Indeed, circumstances compelled this attention. There is, at the same time, much opposition to this idea, as was to be expected. But the idea is bound to spread and be given effect to, though the process might not be as fast as one would like.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. British biologist.

6. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

26 September 1951

My dear Rajaji,

I had and have no doubt at all that such papers (Pyarelal's²) should not be published. The difficulty that has arisen is that Nirmal Bose, who was with Bapu in Noakhali etc, has apparently written about this subject rather fully in a book which he intends publishing. He was asked by various persons, including Amrit Kaur, not to do so but he persists. Then Pyarelal thought that perhaps Nirmal Bose might desist if he (Pyarelal) dealt with this matter in his own way. I have not seen Nirmal Bose's account.³

I am afraid I do not understand all this business at all. It is beyond my depth. I do understand, however, that the effect of all this on large numbers of people will be bad.

I think that in any event Pyarelal should not write this, whatever Nirmal Bose might do.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Private Secretary to Mahatma Gandhi for a long time.
3. Nirmal Kumar Bose, who served Mahatma Gandhi as his secretary in 1946 and 1947, wrote his book *My Days with Gandhi* which covered the last phase of Mahatma Gandhi's life. Many had requested Nirmal Bose not to include an account of Mahatma Gandhi's experiments in *Brahmacharya* in the book as it might give rise to misunderstanding. Nirmal Bose, however, published the book in 1953 without any changes.

GLOSSARY

abhaya	without fear
adalat	a court of appeal
ahimsa	nonviolence
Asoka Chakra	Asoka's wheel
brahmacharya	continence
birta	rent-free land in Nepal
chappals	slippers
chaprasi	office orderly
dhoti	a long piece of cloth used as a lower garment by men
Dussehra	a Hindu annual festival celebrating triumph of good over evil
fatwa	a decree of Muslim divines
Jai Hind	victory to India
jihad	a religious war
kanal	about one-eighth of an acre of farmland in Kashmir
Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai	victory to Mahatma Gandhi
Moharram	a festival in the first month of the Muslim lunar year
moulvi	a learned Muslim priest
mahayagna	a great sacrifice
pandal	a large canopy
puja holidays	holidays associated with Hindu festivals in October-November
rashtra	nation
shastras	texts of the Hindu religion
satyamev jayate	truth alone triumphs
vanaspati	hydrogenated edible oil

INDEX

(Biographical footnotes in this volume and in volumes in the first series are italicized and those in the Second Series are given in block letters.)

- Aarey Milk Scheme (Bombay), 27 fn
 Abadan refinery, 659 fn, 677 fn, 686 fn
 Abbas, Ghulam, 729 fn
 Abdullah, S.M., (*Vol. 7, p. 308*), 95-96, 118, 229-230 fn, 232 fn, 239, 243-244, 263, 266, 279-280, 287-289, 293 fn, 296 & fn-297, 298, 300, 306 & fn, 338, 347, 587, 591, 593, 613, 711; Cabinet of, 623 fn-624; Government of, *see* Kashmir Government
 Abhor Hill District, 430 fn
 Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act (1950), 416 fn
 Acheson, Dean, (*VOL. 1, P. 511*), 611
 Achhru Ram, (*VOL. 8, P. 196*), 478 & fn, 725 & fn
 Afghanistan, 80, 87, 94, 105, 118, 327, 548, 678, 691-692, 716, 729 fn
 Africa, 667, 687, 691 fn, 694
 —, East, 667
 Agra, 114, 505
 Agrarian Reforms Commission (1950), 727 fn
 Ahmad, Azizuddin, 361 & fn-362
 Ahmed, Fakhruddin Ali, (*Vol. 15, p. 286*), 50 & fn
 Ahmedabad, 457, 518
 Ahmedabad Labour Association, 457 fn
 Aiyar, Alladi Krishnaswami, (*VOL. 3, P. 119*), 386-387 fn, 390 & fn-391
 Ajanta, 505
 Ajmer, 10 fn
 Akali Dal, 706 fn
 Akbar, Said, 363 fn
 Alexander the Great, 109
 Ali, Abid, 47 & *fn*, 55 & *fn*
 —, Mir Osman (Nizam of Hyderabad), (*VOL. 1, P. 291*), 95, 515
 —, Syed Nausher, 735 fn, 738 & *fn*
 All India Backward Classes Federation, 531
 All India Bank Employees Federation, 451 fn
 All India Congress Committee, 3 fn, 14, 70, 90, 101, 126, 132 fn, 135, 159 fn, 161, 165 fn, 171 fn-172, 173 & *fn*, 178, 180-181, 182, 195, 203, 225, 244, 267, 269, 272, 382-383, 399, 416, 422, 673, 679-680, 701 fn, 712-713; Ahmedabad session (January 1951) of, 157 & *fn*, 164 & *fn*-165 & *fn*, 168-169, Unity resolution passed at, 164 & *fn*, 701 *fn*; Bangalore session (13-15 July 1951) of, 3 *fn*, 13 & *fn*, 20 *fn*, 132 *fn*, 157 & *fn*, 175 *fn*, 188 & *fn*, 210, 232 *fn*, resolutions passed at, on choice of candidates, 33, 38 and on groupism in Congress, 131, 181, 188 *fn*, 271; Nasik session (20-21 September 1950) of, 157 *fn*, 164-165 *fn*, 167, 210 & *fn*, 269 & *fn*, 597; New Delhi session (17-19 October 1951) of, 3 *fn*, 165 *fn*, 203 & *fn*, 210, 598, 715, 728, resolutions passed at, on anti-social and disruptive tendencies, 728 & *fn*, and on economic progress, 728 & *fn*, and on foreign policy, 597-598, 728, and on communalism, 207; Subjects Committee of, 203 *fn*
 All India Hindu Mahasabha *see* Hindu Mahasabha, All India
 All India Muslim Convention, 698 *fn*
 All India Newspaper Editors' Conference, 514, 720 *fn*
 All India Oriental Conference, Lucknow session (3-5 October 1951) of, 515

- All India Railwaymen's Federation, 451
 & fn, 453-454 fn, 455 & fn-456, 457-
 459 & fn, 460 fn, 675-676, 685, 705
 & fn; General Council of, 453
- All India Shia Conference, 759
- All India Women's Conference, 48-49, 56
- Allahabad, 114
- Allied Control Council, 254 fn
- Allied Powers, 78 fn, 619 fn, 659 fn,
 710 fn
- Allied troops, 604 fn, and Anglo-
 American forces, 605
- Alva, Joachim, 587 & fn
- Amarnath (Kashmir), 27
- Ambedkar, B.R., (*Vol. 5, p. 299*), 378 &
 fn, 381, 383 fn, 387, 392 & fn-393 fn,
 394 & fn-395 & fn, 532, 727
- American forces, 603, 623-624, 707,
 715 fn
- American press, 627
- Americans: A Study in National Character*
 (Geoffrey Gorer), 612 & fn
- Amrit Kaur, (*Vol. 1, p. 274*), 762
- Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 698 fn
- Amritsar, 71, 99, 321 & fn-322, 352,
 711
- Andhra Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party,
 Working Committee of, 447
- Andhra Province, 12 fn, 20 fn, 25, 52, 437
 & fn-438 & fn, 439-441 & fn, 442 fn-
 443, 444 & fn-445 & fn, 446 & fn-
 447 & fn
- Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee,
 441 & fn-442 fn
- Angami Nagas, 430 fn
- Anglo-American Press Association, 328
- Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 340, 659 fn-
 660, 677 & fn, 686 fn, 707 fn
- Ankara, 677, 686
- Arya Samaj, 52 & fn
- Asaf Ali, (*Vol. 6, p. 42*), 400 fn, 469 &
 fn, 533
- Asia, 11, 65, 72, 79-78, 86, 92, 105, 116,
 118, 209, 213, 215, 220, 232 fn, 237,
 275, 329 fn, 413, 557, 559, 613, 619,
 621, 623, 659, 667, 678, 691-693, 710,
 719
- _____, East, 695 fn
- _____, South, 596
- _____, South East, 643 & fn
- _____, West *see* West Asia
- Asoka Chakra*, 66, 72, 690
- Asrani, U.A., (*VOL. 10, P. 82*), 205 & fn
- Assam, 7 fn, 43-44, 50-51, 54, 346, 359,
 429 & fn-430, 431 & fn, 465 fn, 479-
 480 & fn, 481-483, 489 & fn, 509 fn-
 510, 582, 585, 678, 706, 723;
 Government of, 346, 429 fn, 434 fn,
 480 fn, 482 fn-483, 489 & fn, 509;
 Legislative Assembly of, 50
- Assam-Bhutan Boundary, 508
- Assam Boundaries Bill, 508 fn, 510-511
- Assam Congress, 50
- Assam Oil Company (A.O.C.), 429
- Associated Press, 630 fn
- Ataturk, Mustafa Kamal Pasha, (*Vol. 1,*
p. 179), 691 & fn
- Attlee, C.R., (*Vol. 15, p. 109*), 241 & fn-
 242, 278 & fn, 303, 325 & fn, 336 fn,
 339, 341, 351, 684 fn, 754
- Auchinleck, Claude, (*Vol. 14, p. 123*), 242
 fn, 278 fn, 320, 326, 336 fn, 339, 343,
 684
- Australia, 18 fn, 606 & fn; High
 Commissioner in India of, *see* Gollan,
 H.R.
- Ayyangar, M. Ananthasayanam, (*VOL. 5,*
P. 81), 380 & fn, 394 fn, 740 fn
- _____, N. Gopalaswami, (*Vol. 15, p. 248*),
 247, 390 & fn-391 fn, 451 & fn, 455
 & fn, 457, 459-460, 467, 509 fn, 513-
 514, 526, 528, 539 fn, 685
- Azad, Abul Kalam, (*Vol. 1, p. 353*), 62
 fn, 156, 158 fn, 173 fn, 270 fn, 329,
 515, 677, 686, 695, 750
- _____, Prithvi Singh, 741 & fn
- 'Azad Kashmir', 99, 244, 251, 278-279,
 283, 287-289, 292, 311 fn, 333, 338,
 590-591, 674 fn, 703, 729; forces of,
 246 & fn, 248 fn, 250, 252, 262, 279,
 281-283 & fn, 284, 285, 288, 300, 589,
 714; Government of, 729 fn
- Baghdad, 707 fn

- Bagmati river, 495 fn
 Bahawalpur, 95
 Bairagarh, 11 fn
 Bajpai, G.S., (*Vol. 15, p. 568*), 229, 239, 245 & fn-246 fn, 247 fn, 248, 249 fn, 282 fn-283 fn, 300, 341-342, 613, 615 & fn, 631 fn, 637 fn
 Bakshi, G.M., (*Vol. 9, p. 440*), 243, 263, 278, & fn-279, 292, 306, 348
 Baksi, Satyaranjan, 759 & fn
 Baluchistan, 95
 Banaras, 574
 Bangalore, 84, 131 fn-132, 134-136, 138-140, 146, 158, 174, 188, 232-233, 242, 317, 326, 339, 341-342, 422, 429, 454, 539, 673, 679, 681, 683 fn
 Bangalore Municipal Corporation, 22
 Bangaon, 698 fn
 Bao Dai Government, 651 & fn
 Baroda State, 386 fn; ruler of, 466
 Barrah Petroleum Company, 707 fn
 Beg, Mirza Afzal, (*Vol. 14, p. 396*), 229 fn, 287
 Belur, 505
 Bengal, 67, 74, 582, 591 fn, 706
 —, East, 230, 321, 327, 329, 337, 352 fn, 359, 361, 429 fn, 480 fn-481, 489 fn, 517, 582-583 & fn, 584 & fn-585 & fn, 675, 684, 706 & fn, 715, 724; Government of, 230 fn
 Bengal boundary dispute (14 December 1948), 209 fn
 Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulations, 432 fn
 Bennett, E.A., 756 fn
 Bhabha, C.H., (*Vol. 15, p. 295*), 400 fn
 Bhakra Nangal Scheme, 89, 402
 Bharat Sevak Sangh, 184
 Bharatiya Jan Sangh, *see* Jan Sangh
 Bhargava, Gopichand, (*Vol. 4, p. 178*), 179, 484-485, 688 fn
 —, Thakur Das, (*VOL. 7, P. 436*), 490 & fn
 Bhatnagar, S.S., (*VOL. 2, P. 605*), 496 & fn
 Bhatt, B.S., 5 fn
 Bhawe, Vinoba, (*VOL. 5, P. 74*), 172 & fn, 443-444 fn, 446 & fn-447, 722 & fn
 Bhopal, 10 fn
 Bhutan, 508 fn
 Bihar, 7 fn, 53, 56, 116 fn, 150 fn, 196-197, 199-200 & fn, 452 & fn, 470, 472, 495-498, 499 fn, 668, 719 fn; Government of, 452, 471, 495 & fn-496, 499, 501
 Bihar Abolition of Zamindaris Bill (1948), 403 fn
 Bihar Land Reforms Act (1950), 403 fn
 Bijnor, 53
 Bill for the Amendment of the Penal Code (in regard to cow slaughter) *see* Cattle Preservation Bill
 Bindu *see* Rao, G. Bindu Digambar
 Birla, G.D., (*Vol. 5, p. 135*), 297 & fn —, L.N., 736 fn
 Biswas, C.C., (*VOL. 14 Pt. II, P. 74*), 361 & fn
 Black, Eugene R., 367 & fn-368, 369, 373
 Blickenstaff, David, 282 & fn
 Blitz (Bombay), 359 fn, 629
 Bombay city, 7 fn, 12 fn, 27, 49-57, 71, 594 fn, 632, 705, 722 fn
 Bombay Bullion Association, 722 fn, 735 fn-736 fn, 737 fn
 Bombay Province, 11, 47, 55, 386 fn, 723; Government of, 27 & fn
 Bombay P.C.C., 49, 57, 104 fn
 Bonin Islands, 603 fn, 604 fn, 619, 621, 659 fn
 Bose, Nirmal Kumar, (*VOL. 1, P. 566*), 762 & fn
 —, Sarat Chandra, (*Vol. 3, p. 334*), 400 fn
 Boundary Commission for linguistic provinces (proposed), 30 fn
 Bowles, Chester, 629 & fn, 716 & fn
 Brahmaputra river, 346 fn
 Brazil, 305 fn
 Britain *see* U.K.
 British Constitution, 327
 British Government *see* U.K., Government of

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- British Empire, 170, 185
 British press, 233-234, 263, 278-279, 338, 722
 Britter, Eric, 302 & *fn*
 Bucher, F.R. Roy, (VOL. 1, P. 76), 330 & *fn*
 Bulganin, N., 655 *fn*
 Buragohain, S.N., 54 & *fn*
 Burma, 80, 87, 94, 105, 116, 118, 262, 490, 510, 548, 603 & *fn*; 604, 605, 608 & *fn*, 613, 615-617, 637 & *fn*, 639, 643 & *fn*; 644, 667, 678, 687, 697, 709, 726, 730; Government of, 294-295, 611, 614, 637 *fn*, 639, 708 & *fn*; Foreign Minister of, *see* Sao Hkun Hkio; Prime Minister of, *see* Nu, Thakin
 Burma Oil Company (B.O.C.), 429
 Cabinet (India), 125, 132, 136 *fn*-137 *fn*, 138 *fn*, 140 & *fn*, 143, 145 *fn*, 148, 276, 377-380, 384 & *fn*, 390 *fn*-391, 392 *fn*-393 & *fn*, 400, 455 *fn*; 458, 475, 480, 490, 528, 530, 532-533, 551, 616-617, 681 & *fn*, 697, 726 & *fn*-727, 746; Economic Committee of, 511-512 & *fn*, 513 *fn*; Rehabilitation Committee of, 480, 483
 Cabinet Mission Plan, 391 *fn*
 Cadawaller, Commander, 232-233 & *fn*
 Calcutta, 39 *fn*, 84, 141, 351 *fn*-352, 361, 415 *fn*, 533, 632, 675, 698 *fn*, 704 *fn*, 706 *fn*, 727
 Capetown, 687 *fn*
 Cariappa, K.M., (VOL. 2, P. 376), 26, 302-303 *fn*, 532
 Caroe, Olaf, (VOL. 4, P. 365), 234
 Cattle Preservation Bill (1951), 27 & *fn*, 490, 530
 Ceasefire Agreement of (31 December-11 January 1949), 589 *fn*
 Central Credentials Committee, 165 *fn*
 Central Government *see* India, Government of
 Central Election Board (Congress), 155-156, 165, 701 *fn*
 Central Election Committee (Congress), 33, 36, 40, 52 *fn*, 135, 144, 158 *fn*, 165 *fn*, 195, 197, 203, 270 *fn*; Election Sub-Committee, 203
 Central Election Tribunal (Congress), 165 *fn*
 Central Fund, 126
 Central Parliamentary Board (Congress), 125, 162, 197, 225, 412, 688 *fn*
 Ceylon *see* Sri Lanka
 Chandernagore, 663
 Chandigarh, 11 *fn*
 Chattopadhyaya, Kamaladevi, (Vol. 4, p. 349), 48-49, 55 *fn*-56
 Chaudhuri, R.K., 508 *fn*-509 & *fn*, 510
 Chenab river, 591
 Chhatriwala, Mohammad Din, 478 *fn*
 Chiang Kai-shek, (Vol. 10, p. 74), 605, 608
 Chin Hills, 432 *fn*
 China, Nationalist, 306 *fn*, 607 *fn*; Government of, 607, 692 and troops, 294, 637 & *fn*
 China, People's Republic of, 81-82, 97, 105, 116, 254, 256, 294, 410, 421, 468 *fn*, 510, 541 *fn*, 545, 548, 559 *fn*, 603-604 *fn*, 605, 607 & *fn*-608, 609-610 & *fn*, 613, 617, 619, 622, 624, 628-629, 637, 643 & *fn*-644, 647 & *fn*, 677 *fn*-678, 686, 695 *fn*-696, 707, 726-727, 730; Ambassador in India of, *see* Yuan Chung-hsien; cultural goodwill mission to India from, 712 & *fn*, 727 & *fn*, 730; Government of, 559, 604 *fn*, 607, 637 *fn*, 696, 712, 727, 730; troops of, 23 *fn*, 294, 560, 628
 Chitral, 729 *fn*
 Chittaranjan Locomotives Works, 8
 Chou En-lai (VOL. 15 Pt. I, P. 118), 643-644
 —, Mrs, 643 *fn*
 Chumb Valley, 647 *fn*
 Chundrigar, I.I., 400 *fn*
 Churchill, Winston, (Vol. 4, p. 52), 254 *fn*, 691
 Chyle, Oldrich, 300 & *fn*
 Collier's magazine, 367, 370

- Colombo Plan, 276
- Coloured Voters Bill (South Africa), 687 fn
- Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army, *see* Cariappa, K.M.
- Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes *see* Shrikant, Laxmidas M.
- Commonwealth of Nations, 45, 241 fn, 344, 414
- Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference (London, January 1951) 749 fn
- Communal G.O. (Madras Government), 526 fn
- Communist Party of India, 174, 269, 465-466 & fn, 467, 469, 471 fn
- Communist Party of Pakistan, 326 fn
- Communist Party of Soviet Union, 186
- Communists (Indian), 50, 88, 174, 417, 466, 470-472
- Congress Constitution, 4, 21 & fn, 165 fn
- Congress Democratic Front, 62 fn, 157 fn, 165 fn
- Congress Election Manifesto (first general elections), 3 & fn, 13 & fn-14, 16, 20 & fn, 30 fn, 33, 177, 202, 406 fn, 422, 437, 679-680
- Congress, Indian National, 3-5, 10-11 & fn, 12, 18-19, 21 fn, 25, 28, 33-38 & fn, 39 & fn-40, 41 & fn-42, 43 & fn-44 & fn, 46 & fn-47 & fn, 48-51, 53 fn-54 & fn, 55 & fn-56, 57, 62 & fn, 69, 73-74, 78, 86, 88-89, 92, 95, 100-101, 106, 111-112, 115, 119, 123-124 & fn, 125-126, 131-132 fn, 133 fn-134 & fn, 136 & fn-137 & fn, 138 fn-139 & fn, 140-141 & fn, 142-144, 145 fn-146 & fn, 147-149, 151-153, 155 fn-156 fn, 157 & fn-158 & fn, 159 & fn-160 & fn, 161-165 & fn, 167-172 & fn, 173 & fn-174, 175 & fn, 177-182 & fn, 183 & fn, 183-188 & fn, 189-194, 197-198 & fn, 199 & fn-200, 201, 203 & fn-204, 205-210 & fn, 211 & fn, 221-226, 244, 267-272 & fn, 273-274, 279 fn, 313, 348, 358, 399, 404-407, 412, 414, 416-417 & fn, 418, 422-423, 425, 437, 443, 476 & fn, 484-485, 518, 534 fn, 597-598, 679 fn, 681 fn, 697, 701 & fn, 706 fn, 712-713 fn, 717, 728
- Congress Parliamentary Party, 171 fn, 271-272 fn, 351, 378 & fn, 380-383 & fn, 712
- Congress Working Committee, 14 fn, 29, 47, 69, 131 fn-132 fn, 138 fn, 153, 155 & fn-156, 157 fn-158 & fn, 159 & fn-160 & fn, 161-163, 165 & fn-166, 167, 169-170, 173 & fn, 178-179, 184, 195, 230, 267, 269-270 & fn, 271-272, 274, 399-400, 441 fn, 673, 679, 701 & fn-702; Bangalore meeting of (July 1951), 33 fn, 158 fn
- Constituent Assembly of India, 141 fn, 389, 394 fn, 402, 437 fn
- Constitution (First Amendment) Bill (1951), 253 fn, 403 fn, 720 fn
- Constitution of India (1950), 4, 10, 12, 20-21, 23, 30 fn, 36 fn, 75, 94-95, 96 fn, 115-116 & fn, 141 fn, 188 fn, 207, 216 & fn-217, 263 fn, 266, 269 fn, 276, 335, 358, 388-389 & fn, 390, 392, 402-403, 406-407, 432, 490, 508, 510-511, 517, 530, 533-534, 538-540, 592 fn, 679 fn, 688, 704, 718-719 & fn, 739; Article 2 of, 509 fn; Article 3(c) of, 508 fn; Article 74 of, 390 & fn; Article 105, clause 3 of, 739; Article 341 of, 534 fn; Article 356 of, 100 fn
- Coorg, 10 fn
- Council of Foreign Ministers of the U.S., Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China (suggested by U.S.S.R. Government), 256 fn
- Council of States *see* Rajya Sabha
- Criminal Investigation Department, 187
- Crossroads* (Bombay), 629
- Czarist Russia, 691
- Czechoslovakia, 78 fn, 630 & fn-631; Government of, 630 & fn
- Daily Telegraph*, 234 fn, 242
- Dalai Lama, 647 & fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Damodar Valley Scheme, 89, 402
- Dar, S.K., (VOL. 10, P. 128), 437 fn
- Dar Comission *see* Linguistic Provinces Commission
- Darbhangha, 496
- Das, Banarasi, 26 fn
- Dauki (Assam), 509 fn
- Dawn*, 237 fn, 252
- Dayal, Harishwar, (VOL. 11, P. 317), 647 & fn
- Deb Barman, Brojendra Kishore, 526 & fn
- Debt Conciliation Boards (Kashmir), 416 fn
- Declaration of Freedom, (U.S.) Committee of, 760-761
- Defence, Ministry of, 430-432, 434
- Delhi, 10 fn-11, 26, 41, 48-49, 56, 63, 66-67, 70 & fn, 73, 75, 77, 84, 88, 99-101, 102 fn-103 & fn, 114-115, 117-118, 134, 143, 153, 160 fn, 173 & fn-174, 176, 190, 194, 196, 199, 202-203 fn, 222, 224, 230 fn-231, 233, 244, 252, 291 fn, 297, 324-325, 331, 334, 337-338, 352 fn, 400, 402, 421, 446 fn, 454, 466-467, 496, 539, 556 fn, 558, 557, 616, 631 fn, 644, 655-656, 675, 685-686, 690, 704, 708, 711, 713, 716 & fn, 722 fn, 724, 726 & fn, 728, 730 & fn, 756
- Delhi Agreement (1950) *see* Indo-Pakistan Agreement on Minorities
- Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee, 69 fn, 133, 173, 222-233
- Delhi Public Library, 520 & fn-521
- Delimitation Orders Bill, 394 fn, 721
- Dera Baba Nanak Road (Gurdaspur district), 484
- Desai, Morarji, (Vol. 13, p. 5), 41, 47, 55 & fn
- Deshmukh, C.D., (Vol. 15, p. 635), 40 & fn-41 & fn, 42, 46 & fn, 380, 394 fn, 451 & fn, 455, 499 & fn, 513 & fn, 515, 531, 737 fn, 745
- _____, Durgabai, (VOL. 5, P. 525), 735 fn, 738
- _____, P.S., (VOL. 5, P. 368), 508 fn, 531 & fn
- Devers, Jacob Loucks, 229 & fn, 248-249 fn, 251, 280-282 & fn, 283 fn, 284-286, 673 fn
- Dhaka, 415 fn
- Dhebar, U.N., 727 & fn
- Diet (Japan), 624, 710 & fn
- Directive Principles of State Policy, 18 fn
- Distressed Debtors' Relief Act (Kashmir), 416 fn
- Diwakar, R.R., (Vol. 5, p. 311), 123 & fn, 193
- Dixon, Owen, (VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 205), 249, 262, 282, 286, 326, 356, 590, 673 fn
- Documents regarding Kashmir* (Government of India), 249 fn, 283 fn, 300
- Dogra, Prem Nath, (Vol. 16 Pt. I, P. 374), 239 & fn-240, 301
- Dongkar Monastery, 647 fn
- Dowangiri (Assam), 508 fn
- Dulles, John Foster, (VOL. 1, P. 572), 256 fn
- Duncan, S.J., 433-434 fn
- Dutt, S., (VOL. 7, P. 644), 242 & fn, 362, 655 fn
- Earthquake Relief Fund (Assam), 346, 489
- East Punjab *see* Punjab
- Economist*, *The*, 234 & fn
- Ecuador, 306 fn
- Education, Ministry of, 527
- Educational G.O. (Madras Government), 526
- Egypt, 303 fn
- Elizabeth, Princess, (VOL. 4, P. 608), 45
- Ellora, 505
- England *see* United Kingdom
- Esfandiari, Mussa Noury, 659 & fn-660
- Essential Services (prevention of strikes) Ordinance (1951), 451 fn, 456, 685
- Europe, 1, 72, 79-82, 92, 103 & fn, 105, 113, 118, 248, 491, 505, 533, 605, 612, 667, 696, 708, 726; Middle Ages of, 314, 505
- _____, East, 468 fn
- Evacuee Property Law, 479

- External Affairs, Ministry of, 291, 401, 755
- Falconer, G.A., (VOL. 2, P. 376), 340 & fn
- Far East, 259, 275, 580, 598, 603 fn, 605, 607, 609-610, 613, 616, 618-620, 622, 628-629, 656, 687-688, 691, 693, 695-696, 707, 710
- Far Eastern Commission, 254 & fn, 604 fn, 621
- Faridabad, 11 fn
- Ferozepur, 99, 321, 484
- Finance, Ministry of, 461, 483, 497-498
- Five Year Plan, First, 1, 19 fn, 45, 63, 89, 119, 404 fn; draft outline (7 July 1951) of, 14 fn, 63 fn; revised draft (December 1952) of, 14 fn
- Foreign Office (London), 235, 638
- Formosa, 255-256, 258, 609, 619, 622, 687, 692, 696; Government of (Chiang Kai-shek), 605, 696 *see also* Taiwan
- France, 18 fn, 306 fn, 611 fn, 678, 686; Ambassador in India of *see* Levi, Daniel; Embassy in Delhi of, 651; Government of, 651, 663 fn; National Assembly of, 663 & fn; Parliament of, 663
- Franco, General, (Vol. 8, p. 457), 470, 612
- Gadgil, N.V., (Vol. 3, p. 68), 150
- Gandak project, 499 & fn, 501
- Gandhi, Feroze, (Vol. 6, p. 81), 193
- _____, Mahatma, 3, 10, 14, 26, 66, 72-74, 82, 92-94, 102-103, 107-108, 110, 113, 119, 159, 185, 188, 209 fn, 212-213, 218, 230, 232 fn, 329 & fn, 399-400, 420, 518-519, 694, 762 & fn
- _____, V.B., 55 & fn
- Gandhidham, 11 fn
- Ganga Ram, 229 fn
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 630 & fn
- General elections (1951-52), 33, 61 & fn, 90, 92, 104, 181-182, 185-187, 358, 416, 418, 429, 467, 680, 695, 717-718, 724, 731
- Geneva, 293, 713 & fn, 752
- Germany, 104, 254 fn, 605, 612, 696, 710
- Ghazi, Shah Mahmoud Khan, 381 & fn-382 fn, 716, 729 fn
- Ghose, P.C., (Vol. 13, p. 1), 157 fn, 190
- Gilder, M.D.D., (Vol. 8, p. 356), 47 & fn
- Goburdhan, R., 630 & fn
- Golaganj, 509 fn
- Gollan, H.R., 319
- Gordon-Walker, P.C., (VOL. 5, P. 203), 322 & fn, 325-326
- Gorer, Geoffrey, 612 & fn
- Govwala, A.D., (VOL. 16 Pt. I, P. 537), 379 fn
- Govwala report on administration of public enterprises, 379 & fn-380
- Goswami, T.C., 759 & fn
- Govind Das, (Vol. 7, p. 660), 26 fn, 490 & fn, 530
- Govindpuri, 11 fn
- Gracey, Douglas David, (VOL. 5, P. 260), 242 fn, 278 fn, 321, 326, 336 fn, 339, 342-343, 684
- Graham, Frank, (VOL. 16 Pt. I, P. 367), 143, 229 & fn-230, 231-233, 239, 242-243, 245, 247 & fn-248 & fn, 249 & fn-250, 251-253, 259-260 & fn, 279-280 & fn, 281-282 & fn, 283 fn-284, 285-289 & fn, 292-295, 297, 300, 304-306 & fn, 307-308, 320, 323, 326, 337, 348, 361, 595-597, 673 & fn, 674 fn, 675, 683, 704, 711, 713 & fn-714, 729 & fn; proposals of, 298-299 & fn, 302 & fn-303, 304 & fn-305, 306-307 & fn, 308 & fn, 362, 723, 729-730
- _____, Mrs, 595
- Great Britain *see* U.K.
- Great Indian Peninsular (G.I.P.) Railway Clerks Union, 458
- Greece, 109
- Greek army 691
- Gromyko, Andrei, (VOL. 14 Pt. II, P. 345), 617 fn
- Gross, Ernest, 304 fn
- Grow-More-Food Campaign, 409 & fn
- Guha, A.C., 144 & fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Guha Roy, Pratap Chandra, 49 & *fn*
 Gujarat, 7 *fn*, 114
 Gundevia, Y.D., (VOL. 1, P. 525), 669 & *fn*
 Gupta, C.B., 124 & *fn*, 127, 198
 Gurdaspur, 99
 Gurmani, M.A., (VOL. 9, P. 302), 308 *fn*, 323 *fn*, 352 *fn*
 Gwalior, 95
- Halebid, 505
 Harriman, Averell, 686 *fn*
 Havana Charter, Article 86 of, 631
 Hazara, 363 *fn*
 Henderson, Loy W., (VOL. 7, P. 628), 235 & *fn*, 294, 611, 627-629, 637 & *fn*, 716 & *fn*
 —, Mrs, 627
 Himachal Pradesh, 10 *fn*
 Himalayan Airways, 545
 Himalayas, 27, 220, 495 *fn*
 Hind Mazdoor Sabha, All India, 351 *fn*
 Hind Mazdoor Sangh, 451 *fn*
Hindu, The (Madras), 267 & *fn*, 446 & *fn*
 Hindu Code Bill, 76, 111, 215, 277, 297, 377 & *fn*-378 & *fn*, 379-380 & *fn*, 381-383 & *fn*, 384 & *fn*-385, 386-387, 389-390 & *fn*, 391 & *fn*-392 *fn*, 393 & *fn*-394 *fn*, 395, 407 & *fn*, 705, 715, 719-720
 Hindu Mahasabha, All India, 38, 73, 75, 77 *fn*-78 & *fn*, 80-81, 84, 93 *fn*-94, 116-118, 150 & *fn*, 187, 231 *fn*, 331 *fn*, 335, 699; election manifesto of, 231 *fn*
 Hindustan Aircraft Ltd., 8
 Hindustan Hamara Party, 335 & *fn*
 Hirakud river valley scheme, 89, 402, 500
 Hirey, B.S., 179 & *fn*
 Hitler, Adolf, (Vol. 5, p. 477), 118, 605
 Ho Chi Minh, (VOL. 1, P. 519), 651 *fn*
 Hokkaidu, 622
 Home Affairs, Ministry of, 359, 469 & *fn*, 471 & *fn*, 717-718
 Honshu, 622
 House of Commons (U.K.), 241 *fn*, 339, 341, 739
- House of Representatives (U.S.); Foreign Affairs Committee of, 691 *fn*
 Husain, Zakir, (Vol. 3, p. 67), 703
 Huxley, Julian S., (VOL. 3, P. 499), 761 & *fn*
 Hydari, Akbar, (VOL. 3, P. 5), 432 & *fn*
 Hyderabad State, 25 & *fn*, 52-53, 87 *fn*-88, 95, 150 *fn*, 201-202, 236 & *fn*, 467, 475, 513, 528, 711, 722; Nizam of *see* Ali, Mir Osman
- Ibrahim, Sardar *see* Khan Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim
 Iengar, H.V.R., (VOL. 2, P. 192), 125, 465, 470, 525
 India Engineering Exhibition (10 January-18 March 1951), 402 & *fn*
 India, Government of, 5-6 *fn*, 10-11, 24 & *fn*-25, 26, 29, 40 *fn*, 63, 65, 88-89, 95, 98, 105, 115, 117, 133-136, 141 & *fn*-142, 146-150 & *fn*, 151-153, 160 *fn*, 165 *fn*, 177, 183 & *fn*, 187, 206, 208-209, 248 *fn*, 250 & *fn*-251, 254, 258-259, 263, 266, 276, 278 *fn*, 285 & *fn*, 289 & *fn*-290 & *fn*, 291-292, 296 & *fn*, 303, 307 *fn*-308 & *fn*, 312 & *fn*, 318 & *fn*, 322 *fn*, 335, 345-346, 356, 371, 379 *fn*, 384-385, 390 & *fn*, 394 *fn*, 399-402, 404-405, 408 *fn*, 411, 413 *fn*, 423-424, 430 *fn*, 432 *fn*, 434, 437-442 & *fn*, 443, 445-446 *fn*, 451-452, 454 *fn*-455 *fn*, 456, 458-459 & *fn*, 461, 467, 470 *fn*, 479-480 *fn*, 485, 489 & *fn*, 496, 498, 509-510, 512-513 & *fn*, 530, 538, 541 *fn*, 545 *fn*, 547 *fn*, 550-551, 554, 560, 577-578, 590 *fn*, 597-598, 603 *fn*-604 *fn*, 608-610, 617-623, 656, 664, 675-676, 681 *fn*-682 *fn*, 685, 697, 702-703 *fn*, 706 *fn*, 709 *fn*, 721 & *fn*, 724-725, 730, 737 *fn*; Defence Committee of, 394 *fn*, 538; Foreign Affairs Committee of, 394 *fn*, 613, 631
 India House (London), 233, 745, 747, 749-750, 754-755
 India Office (London), 528
India's Threat to Pakistan—Cor-

- responsence between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India—15 July-11 August 1951*, (White Paper by Government of Pakistan), 355 fn
- Indian Air Force, 421, 429
- Indian Army, 53, 236 fn, 311 fn, 340, 421, 532, 538, 623 fn, 663, 682
- Indian Companies (Amendment) Bill, 705 & fn
- Indian Home Guards, 320 fn
- Indian National Airways (I.N.A.), 545
- Indian National Army, 53 fn, 434
- Indian National Trade Union Congress, 456 & fn-457 & fn, 518-519
- Indian Navy, 421
- Indian Press, 237 & fn
- Indian Union, 3, 95, 264 fn, 311-312 & fn, 313, 509, 663, 682; armed forces of, 283 & fn-284, 285, 290 fn-291 fn, 305 fn, 320 fn-321 & fn, 329 fn, 331 fn, 334, 350, 352-353 & fn, 354, 356, 681 & fn, 711 fn
- Indo-Burmese Treaty of Peace and Friendship (7 July 1951), 686 & fn, 730 fn
- Indo-China, 687
- Indo-Japanese Bilateral Treaty (1952), 255
- Indo-Pakistan Agreement on Minorities (8 April 1950), 209 fn, 237 fn, 332, 337, 415 & fn, 481, 584
- Indo-Pakistan Commission in regard to joint waters (proposed), 368-369
- Indo-Pakistan Relations. Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, July 15, 1951-August 9, 1951*, (White Paper, M.E.A., Government of India), 317 fn, 349 fn
- Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement (21 April 1950), 209 fn
- Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement (23 February 1951), 209 fn
- Indo-Soviet Agreement for economic cooperation (1955), 655 fn
- Indo-Turkish Cultural Treaty (29 June 1951), 677-678 fn, 686
- Indonesia, 80, 94, 103, 108, 116, 229, 262, 604-605, 608 & fn, 613 & fn-614, 615-616, 643 & fn-644, 678, 687, 709; Government of, 611, 614, 708
- Indus Basin, 367 fn, 370
- Indus river, 591
- Industrial Revolution, 212
- Industries (Development and Control) Bill (1949), 379, 381, 394 fn, 410, 721 & fn
- Industry and Supply, Ministry of, 6 fn
- Intelligence Bureau, 469 & fn
- Inter-Dominion Agreement between India and Pakistan (4 May 1948), 209 fn, 368 & fn-369, 371
- Inter-Dominion Conference (Calcutta, April 1948), 591 fn
- Inter-Dominion Conference (May 1948), 371
- Inter-Dominion Conference (Lahore, July 1948), 339, 368 fn,
- Inter-Dominion Conference between India and Pakistan (New Delhi, 6-14 December 1949), 591 fn
- Interim Government, 400 fn
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 367 & fn-368, 372
- International Court of Arbitration (The Hague), 369
- International Court of Justice (The Hague), 304, 350 fn, 368 fn, 369 & fn, 659 fn, 673 fn, 677 fn, 686 fn
- International Economic Conference (Moscow), 468 & fn; Indian Preparatory Committee set up by the India Peace Council for, 468 fn
- International Joint Commission for Canada and the U.S.A., 368, 372 & fn
- Iran, 80, 82, 104-105, 303 fn, 340, 659 & fn-660 & fn, 677 & fn-678, 686 & fn-687, 691, 693, 695, 707 & fn, 726; Ambassador in India of, *see* Esfandiari, Mussa Noury; Government of, 304, 659 fn-660, 677 & fn, 686, 706-707, 726 fn; Prime Minister of, *see* Mossadeq Mohammad; Shah of, *see* Pahlavi, Reza Shah
- Iraq, 105; Government of, 707 fn

- Iraq Petroleum Company, 707 fn
- Jagir Abolition Regulation Act (1949, Hyderabad), 53 fn
- Jagjivan Ram, (*Vol. 15, p. 208*), 195, 400 fn
- Jain, Ajit Prasad, (*Vol. 8, p. 207*), 132 & fn-133 & fn, 134-136 & fn, 137 & fn-138 & fn, 139, 141 & fn-142, 145 & fn-146, 147, 149 & fn, 151 & fn-152, 196, 211 fn, 270 fn, 475 & fn, 478, 480, 675, 681 fn
- Jairamdas Doulatram, (*Vol. 4, p. 136*), 132, 319 & fn, 328, 430, 432 & fn-433 & fn
- Jalan, I.D., 226 & fn
- Jalandhar, 39 fn, 321
- Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, 224, 476 & fn-477, 594 fn; Lucknow session (April 1947) of, 476 fn
- Jammu, 96, 118, 243, 278 fn, 292-293, 593, 725-726
- Jammu and Kashmir State, 13, 240 & fn, 246 fn, 249-250, 252, 266, 283-285, 288-289 fn, 290 & fn-291, 301, 308 fn, 311-312 fn, 322 fn, 335, 349, 354, 416, 598, 682, 714, 727, 730; Government of, *see* Kashmir, Government of
- Jamshedpur, 84
- Jan Sangh, 38-39 & fn, 73, 84, 94, 96 & fn, 116-118, 698 fn
- Japan, 18 fn, 78 & fn-79, 104, 144 fn, 253 fn, 254, 256 fn-257, 258-259, 598, 603 & fn-604 fn, 605-606 & fn, 607-609, 610 fn, 612-613, 616-619 & fn, 620-623 & fn, 624, 628-629, 638, 687, 695 & fn-696, 697, 707, 709 fn-710 & fn, 714 & fn; Government of, 254, 605, 619, 714 fn
- Japanese forces, 605, 710
- Japanese peace treaty, 78 & fn, 144 & fn, 253 & fn, 255 fn-256 & fn, 263, 597, 603 & fn-604, 605-606 & fn, 607 & fn-608, 610, 612-617 & fn, 618, 624, 628, 638, 655 fn-656, 677 fn, 687, 695, 697, 707, 709 & fn-710 fn, 714 & fn, 726; Anglo-American draft of, 256 fn, 257, 709, Article 5 of, 610, 619 & fn, 624, Article 6 of, 610, 619 fn, 624
- J.V.P. Committee, 437 fn, 447 fn
- Jebb, Gladwyn, (*VOL. 15 Pt. I, P. 378*), 235, 341, 682 fn
- Jhansi, 324, 336-337
- Jhelum (district), 330, 334, 337, 350 & fn
- Jhelum river, 591
- Jinnah, M.A., (*Vol. 1, p. 168*), 94, 229 & fn, 328, 363
- Jog, G.G., 174 & fn
- Joint Indo-Pakistan Authority for Indus Basin (proposed), 367 fn
- Joint Rehabilitation Board, 133 fn
- Jullundur *see* Jalandhar
- Junagadh, 87 fn, 236 & fn, 693 fn
- Kaesong, 598 fn, 617, 687 fn, 706, 710, 714-715 fn
- Kairon, Pratap Singh, (*Vol. 14, p. 75*), 178 & fn-179, 224
- Kamath, H.V., (*Vol. 9, p. 397*), 508 fn, 760 & fn
- Kanchrapara, 77 fn
- Kanpur, 127, 351 fn
- Kapur, B.K., (*VOL. 4, P. 160*), 354 & fn-355 fn, 357
- Karachi, 103 fn, 231, 233, 238, 252, 291 fn, 311 fn, 319 fn, 333, 335 fn, 339, 349 fn, 358, 675, 689 fn, 693 fn, 711, 713, 726 fn; British High Commissioner in, *see* Laithwaite, Gilbert
- Karaikal, 663
- Karaka, D.F., (*Vol. 13, p. 416*), 629 & fn, 631 fn
- Karnataka, 20 fn, 52
- Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee, 441 fn-442 fn
- Karotana, 320 fn, 353 fn
- Kashani, Sayyid Abol Qasem, 329 & fn, 354, 357
- Kashmir, 12 fn-13, 27, 66, 68-69, 77 fn, 79-80, 85-87 & fn, 88, 94-96 & fn, 99, 104, 114, 116-117, 229 & fn-230 & fn, 231-232 & fn, 233-234 & fn,

- 235, 237-238, 240 & fn-241, 242-244, 246-247 fn, 248 & fn, 250 fn, 252, 259-264 & fn, 265-267 & fn, 275, 278 & fn-279, 280 & fn-281, 283-284, 287, 289 & fn-290, 293 & fn, 295-297 & fn, 298-301, 302 fn-303 & fn, 305-306 & fn, 313 fn, 318, 320, 322-323 & fn, 324-325 & fn, 326 & fn-327, 329-330, 331 fn-332, 333-340, 342-343, 347-349 & fn, 350, 352-356 & fn, 357-358 fn, 359 fn, 368, 370, 400, 414-416, 453 & fn-454, 455, 510, 577, 582 & fn, 583-584 & fn, 586-588, 590 & fn-591, 593-598, 611, 623 & fn-624, 673 & fn-674 & fn, 675-676, 678, 682 & fn-683, 684, 688 fn, 690-693, 697 fn, 699, 703-704 & fn, 711, 713-714, 723, 725-726, 729 & fn-730; Constitution for, 96 fn; Government of, 96, 99, 118, 229, 240-241, 245-246, 249, 251, 280-281, 283, 285, 288-289, 293, 296, 298, 301, 305, 333, 348, 354-355, 416 fn, 593, 682; Legislative Assembly of, 229 fn; Maharaja of, *see* Singh, Hari
- Kashmir Constituent Assembly, 96 & fn, 261 & fn, 263, 296, 299 fn, 306 & fn, 348, 590 fn, 673 fn-674, 682 & fn-683, 711, 725, 727 fn, 730
- "Kashmir Day", 77 fn
- Kashmir National Conference *see* National Conference
- Kashmir State armed forces, 290 fn, 305 fn
- Kashmir Valley, 284
- Kathmandu, 496, 545 fn-546, 549, 557 fn, 563-564, 571
- Katju, Kailas Nath, (*Vol. 1, p. 154*), 533, 537
- Kaul, T.N., 655 fn
- Kerala, 20 fn
- Keskar, B.V., (*Vol. 11, p. 15*), 511 & fn
- Key, David Mackendree, 638
- Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhuri, (*Vol. 1, p. 330*), 349 & fn
- Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, (*Vol. 4, p. 293*), 277, 416
- _____, Abdul Qayyum Khan, (*Vol. 14, p. 98*), 237, 674 fn
- _____, Akbar (*alias* Gen. Tariq), 326 fn
- _____, Akhtar Ali, 352 fn
- _____, Ghazanfar Ali, (*VOL. 1, P. 191*), 400 fn
- _____, Liaquat Ali, (*Vol. 10, p. 356*), 66, 80, 87 & fn, 153-154 fn, 209 & fn, 234 fn, 236 & fn-237 fn, 238 & fn, 242-243, 246, 248-249 & fn, 266--267 & fn, 311 & fn-312, 313 & fn, 315, 317 & fn-318 fn, 319-320, 322 fn, 329-331 & fn, 338-339, 347, 349 & fn-350 fn, 351 fn, 352, 353-354 & fn, 355-356 fn, 357, 363 & fn, 369 fn, 400 fn, 455, 458, 582 fn-583 fn, 596, 608 fn, 681-682 & fn, 688 & fn, 703 & fn, 728-729
- _____, Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim, (*VOL. 5, P. 238*), 674 fn, 729 & fn
- _____, Shafaat Ahmed, (*Vol. 5, p. 43*), 400 fn
- _____, Shah Nawaz, (*Vol. 14, p. 121*), 53 & fn
- _____, Sher Ali, 343
- _____, Zafar Ali, 352 fn
- Kher, B.G., (*Vol. 8, p. 279*), 47
- Khosla, A.N., (*VOL. 1, P. 368*), 367 & fn, 373, 496 & fn, 499-501
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 655 fn
- Khulna, 684
- Kidwai, Rafi Ahmed, (*Vol. 1, p. 270*), 131-132 fn, 133-136 & fn, 137 fn, 138 & fn, 139 & fn-140 fn, 141 & fn-142, 143, 145 & fn-146, 149 & fn-150, 151 fn-152, 153-154 fn, 157 fn-158 fn, 165 fn, 206 & fn, 211 fn, 270 fn, 271, 348, 681 fn, 702
- King's Canal (Madhubani), 495 fn
- Kirpalani, M.K., (*VOL. 1, P. 465*), 369, 620 & fn
- Koirala, B.P., (*VOL. 2, P. 479*), 546 fn, 549, 563-564
- _____, M.P., (*VOL. 2, P. 476*), 545-546 fn, 548-549, 556 fn, 564-565, 567, 571
- Kolaba district (Maharashtra), 46 fn
- Korea, 72, 79, 104, 254, 263, 422, 580, 598, 603 fn, 609, 677 & fn, 687, 696, 706, 710, 715

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- , North, 715 fn
 Korean war, 421, 629, 655 fn
 Koshi river *see* Kosi river
 Kosi project, 495-499 & fn, 500-501
 Kosi river, 495 & fn-496, 500-501
 Kripalani, J.B., (*Vol. 1, p. 237*), 62 fn, 153, 157 fn, 165 fn, 190, 196, 271, 417 fn
 Krishak Mazdoor Praja Party (K.M.P.P.), 50, 54, 62 fn, 149 fn, 153, 165 fn, 182 & fn, 198 fn, 417 & fn-418; Madras resolution of, 182 & fn
 Krishnamachari, T.T., (*VOL. 7, P. 447*), 735 fn
 —, V.T., (*Vol. 10, p. 412*), 501 & fn
 Kubernagar, 11 fn
 Kumaon, 510
 Kumaraswami Raja, P.S., (*VOL. 11, P. 19*), 395, 437, 446, 490, 526 & fn
 Kunzru, H.N., (*Vol. 1, P. 270*), 124 & fn 125, 581 & fn
 Kurile Islands, 254 & fn, 258, 603 fn-604 fn, 609, 620, 622
 Kutch, 7 fn
 Kyushu, 622

 Ladakh, 85, 220
 Lahore, 64 fn, 66, 143, 315, 324-325, 330, 334, 337, 350 fn, 352, 689 fn, 699
 Laithwaite, Gilbert, 326 & fn
 Lake Success, 674 fn
 Lal, Jagat Narayan, 437 fn
 Lal Chand, 224
 Lalwaney, K.G., 737 & fn
 Lehman, Herbert H., 709 fn
 Levi, Daniel, (*VOL. 4, P. 644*), 657 & fn
 Lhasa, 647 & fn
 Lie, Trygve H., (*VOL. 4, P. 407*), 637 & fn
 Lilienthal, David E., (*VOL. 13, P. 399*), 267 & fn, 367 & fn-368, 369-372
 Linguistic Provinces Commission (17 June 1948), 20 fn, 437 fn
 Lockhart, Rob, (*VOL. 4, P. 283*), 342 & fn-343
 Loeb Jr., James, 599 & fn
 Lohit river, 346 fn
 Lok Sabha, 35

 London, 367, 527, 537, 610, 678, 689 fn, 746-747, 749-751 & fn, 752-755, 756 fn
 Lower House (Indian) *see* Lok Sabha
 Lozano, Alfredo, (*VOL. 8, P. 50*), 285, 291 & fn
 Lucknow, 78 fn, 84-85, 114, 759
 Ludhiana, 90 fn, 92, 179, 199, 483-484, 536, 724 & fn, 741, 752

 Madani, Husain Ahmed, (*Vol. 8, p. 137*), 478 & fn
 Madhya Bharat, 7 fn, 509 fn
 Madhya Pradesh, 44 & fn-45, 267 fn, 711 fn, 722; Council of Ministers of, 183 fn; State Assembly elections in, 44 fn
 Madras city, 27, 74, 437 fn, 440-441 & fn, 442 fn-443, 445 & fn-446, 632
 Madras Government's Bill for abolition of zamindaris, 403 fn
 Madras Partition Committee, 442 fn-443 & fn, 445
 Madras State, 84-85, 386 fn, 445, 490-491, 716; Government of, 403 fn, 442 & fn-443 fn, 446-447, 491; Legislative Council of, 441 fn; State Assembly of, 182 fn, 438 fn
 Mahanadi river, 89
 Maharashtra, 12 fn, 20 fn, 52, 114; Assembly of, 46 fn
 Mahe, 663
 Mahtab, Harekrushna, (*Vol. 9, p. 435*), 394 fn
 Majail, Ishwar Singh, 741 & fn
 Malaviya, K.D., (*Vol. 1, p. 260*), 134 & fn, 154 & fn
 Malaya, 94, 105
 Malik, A.M., (*VOL. 14 Pt. II, P. 79*), 361 & fn
 —, H.S., 328 & fn
 Mamdot's Estate, 484
Manchester Guardian, 233-234 fn, 278 & fn-279 fn, 304
 Mandal, Jogendra Nath, (*VOL. 3, P. 282*), 400 fn
 Manekshaw, S.H.F.J., 305 & fn

- Manipur, 465 fn
 Manipur Nagas, 431
 Mann, B.S., 380 fn, 584 fn
 Martin, Kingsley, (VOL. 5, P. 261), 338 & fn
 Marwari Relief Society, 24
 Masani, M.R., (Vol. 6, p. 135), 632
 Mashruwala, K.G., (VOL. 6, P. 401), 171 & fn-172 fn
 Masoudi, Mohammad Saeed, 586 & fn, 588, 599
 Mathai, M.O., (Vol. 15, p. 385), 447, 751 & fn-752, 753, 755
 Mathew, C.P., 49 fn
 Matthai, John, (Vol. 5, p. 101), 48-49 fn, 400 fn
 Mavalankar, G.V., (VOL. 2, P. 614), 380 & fn, 735-736, 740
 McGhee, George M., 691 fn
 McNaughton, Andrew G.L., (VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 29), 262
 Medhi, Bisnuram, (Vol. 8, p. 483), 43 & fn, 44 & fn, 50, 54 & fn, 345, 359, 429, 489 & fn
 Medina (Bijnor), 362
 Meerut, 53 fn, 198 fn, 322, 324, 336
 Mehta, Asoka, (Vol. 7, p. 442), 55
 Mendhar, 320 fn, 353 fn
 Menon, K.P. Kesava, 578 fn
 —, K.P.S., (Vol. 15, p. 326), 613 & fn
 —, V.K. Krishna, (Vol. 7, p. 15), 144, 232-233, 240-241 & fn, 242, 278, 293, 303 & fn-304 fn, 321 & fn-322 & fn, 351, 527, 537 fn, 612, 615, 667, 689 fn, 745-746 & fn, 748, 751 & fn-752, 756 & fn
 Menzies, Robert Gordon, (VOL. 15 Pt. II, P. 276), 319 & fn
 Middle East, 234-235, 242, 304, 659, 667, 687, 691, 730
 Mikir Hill district, 430 fn
 Milap (Delhi), 359 fn
 Mishra, D.P., (Vol. 7, p. 660), 183 & fn-184, 188 & fn, 267 & fn, 273, 632, 711 fn
 —, Shyam Nandan, 195 & fn
 Misra, Bhadrakali, 563 & fn, 565
 Mission to India (Chester Bowles), 716 fn
 Mohammad, Ghulam, (VOL. 5, P. 80), 368
 Mookerjee, S.P., (Vol. 11, p. 739), 39 fn, 74 & fn, 77 fn, 351 fn, 358 & fn, 380 fn, 580 & fn, 583 & fn, 698 fn, 706 fn
 Morocco, 696 fn
 Morrison, Herbert, 295 & fn, 303 fn-304 fn, 638 & fn
 Moscow, 468, 616 & fn, 656, 667, 669 fn; Indian Embassy in, 669
 Moscow Economic Conference *see* International Economic Conference
 Moss, Eric, 339 & fn
 Mossadeq, Mohammed, 659-660, 686 fn-687
 Moul Petroleum Company, 707 fn
 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, (Vol. 13, p. 276), 279 & fn-280 fn, 320, 336 & fn
 Mudgal, H.G., (VOL. 16 Pt. I, P. 257), 722 & fn, 735 & fn-736 & fn, 737 & fn, 740 fn
 Mudgal Case, 722, 735; Committee of Inquiry for, 735 & fn-736, 738, 740; report of, 735-736 & fn, 737-738, 740 fn
 Mudgal Publications, 736-737 fn
 Mudie, R.F., (Vol. 5, p. 143), 339
 Mukherjee, H.C., (Vol. 10, p. 383), 537 & fn
 Munshi, K.M., (Vol. 5, p. 292), 27, 139, 295, 346, 387 & fn-388 fn, 429 & fn, 489 & fn-490, 491
 Muslim Conference, 229 & fn
 Muslim League, All India, 39, 44 fn, 51, 54 & fn, 94-95, 112-113, 229 & fn-230, 234, 315, 328, 400 & fn, 414-415, 476, 586-587, 691, 695
 Muzaffarnagar, 206
 Muzzaffarpur, 495 fn
 My Days with Gandhi (Nirmal Kumar Bose), 762 fn
 Mysore city, 20, 505, 540
 Mysore High Court, 539; Chief Justice of, 539

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Mysore State, 539 fn; Government of, 539 fn, 540
- Mysore State Congress, 539 fn
- Nadia, 360
- Naga Hill Council, 429 fn-430 fn, 432 fn, 434 fn
- Naga Hill districts, 431-434 & fn
- Nagaland, 434 fn
- Nagoke, Udham Singh, (VOL. 5, P. 19), 223-224, 345 & fn
- Nagpur, 358 fn
- Nair, Krishnan, 21 fn
- Nanda, Gulzarilal, (Vol. 9, p. 309), 45 & fn, 193, 499 & fn, 727
- Narayan, Jayaprakash, (Vol. 4, p. 305), 454 & fn-455 fn, 456 fn-457 & fn, 458 fn-459 & fn, 460
- Narendra Deva, (Vol. 4, p. 367), 48, 55 fn
- National Cadet Corps, 26 fn
- National Conference, Kashmir, 95, 229 & fn-230, 240, 293, 301, 415, 588, 591, 593, 725-726, 730 & fn; General Council of, 96 fn; 'New Kashmir' manifesto of, 229 & fn
- National Development Council, 703 fn
- National Herald*, 127 fn
- Nazimuddin, Khwaja, (Vol. 13, p. 235), 729
- Nehru, B.K., (Vol. 1, p. 283), 367 & fn, 373
- _____, Jawaharlal, 3 fn, 33 fn, 44 fn, 55 fn, 62 fn, 77 & fn, 87 fn, 117, 127 fn, 131 fn-132 fn, 133 fn-134 fn, 138 fn, 140 fn-141 fn, 145 fn, 151 fn, 155 fn, 157 fn-158 fn, 159 & fn-160 fn, 165 fn, 167, 171 fn-172 fn, 173 fn, 175 fn, 182 & fn, 183-184, 187-188 fn, 200 fn, 206 fn, 230 fn, 233-234 fn, 236 fn-237 fn, 238 fn, 241 fn-242 fn, 243 fn, 247 fn, 249 & fn, 251-267 & fn, 268-270 & fn, 271-272 & fn, 273-275 & fn, 276-278 & fn, 279 fn, 283 & fn-284, 285-287, 302 fn-303 fn, 304 fn, 311 fn, 319 fn, 329 fn, 331 fn, 336 fn, 339, 341, 349 fn, 358 & fn, 367 fn, 369 fn, 378 fn, 380 fn, 384 fn, 387 fn, 393 fn-394 fn, 395 fn, 400 fn, 432 fn, 434 & fn, 437 fn, 441 fn-442 fn, 444 fn, 452 fn-453 fn, 454 fn, 457 fn, 459 fn, 466 fn, 468 fn, 469 fn, 512 fn-513 fn, 526 fn, 534 fn, 537 fn, 557 fn, 561 fn, 581 fn-582 fn, 583 fn, 594 fn-595, 596, 608 fn, 615 fn, 631 fn, 637 fn, 655 fn, 674 fn, 684 fn, 688 fn, 697 fn, 701 fn, 703 fn-704 fn, 713 fn, 720 fn, 722 fn, 724 fn, 735 fn-736 fn, 739 fn, 746 fn, 749 fn, 751 fn, 756 fn, 760; report to AICC (6 July 1951) of, 17 & fn
- _____, addresses, AICC session, New Delhi, 174-178, a convention of Sikhs, 519-520, Delhi State Congress workers, 159-160, Subjects Committee, AICC, New Delhi, 208-209, U.P.C.C., Lucknow, 185-189; appeals, for subscriptions for election funds, 126, to railwaymen to give up strike, 451-453; delivers, Presidential address to the Indian National Congress, New Delhi, 210-222; drafts Congress Election Manifesto, 3-13, resolutions, on avoidance of war and preservation of peace, 597-598, on breaking down communal barriers, 207-210, on choice of candidates for elections, 33, on groupism in the Congress, 131; holds talks, with Frank Graham on his draft proposals, 248-252, 283-287, with Loy Henderson, 627-629; inaugurates Delhi Public Library, 520-521; issues message of the Congress, 207 and statements to the press, on accepting Congress Presidentship, 180-182, on Praja Parishad activities in Kashmir, 301, on resignations of Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and A.P. Jain, 134-135 and their withdrawal, 135-136; lays foundation stone of Vidhan Soudha, Bangalore, 505-508; meets the press, 182-184, 253-278; participates, in the debate, on the Draft Election Manifesto, 20-30, and on secular State,

419-420, in a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party, 161-171; sends messages, to All India Oriental Conference, 515-516, to All India Shia Conference, 759, to fourth annual session of the I.N.T.U.C., 518-519; speaks, from the ramparts of the Red Fort, 420-422, at the Congress Parliamentary Party meeting on Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, 363, while introducing election manifesto at the A.I.C.C. session in Bangalore, 13-20, while moving the resolution on planned economy at the Subjects Committee, 422-425, at an emergency secret meeting of the A.I.C.C., 172-173, at Ramlila Grounds, New Delhi, 61-69, at the meeting of Delhi State Congress Committee, 69-77, at public meetings in Bangalore, 311-317, in Delhi, 102-119, in Lucknow, 78-90, in Ludhiana, 90-102; speaks in Parliament, on Assam Bhutan Boundary, 508-511, on B.R. Ambedkar's resignation, 394-395, on collection of funds from industrialists, 124-125, on fast unto death by fifteen persons for formation of Andhra province, 439-443, on French and Portuguese settlements, 663-664, on Japanese peace treaty, 617-620, on Mudgal case, 735-740, on motion of thanks on the President's Address, 577-594, on observance of festivals, 760, on Part C State Bill, 529-530; submits report to the A.I.C.C., 399-418, and replies on the debate on the report, 419-420

—, On Abdullah, S.M., arrest of, 229-230, bid on life of, 348; Abul Kalam Azad, tours of, 677-678, 686, 695; administration, 401-411, 423 and A.D. Gorwala's report on, 379-380; adversity, 91; agrarian system, reforms in, 424; agriculture, reforms in, 408-409; agricultural classes, reservations for, 535; ancient architecture, 505; Andhra State, formation of, 25, 437,

447, and Government of India, 442, and Rayalaseema, 445-446 and Tamil Nad, 444, difficulties in, 438-441, 445, fast by Swami Sitaram and others for, 473-444, position of Madras city, 441-443, 445-446; armed forces, reduction of, 230, 236-237, 240, 320, 324, 336; Asia, awakening in, 65, India's policy towards, 86, 213, land reforms in, 215, U.K. and U.S. attitude towards, 258, 613, 692-693; Assam, air service to, 429, food situation in, 429, 489, earthquake and floods in, 346, 678, rehabilitation works in, 479-483, Shrikant's report on tribal areas of, 430-431; Assam-Bhutan boundary, rectification of, 508-510; astrology and astrologers, predictions of, 69-71, 83, 176, 359, 712; atomic war, 376; 'Azad Kashmir', Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's speech on freeing, 263-264, 278-279, 292-293, conditions in, 99, 279, 333, 590-591; backward classes, 526, 531; backwardness, India's drift to, 82, 94, 108-109, 115, 217; basic and key industries, 18-19; Belur, temple at, 505; Bengal (West), evacuation of Muslims from borders of, 360-361, situation in, 583; C.C. Biswas, functioning of, 361-362; black marketing and hoarding, 8, 421-423; Brahmin-non-Brahmin question, 113, 315; Burma, India's relations with, 19, 605-610, 614, 617-618, 638-639, Kuomintang troops in, and decision to move U.N., 294-295, 637-638, reparations from Japan for, 603-605, 607, 609, 612, 617, 638, 697, suggestion of joint conference by, 604, 608; China, India's relations with, 628, 643-644; communal organisations and parties, activities of, 34, 38-39, 67-68, 73-75, 80-81, 84-85, 88, 93-94, 112, 115, 164, 168, 188, Hindu *rashtra* demand by, 96, 115, 117, 187, support and sympathy of jagirdars, zamindars and princes to, 115-116, 466, 725;

communalism, 67, 73-75, 80, 85-86, 92-94, 96-97, 112, 115, 117-118, 168, 174, 185-186, 188-189, 191, 199, 204, 207, 218-220, 315-316, 346, 414-415, 467, 582, 591, 593, and India's image abroad, 693-694, and Mahatma Gandhi, 218, in Pakistan, 93, 218, 582; communalists, activities of, 85, 187, 191, 194, 314, 417, 466; communism, 88, 186, 406, 612; Communist Party of India, 50, 88, 174, 269, 417, 465-467, 469-472, change in policy of, 471, release of detenus of, 470-472, violence by, 102, 465, 472; Congress Party, and communal parties, 38-39, 164, and communalism, 73-74, 112, 174, and constructive work, 183-184, and elections, 35, 62-63, 101, 119, 131, 177, 185-186, 273, and election manifesto, 3-20, 24, 30, 33, 177, 202, 204, 220, 422, 679-680, and J.B. Kripalani's Krishak Mazdoor Praja Party, 153, and planning, 19, and policy on basic industries, 5-6, and Socialist Party, 153, 198, approach of, 418, 679, complaints against, 131, 147, 189, 205-206, cooperative commonwealth goal of, 4, 20-21, differences with P.D. Tandon and resignation from Working Committee and Parliamentary Board of, 152, 155-160, 162, 166, 168, 172-173, 701-702 and assumption of Presidentship of, 100-101, 106, 119, 175, 180, 182, 199, 210 and combining two offices of President and Prime Minister, 268-269, 273, disapproval of Ministers joining opposition, 146, 148, factionalism and indiscipline in, 37, 69, 89, 101, 131, 135, 177, 180, 189, 207, 222, formation of new Working Committee of, 178-179, internal developments in, 153-154, 156, 159-163, 165-171, 173-175, 179-181, 185-186, 190, 201-202, 205, 244, 270-271, 700-701, 712, in U.P., 267, invitation to seceders to rejoin, 38, 89, 119, 131, 174, 181-182, 184, 188-191, 193, 211,

271, need for revitalization of, 38, 171-172, 184, 271, principles and objectives of, 4, 19, 69, 86, 176-177, 204, 207-208, 210, 221, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai's criticism of, 206, resolutions at Ahmedabad A.I.C.C. Session of, 157, 164-165, 168, at Bangalore Session of, 157-158, 170, 181, 210, 271, at Delhi Session of, 203, 597, at Nasik Session of, 167, 210, 269-270, Report on Union submitted to, 210, 399-418, resignations of Rafi Ahmed Kidwai and A.P. Jain from, 132-139, 143, 145-149, 151-153, and retention of A.P. Jain in Cabinet, 149-150, efforts for withdrawal of, 132-133, 135-137, 141-142, 152, Tandon's reaction to, 138-142, 145, 148, social policy of, 4; Cabinet (Indian), differences in, 697, reconstitution of, 532-533, resignation of Ministers from, and their withdrawal, 532, 681, 697; capital formation, 7; caste system, 67, 85, 93, 219; cattle protection, 27; Chief Commissioners, status of, 529-530; China, cultural mission to India from, 712-727, India's relations with, 628, 643-644, 727-728, recognition of, 628; Christians (Indian), 113; Churchill, Winston, suggestion for a Middle Eastern empire by, 691; civilization, 212; cold war, 81; Colombo Plan, 276; colonial territories, upheavals in, 686-687; Commonwealth, India's association with, 414; complacency, 78, 208; controls, 7, 22, 27-29, 401-402, 410; cooperative farming, 16, 23, 27, 68; cooperative village management, 424; corruption, 9, 185-186, 411-412, Mudgal case of, 722, 735-740, Punjab cases of, 101, 688, 705; cow-slaughter, Bill on, 26-27, 490, 530; crude oil, proposal to supply to Pakistan of, 429; culture, and cultural activities, 9, 25, 113, 212, 220-221, 313, 316-317; Custodian-General of Evacuee Properties, position of, 478, 725;

customs, 412; Dalai Lama, return to Lhasa of, 647; Declaration of Freedom and human individuality, ideal of, 760-761; Delhi, condition of mosques in, 99; democracy, 76, 104, 135, 211, 407, 417, 506-508, 612; distribution, system of, 425, of essential commodities, 6, of land, 22-23; Dorothy Woodman, views on Nepal of, 545; economic development, 7, 80, 402, 408, 423; education, and learning through crafts, 9, place of classics and science in, 516; equality, 75; Europe, changes in, 82; evacuee properties issue, difficulties with Pakistan on, 535-536, laws for, 478-479, problems of, 475; electoral alliances, 205; electoral position, in Assam, 43-44, 50-51, 54, in Bihar, 56, 195-197, 199-200, in Bombay, 47, 55 and S.K. Patil's role, 44, 56-57, in Hyderabad, 52, 201-202, in Punjab, 223-224, in West Bengal, 49, 144; family planning, 409; famine, threat of, 7, 723; Far East, situation in, 259, 607, 609, 616, 622, 629, U.S. policy towards, 613; fascism, 118, 219, 612; fear and fearlessness, 110, 212; festival holidays, 760; first five-year plan, dependence on foreign aid for, 421, implementation of, 681, report of, 14, 27, 63, 88, 119, 186, 216-217, 276, 334; food problem, 409, 579, 676, 685, 705, 713, 722-723, of Assam, 429, 489, of Madras, 490-491, 716; foreign policy, 12, 79, 214-215, 332, 412-413, 577-581, 599, 710; foreign possessions in India, 12, peaceful settlement of, 663-664; foreign services, 413-414; freedom, ideal of, 74, 104, 212; freedom of expression, 335; general elections, first, 33-35, 46, 62-63, 78, 90, 92, 101-102, 104, 119, 192-195, 203, 208, 211-212, 272, 297, 327, 416, 680, and candidatures of important contestants, 40-42, 44-49, 53, 56 of Speakers of legislatures, 226, 731, and criteria for selection of Congress

candidates, 34-36, 61, 101, 144, 177-178, 187, 194, 203, 207, 214, 224, 418 and Morarji Desai's views on, 56-57, and *fatwa* of *moulvis*, 222-223, and independent candidates, 40-42, and representation to minorities and women, 35-36, 40, and seats for Congress seceders, 36-37, attendance at meetings of, 724-725, collection of funds for, 124-127, 178, 193, 206, cooperation from Chief Ministers for conduct of, 717, guidelines for, 125, 717-718, issues and principles involved in, 61, 100, 112, 272, responsibilities of Central Election Committee and Pradesh Congress Committees in, 33, 36-37, 39-40, 225, role of communal parties, princes and zamindars in, 34, 39, 695, 724, suggestion of broadcasts by political parties, 123; Germany (West), rearmament of, 402-403; Halebid, temple at, 505; hard work, 20, 71, 83, 421; Harijans, treatment of, 110; Hindi, status of, 98, 114; Hindu Code Bill, 705, 715, 720, differences with Rajendra Prasad on, 377, 384-392, progress in Parliament of, 76, 111, 215, 277, 297, 378, 381-384, 392-393, 395, 719-720 and resignation of Ambedkar, B.R., 397-395, support to, 377, 379-380; Hindustani language, 515; human material, 14, 316; Hyderabad State, communal problem in, 52-53, 88, 201-202, 528, land problem in, 53, police action in, 236, suggestion for distribution of areas of, 25, 52; idealism and realism, 213; India, and South Africa, 630, 643, 660, agrarian system of, 5, 16, agricultural programme of, 7-8, bilateral treaty with Japan by, 2, 57, 144, 255, 616, 623, British policy towards, 109, 116, critical situation in, 158-160, 162, 400-402, 405, disruptive forces in, 13, 192, 207-208, 220, 417, 421, foreign policy of, 12, 79, 214-215, 332, 412-413, 532, 577-581, 599, 710, foreign propaganda of, 693-694,

freedom struggle of, 7, 3, 71, 694, glorious period of, 71-72, 106, movement of troops towards borders of Punjab by, 311-312 and Liaquat Ali Khan's reaction, 311, population of, 17, progress of, 6, 63, 93, 104-105, 399-418, relations with Pakistan, 87-88, 91-92, 104, 143, 167, 209, 221-222, 238-239, 313, 345, 347, appeals for easing tension in, 319, 330, 354-355, 357, a secular State, 11, 67, 207, 304, 332, 587, 693; industrial relations, 410, 518-519; Industrial Revolution, 212; industrialisation, 81; inequalities, removal of, 424-425; International Economic Conference, delegation to, 468; Iran, and oil dispute, 659-660, 677, 686-687, 693, 725, 730, India's appeal for peaceful settlement of, 659-660, nationalization of oil industry in, 706-707, U.K. and U.S. attitude to, 234, 340, 660, U.N. competence to settle, 660; irrigation and power projects, 7; Jammu Province, Praja Parishad's activities in, 96, 118, 239-240, 301-593; Japan, and Japanese Peace Treaty, and Australia's attitude to, 606, and Burma's stand on, 603-605, 611, 708, and China's stand on, 254, 603, 607, 609-610, 707, and Formosa, 607, and Indonesia's stand on, 611, 708, and U.S.S.R.'s stand on, 256, 603, 607, 609-610, 612, 616, and comparison of India's policy on Kashmir with U.S. policy on Japan, 623-624, and Korean settlement, 254, 609, India's refusal to sign, 78-79, 255, 258, 597-598, 603, 606, 608-609, 613, 619-622, 695-696, 708-710 and Japan's reaction, 710 and U.S. reaction, 616, 621-623, 628, 709, 714, need for preservation of peace in, 259, position of islands near, 254, 258, 619, 621, reparations from, 606, for Burma, 603, 617, 638, for India, 604-605, 638, for Indonesia, 611, occupation policy towards, 605-607, 614-615, 618-619, 622, 628, 707,

relations with, 9, 144, 255, 605-610, 614, 616, 618, 623, 714, S. Radhakrishnan's views on, 610, sovereignty of, 618-619, 621-622, U.K.'s differences with U.S. on draft of, 256, U.K. press on, 256, U.K.'s persuasion of India on, 612, U.K. and U.S. draft of, 256-257, 604, 607, 617-618, 695, Vijayalakshmi Pandit's views on, 612; Junagadh, merger of, 236; Kashmir, accession to India, 244, 290, communalism and national movement in, 229-230, 239, 333, 593 and Mahatma Gandhi, 94-95, 103, 229-230, conduct of U.N. observers in, 233, 339-340, 348, constituent assembly of, 96, 224, 246, 260, 264, 293, 296-297, 301, 323, 325, 347, 354, 590, and question of ratification of accession, 244-245, 252, 261, 306, constitutional position of, 266, India's help to, 238, 241, 266, Jinnah's attempts in, 229, Muslim League's attitude to, 95, 586, Owen Dixon's views on Pakistan troops in, 356, 589, Pakistan's raids and troop movements towards borders of, 230, 233, 244, 312-313, 318, 320, 322, 353, press comments in U.K. and U.S. on, 232-234, 304, 338, progress of, 99, 116-117, 264, 323, 333, role of Abdullah, S.M. in, 118, 587-588, 591, secularism in, 94-95, 117, 340, 587, 590, security of, 262; Kashmir issue, 86-87, 94, 99, attitude of and part played by U.K. and U.S. on, 232, 234, 298, 303, 323, 325-326, 338, 340, 353, Frank Graham's proposals on, 249-252, 673, 711 and arbitration on differences, 252, 281-282, 286, 308, and demilitarization, 250-252, 260-262, 265, 282-287, 290, 294, 300-302, 307, 713-714, 729-730 and plebiscite, 238, 247, 262, 290-291, 295, 297, 334-336, 598 and plebiscite administrator, 247, 250-252 and reaction of Kashmir leaders to, 287-288, India's policy of peaceful solution of, 13, 67, 266, 318,

327, 332-355 and Pakistan's war propaganda for solution of, 13, 87, 245-247, 303, 312-313, 324, 330, 336, 349, 594, suggestion of mediation by Asian countries on, 262, support of Muslim organisations to India's stand on, 594, U.N. resolutions on, 230, 232, 241, 260-262, 279, 287, 289, 294, 300, 308, 326, 335, 349, 357, 588-590; Korean issue, 580, 598, 609, 629, 677, 687, 696, 706, 710; Kosi project, and employment opportunities, 495, 497-498, benefits from, 496, finances for, 495-501, stages of, 496-500; labour legislation, 8; laissez faire policy, 5-6, 18; land reforms 9, 67-68; landless labour, 16-17; Liaquat Ali Khan, assassination of, 209; life, 27, 317; linguistic provinces, 12, 20, 24, 30, 437, Dar Commission report on, 437; literacy, spread of, 520-521; Mahatma Gandhi, Nirmal Bose's book on, 762, role and teachings of, 14, 66, 82, 92, 107-108, 110-111, 119, 188, 211, 213, 329; manpower, proper use of, 424; Menon, V.K. Krishna, advice to take long leave due to illness, 745-756; Middle East, and U.K. policy towards, 234-235, 304, and U.S. policy towards, 235, conditions in, 304; migrations from and to East Bengal and West Pakistan, 230-231, 327, 332, 337, 585; military training, 25, 26; minorities, 19, 115, 181, 412-420, 475-476, 481, 585, 594; Mishra, D.P., resignation of and reaction to, 183-184, 188, 267, 273; mixed economy, 408, 423; Mudgal case, 722-740; Mookherjee, S.P., speeches by, 74, 358, 583; Muslims, conditions of, 475-476, exodus from U.P. and Rajasthan of, 475, 481-482, 517, 715, 724, loyalty of, 704, treatment of, 476-478; Muslim League, 95, 315, British support to, 112-113, 234, violence of, 230; Naga Hills, and Phizo, A.Z., 429-431, 433-434, agitation in, 432, plebiscite for

independence in, 429, 434; Nagas, 429, demand for independence by, 433, compensation for loss suffered in wartime by, 430-434, 605; narrow-mindedness, 14, 61, 114; nationalization, 18-19; North West Frontier Province, trouble in, 729; Nepal, Advisory Council for, 545, 561, 563-566, 572-573, armed forces of, 570, Cabinet crisis in, 547-548, 562-563, 570-571, democratic government for, 566-570, developments in, 236, 555-559, 644, exchange of diplomatic representatives by, 548, functions of Indian advisers in, 547-548, 551, 553, India's relations with, 12-13, 236, judiciary and Public Service Commission in, 554, 566-567, 569, loan of Indian officials to, 551, 553, names for Prime Ministership, 563-567, 571-572, need for efficient government in, 549-550, 553-555, position of Indian Ambassador in, 547, of the King in, 546-547, 550, 564, representation of various political groups in Cabinet of, 564-566, 571-572, role of great powers in, 340, treaty of China with, 643; neutrality, 599; One World ideal, 213; opposition party, need for, 196; Osmania University, 514-515; parliamentarians, conduct of, 738-739; parliamentary procedures, slow pace of, 718-719; Part B and C States, changes in administration of, 10, 19-20, 24, 192, 412-413; Part C States Bill, 705; Pakistan, and canal waters issue, 335, 350-351, 367-373, 577, 581, 583-584 and evacuee properties issue, 231, 335, and Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, 363, and his outbursts against India, 247, 351, his peace plan, 356, communal principle of, 67, 113, 218, 234, 315, 332, 699, condition of gurdwaras in, 98-99, 345, 536, 591, exchange of territories and population with, 585, exodus from border districts of, 711-712, foreign propaganda by,

693-694, Hindustan Hamara Party of, 355, military conspiracy in, 326, 338, minorities in, 218-219, 704, S.P. Mookerjee's speeches on, 358, no-war declaration proposal of, 238-239, 246, 313, 335, 586, 593, presence of British officers in, 241-242, 278, 321, 326, 339, 351, 683-684 and British reaction to remarks on, 241-242, 341-344, 692, press statements on, 64, 237, 320, 352, 357, 362, two-nation theory of, 94-96, 118, 231, 315, 328, U.K. and U.S. encouragement to, 242-243, 347, 674, 690, 692, 698, war propaganda and preparations in, 63-66, 119, 221, 230, 233, 236-238, 242, 274, 313, 337, 350, 352, 422, 455-456, 592, 674-675, 681-683, 690, 697-699, 703, 711, 714, 723 and India's steps for self-defence, 64-65, 72, 79, 275, 318, 322, 324, 329, 331, 334, 337, 350, 354, 356, 683, 689, 698, 700, 703, and civil defence, 275, 592, 594, 689, 698-699, 703-704, warning against attack by, 65, 318, 320, 323; partition of India, 90, 218-219, 221, annulment of, 230-231, 414, 422; passports, impounding of, 525; Pepsu, communal tension in, 705; planning, 4, 15, 20-22, 88, 218, 425, approach to, 403-404, 408, dependence on foreign aid for, 421, 423, people's cooperation with, 88-89, social purpose of, 19, 21, utilisation of resources for, 18, 217, 423; Planning Commission, report of, 14, 23, 63, 88, 119, 186, 216-217, 276, 334, 404, 680-681, role of, 4-5, 45, 403-404; power blocs, 612; Press Bill, 276, 381, 514, 532, 705, 715, criticism of, 720-721; Press Commission, formation of, 253, 276-277; price policy, 6; private enterprise, 18, 218; private sector and public sector, 6, 8, 423; production, need to increase, 423, system of, 425; prohibition, 23-24, 27; provincial autonomy, interference in, 540; public health, 9, 17; Punjab, and refugee

problem, 90, 100, black marketing in, 705, complaints against State Government of, 101, corruption cases in, 741-742, Governor's rule in, 100, 688, language question in, 97, 519-520, progress of, 90-91, 483-485, role of newspapers in, 97, status of Sikhs in, 97; railway services, 8-9; Railwaymen's Federation, proposed strike by, 451-461, 675, 685, and Essential Services Ordinance, 456, 685, and food situation, 452-453, 676, and Jayaprakash Narayan's role, 454-460, and mediation by Prime Minister, 458, and possibility of war with Pakistan, 456, 458-460; Rajagopalachari, C., resignation from Cabinet by, 525, 532; Raju, L.S., case of, and role of Mysore judiciary, 539-541; recruitment to public services, 9; refugee landowners, proprietary rights for, 535-536; refugees, and Sri Prakasa's report on, 479-483, colonies for, 11, rehabilitation of, 3, 10-11, 24, 90-91, 151, 221, 480-482; religion, 107-108; resources of India, 18, 217; rights and duties, 14; river valley projects, 15, 89, 217, 495-501; rural economy, reorganization of, 424; savings, 7, 15, 217, 423; Saurashtra, agrarian reforms in, 727; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, advancement of, 10, 217, 534-535; scholars abroad, report on activities of, 527-528; science, 19, 212, 516; scientific research, development of, 7, 19, 84; Scindia Steamship Co., Government's dealings with, 511-513; secular State, concept and adoption of, 11, 67, 207, 304, 407, 419, 759; Sikhs, 520, 534, 536, 538; Sikh army officers, allegations of ill-treatment against, 531-534, 538; slogans, 92, 105; small-scale and cottage industries, development of, 5, 17, 23, 410, 424-425; social reform, 7, 76, 216, 419-420; socialistic pattern of society, concept of, 89; Sri Prakasa, report on

- rehabilitation in Assam, 479-483; standard of living, 8; statesmanship, 580-581, 583; state trading, 6; surveillance of students, teachers and management, disapproval of, 469-470; Tibet, Chinese action in, 628, India's attitude to, 647, Nepal's relations with, 647, vulnerability of India's border with, 541, 559-561, 726-728; trade union movement, 518; transport services, nationalisation of, 9; Tripura, conditions in, 526-527; unity (of India), 85, 93, 101, 113-114, 168, 219, 314-315; U.S.S.R. and issue of visa to *Pravda* correspondent of, 656; United Kingdom, policy towards Middle East of, 632, 655-656, 691; United Nations, role of, 23, 213; United States of America, attitude to Czechoslovakia of, 630-631, to Spain of, 611, search for bases by, 611-612; United States Information Service, activities in India of, 629, 631-632; Uttar Pradesh, conditions of minorities in, 362, 475, 570, language policy of, 517; Vanaspati Bill, 490; Vietnam, recognition of Bao Dai Government in, 651; village as a social and economic entity, 424; Vinoba Bhawe, walking tours of, 722; wars, 65, 79, 212, 214-215, 275, 401, 422, 579, 580-581, 585-586; welfare State, 406; wisdom from classics, 516; women, role of, 12, 19, 407; world situation, 72, 81, 211, 406-407; Zafrullah Khan, role of, 231; zamindaris and jagirdaris, abolition of, 5, 68, 115-116, 216, 403, 408, 719
 —, R.K., (*Vol. 1, p. 336*), 299 & fn
 —, Swarup Rani, (*Vol. 1, p. 1*), 315
 Nepal, 12, 87 fn, 236 & fn, 340, 495-497, 499 & fn, 501, 545-547 & fn, 548-549 fn, 550-552, 554-557 & fn, 559-560, 561 fn-562, 563-564, 566, 568-573, 643 & fn-644, 678, 708, 726; Advisory Council in, 545, 561 & fn, 563-565, 567, 572 fn-573; Cabinet of, 547-555 & fn, 556 & fn-557, 558, 561-564, 566 & fn, 567, 571, 643; Constitution of, 557; Foreign Office of, 556 fn; Government of, 236, 496, 500-501, 545 & fn, 547 & fn-548, 550-551, 553, 555, 557-560, 562-563, 565-566 & fn, 570, 572, 643; King of *see* Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah; King's Proclamation of 18 February 1951, 568 & fn; King's Proclamation appointing Advisory Council, 572 & fn
 Nepal Terai, 545 fn, 563-566, 571
 Nepali Congress, 12 fn, 545-546 & fn, 547-548, 555 fn-556 fn, 557 fn, 561 fn-562, 564-566 & fn, 567, 570-572, 726 fn
 Netherlands, The, 306 fn
 New Delhi, 39 fn, 253 fn, 267, 631-632, 655 fn
New Statesman and Nation, 278, 338 & fn, 545
 New York, 127, 298 fn-299 fn, 367
New York Herald Tribune, 277 fn
 Nijalingappa, S., 202 & fn
 Nilokheri, 11 fn
 Nimitz, Admiral C.W., 247 & fn
 Nimmo, Robert H., 231 & fn
 Nishat (Srinagar), 232
 Nishtar, Abdur Rab, (*Vol. 15, p. 212*), 237, 400 fn
 'No-war declaration' by India and Pakistan, proposal for, 238 & fn, 313 & fn, 318
 Noakhali, 762
 N.A.T.O., 696 fn
 N.W.F.P., 234, 237, 283, 337, 729
 Nu, Thakin, (*VOL. 4, P. 452*), 330, 491, 603-604, 606, 608 fn, 637 & fn, 639, 644, 726, 730
 Nye, Archibald E., (*VOL. 3, P. 5*), 326
 'One World', 213
 Orissa, 533
 Osmanabad, 52
 Osmania University, 54

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Other Backward Classes, 10, 117

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, 691 & *fn*

Pakhtoonistan, 692

Pakistan, 4, 10-12 & *fn*, 13, 24, 63-69, 70 *fn*-71, 72, 75, 77 & *fn*, 79-80, 85-87 & *fn*, 90-96, 98-99, 104-105, 107, 113-115, 117-119, 132, 141, 143, 153, 167-168, 173, 176, 188, 209, 218-219, 221, 230 & *fn*-231 & *fn*, 232-234 & *fn*, 235-236 & *fn*, 237 & *fn*-238 & *fn*, 239, 241 & *fn*-242 & *fn*, 243-244, 245 *fn*-246 & *fn*, 247 & *fn*-248 *fn*, 249 & *fn*-250, 251-252 & *fn*, 260 *fn*, 262-266, 267 *fn*, 269 *fn*, 273-274, 277-278 & *fn*, 279-283 & *fn*, 284-285 & *fn*, 286-289 & *fn*, 290 & *fn*-291 & *fn*, 294, 297-298, 300-301, 302 *fn*-303, 305 *fn*, 307 *fn*-308 & *fn*, 311 & *fn*-312 & *fn*, 313 & *fn*, 315-317 & *fn*, 318 & *fn*-319 & *fn*, 320 & *fn*-321, 322 & *fn*, 323 & *fn*-324, 325-329 & *fn*, 330-331 & *fn*, 332-336 & *fn*, 337-348, 349 *fn*-350 & *fn*, 351 & *fn*-352 & *fn*, 353-354 & *fn*, 355 & *fn*-356, 357-358 & *fn*, 359 *fn*-360, 361-363, 367 & *fn*-368 & *fn*, 369-370, 372-373, 400, 414-416, 422, 429, 453-458 & *fn*, 459 & *fn*-460 & *fn*, 461, 475, 478 *fn*-479, 481, 509 & *fn*, 517, 527, 535-536 & *fn*, 577, 581-582 & *fn*, 583 & *fn*-584 & *fn*, 585-591 & *fn*, 592-594, 596-598, 603-604, 608 *fn*, 612-613, 630, 673 *fn*-674 & *fn*, 675, 678, 681 & *fn*-682 & *fn*, 683-688 & *fn*, 689 & *fn*-690, 691-693 & *fn*, 694-695, 697 & *fn*-698, 699-700, 703 & *fn*-704 & *fn*, 706, 711 & *fn*-712, 713 & *fn*-714, 715, 723-724, 726, 728-729 & *fn*, 741 *fn*; armed forces of, 237, 246 & *fn*, 261-262, 278 *fn*, 281, 283 & *fn*-284, 285, 287, 312 *fn*, 320 *fn*, 330, 337, 350 & *fn*, 353 *fn*-354, 355, 357, 360, 400, 682-683 *fn*, 684, 703; Government of, 65, 239, 247 *fn*-248 *fn*, 250 *fn*, 252, 261, 277, 283, 289 & *fn*-290 *fn*, 308 *fn*, 312 & *fn*, 323, 326, 330, 334, 339, 342-343, 345,

352 & *fn*, 357, 362, 367, 371-372, 459 & *fn*, 466, 674, 681 *fn*-682, 684, 689 *fn*, 730; High Commission in New Delhi of, 348

_____, East, 10-11, 242 *fn*, 311 *fn*-312 *fn*, 313, 320, 324, 326, 338, 343, 352 *fn*, 415 & *fn*, 475, 481, 675, 703, 723

_____, West, 10-11 & *fn*, 242 *fn*, 311 *fn*-312, 313, 320-321, 326, 337, 343, 400, 415, 715

Pakistan Army, 241, 321, 326 & *fn*, 330, 335, 338, 340, 343, 684, 689 *fn*, 703

Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi, 348

Pakistan Muslim League, 349 *fn*

Pakistan Radio, 674 *fn*

Pakistan Times, The, 237 *fn*

Pakistan press, 237 & *fn*, 248 *fn*, 312, 319 *fn*-320-321, 352, 517, 697 *fn*, 714

Pandit, Vijayalakshmi, (*Vol. 1, p. 1*), 45-46, 127, 143, 153-154 *fn*, 198, 277 & *fn*, 297, 300, 599, 611, 614, 627, 632, 667, 745

Panikkar, K.M., (*Vol. 1, p. 384*), 144, 612, 643, 655 & *fn*-656, 730, 745

_____, Mrs., 643 *fn*

Panna Lal, 437 & *fn*

Pant, G.B., (*Vol. 3, p. 106*), 47, 53, 127, 198, 362, 517

Pardivala, H.R., 47 & *fn*-48, 55 & *fn*

Paris, 298 & *fn*, 302 *fn*, 306 & *fn*, 678, 695, 729, 749 & *fn*, 752

Parliament (Indian), 34, 46 *fn*-47, 53, 61 *fn*-62, 74, 104, 111, 143, 154, 162, 164, 168, 171, 175 *fn*, 199, 203, 208, 247, 253 *fn*, 297, 342, 348, 351, 354, 358 & *fn*, 377 *fn*-378 *fn*, 379 & *fn*, 381-383 & *fn*, 384 & *fn*-385, 386-387, 389, 392 *fn*-393, 394 & *fn*-395, 407 *fn*, 439, 490 *fn*, 508-511, 514 *fn*, 527, 529-530, 577, 579, 581, 584-586, 588, 590, 593, 604, 613, 617, 620, 627, 655, 668, 685, 697, 703-705, 715-716, 719-720 & *fn*, 721 & *fn*-722 & *fn*, 730, 735 & *fn*-736 & *fn*, 737-740 & *fn*, 760 & *fn*

- Parliament (U.K.), 241, 739
- Part A States, 10 & fn, 19, 509 fn, 540
- Part B States, 10 & fn, 19, 24, 412-413 & fn, 509 fn
- Part C States, 10, 19, 24, 412-413 & fn, 509 fn
- Part C States Bill, 379, 381, 527, 529 & fn, 704 & fn-705
- Partition (of India), 358 fn, 400, 414-415, 422
- Parulekar, N.B., 235 & fn
- Patel, Vallabhbhai, 162-163, 211, 400 fn, 402, 437, 583 fn
- Patil, R.K., (VOL. 12, P. 43), 44 & fn
 —, S.K., (Vol. 12, p. 503), 55-57
- Patna, 195, 417 fn, 451, 496
- Pay Commission, first, 451 fn, 460-461
- Peking, 616
- Peking agreement between Government of China and Tibetan delegation (23 May 1951), 647 & fn
- Pescadore Islands, 603 fn-604 fn, 609
- Peshawar, 350, 352
- Phizo, A.Z., (VOL. 15 Pt. II, P. 181), 429 & fn-430, 431-434 & fn,
- Planning Commission, 4, 6 fn, 14-17, 29, 44 & fn-45, 63 & fn, 88, 119, 186, 216, 275-276, 379 & fn-380, 402, 404 & fn, 423, 482, 497-499, 501, 680-681, 727; interim report of, 14 & fn, 17, 27, 276, 404, 680-681, 721
- Poland, 78 fn
- Pondicherry, 663
- Poona, 84, 235
- Poonch, 279-280 & fn, 350, 352-354, 356
- Portugal, 664; Government of, 663 & fn; Parliament of, 664
- Potsdam Conference (1945), 254 fn, 621-622
- Potsdam Declaration, 254 & fn
- Prague, 630 & fn
- Praja Parishad Party (Jammu), 96 & fn, 118, 240 & fn, 301
- Prakasam, T., (Vol. 1, p. 359), 182 fn, 447
- Prasad, Rajendra, (Vol. 3, p. 4), 141 fn, 377 & fn, 380 fn, 384 & fn-385 fn, 386, 388-389 & fn, 390 & fn-391 fn, 400 fn, 431 & fn-432 fn, 433, 693 fn, 703 & fn
- Pratapnagar, 11 fn
- Pravda, 656
- Press Commission, 253 & fn, 276-277
- Press Emergency Act, 720 fn
- Press (Objectionable Matter) Bill (1951), 276, 381, 514 & fn, 532, 705 & fn, 715, 720 & fn-721; select committee for, 715 & fn
- Preventive Detention Act (1950), 471 fn
- Prime Minister's Relief Fund, 26
- Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (Chester Bowles), 716 fn
- Provisional Parliament, 216 fn, 384 fn, 390 fn
- Punjab, 11-12 fn, 39 fn, 64, 66, 71, 90-92, 96-97 & fn, 98-100 & fn, 101-102, 114-115, 176, 223, 231, 320, 322, 324, 331, 336-337, 347, 368, 370, 372, 400, 412 & fn, 466, 519 & fn, 535 & fn-536, 591, 688, 705, 724 fn, 741 & fn; Cabinet of, 688 fn, Government of, 100, 371, 741
 —, West, 10, 63, 231, 237, 267, 368, 370-371, 591; Government of, 371
- Punjab Congress, 224, 412 fn
- Pepsu, 97 & fn, 192, 535 fn, 705
- Pyarelal, (Vol. 1, p. 261), 762
- "Quit Kashmir" movement, 230 fn
- Radha Raman, 23 fn
- Radhakrishnan, S., (Vol. 4, p. 564), 144, 468 fn, 610 & fn, 612, 617 & fn, 669 & fn, 745
- Raghavan, G.V., 453 & fn
- Rahman, Hifzur, 477 & fn
- Raiji, Jayashri, 48 & fn
- Railway, Ministry of, 458-459, 461
- Rajagopalachari, C., (Vol. 1, p. 350), 41-42, 123, 156 & fn, 244, 247, 280, 387 fn, 400 fn, 433, 465 & fn-466, 469 & fn-470 fn, 511 & fn-512 & fn, 514-515, 525 & fn-526 fn, 529 & fn, 532-533, 537, 656, 720 fn, 728, 762

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Rajasthan, 7 fn, 150 fn, 475, 481-482, 517, 535 fn, 724
- Rajpura, 11 fn
- Rajputana, 95, 715
- Raju, L.S., 539 & fn-540
- Rajya Sabha, 35, 224
- Ram Rajya Parishad, 39 & fn
- Rampur, Nawab of, 759
- Rana, Bijaya Shamsher Jung Bahadur, (VOL. 2, P. 473), 556 & fn, 558
- _____, Kaiser Shamsher Jung Bahadur, (VOL. 15 Pt. II, P. 393), 563 & fn
- _____, Mohun Shamsher Jung Bahadur, (VOL. 11, P. 377), 555 fn-556 fn, 557-558, 560-561 & fn, 562-563 & fn, 564-565, 571-572 fn, 573
- _____, Subarna Shamsher Jung Bahadur, 548 & fn, 563, 565
- Ranga, N.G., (Vol. 7, p. 534), 441 fn-442 fn
- Rao, A. Kaleswara, 24 fn-25 & fn
- _____, A. Kameswara, 443 & fn
- _____, B. Shiva, (Vol. 3, p. 345), 93
- _____, G. Bindu Digambar, (VOL. 11, P. 81), 201 & fn
- Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, 39, 73, 76, 84, 94, 96, 116, 150
- Rau, B.N., (Vol. 14, p. 559), 230 fn, 289, 297 & fn, 299 & fn, 304 & fn-305, 306 & fn-307 & fn, 323 fn, 623 & fn, 659
- Rauf, M.A., (Vol. 15, p. 296), 330, 603 & fn-604, 614, 638
- Rawalkote, 350, 352-353
- Rawalpindi, 64, 284, 291 fn, 330, 334, 337, 350 & fn, 363, 689 fn, 728 fn
- Rawalpindi conspiracy, 326 fn
- Rayalaseema, 443, 445 & fn-446
- Red Fort (Delhi), 704
- Reddy, K.C., (Vol. 8, p. 566), 539 & fn
- Relief and Rehabilitation, Ministry of, 401, 477
- Reserve Bank of India, 632
- Reuters, 234
- Roberts, F.K., 242, 341 & fn-342, 637 & fn-638
- Rome, 109
- Roosevelt, F.D., (Vol. 6, p. 10), 254 fn
- Roy, B.C., (Vol. 4, p. 230), 49, 132 & fn-133, 136-137, 139, 141-142, 146-147, 151-152, 160 & fn, 226, 274, 360, 532, 537
- Russia *see* U.S.S.R.
- Ryukyu Islands, 603 fn-604 fn, 609, 619, 621, 695 fn
- Saadulla, Mohammed, (VOL. 2, P. 172), 44 fn, 51
- Saharanpur, 142
- Saigon, 651
- Saikia, Akram Husain, 51 & fn
- Sampurnanand, (VOL. 2, P. 143), 127 & fn, 541 & fn
- San Francisco, 78 & fn, 253 fn-254, 605, 608, 610, 613 fn-614, 616, 669, 687, 709 & fn, 714; Conference (1951) at, 78 fn, 144 fn, 255 fn-256 & fn, 597, 615 & fn-616 & fn, 617-618, 620, 623, 707, 709, 714
- Sao Hkun Hkio, 604 & fn-605, 606, 608 & fn, 613, 697
- Sarma, Siddhinath, 50 & fn-51
- Sarwate, V.S., (VOL. 10, P. 330), 508 fn-509 fn
- Sastri, G. Sitaram *see* Sitaram, Swami
- Satyavati, (Vol. 14, p. 544), 203 fn
- Satyavati Nagar, 203
- Saurashtra, 7 fn, 386 fn, 723, 727; Chief Minister of, *see* Dhebar, U.N.; Government of, 727 fn
- Scheduled Castes, 10, 117, 394 fn, 531, 534 & fn
- Scheduled Caste Sikhs, 534 fn
- Scheduled Tribes, 10, 117, 394 fn
- Schmidt, P.J., 229 & fn, 245 & fn-246, 247 & fn-248, 249 fn, 251-252, 282 & fn-283 fn, 284-286, 300, 673 fn
- Scindia Steamship Company Ltd., 511; ships of, 513 & fn
- Sen, Sukumar, (VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 418), 718
- Setalvad, M.C., (Vol. 15, p. 86), 386 fn-387 fn, 388 & fn, 391
- Seth, Damodar Swarup, (Vol. 13, p. 618), 41 fn

- Shah, K.T., (*Vol. 2, p. 399*), 592 & fn, 735 fn, 738
- Shahrir, Sultan, (*VOL. 1, P. 485*), 103 & fn-104, 108, 643 fn, 726
- Shalimar (Srinagar), 232
- Shankar Lal, (*Vol. 3, p. 74*), 189 & fn
- Sharma, Balakrishna, 125 & fn
- Shastri, Algurai, (*VOL. 10, P. 200*), 24, 419 & fn
- _____, Lal Bahadur, (*Vol. 5, p. 164*), 52 fn, 205
- Shikoku, 622
- Shimla, 133 & fn, 142, 147
- Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 223 & fn-224, 536 fn
- Shrikant, Laxmidas M., 430 & fn-431; Report on Assam of, 430 & fn-431 & fn
- Shrinagesh, J.M., 546 & fn
- Shuster, William Morgan, 686 & fn
- Sialkot, 64, 330, 334, 337, 350 fn
- Siam, 295
- Siberia, 22
- "Sikhs in the Army" (an article in *Spokesman*), 531 & fn
- Sikkim, India's representative in, *see* Dayal, Harishwar
- Sind, 368, 724
- Sindri Fertiliser Factory, 403
- Singh Achal, 25 fn
- _____, Baldev, (*Vol. 14, p. 122*), 400 fn, 532
- _____, C.P.N., (*VOL. 11, P. 279*), 501, 545 & fn-546, 555 & fn-556 & fn, 558, 560-561 & fn, 562, 566 & fn-567, 568
- _____, Hari (Maharaja of Kashmir), (*Vol. 5, p. 467*), 95, 229 fn, 586
- _____, Hukam, 380 fn, 531 & fn, 533, 537
- _____, Giani Kartar, (*VOL. 6, P. 45*), 223, 534 & fn-535 fn, 536 fn
- _____, K.I., (*VOL. 15 Pt. II, P. 402*), 545 & fn, 548
- _____, Lakhinder, 538
- _____, Lal Awadhesh Pratap (*Vol. 8, p. 580*), 25 & fn
- _____, Mahabir, 23 fn
- _____, Mukhtiar, 125
- _____, Pritam, 538
- _____, Raghunath, 26 fn
- _____, Master Tara, (*Vol. 4, p. 572*), 192, 223-224, 536
- _____, T.N., (*Vol. 11, p. 568*), 663 fn
- _____, Yudhvir, 225 & fn
- Sinha, Anugraha Narayan, (*VOL. 15 Pt. I, P. 40*), 199 & fn
- _____, Raghavendra Prasad, 22 fn
- _____, Satyanarayan, (*VOL. 2, P. 17*), 195, 197, 382
- _____, Sri Krishna, (*Vol. 3, p. 420*), 195, 197, 199-200 & fn, 498
- Sinkiang, 730
- Sitaram, Swami, 437 & fn-438 & fn, 440, 442 & fn, 443 & fn-444 & fn, 446 & fn
- Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, (*Vol. 3, p. 265*), 30, 508 fn
- Socialist Democratic Party (Japan), 606 & fn
- Socialist Party of India, 34, 41, 48, 141 fn, 153, 188 & fn, 417-418
- Socialist Party of Japan, 710 fn
- Socialists, 50, 54
- Soekarno, A., (*Vol. 14, p. 452*), 616
- Somnath temple (Gujarat), 693 & fn
- Sopore, 229 fn
- South Africa, 630, 643, 660 & fn, 682 fn; Government of, 660; Parliament of, 687 fn
- South Sakhalin Islands, 254 & fn, 603 fn-604 fn, 609, 620
- Soviet Union *see* U.S.S.R.
- Spain, 470, 611 & fn-612, 696 & fn, 710
- Spanish army, 696 fn
- Spokesman* (New Delhi), 531-534
- Sri Lanka, 94, 678
- Sri Prakasa, (*Vol. 2, p. 203*), 43, 50 & fn, 193, 195, 203, 379, 479 & fn-480 & fn, 481-483
- Srinagar, 68, 231-232, 244, 280, 292-293, 296 fn, 675
- Srivastava, J.P., (*Vol. 13, p. 717*), 127 & fn, 198
- Stalin, Josef, (*Vol. 2., p. 397*), 254 fn
- States, Ministry of, 401, 539 fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- States People's Conference, All India, 229
- States People's movement, 415
- Strangling of Persia, The*, (William Morgan Shuster), 686
- Subhan, Mohammad, 299
- Sudarshan, Seth, 742 & fn
- Supreme Court of India, 216 & fn
- Swaminathan, R.V., 22 fn
- Swarup, Hari Raj, 124
- Switzerland, 753-755
- Tagore, Rabindranath, 72, 107
- Taiwan, 603 fn-604 fn, 677 fn, 695 fn *see also* Formosa
- Taj Mahal (Agra), 505
- Tamil Nadu, 114, 443-445
- Tamilnad Provincial Congress Committee, 441 fn-442 fn
- Tandon, Purushottamdas, (*Vol. 1, p. 127*), 28 fn, 136 fn-137, 138 fn-139, 140 & fn, 145 & fn, 151 fn, 153, 155 & fn-156, 157 & fn-158 fn, 159 fn-160 & fn, 165 fn, 172 & fn-173 & fn, 178, 194, 210 fn, 269 fn, 701 fn
- Tass, 656
- Tayyebulla, M., 51 & fn
- Teheran, 686 fn
- Tej* (Delhi), 359 fn
- Telengana, 88, 465 & fn-466 fn, 467, 722
- Tennessee Valley Authority, 267 fn
- Territorial Army of India, 26 & fn
- Thailand, 80
- Thapa, Vishwa Bandhu, 549 & fn
- Thimayya, K.S., (*VOL. 4, P. 13*), 305
- Thirty Eighth Parallel, 706
- Tibet, 23 & fn, 105, 116, 510, 541 & fn, 549, 559 & fn-560, 628, 643 & fn, 647 & fn, 726, 730
- Tibetan delegation, 647 & fn
- Tilak, Raghukul, (*VOL. 7, P. 379*), 198 & fn
- Times, The* (London), 232 fn, 256 & fn, 293 & fn, 302, 304, 624
- Times of India, The*, 611
- Ting state, 729 fn
- Ting Si-lin, 727 fn
- Tirtha, Ramanand, (*Vol. 8, p. 41*), 201
- Tithwal, 312 fn, 320 fn
- Tokyo, 146 fn, 255 fn, 614, 638
- Tottenham, Francis Loftus, 343 & fn
- Travancore, 48-49, 113, 275
- Travancore-Cochin, 62 fn
- Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, (*VOL. 2, P. 478*), 12 fn, 545-547 & fn, 548-549, 552-553, 555 & fn-556, 557 fn, 561 & fn-562, 563-568, 572 fn, 708
- Tripura, 465 fn, 526-527
- Tripuri, 11 fn
- Trivandrum Conference of presiding officers of legislative bodies, 226
- Trivedi, C.M., (*VOL. 3, P. 5*), 483 & fn, 688, 705, 741-742
- Truman, Harry S., (*Vol. 15, p. 297*), 409 fn, 458 & fn, 686 fn
- Turkey, 306 fn, 677-678, 686, 691, 695; Government of, 686
- Tyagi, Mahavir, (*Vol. 5, p. 211*), 134
- Ulhasnagar, 11 fn
- Umaruddin, Muhammad, 54 & fn
- Union Christian College (Alwaye), 49 fn
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 20, 77-78 fn, 81, 88, 186, 254 fn, 256, 306 fn, 468 fn, 595, 603, 605, 607-610, 615 fn-616 fn, 622, 624, 628, 655 & fn-656, 660, 678, 687, 691-692, 695 fn-696; Government of, 256 fn, 528, 632, 655, 686
- United Kingdom, 56, 84, 197, 226 & fn, 232, 234-235, 242, 254 fn, 256-257, 263, 292, 298, 303-304 & fn, 306 fn, 323, 325-326, 338, 340, 343-344, 347, 353, 387, 390, 466, 525, 545, 591, 604-607 & fn, 611 & fn-612, 614, 618, 659 & fn-660, 667, 669, 673 & fn-674, 686 & fn-687, 689, 692-693, 695, 706-707 fn; Acting High Commissioner in Delhi of, *see* Roberts, F.K.; Government of, 112-113, 232, 235, 294, 304, 322 fn, 328, 338, 340-341, 344, 353, 400, 538, 545-546, 617, 632, 659 fn-660, 673-674, 677 & fn-678, 681 fn, 684, 686, 690-691, 698, 707-709, 726 fn, 730,

- 753; High Commission in India of, 525; Labour Government of (1946), 677 fn
- United Nations Charter, 213-214, 598, 619 fn, 660 fn; Article 51 of, 619 fn
- United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), 230, 239, 252, 262-264, 281, 291 & fn, 293-294, 305, 323 fn, 335, 340, 349, 588 & fn-589, 682 fn, 714
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 520, 678, 695
- United Nations General Assembly, 298 & fn-299; Political Committee of, 580 fn
- United Nations Korean Commission, 580 fn
- United Nations Organisation, 23, 213-214, 230 fn, 232 & fn, 234 fn, 246, 248 fn-249, 250 fn, 252 & fn, 258-262, 265, 281-282, 286, 288, 290 & fn-291, 295, 302 & fn, 307 fn-308, 312 & fn, 323-326, 331 fn, 335, 339, 348-349 & fn, 350, 352-353, 356-357, 368, 584, 589, 596-598 & fn, 603 fn, 619 fn, 637 & fn-638, 660 & fn, 673 fn, 675, 681-682 fn, 686 fn-687, 696, 706, 723, 726 fn; Secretary General of *see* Lie, Trygve
- United Nations Secretariat, 675
- United Nations Security Council, 99, 143, 230 & fn-231 fn, 232, 234 fn, 238, 242, 244, 249 fn, 260 & fn-261, 262-264, 287, 289, 294, 296-297 & fn, 298-300, 302 fn, 304 & fn-305, 306 & fn-307 & fn, 311 fn, 313 fn, 323 & fn, 341, 358 fn, 368 fn, 589-590 & fn, 659 & fn-660 & fn, 674-675, 682 & fn, 691, 704 & fn, 713-714, 729 & fn-730; Resolution of 13 August 1948 of, 250 & fn-251, 261, 281, 286-287, 299 fn-300, 307 fn-308 & fn, 588 & fn, 713 fn; Resolution of 5 January 1949 of, 250 & fn-251, 252, 261, 281, 285-287, 299 fn-300, 308 & fn, 588, 713 fn; Anglo-U.S. Resolution (30 March 1951) of, 230 fn, 260 & fn, 289, 293, 305-306 fn, 307-308, 323 fn, 326, 589-590, 673 & fn; Anglo-American Resolution (10 November 1951) of, 729 fn; Resolution on Anglo-Iranian oil dispute of, 659 & fn-660
- United States of America, 27, 68, 72, 77, 81-84, 88-89, 97, 127 fn, 234, 242-243, 253 fn-254 fn, 255-256 & fn, 258, 263, 277, 292, 295, 298, 306 fn, 323, 325-326, 338-340, 347-348, 353, 409 & fn, 421, 458, 466, 468 fn, 498, 591, 595-596, 599, 603 & fn-604 & fn, 605-606 & fn, 607 & fn-608, 609-611 & fn, 612-614 & fn, 615-616 fn, 617-621, 623 fn, 627-630 & fn, 631 & fn 632, 633, 637-638, 647, 655, 669, 673 & fn-674, 678, 682 fn, 687, 692-693, 695 & fn-696 & fn, 707 fn-708 & fn, 709, 714-716, 726 fn, Ambassador in India of, *see* Henderson, Loy; Ambassador in Rangoon of, *see* Key, David Mackendree; Government of, 254, 256 fn, 338, 606, 610-611, 616-623, 630 fn, 632, 637-638, 673-674, 690-691, 698, 707-709 & fn, 716 fn; Mission in India of, 631-632; State Department of, 253 & fn, 611-612, 627-629, 632
- U.S. Armed Forces, 607, 610 fn, 623 fn, 710 fn
- U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 267 fn
- U.S.-Canada Commission *see* International Joint Commission for Canada and the U.S.A.
- U.S. Congress, 409 fn, 599 & fn, 709 fn; Loan Agreement with, 705
- U.S.I.S., 629, 631 & fn-632, 736 fn
- U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee of, 256 fn
- Upadhyaya, Surya Prasad, 548 & fn-549, 563 & fn, 565
- Upper House (Indian) *see* Rajya Sabha
- Uttar Pradesh, 11, 48, 53, 62 fn, 116 fn, 125 fn, 127 fn, 141 fn, 150 fn, 153, 267, 475, 517, 535 fn, 705, 719 fn, 723; Assembly of, 53, 517; Government of, 124, 541 fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- U.P. Pradesh Congress Committee, 38 & fn, 45, 90
- Uri, 312 fn
- Vaidya, Kashinathrao, (VOL. 4, P. 438), 735 fn, 738 & fn
- Vanaspati Bill (1951), 490 & fn
- Vellodi, M.K., (VOL. 2, P. 55), 528 & fn
- Venkatappaiah, Konda, 444 & fn
- Venkatrao, Kala, (VOL. 11, P. 15), 442 fn
- Viceroy's Executive Council, 127 fn, 399
- Vidhan Soudha (Bangalore), 505 fn
- Viet Minh, 651 fn
- Vietnam, 651 & fn; Government of, 651
- View from New Delhi*, A. (Chester Bowles), 716 fn
- Vijayavargiya, Gopikrishna, 24 fn
- Vindhya Pradesh, 10 fn
- Vira, Dharma, (VOL. 6, P. 395), 752 & fn
- Wadia, P.A., 468 & fn
- War Office (London), 303 fn
- Wardha, 722 fn
- Washington, 45, 198, 253-254 fn, 255, 627, 667; Indian Embassy in, 618; Indian Ambassador in, *see* Pandit, Vijayalakshmi
- Wavell, A.P., (Vol. 13, p. 185), 399
- Wealth of India* (P.A. Wadia), 468 fn
- Wells of Power* (Olaf Caroe), 234
- West Asia, 103 fn, 234, 303 fn, 329 fn, 596, 691 fn, 677-678
- West Bengal, 11, 62 fn, 114, 146, 150 fn, 230 & fn, 327, 337, 415 & fn, 430, 467, 481-482, 585, 675, 684, 706, 714; Government of, 527-528, 684
- White Paper issued by Government of India as a reply to the U.S. note of 26 August (30 August 1951), 253 fn
- White Paper on war propaganda in Pakistan (issued by Government of India), 274, 278 fn
- With Dr. B.C. Roy and Other Chief Ministers* (Saroj Chakrabarty), 360 fn
- Woodman, Dorothy, (VOL. 7, P. 265), 545 & fn
- Working Journalists Association, 514
- World Bank *see* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- World War I, 215, 605
- World War II, 3, 215, 401, 411, 430 fn, 659 fn, 689, 698
- Yalta Agreement, 622
- Yalta Conference (1945), 254 & fn, 604 fn
- Yanam, 663
- Yoshida, Shigoru, 256 & fn, 624, 710 & fn; Cabinet of, 623 fn-624; Government of, 615
- Yuan Chung-hsien, 89 & fn, 643 & fn
- Yugoslavia, 306 fn
- Zafrullah Khan, (Vol. 9, p. 394), 12 fn, 231 & fn, 237, 299 fn
- Zaheer, Syed Ali, (Vol. 15, p. 89), 400 fn, 678
- Zaidi, Col. S.B.H., 299 & fn
- Zamindar* (Lahore), 352 fn
- Zariff, T.M., 698 fn

During the four months from July to October 1951 covered in this volume, Jawaharlal Nehru strove for the maintenance of peace with Pakistan and had detailed discussions with the U.N. mediator, Frank Graham, on the Kashmir issue. On Graham's draft proposals, Nehru's view was that until Pakistan's reactions were known to such basic questions as the disbanding of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces and the stationing of forces on their side of the ceasefire line, the Government of India could not make any commitment regarding their own position. It was also made clear to Graham that the legal validity of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not open to question....

The approach of the first general elections had galvanized the communal parties into intense activity; and Nehru regarded this as threatening the unity, progress and stability of the country. He also sought to check the growth of reactionary trends in the Congress and, finding it difficult to work with the Congress President, Purushottamdas Tandon, resigned from the Congress Working Committee and the Congress Election Board. This resulting in Tandon resigning his own office, Nehru took over the presidentship of the Congress, drafted the election manifesto and secured its adoption by the AICC, laid down the criteria for the selection of candidates, and campaigned throughout the country....

In foreign affairs, India did not participate in the San Francisco conference for signing a peace treaty with Japan but decided to conclude a bilateral treaty with Japan and establish normal relations with that country....

Distributed by
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

ISBN 0 19 563681 3

